Houthis Provoke Yemenis by Burying Sammad Near Saleh Mosque in Sanaa

Saleh al-Sammad. (Reuters)
Saleh al-Sammad. (Reuters)
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Houthis Provoke Yemenis by Burying Sammad Near Saleh Mosque in Sanaa

Saleh al-Sammad. (Reuters)
Saleh al-Sammad. (Reuters)

Houthi militias buried on Saturday leader of its council Saleh al-Sammad in the Sabeen Square, near the memorial of the unknown soldier and facing al-Saleh Mosque.

The Iran-backed group sought to organize a massive funeral for its leader, who was killed by a Saudi-led coalition air raid some ten days ago, in an effort to portray him before the public as a legitimate leader instead of a figure in a militia, which is not internationally recognized.

The location of the burial sparked widespread anger among the Yemenis, who viewed it as a “Houthi violation of the symbolism of the place Yemenis had chosen decades ago as a memorial for Yemen's unknown soldiers, who took part in the 1962 revolution that overthrew the Imam rule.”

Despite the large funds paid by the Houthi to their followers to participate in the funeral and the forced attendance of employees and students, the turn out was unusually slow because the majority of Sanaa residents, except those loyal to the militia, refused to obey their orders.

Mahdi al-Mashat, who was appointed as Sammad’s replacement as the head of the Supreme Political Council, was present at the funeral along with other senior leaders, such as the cousin of its leader, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi.

Houthi delivered a speech at al-Saleh Mosque before Sammad’s corpse was buried in a nearby location west of the mosque.

In addition to the militias' violation of the symbolism of the location, activists in the General People's Congress (GPC) noted that this same area was where the first shot was fired against former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, his relatives, party leaders and civilian supporters in December.

The former president was killed by the Houthis in December only days after he announced that he was severing his alliance with them and ready to open a new chapter in ties with the Saudi-led Arab coalition.



Lebanese Ex-FM Mitri to Asharq Al-Awsat: No Alternative to Resolution 1701, Even if It Needs Rewording

Lebanese Former Foreign Minister Tarek Mitri.
Lebanese Former Foreign Minister Tarek Mitri.
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Lebanese Ex-FM Mitri to Asharq Al-Awsat: No Alternative to Resolution 1701, Even if It Needs Rewording

Lebanese Former Foreign Minister Tarek Mitri.
Lebanese Former Foreign Minister Tarek Mitri.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 forms the cornerstone for any diplomatic solution to the Israeli war on Lebanon, despite the loopholes caused by repeated violations since its adoption in August 2006.

Although rapid developments and Israel’s policy of destruction across Lebanese territories have made it difficult to be “built upon”, Lebanese former Foreign Minister Tarek Mitri stated that it is impossible to agree on an alternative resolution due to the sharp divisions within the Security Council and the veto power wielded by the United States and Russia.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Mitri emphasized that there is “no alternative to this resolution, although it requires a new preamble and rewording.”

Ambiguous clauses in the resolution have led to its repeated violations by both Israel and Hezbollah, as each interprets the provisions according to its own interests.

Mitri, who was one of the architects of the resolution when he served as acting foreign minister in former Prime Minister Fuad Siniora’s government, pointed out that all Security Council resolutions contain some ambiguities, and a careful reading of 1701 shows that while its tone is strong, its wording leaves room for interpretation.

“The main problem with resolution 1701, which led to its varied interpretations, is that it calls for a cessation of hostilities rather than a ceasefire. There was also ambiguity, especially in paragraph (8), which discusses security arrangements in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line, making it free of armed personnel,” he said.

He also noted that the resolution was issued under Chapter VI, but the greatest confusion arose when it came to the role of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeepers, as they were given the authority to take all necessary measures to prevent any military presence or unauthorized armed activities, as if it were issued under the UN’s Chapter VII article.

“Unfortunately, these forces did not fulfill their role, and instead of being a monitoring and intervention force, they themselves have become monitored,” he continued referring to their being tracked and confronted by Hezbollah supporters.

The developments of the July 2006 war led to the adoption of this resolution under fire and the massacres committed by Israel. Mitri did not hide the fact that resolution 1701 was not thoroughly studied, and all parties were primarily focused on agreeing to halt hostilities.

He noted that the resolution “would not have been issued if the Lebanese government, under the leadership of Fuad Siniora, had not decided to send 15,000 soldiers to the South. However, for various reasons, Lebanon was unable to fulfill this promise, first due to a lack of resources and the army being preoccupied with numerous tasks, including maintaining internal security.”

Although the resolution has been subject to continuous violations, which the Security Council has frequently evaluated and warned against, it has remained a framework that regulates the security situation along the Blue Line, which separates Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories.

The former minister pointed out that between the adoption of the resolution and the cessation of hostilities in 2006, and Oct. 7, 2023, “Hezbollah did not initiate any conflicts, its weapons were not visible, and its military activities were absent. Hezbollah considered itself compliant with resolution 1701 as required, while Israel violated Lebanese airspace thousands of times, even refusing to provide Lebanon with landmine maps, which led to the deaths of dozens of Lebanese civilians.”

On whether this resolution is still viable, Mitri noted that the true intentions of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government are unclear.

“The Americans are warning Netanyahu against a ground invasion, but he claims he only wants limited operations to target Hezbollah, which is uncertain,” he remarked.

He also highlighted contradictory signals, such as when the Americans and French presented their proposal for a ceasefire, Israel resorted to a rapid escalation in Lebanon.

Mitri expressed concerns based on previous Israeli experiences, saying: “In 2006, Israel claimed its operations in Lebanon aimed to strike Hezbollah, but they destroyed Lebanon, and today they are applying the same scenario, even though they have avoided targeting Beirut’s international airport and refrained from destroying bridges.”

He emphasized Lebanon’s role in opening a diplomatic window, stating that the country has no choice but to implement resolution 1701 and be prepared to send the army to the South.

“Israel knows the Lebanese government is weak, and if it obtains a commitment from Lebanon to implement the resolution, it will demand even more,” he stated.

Although many believe that resolution 1701 is no longer the valid international course to end the current war in Lebanon, Mitri ruled out the possibility of the Security Council issuing an alternative resolution.

He argued that the Security Council may renew the call for its implementation with some rewording and a new preamble.

He also explained that the international institution is paralyzed, with the US and Russian vetoes preventing any alternative decision.

“If Israel makes military advances, it will close the door to a diplomatic solution. However, if Hezbollah manages to withstand Israeli intervention, it could open the door for political solutions,” the former minister concluded.