US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland defended his country’s policies toward the Libyan conflict, denying that the United States favors one faction over another, and refuting the allegations that Washington was ignoring Turkey’s military intervention in Libya as a way to counter the increased Russian involvement in the country.
In a wide-ranging interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Norland said Libyans have made progress toward a political settlement, adding that they “are tired of war.”
He commended the head of the Government of National Accord, Fayez al-Sarraj, for announcing his intent to step down, but said he would like to see him staying in his post for a little bit more time.
The diplomat spoke of his recent visits to Egypt and Turkey where he met with top officials, saying he would “encourage” Cairo and Ankara “to consult directly with each other as a way to avoid miscalculations” on Libya.
Explaining what is meant by his country’s proposal to “demilitarize” the Libyan cities of Sirte and al-Jufra, he said that “joint police or civilian security personnel” would remain in those areas. Any remaining armed groups, including Kremlin-linked mercenaries known as the Wagner Group, would only “undermine” confidence building measures between the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army.
“There’s unfortunately little doubt that Wagner is acting on behalf of the Russian government, and that their activities help to drive instability in Libya,” he said. “Those who call for the withdrawal of Syrian and other fighters from western Libya, for example, cannot possibly hope to see this happen as long as Wagner continues to build up its presence in the east.”
The Ambassador did not want to take a position on the agreement signed between the GNA and Turkey last year, and said bilateral maritime disputes involving competing claims over territorial waters in the Mediterranean “is a matter for international law and negotiations between the parties themselves.”
“My understanding is that the GNA did what it had to do to survive the LNA offensive,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.
Below is the full text of the exclusive interview with Norland:
1- Libya seems to be making some kind of progress towards a political settlement now, after the failure of the National Army’s push towards Tripoli, earlier this year. The warring parties are engaged in dialogue in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Switzerland and may be other places too. How optimistic are you now of reaching a breakthrough? What would you say to the Libyans who are engaged in these talks/negotiations? And are you playing any role in helping the Libyans reach a settlement?
Camille, thank you for the question, and thank you for the opportunity to talk about Libya with your readers. I agree with your view. Libyans have made progress toward a political settlement. Several sets of talks in Geneva, Montreux, as well as helpful confidence-building discussions in Egypt and Morocco, have helped set the stage for the upcoming Libyan Political Dialogue Forum or LPDF guided by the UN and now is the time to focus on this process. I know that many Libyans see this as just another conference where politicians talk, and maybe they believe it will fail like previous talks did. Yet there are many things that are different this time around. First of all, people are tired of war: In my many consultations with Libyan leaders, I see that there is a growing consensus on the importance of political dialogue - not military force for resolving the conflict. Similarly, Libyans increasingly want to re-assert Libyan sovereignty and remove armed foreign forces from the country. In addition, the LPDF will be the first edition of talks where participants must declare themselves ineligible for political positions in the new institutions to be created. It’s also worth noting that in the same context, Prime Minister Sarraj has signaled his intention to eventually step down and turn power over to the new executive authority that would be established under the LPDF. That is a courageous and unprecedented step that also sets this moment apart from previous attempts to find a political settlement.
2- You have lately been involved in meetings on Libya with both the Egyptians and Turks. Are you encouraged by what you have been told by these opposing sides, each of which is backing a different party in Libya? Can we assume that you have brokered a ‘Libyan truce’ between the Turks and the Egyptians? What do you expect Cairo and Ankara to do next to push the Libyans towards a deal?
I was encouraged by my consultations with senior officials in Cairo and Ankara earlier this month and in August, in line with Secretary Pompeo’s desire to use American diplomatic tools to help create the conditions that lead to a successful political process for Libya. My consultations suggested the United States, Egypt, Turkey, and other international partners are looking for pragmatic ways to support the LPDF. Such consultations help us understand common interests in finding a peaceful, negotiated settlement to the conflict rather than escalating and further destabilizing Libya and the region. Having said that, I certainly would encourage Egypt and Turkey to consult directly with each other as a way to avoid miscalculations and build cooperation on their common interest in a stable and peaceful Libya.
3- Can you explain to the readers what is meant by your proposal to “demilitarize” the Libyan cities of Sirte and al-Jufra? Who will be in charge of these two cities? Does this mean, in addition to the withdrawal of the National Army units, the Russian mercenaries will also have to leave their alleged bases in the Ghardabiya Airbase and al-Jufra airbase? Is this what you are seeking?
As a matter of policy, the United States has consistently called for the departure of all foreign forces including mercenaries and contractor forces from Libya. These armed foreign groups have only further destabilized Libya and escalated the conflict. Wagner, the Kremlin-linked contract company is among those actors. In the near term, what we recommended is a concrete confidence-building measure by demilitarizing Sirte and al-Jufra, likely with joint police or civilian security personnel to remain in those areas. The exact details to operationalize this idea should be negotiated by the Libyans themselves. This could be a concrete first step that facilitates additional steps towards de-escalation. Any remaining armed groups, including Wagner, would only undermine such confidence building measures.
4- Can you expand on the role Russia plays in Libya? The Wagner Group is alleged to have deployed not only mercenary fighters, but also aircrafts and anti-aircraft battery missiles in Libya, an allegation Moscow denies. Is it your understanding that these Russian mercenaries could not have been deployed without an agreement from the highest authorities in Moscow, namely the Kremlin? As a follow up, can you confirm that these mercenaries are still deployed in Libya, including in the oil fields?
As I said earlier, the United States opposes all foreign military involvement in Libya including that of the Wagner Group. As I think you’ve seen, our military, namely AFRICOM has publicly identified Russian military activities and instances when Russia has brought in sophisticated weapons in violation of the arms embargo. There’s unfortunately little doubt that Wagner is acting on behalf of the Russian government, and that their activities help to drive instability in Libya. Those who call for the withdrawal of Syrian and other fighters from western Libya, for example, cannot possibly hope to see this happen as long as Wagner continues to build up its presence in the east.
5- Do you believe that Russia is seeking to establish a base in Libya, and what would that mean, if true?
I don’t claim to know Russian intentions, that is a question for Moscow. What I do know is that Libyans are looking for less rather than more foreign military presence in their country. We share that interest and see the LPDF as the best tool to help Libyans achieve this.
6- Russia has lately complained that it has offered to sit down and talk with you on Libya but you are refusing to do so. Why, if true?
I never refused discussions with Russia. The United States has regular contact with Russia, including on Libya. The Russian government is well informed of our position on the role of Wagner in Libya, and our support for the LPDF. I think there is a current within Russia that is actually supportive of a Libyan political solution and recognizes that Russia can achieve its legitimate interests in Libya, such as promoting Russian businesses and counterterrorism, through political dialogue. The Russian military investment in Libya, however, undermines this position.
7- You have been a subject of constant criticism by your opponents in Libya, who allege that you are leaning towards, or even backing, the Muslim Brotherhood in Western Libya. Those who hold such a view accuse you of ignoring Turkey’s military involvement in Libya, may be as a tool in countering Russia’s involvement. Turkey, according to its opponents, publicly backs the Muslim Brotherhood and hosts Libyan Islamists, some of which your own government used to consider as terrorist. Your critics would also accuse you of allowing the Turks to establish bases in Libya, from which they can threaten Egypt (by the Islamists) and even European states (by an influx of migrants). Can you set the record straight and refute these allegations?
We don’t support any one side in the Libyan conflict. As a pragmatic matter, the Turkish military intervention would likely never have happened had the LNA not engaged Wagner mercenaries in its offensive on Tripoli. Now the challenge is to help all Libyans -- east, west and south -- create the conditions for reclaiming their sovereignty and setting the stage for the departure of all foreign combat forces. The United States is engaged in active diplomacy with all sides, something the White House called 360 diplomatic engagement, in order to support the LPDF. The ongoing escalatory military dynamic is fraught with the risk of miscalculation and new levels of violence. It should be clear to all that renewed hostilities in Libya will not produce a victor, it will only bring more carnage, more criminal activity, more illegal migration and more problems for the average Libyan -- be it a reduction of income, a degradation of medical care, or less electricity. As I said, we oppose all foreign military intervention in Libya and we have zero tolerance for terrorists. A political settlement under the LPDF will open the way to the departure of all foreign forces and can facilitate solving problems that thrive within the instability of the Libyan conflict.
Similarly, militias will need to be disarmed, demobilized or where possible, integrated into the regular military or security services under civilian control. Exactly how that happens is a question for Libyans to decide. That decision process would be most effective under new political institutions in a sovereign Libya following a political settlement under the LPDF.
8- As a follow up to the above, what is your position on the legality of the Turkish treaty with the Government of National Accord in Tripoli regarding oil explorations in the Mediterranean, as well as the security deal too? That deal, as you well know, has been rejected by Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, who claim it encroaches on their waters?
The US does not take a position on bilateral maritime disputes involving competing claims over territorial waters – this is a matter for international law and negotiations between the parties themselves. My understanding is that the GNA did what it had to do to survive the LNA offensive.
9- Has Sarraj explained to you why he has offered to resign by the end of this month? Do you still expect him to do so soon?
Thanks for this question. I just want to commend Prime Minister Sarraj for announcing his intent to step down. His historic decision to step down voluntarily shows that he is willing to put the interests of the Libyan people above his own personal interest, and deserves respect. Regarding the exact timing, I have to acknowledge that at the time of his announcement we expected that he would be able to turn power over to a new executive authority at the end of October. However, due to COVID and other complications in organizing the dialogue, UNSMIL has indicated that the current timing of LPDF meetings will push this into November. So I would hope and expect that he stays on as Prime Minister a little longer, at least until this transfer of power is possible. Having said that it’s clear to me that he has every intention of stepping down.
10- In a briefing you gave a few months ago, you hinted that some in Egypt may have backed the wrong side in Libya, alluding to Haftar. Are the Egyptians still clinging to him, or are they backing different groups now, mainly tribes from eastern Libya? Do the Americans have any contact with Haftar and his National Army now?
The Cairo Declaration, which broadened the political face of the east, and Egypt’s support of the LPDF with important steps such as hosting the Hurghada Security talks are evidence that the Egyptians are invested in the political solution to the Libya conflict rather than a military one. I don’t want to speak for the Egyptians, but in my consultations with senior officials they’ve signaled a pragmatic approach which recognizes that military escalation only destabilizes Libya and potentially threatens the wider region. As a neighbor, this is the exact opposite of what they want to see. So I’ll repeat here my genuine appreciation for Egypt’s concrete steps in support of the LPDF.
On the second part of your question, we do have contact with General Haftar and the LNA, and recognize that they can be part of the solution if they are willing to follow the exclusively political path. It was a good signal from the LNA that oil production was able to resume for the benefit of Libyans. We understand their representatives are taking a constructive approach in the 5+5 talks this week in Geneva. Our outreach to the LNA is part of our wide ranging diplomatic engagement with all sides, and should not be confused with taking sides.
11- Have you witnessed an increase in ISIS or Al-Qaeda’s activities in Libya lately, taking advantage of the fighting between the warring parties of eastern and western Libya?
We know that the conflict has given terrorist groups the space and the opportunity to try to regroup in Libya. Thus far our counter-terrorism efforts have constrained ISIS and Al-Qaeda efforts to reestablish a significant presence. But the threat is still there, and the best way to address this is to ensure that the State of Libya is a fully sovereign and capable partner in the fight against terrorism. Success in the LPDF offers the best guarantee that this will happen.
12- I have to ask you this question: having served in Kabul before, which, in your opinion, is more difficult to resolve the Afghan or the Libyan crisis.
Both conflicts have proven resistant to efforts at peaceful resolution, though the Afghan conflict has now lasted much longer than the Libyan one. Both conflicts have opened up space for extremists and terrorist groups. Both conflicts involve efforts to establish democratic governments in places that have not known this before. Both conflicts feature corruption and entrenched interests opposed to a peaceful resolution. Both conflicts have led to enormous hardships for average citizens. Both conflicts have featured toxic foreign intervention, and in both cases the United States has sought to play a helpful role in support of democracy and human rights, though not without some mistakes along the way. Both Afghanistan and Libya represent potentially lucrative commercial gateways to remote markets. While both Libya and Afghanistan have significant untapped natural resources, Libya has had the advantage of being able to access its natural wealth and put it on the world market before Afghanistan could. This gives Libyans an advantage which we hope will be seized upon through the LPDF. If Libya is able to emerge as a stable and unified country through political dialogue it could be incredibly prosperous.
13 - Is Libya better or worse without Gaddafi? An assessment from a non-Libyan is much appreciated.
Certainly if you read books like Hisham Matar’s “In the Country of Men” you realize the Gaddafi era featured brutality and torture, and the downing of Pan Am 103 was his regime’s work as well. But questions about a country’s leadership should really be answered by the citizens of that country. That is exactly why we are so focused on supporting sovereign Libyan efforts to achieve a lasting end to the conflict and national elections as quickly as possible, through which Libyans can exercise the voice that the Qaddafi dictatorship sought to silence through violence and oppression. In the coming days, Libyans from across the political spectrum, including the so-called “Greens,” will come together peacefully through the LPDF to debate the most critical issues facing the country and forge government institutions that are accountable to the Libyan people. This dialogue stands in powerful contrast with the former regime, where Libyans had no say in how leaders were chosen, no freedom to criticize leaders, and no power to demand accountability. No one can deny that the years since the revolution have been tumultuous, but I believe there is a real opportunity for Libyans to start building a brighter future.
