Tunisian PM Discusses Controversial Social Issues with UGTThttps://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2520366/tunisian-pm-discusses-controversial-social-issues-ugtt
Tunisian PM Discusses Controversial Social Issues with UGTT
Tunisians demonstrating in support of the protesters of El Kamour oilfield, near the town of Tatouine, clash with riot police officers on Habib Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis, Tunisia. Reuters file photo
Tunisian PM Discusses Controversial Social Issues with UGTT
Tunisians demonstrating in support of the protesters of El Kamour oilfield, near the town of Tatouine, clash with riot police officers on Habib Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis, Tunisia. Reuters file photo
The new Tunisian government is facing a set of controversial issues that previous governments have been unable to solve, including the protests of the mining basin in al-Gafsa, the disruption of phosphate production, and al-Kamour sit-in in the Tataouine region.
The cabinet hopes its current agreement with the leaders of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) will help find solutions to several pending issues.
The UGTT has announced its support for the government of independent experts formed by Hichem Mechichi.
Talks between the two sides have resulted in an agreement on the third installment of the wages of public sector employees. In addition, Mechichi reinstated UGTT’s former leader Mohamed Trabelsi as Minister of Social Affairs.
Trabelsi is the Union’s main negotiator in a number of meetings on social and economic issues.
The Prime Minister launched talks on Saturday on the disruption of phosophate production and transportation in the mining basin, and hydrocarbons in Tataouine region, stressing that the main goal is to find convenient solutions to these social issues.
He stressed that it is no longer acceptable to halt the production of phosphates and oil, noting that these protests damage the state's own resources.
Political analyst Jamal al-Arfaoui believes that the transformation in the relationship between the government and the Union is linked to the drop in state resources and the consequent severe economic and social crises.
He indicated that this led to a “compulsory social truce in order to save the situation in the country that is on the verge of bankruptcy."
In light of the recent situation, both sides realized that it is no longer feasible to rely on confrontation, according to Arfaoui.
The analyst added that the two parties have exchanged messages, and Mechichi asserted that the UGTT is a fundamental partner in overcoming social crises.
The Union responded by saying it was open to help the government overcome the difficult period, which yielded positive outcomes and could result in a real partnership to save the country.
He believed that the Union’s fear of the parliamentary alliance led by Ennahda Movement, Heart of Tunisia, and the Dignity Coalition might be among the reasons that pushed the UGTT “to the government's rescue and to extend a helping hand.”
Meanwhile, al-Kamour sit-in organized a meeting in al-Tataouine region between the government and the Union.
The meeting called upon the government to implement its 2017 pledges.
Tariq Haddad, spokesman for al-Kamour protests, asserted that the first and foremost goal behind these meetings is to defend the right to development, and to ensure job opportunities to the unemployed youth.
The Assistant Secretary-General of the UGTT’s legal affairs, Hafeez Abdul Hafeez, said that lengthy sessions, no later than October 15, will be held with the government to settle the issue of civil society workers after the revolution.
The Union is also expected to announce an increase in the minimum wage of private sector workers as part of efforts to improve the purchasing power of the poor.
A photo released by Iran's Nour News of a previous meeting between Khamenei and Sinwar
A compelling story is often enough to send a journalist in search of the man who carries it. The search becomes even more urgent when that man carries two. That was the case many years ago when I set out to find Anis Naccache.
As a young Lebanese activist, Naccache joined Fatah’s student battalion and later worked under the patronage of Khalil al-Wazir — better known as Abu Jihad — a member of Fatah’s Central Committee. My curiosity was piqued when I learned that Naccache had served as an aide to the famed Venezuelan militant Carlos the Jackal during the kidnapping of OPEC ministers in Vienna on December 21, 1975. The world had never witnessed an operation of that kind.
Carlos became an international celebrity, much to the annoyance of the man who had dispatched him on the mission — Wadie Haddad, the head of external operations for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. I suspected that speaking with Naccache might also open a path to Carlos himself. It did. But Vienna was only part of Naccache’s story.
When anti-Shah demonstrations erupted in Iran in 1978, Naccache obtained Abu Jihad’s permission to train Iranian opponents of the Shah in camps operated by Fatah in Lebanon. He would later go further. In an interview I conducted with him, he claimed that the idea of creating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was born during a meeting in a Beirut apartment attended by a handful of individuals. The idea was later conveyed to the leaders of the Iranian Revolution, who embraced it on the principle that regular armies could not be trusted.
After the revolution’s victory, Naccache traveled to Tehran.
One day, in a small gathering, participants discussed the danger posed by Shapour Bakhtiar, the Shah’s last prime minister, who was living in exile. Some feared that enemies of the revolution might rally around him to destabilize, or even overthrow the new regime.
Former Iranian Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar in Paris the day after an assassination attempt against him in 1980 (AFP)
According to Naccache, the idea of eliminating Bakhtiar was raised. He revealed that a revolutionary court had sentenced Bakhtiar to death and that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had approved the sentence without publicly announcing it, effectively transforming it into something akin to a fatwa authorizing his killing.
Bakhtiar was living in France under heavy protection. Tehran had not yet developed teams capable of conducting foreign operations. Naccache said he volunteered for the mission with a small group. He obtained Bakhtiar’s telephone number, called claiming to be a journalist seeking an interview, and was surprised to receive an appointment. He visited the residence, conducted the interview, and studied the premises and the vulnerabilities in its security arrangements.
On July 18, 1980, Naccache and his team returned to assassinate Bakhtiar. A reinforced door prevented them from reaching their target. The operation left two policemen and a French woman dead. Naccache was wounded and arrested.
Throughout the 1980s, Iran’s demand for his release overlapped with a series of kidnappings of French nationals in Lebanon by shadowy organizations seeking to exchange them for Naccache. After ten years in prison, France eventually struck a deal and released him.
When I asked who in Iran had known about the assassination plan, he replied: “I informed Mohsen Rafighdoost, who was responsible for the Guards’ administrative staff, and Mohsen Rezaei, a member of its command.”
The Lebanese-Palestinian-Iranian overlap would emerge elsewhere. Imad Mughniyeh — known as Hajj Radwan and accused of involvement in attacks against Israelis, Americans, and Arab targets — had for a time served in Yasser Arafat’s security detail before joining Hezbollah, the centerpiece of Iran’s project in Lebanon and the wider region. Naccache told me that he had personally trained Mughniyeh at the latter’s request.
Naccache spoke with fascination and confidence about the Iranian project, and I listened carefully. He said the region would undergo profound transformations and that revolutionary Iran believed its responsibility began with “liberating the Middle East from American occupation, whether direct or disguised.”
According to him, leaders of the Revolutionary Guards believed that “the American thread” was what guaranteed the stability and survival of many regimes in the region, and that cutting that thread would transform the Middle East’s map and balance of power.
When I asked whether General Qassem Soleimani belonged to this camp, Naccache replied that he was among its leading figures and was working systematically to undermine the American presence throughout the region.
“The revolution never concealed its desire to expel America from Iran and from the region,” he said. “The first message was the seizure of the Americans in their embassy in Tehran. The second was the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. Hajj Imad helped deliver other messages.”
He also argued that the program of tunnels, missiles, and drones was designed to reduce the strategic value of America’s regional allies by demonstrating that their territory was vulnerable and that alliance with Washington could not guarantee their security.
“If Israel is an American aircraft carrier,” he asked, “what remains of its prestige when every inch of it can be reached by the missiles of the Axis of Resistance?”
Naccache also maintained that Hassan Nasrallah’s personality had earned him the trust of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and elevated him to the role of a partner in shaping Iran’s Arab policies, particularly in countries bordering Palestine.
“Nasrallah and Soleimani,” he underlined, “are closest to the Leader’s heart.”
Perhaps the most striking thing I heard from Naccache was his prediction that “the major blow” was coming. “Sooner or later,” he said, “missiles will rain down on Israel from every direction. Many who emigrated there will regret their decision, and those doubts will open the door to the end of this entity.”
What I heard from Naccache was more explicit than what I later heard in the offices of Islamic Jihad, Hamas, or Hezbollah leaders, though it pointed in the same direction.
Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, the secretary-general of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, was equally convinced that the blow was coming. Khaled Mashaal was more cautious when discussing Iran’s role. Hassan Nasrallah, by contrast, never felt the need to conceal that Iran was Hezbollah’s principal source of weapons, funding, and strategic backing.
The historic handshake between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn following the signing of the Oslo Accords, under the auspices of US President Bill Clinton, in Washington in September 1993 (Getty Images)
Revolutionary Iran and the Palestinian Obsession
From the outset, Khomeini’s Iran sought influence in several regional arenas. None preoccupied it more than the Palestinian arena. Yasser Arafat, however, had no intention of placing the Palestinian cause in the custody of Iran’s revolutionary regime. Nor was he prepared to hand Palestinian decision-making to any power on earth.
To preserve the independence of that decision, he forged alliances, fought battles, and moved from one capital to another, resisting those who sought to turn Palestine into a bargaining chip in negotiations with the great powers. His long struggle with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad belonged to that category. “Palestine is a cause for me,” Arafat used to say. “For Assad, it is a card to be played.”
Arafat quickly concluded that the Iranian Revolution lacked what he described to some aides as “realism, careful calculations, and restraints.” He felt that some of its leaders were guided by illusions, particularly in their underestimation of both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Nor was he prepared to place the Palestinian revolution under the guardianship of Khomeini’s revolution. He sensed that the new Iran would soon find itself in conflict not only with its neighbors but with more distant powers as well.
Arafat’s appearance in Tehran six days after the revolution’s victory was historic, but it did not lead him to pledge allegiance to Khomeini as others did. He kept his distance.
When Iranian revolutionaries seized American hostages in the US embassy in Tehran, Arafat explored the possibility of mediation. Tehran rejected the idea. It reacted similarly when he attempted to mediate after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War. Iran therefore began searching for other Palestinian allies. In time, it also contributed to weakening Arafat’s authority. Then came a development larger than Khomeini’s Iran could comfortably tolerate.
On September 13, 1993, the Oslo Accords were signed. Yasser Arafat shook hands with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn under the sponsorship of President Bill Clinton. Arafat had unleashed a second geopolitical earthquake, the first having been launched by Anwar Sadat.
His legitimacy remained intact. His image was inseparable from the first bullet fired by Fatah in the mid-1960s, an act widely credited with reviving the Palestinian cause. Iran felt threatened. It feared losing the bridge through which it hoped to reach the Sunni street and mobilize it against the “Great Satan,” not merely against Israel.
Tehran therefore intensified its investment in Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Arafat’s calculations diverged not only from Iran’s but also from those of the so-called camp of “steadfastness and confrontation.”
The hostility directed toward him became intense.
During an interview in Damascus, Ahmed Jibril, secretary-general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command, accused Arafat of treason. I asked whether he had ever sent someone to assassinate him.
“No,” Jibril replied, “but every morning I turn on the radio hoping to hear of the birth of a Palestinian Islambouli.”
He was referring to Khalid Islambouli, the man who assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.
“I Have Lived Longer Than I Expected”
If Iran failed to draw Arafat beneath its mantle, it had greater success among Palestinian Islamists. Dr. Fathi Shiqaqi, the founder and secretary-general of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, opened the first window. The story began when Shiqaqi was a student at Zagazig University in Egypt. During the upheavals of 1978, fellow students asked him to prepare a ten-page paper on the events unfolding in Iran. The assignment captivated him.
He immersed himself in Islamic sources, Khomeini’s writings, and Muslim Brotherhood thought. He emerged convinced that the revolution in Iran was Islamic rather than sectarian.
Instead of a ten-page report, he produced a booklet titled Khomeini: The Islamic Solution and the Alternative. The booklet drew the attention of Egyptian authorities, who imprisoned him. He would later be jailed again and eventually leave Egypt secretly. He was arrested by Israeli authorities in Gaza in 1983 and again in 1986 before being deported from Palestine in August 1988.
The Israelis failed to appreciate that expelling Shiqaqi would strengthen his relationship with Iran and Hezbollah. Tehran welcomed him warmly. Khomeini received him in 1988 and pledged support for Islamic Jihad in both arms and funding. Thus Islamic Jihad became Iran’s first significant breakthrough into the Palestinian arena.
Ghassan Charbel, Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, during an interview with the late Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan Shalah in December 2002 (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Following the Arafat-Rabin handshake, Shiqaqi contacted Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, who would later succeed him as leader of the movement. At the time, Shallah was living in the United States and pursuing an academic career.
“The time has come,” Shiqaqi told him. Shallah later explained to me that the phrase signaled a decision “to go further in jihadist action.” The era of suicide bombings was approaching.
On January 22, 1995, Islamic Jihad carried out a devastating double suicide attack at Beit Lid near Tel Aviv, killing 20 Israeli soldiers. Rabin vowed to punish those responsible, even if they were beyond Israel’s borders. It was widely understood that he had ordered Shiqaqi’s assassination. Only days later I visited Shiqaqi in his modest apartment in Damascus. “I am still young,” he said immediately. “It is not yet time for my memoirs. We still have much work ahead of us.”
When I asked about Rabin’s threats, he dismissed them.
“I believe I have lived longer than I expected,” he replied. “The blood of martyrs produces more fighters and escalates the confrontation. We are not concerned by such threats. In the end, as Imam Ali said, destiny is the guardian of life’s appointed term.”
The phrase stayed with me. So did the feeling that our first interview might also be our last. Israel does not easily forgive those who target its soldiers. Mossad’s reach is long, and Rabin was not a man likely to leave such a challenge unanswered.
On October 26, 1995, Mossad found Shiqaqi in Malta and killed him as he returned from Libya.
Ramadan Shallah later told me that Israeli intelligence had penetrated Libyan security and discovered the alias Shiqaqi was using: Ibrahim al-Shawish, a secret known only to Shiqaqi and Shallah.
Hassan Nasrallah and Ali Khamenei (Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader)
"If He Lives, He Will Become the Khomeini of the Arabs"
In Beirut, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah learned of Shiqaqi's assassination and immediately traveled to Damascus. He met Shallah and advised the movement to select a new secretary-general, just as Hezbollah had done after Israel assassinated its secretary-general Abbas al-Musawi, and to announce the successor's name in the statement mourning the previous leader.
According to Shallah, Nasrallah argued that doing so would help preserve the morale of the resistance camp. But, he added, Nasrallah did not interfere in the selection process itself, as that was an internal Islamic Jihad matter and the movement's allies trusted its choices.
Shallah also recalled that Shiqaqi greatly admired Nasrallah: "I was visiting Beirut at the end of 1989 when Dr. Fathi, may he rest in peace, returned from a Hezbollah event at which Nasrallah had spoken. At the time, Nasrallah was not yet secretary-general but a resistance official. Dr. Fathi spoke about him with tremendous admiration. I expressed surprise at the extent of his admiration, and in the presence of several brothers he said: 'If this man lives long enough, he will become the Khomeini of the Arabs.'"
I asked Shallah which model Palestinian factions drew upon when they began carrying out suicide operations. He replied that they had been inspired by the model pioneered by the Lebanese resistance when Abu Zaynab carried out the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut.
Hamas and the Road to Tehran
Despite Iran’s successes with Islamic Jihad, its greatest achievement was drawing Hamas into its regional program, exploiting the movement’s need for weapons and funding. Tehran had long sought an opening. Israel inadvertently provided one.
In late 1992, after members of the Qassam Brigades kidnapped and killed an Israeli officer, Israel deported roughly 415 Palestinian activists from Gaza and the West Bank, most of them affiliated with Hamas. Among them were future leaders such as Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi and Ismail Haniyeh.
Lebanon refused to receive them, and the deportees remained for months in the border area of Marj al-Zohour, transforming their tent encampment into a center for meetings, prayers, lectures, and solidarity visits.
The Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah quickly seized the opportunity. They supplied food, medicine, and shelter. As relationships developed, they trained some of the deportees in explosives, secure communications, and combat tactics. Iran saw in Hamas a prize far larger than Islamic Jihad because of its much broader popular base. The relationship did not begin smoothly.
Some Hamas figures remained wary of Iran because of Sunni-Shiite sensitivities. Others hesitated to accept Iranian funding for fear that it would tie the movement to a political agenda rooted in Iran’s revolutionary worldview.
Over time, those reservations faded. Iranian support became institutionalized. When Hamas seized control of Gaza in June 2007 and expelled the Palestinian Authority, Tehran and Hezbollah recognized a major opportunity.
For Soleimani and Nasrallah, an autonomous Gaza offered the possibility of integrating Hamas into the concept of the “unity of fronts” and preparing it to participate in the long-awaited “major blow.”
The relationship would face serious tests, particularly after Hamas leaders left Syria rather than support Bashar al-Assad’s campaign against the uprising. Iranian and Syrian circles attacked Khaled Mashaal, accusing him of abandoning the resistance camp.
Iran reduced its support, though it never entirely severed assistance to the Qassam Brigades. Differences also emerged over Iran’s role in Yemen and allegations of Shiite proselytization there.
Yet Soleimani and Nasrallah remained committed to preserving the Palestinian component of the Axis of Resistance.
Gradually, relations recovered. Soleimani rewarded Hamas with an extensive program of financing, weapons transfers, local arms production inside Gaza, and advanced training. In 2012, Yahya Sinwar — released from an Israeli prison the previous year — was elected to Hamas’ political leadership in Gaza. Five years later he became head of the movement in the territory.
That same year, Ismail Haniyeh succeeded Khaled Mashaal as chairman of Hamas’ Political Bureau after Mashaal had held the post for twenty-one years.
The military wing gained increasing influence, particularly through Sinwar’s close relationship with the Qassam Brigades and their commander, Mohammed Deif.
An Iranian woman holds a poster featuring Ismail Haniyeh during his funeral procession in Tehran. The poster also depicts Qassem Soleimani, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Fathi Shiqaqi, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Imad Mughniyeh and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (AFP).
Sinwar’s Flood
On October 7, 2023, Sinwar and Deif realized their ambition. They launched what they called “Al-Aqsa Flood.” The following day, Hezbollah found itself under pressure to respond to the message sent by the architects of the operation and joined what it termed the campaign to support Gaza.
The world was startled by Israel’s vulnerability in the opening hours, especially after it became clear that the attack had left more than a thousand Israelis dead and scores taken hostage. But after the initial shock, Israel’s war machine awakened and opened multiple fronts.
Benjamin Netanyahu viewed the operation as bearing unmistakable Iranian fingerprints. The retaliation was severe, from Hezbollah in Lebanon all the way to Iran’s Supreme Leader himself. Sinwar’s Flood altered the face of Gaza and Lebanon. It also contributed to the downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
For the first time, American strikes hit Iranian nuclear facilities. Israeli aircraft dominated the skies over Tehran, while Iranian missiles struck targets inside Israel.
The Iranian roar eventually erupted into war, one that unsettled the region, rattled the global economy, and whose consequences remain unresolved.
Egyptian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Syria Nominates New Ambassador Instead of Al-Ahmad, Approval Under Wayhttps://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5281104-egyptian-official-asharq-al-awsat-syria-nominates-new-ambassador-instead-al
Egyptian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Syria Nominates New Ambassador Instead of Al-Ahmad, Approval Under Way
Egyptian Foreign Minister and his Syrian counterpart during a previous meeting in Cairo. (Egyptian Foreign Ministry)
The crisis surrounding Syria's nomination of Mohammad Taha Al-Ahmad as its ambassador to Egypt, first revealed in an Asharq Al-Awsat report published on June 1, appears to be heading toward a resolution. An Egyptian official source told Asharq Al-Awsat that Cairo has received the name of a new nominee from the Syrian side and is in the process of approving him.
Asharq Al-Awsat previously published a widely discussed report on what it described as "Egyptian reservations" that had delayed Cairo's acceptance of several members of the Syrian diplomatic mission. At the time, an informed source told Asharq Al-Awsat that there were objections to some members of the delegation, including Egypt's refusal to approve Syria's nominee for ambassador to Cairo.
The source explained in the June 1 report that the Syrian government had formally nominated Mohammad Taha Al-Ahmad as ambassador to Egypt. While the Egyptian government did not explicitly reject the nomination, it conveyed unofficial messages indicating that it did not consider him an acceptable candidate because of his political background.
Mohammad Taha Al-Ahmad currently serves as director of the Arab Affairs Department at Syria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. He earned a bachelor's degree in agricultural engineering from the University of Aleppo in 2007, a master's degree in the financial and economic evaluation of agricultural projects from Cairo University in 2012, and a doctorate in agricultural development from the University of Idlib in 2020.
He held several ministerial positions in the Syrian Salvation Government before being appointed to his current position at the Foreign Ministry in May 2025. The following month, he was appointed head of the People's Assembly election committee.
The Syrian foreign minister during talks in Cairo last month. (Egyptian Foreign Ministry)
Another Nominee
An Egyptian official source told Asharq Al-Awsat that "the Syrian government has submitted another nominee to head the Syrian diplomatic mission in Cairo," noting that "the process is moving toward approval of the new nominee by the Egyptian authorities."
The source said that "matters are proceeding normally and positively with the Syrian side," without disclosing the nominee's identity.
Since the fall of Bashar Al-Assad, Egyptian-Syrian relations have been marked by cautious bilateral engagement, driven by Cairo's concerns over the issue of armed groups, before gradually shifting toward economic cooperation.
In late April, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi met Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa on the sidelines of the Arab-European Consultative Summit in Cyprus. Media outlets in both Cairo and Damascus reported at the time that the two presidents held a "cordial discussion" on regional developments and ways to strengthen cooperation.
While the Egyptian source declined to reveal the name of the new nominee to head Syria's diplomatic mission in Cairo, Firas Al-Khalidi, coordinator of the Cairo Platform, a member of Syria's Constitutional Committee and a member of the Syrian Negotiations Commission, said that "the Syrian side has nominated Yahya Diab, a former diplomat who defected from Bashar Al-Assad's regime, as ambassador to Cairo."
Al-Khalidi told Asharq Al-Awsat that "the Egyptian side has accepted Diab's nomination to head the Syrian mission in Cairo."
The crisis over Syria's ambassadorial nomination to Cairo appears to be heading toward a resolution. (Egyptian Foreign Ministry)
Cautious Relations
Former Egyptian assistant foreign minister Ambassador Hussein Haridy said that "the Egyptian government has the right to reject any nominee to head a diplomatic mission, or any other diplomat, if it possesses information indicating that the nominee engaged in activities affecting its national security."
Haridy told Asharq Al-Awsat that "the Syrian side publicly announced Mohammad Taha Al-Ahmad's nomination to the embassy in Cairo before obtaining Egypt's approval," describing the move as contrary to established diplomatic practice.
In Haridy's view, "relations between Cairo and Damascus will remain cautious given the background of the current Syrian government."
He said that "the Egyptian side distinguishes between the historic people-to-people relationship between the two countries and its channels of communication with Syria's current government. There remain areas for cooperation between Cairo and Damascus, particularly at the economic level."
In January, Damascus hosted the first Egyptian-Syrian Economic and Investment Forum, with the participation of 26 leaders from Egyptian chambers of commerce and business organizations. The event aimed to build effective partnerships between the two countries' commercial chambers and explore opportunities for cooperation in trade, industry, services, infrastructure and reconstruction.
At the time, the Federation of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce said that the forum sought to create Syrian-Egyptian-European alliances through the Union of Mediterranean Chambers and to promote Syrian exports to Africa through the Federation of African Chambers.
Students Discover 1,800-Year-Old Roman Villa Beneath School Gymhttps://english.aawsat.com/culture/5281092-students-discover-1800-year-old-roman-villa-beneath-school-gym
Students Discover 1,800-Year-Old Roman Villa Beneath School Gym
Students' curiosity uncovered what had lain hidden beneath the earth for centuries. (Special Superintendency of Rome)
Archaeologists in Rome have uncovered the remains of a luxury Roman residence dating to the second century CE beneath a high school near the Colosseum, after students' curiosity about mysterious underground rooms led to a formal excavation of the site.
According to Live Science, students at Liceo Scientifico Cavour, located just steps from the Colosseum, had long shared stories about hidden chambers beneath the school's gymnasium. What began as rumors ultimately led to a remarkable archaeological discovery.
During unofficial explorations of the underground spaces, students came across evidence of an ancient structure beneath the school.
After informing a teacher, who alerted the relevant authorities, archaeologists were called in to investigate the site. Excavations carried out earlier this year revealed that the dark passageways and partially lit rooms formed part of an elaborate Roman residence dating back nearly 1,800 years.
Liceo Scientifico Cavour occupies a building near the Colosseum that originally served as the headquarters of a Catholic missionary organization. When the complex was constructed in the late nineteenth century, preliminary excavation work uncovered part of an ancient domus, the term used for a large Roman urban residence.
The area is among the most historically significant parts of ancient Rome. Prominent figures including Cicero, Pompey and Octavian, later known as Augustus, are known to have lived there. Yet the district remains only partially understood by archaeologists because layers of modern construction cover much of the ancient landscape.
Researchers say the discovery offers a rare opportunity to study a section of ancient Rome that has remained largely inaccessible, while shedding new light on the city's residential life during the height of the Roman Empire.
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