Scientists Link 2013 Gas Attack in Syria’s Ghouta to Regime Stockpile

Diplomats and scientists said that the chemical weapons stockpile of the Syrian regime was linked to the 2013 sarin nerve gas attack in Ghouta. (Reuters)
Diplomats and scientists said that the chemical weapons stockpile of the Syrian regime was linked to the 2013 sarin nerve gas attack in Ghouta. (Reuters)
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Scientists Link 2013 Gas Attack in Syria’s Ghouta to Regime Stockpile

Diplomats and scientists said that the chemical weapons stockpile of the Syrian regime was linked to the 2013 sarin nerve gas attack in Ghouta. (Reuters)
Diplomats and scientists said that the chemical weapons stockpile of the Syrian regime was linked to the 2013 sarin nerve gas attack in Ghouta. (Reuters)

Diplomats and scientists announced that the chemical weapons stockpile of the Syrian regime was linked to the largest sarin nerve gas attack in the war.

Laboratory tests confirmed the findings, supporting claims that the regime of Bashar Assad was behind the August 21, 2013 attack in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta, said an exclusive Reuters report.

Laboratories working for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons compared samples taken by a UN mission in Ghouta after the attack, when hundreds of civilians died of sarin gas poisoning, to chemicals handed over by Damascus for destruction in 2014.

The tests found “markers” in samples taken at Ghouta and at the sites of two other nerve agent attacks, in the towns of Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib governorate on April 4, 2017 and Khan al-Assal, Aleppo, in March 2013, two people involved in the process said.

“We compared Khan Sheikhoun, Khan al-Assal, Ghouta,” said one source who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the findings. “There were signatures in all three of them that matched.”

The same test results were the basis for a report by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in October which said the regime was responsible for the Khan Sheikhoun attack, which killed dozens.

The findings on Ghouta, whose details were confirmed to Reuters by two separate diplomatic sources, were not released in the October report to the UN Security Council because they were not part of the team’s mandate.

They will nonetheless bolster claims by the United States, Britain and other Western powers that Assad’s regime still possesses and uses banned munitions in violation of several Security Council resolutions and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The OPCW declined to comment. Syria has repeatedly denied using chemical weapons in the conflict now in its seventh year and has blamed the chemical attacks in the rebel-held territory of Ghouta on the insurgents themselves.

Russia has also denied that Syrian regime forces have carried out chemical attacks and has questioned the reliability of the OCPW inquiries. Officials in Moscow have said the rebels staged the attacks to discredit the Assad regime and whip up international condemnation.

Under a US-Russian deal after the Ghouta attack in 2013, Damascus joined the OPCW and agreed to permanently eliminate its chemical weapons program, including destroying a 1,300-ton stockpile of industrial precursors that has now been linked to the Ghouta attack.

But inspectors have found proof of an ongoing chemical weapons program in Syria, including the systematic use of chlorine barrel bombs and sarin, which they say was ordered at the highest levels of regime.

“A match of samples from the 2013 Ghouta attacks to tests of chemicals in the Syrian stockpile is the equivalent of DNA evidence: definitive proof,” said Amy Smithson, a US nonproliferation expert.

She and other sources familiar with the matter said it would have been virtually impossible for the rebels to carry out a coordinated, large-scale strike with poisonous munitions, even if they had been able to steal the chemicals from the regime’s stockpile.

“I don’t think there is a cat in hell’s chance that rebels or ISIS were responsible for the Ghouta attack,” said Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, an independent specialist in biological and chemical weapons.

The UN-OPCW inquiry, which was disbanded in November after being blocked by Syria’s ally Russia at the UN Security Council, also found that ISIS had used the less toxic blistering agent sulfur mustard gas on a small scale in Syria.

The Ghouta attack, by comparison, was textbook chemical warfare, Smithson and de Bretton-Gordon said, perfectly executed by forces trained to handle sarin, a toxin which is more difficult to use because it must be mixed just before delivery.



Three Deadly Attacks on Health Centers in Sudan's South Kordofan in Past Week, Says WHO

Sudanese families prepare to ride on trucks while on their way to Egypt through the Qustul border, after the crisis in Sudan's capital Khartoum, in the Sudanese city of Wadi Halfa, Sudan May 1, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese families prepare to ride on trucks while on their way to Egypt through the Qustul border, after the crisis in Sudan's capital Khartoum, in the Sudanese city of Wadi Halfa, Sudan May 1, 2023. (Reuters)
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Three Deadly Attacks on Health Centers in Sudan's South Kordofan in Past Week, Says WHO

Sudanese families prepare to ride on trucks while on their way to Egypt through the Qustul border, after the crisis in Sudan's capital Khartoum, in the Sudanese city of Wadi Halfa, Sudan May 1, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese families prepare to ride on trucks while on their way to Egypt through the Qustul border, after the crisis in Sudan's capital Khartoum, in the Sudanese city of Wadi Halfa, Sudan May 1, 2023. (Reuters)

Sudan's South Kordofan region has seen attacks on three health facilities in the past week alone, leaving more than 30 dead, the World Health Organization said Sunday, AFP reported.

"Sudan's health system is under attack again," WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said on X, pointing out that, since February 3, "three health facilities were attacked in South Kordofan, in a region already suffering acute malnutrition".


Killing of Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi Raises Succession Questions in September Current

Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi (file photo, Reuters)
Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi (file photo, Reuters)
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Killing of Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi Raises Succession Questions in September Current

Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi (file photo, Reuters)
Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi (file photo, Reuters)

Since the killing of Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi, son of Libya’s late leader Moammar Gadhafi, in the western Libyan city of Zintan last Tuesday, urgent questions have surfaced over who might succeed him in leading the political current he represented.

The questions reflect Seif al-Islam’s symbolic status among supporters of the former regime, known as the September Current, a reference to backers of the September 1 Revolution led by Moammar Gadhafi in 1969.

Search for new leadership

Othman Barka, a leading figure in the National Current that backed Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi, said supporters of the former regime had yet to agree on a new leader but retained the organizational and political capacity to overcome the current phase and later move toward an alternative leadership framework.

Barka told Asharq Al-Awsat that ties to Gadhafi and his sons had been both emotional and political, but said that what he described as national work would continue. He said organized efforts would be made to reach a new leadership after the repercussions of the killing were overcome.

It remains unclear how Ahmed Gaddaf al-Dam, the political official in the Libyan National Struggle Front and one of the most prominent figures of the former regime, views the future leadership of the September Current following Seif al-Islam’s killing.

Sources close to him told Asharq Al-Awsat it was too early to speak of a new leadership while mourning ceremonies continued in Bani Walid.

Gaddaf al-Dam limited his public response to reposting a statement by those describing themselves as supporters of the Jamahiriya system on his Facebook page. He stressed unity, saying the killing would not lead to the fragmentation of the current and that September supporters remained a single, solid bloc.

In Bani Walid in western Libya, where Seif al-Islam was buried on Friday, shock was evident in the tone of Libyan activist Hamid Gadhafi, a member of the late leader’s tribe. He told Asharq Al-Awsat that clarity over the future leadership would emerge after about 10 days.

Possible successors

Libyan social media pages circulated the names of potential successors, including Seif al-Islam’s sister, Aisha, and his brother, Saadi. Libyan political analyst Ibrahim Belqasem rejected that view, telling Asharq Al-Awsat that the only remaining driver for supporters of the former regime would be the emergence of an unexpected, nonpolitical figure, describing it as an attempt to rescue the current.

After the fall of Gadhafi’s rule in 2011, following 42 years in power since the 1969 revolution, his supporters reemerged under the banner of the September Current. They are popularly known as the Greens, a reference to the Green Book.

Fragmented components and the absence of unified leadership mark the September Current. Seif al-Islam was widely seen as a central symbol among supporters, as well as among political figures and groups calling for the reintegration of former regime supporters into political life and for the recognition of their rights.

Nasser Saeed, spokesman for the Libyan Popular National Movement, one of the political arms of former regime supporters, said he expected a national political leadership to take shape in the coming phase to continue what he described as national work until the country stabilizes. Libyans can determine their future.

He said the emergence of a new leader or symbol was a matter for a later stage, stressing that the project was ideological rather than tied to individuals.

Saeed told Asharq Al-Awsat that Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi’s legacy lay in a unifying national project that rejected foreign intervention and sought to restore sovereignty and stability. He said Seif al-Islam had represented hope for overcoming the crisis and that his project extended the path of the September Revolution as a liberation choice that still retained supporters.

Structural challenges

Organizationally, the former regime cannot be confined to a single political framework. Its structures and leadership are diverse, including independent organizations and figures.

Among the most prominent are the Libyan Popular National Movement, founded in 2012, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Libya, formed in 2016 by politicians and tribal leaders in support of Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi.

Their representatives increased their presence after 2020, whether in the Geneva forum that led to the formation of the Government of National Unity or in UN-sponsored structured dialogue tracks, before suspending participation following Seif al-Islam’s killing.

Voices within the September Current believe the killing marked a decisive turning point that cast heavy shadows over the ability of former regime supporters to forge unified leadership, citing structural difficulties rooted in historical disagreements between what is known as the old guard and supporters of change led by Seif al-Islam.

Khaled al-Hijazi, a prominent political activist in the September Current, agreed with that assessment, saying Seif al-Islam’s symbolic role had helped balance internal disputes due to his reformist project before the February 17 uprising.

Al-Hijazi told Asharq Al-Awsat that the loss of that symbolism could revive old divisions and complicate efforts to recreate an inclusive leadership, amid internal and external factors that make unification highly complex in the foreseeable future.

Barka said differences were natural, stressing that the current was not a closed party and believed in democracy and pluralism. He said generational competition did not amount to conflict and noted there had been no violent clashes between supporters of different paths within the September Current.

He concluded by saying that the diversity of approaches served a single goal: the freedom and prosperity of Libyan citizens and the building of a sovereign state capable of overcoming the crisis that has persisted since 2011.


Hezbollah Overhaul Gives Qassem Tighter Administrative Control

Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, speaks to the media at the site of the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, in Beirut’s southern suburbs last year (Social media)
Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, speaks to the media at the site of the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, in Beirut’s southern suburbs last year (Social media)
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Hezbollah Overhaul Gives Qassem Tighter Administrative Control

Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, speaks to the media at the site of the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, in Beirut’s southern suburbs last year (Social media)
Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, speaks to the media at the site of the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, in Beirut’s southern suburbs last year (Social media)

The resignation of Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, a move that bore the hallmarks of a dismissal, has lifted the lid on a far-reaching internal shake-up of the group’s organizational structure after the heaviest blows it has suffered in its history.

The restructuring follows Hezbollah’s latest war with Israel, which decimated the group’s senior leadership, killing its long-time secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, his designated successor Hashem Safieddine, a third potential successor Nabil Qaouq, along with much of its military command.

Well-informed Lebanese sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Safa’s exit marks only the visible edge of bigger changes underway as the group moves to overhaul its leadership, security, and political apparatus in response to the unprecedented damage inflicted by the war.

Previously, that post led the organization without delving into the executive council's responsibilities, which function as a government-like body within the party.

Another key shift is the growing role of political figures in decision-making at the expense of clerics who had dominated the leadership in the previous phase.

New figures have also entered the decision-making circle, including individuals who worked with Qassem in the Islamic Daawa Party and Islamic committees before joining Hezbollah after its founding.

Raad seen as deputy secretary-general

The picture becomes clearer with the entry of Mohammad Raad, head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc Loyalty to the Resistance, into the party’s decision-making core. There is a clear trend toward appointing him deputy secretary-general.

However, the decision is unlikely to be announced before parliamentary elections. MP Hassan Fadlallah is expected to assume leadership of the bloc after the latest elections.

Fneish to lead the party’s executive council

Sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that former minister and MP Mohammad Fneish has taken over responsibility for Hezbollah’s executive council, where he is tasked with reorganizing the party’s administrative and institutional structure. Sheikh Ali Daamoush is handling operational and organizational duties within the council.

Internal organizational measures

Opposition sources familiar with Hezbollah’s internal affairs said Safa was among the first officials affected by internal organizational decisions that curtailed media activity. A directive from the secretary-general’s office barred him from making statements without prior approval from the party’s media relations department.

The same sources said the measures went beyond media restrictions and were accompanied by a noticeable reduction in Safa’s political role, including contacts with political forces and involvement in elections and nominations. According to this account, he has had no public presence in recent months as a political envoy, neither to allies nor rivals.

Redistribution of roles

Sources explained that the unit, previously known in practice as the Security Committee, had handled internal security disputes and field tensions within Hezbollah’s environment or with other parties, intervening directly before coordinating with relevant actors and later with Lebanese state institutions, including security and judicial bodies. It also followed detainee cases and brokered reconciliations.

They added that the unit’s head benefited from growing influence within the party, particularly after being pushed to the forefront in sensitive files such as indirect negotiations and prisoner exchanges, enabling him to build political and international networks, including external channels.

Limiting political authority

Sources tracking the organizational file said the expansion of this role eventually led the unit to exceed its strictly security mandate by performing political functions, including receiving delegations and relaying messages.

They said that after the current leadership took charge, clear instructions were issued to restrict the Liaison and Coordination Unit’s role to security and technical coordination only, barring it from any political, negotiating, or media activity.

According to sources, all political decisions and contacts are now confined to the party’s political leadership, specifically to Secretary-General Naim Qassem, parliamentary bloc head Mohammad Raad, or the secretary-general’s political aide, Hussein Khalil. The security unit’s role is limited to technical coordination with Lebanese security agencies.

Broader structural shifts

Observers link these changes to broader transformations within Hezbollah since Qassem assumed leadership. They note that the previous phase saw prominent roles for clerical figures in the second and third ranks, such as Hashem Safieddine and Nabil Qaouq, who Israel killed in the recent war.

The current scene, by contrast, is marked by the rise of non-clerical political figures, including Mohammad Raad, Mahmoud Qmati, and Ibrahim Mousawi, signaling a gradual shift toward reinforcing the party’s political character.

The sources said media affairs have been centralized under a single administration overseen by MP Ibrahim Mousawi, with direct coordination with the leadership, as part of a policy aimed at unifying messaging and restricting public statements to authorized figures.

War fallout behind Safa’s removal

Political analyst Ali al-Amin told Asharq Al-Awsat that Safa’s sidelining comes amid the fallout from the war and its direct repercussions on Hezbollah, as well as the impact of Iran’s retrenchment and ongoing US-Iran negotiations. He said the party has come to realize that what was possible in the past is no longer sustainable.

Al-Amin said the decision affects a body with both personal and institutional dimensions, noting that Safa is subject to US sanctions, making the move a clear signal that Hezbollah no longer enjoys the same level of control over security bodies amid US pressure and Lebanese state demands to dismantle the apparatus.

He said Hezbollah is trying to adapt to new realities, adding that acceptance of this path will depend on how the party handles implementation of the principle of exclusive state control over weapons.

He noted that recent statements by Mohammad Raad had a tone that could appear positive about weapons exclusivity but fell short of complete clarity. He described the current step as an initial practical measure whose impact will be assessed later, both at the Lebanese official level and by US officials closely following the Lebanese file.

Al-Amin said Hezbollah will continue, whenever possible, to present itself as a political party, even if only superficially, in an effort to project a peaceful, civilian image and show alignment with state institutions.

He added that any progress or disruption in US-Iran negotiations would be reflected in greater flexibility in the party’s domestic behavior, unless a decisive international decision is taken to end Hezbollah’s current status.

In this context, reports have circulated that Hussein Abdallah has been tasked with heading the Liaison and Coordination Unit. Abdallah previously served as Hezbollah’s security chief in southern Lebanon and is considered close to Naim Qassem. Responsibility for contacts with the state and abroad has reportedly been assigned to his deputy, Ahmed Mahna.

Party-aligned account

A source close to Hezbollah offered a different account, telling Asharq Al-Awsat that the measures affecting Safa are part of an organizational restructuring the party has pursued since the end of the war as part of a comprehensive internal review affecting multiple positions and officials.

The source stressed that Safa remains within Hezbollah’s organizational structure.

By contrast, Al-Jadeed television reported that Safa submitted his resignation as head of the Liaison and Coordination Unit with internal approval, citing deep disagreements with Secretary-General Naim Qassem, Shura Council member and parliamentary bloc head Mohammad Raad, and the curtailment of his powers.