Amr Moussa: We Convinced Saddam Hussein to Bring Back Int’l Inspectors, But US Already Decided to Go to War

For the third episode of excerpts obtained from the upcoming biography of the Arab League’s ex-chief Amr Moussa, which will soon be released by Dar El-Shorouk, Asharq Al-Awsat goes over efforts spent by the Egyptian veteran diplomat in the Iraq file.

In his biography, “The Years of the Arab League”, Moussa dedicates two whole chapters to recount events building up to the US invasion of Iraq.

He talks about his attempts alongside late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to avert a US strike on Iraq, the events of the US invasion of Iraq, and his efforts in the post-2003 political process.

Moussa goes into great detail about his meeting with Hussein, who he said was “a frightening man with soft hands.” He recalls using a serious tone when speaking to the then Iraqi leader.

“Some said it was the fiercest tone an Arab official ever used with Saddam Hussein,” reminds Moussa.

The former secretary-general of the Arab League says that his efforts with then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan did not come to fruition because Washington had already decided to go to war.

According to the memoir, former US Secretary of State Colin Powell, at the time, described Hussein as a “deceiver and a liar,” and accused him of deluding Moussa and Annan.

“One of the first issues I had to immediately deal with after assuming the Secretary-General office at the Arab League was Iraqi-UN negotiations on inspections for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) being put on ice,” says Moussa.

At the time, the US was claiming that Iraq either already owns or is seeking to develop WMDs, especially nukes.

Early November 2001, Moussa made his first visit to the UN in his capacity as chief of the Arab League. He was there to attend the UN General Assembly sessions that were rescheduled from September to November because of the September 11 attacks.

Moussa remembers speaking to Annan and telling him that it was “unfitting” for his legacy as UN chief for a war to break out between the US and Iraq under his leadership.

He also complains to Annan about the lack of “apparent effort to prevent an imminent war on Iraq that the US wants and seeks.”

Annan then replies restlessly: “I'm trying my best, but Saddam Hussein is stubborn, and you know him better than me.”

“We must give Iraq a chance to dodge the war for which Washington is preparing. I will visit the Iraqi president next January. I want a message from you that I can convey to him on resolving the situation on resuming the work of international (WMDs) inspectors,” Moussa proposes.

“I am confident that when I tell him (Hussein) that I am bearing a clear message from the UN secretary-general calling for mobilizing on the issue of arms inspections, he will respond positively,” he adds.

Annan agrees with Moussa and moves forward on the proposal.

Later on, Moussa makes arrangements with then Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri regarding his visit to Iraq.

“My plane landed in Baghdad on the morning of January 18, 2002. I found Sabri greeting me. He was one of the professional foreign ministers that I had respect for, but Saddam's dictatorship and unilateralism severely limited his margins of maneuver and action,” Moussa explains.

His meeting with the Iraqi dictator was scheduled for the next day.

Moussa, accompanied by an Arab League delegation, was taken by a convoy to one of the presidential prestigious guest houses.

Each of Ahmed ben Helli, deputy secretary-general of the Arab League, Hussein Hassouna, the head of the Arab League mission at the UN, and Ambassador Hisham Badr, were present with Moussa.

The following day, Moussa was escorted by Iraqi military officer and Hussein's personal secretary Abid Hamid Mahmud.

Moussa hopped in the passenger seat of a beige Toyota driven by Mahmud. They drove to a humble yet beautiful palace located in the Radwaniya area, southwest Baghdad.

There, Moussa regrouped with Helli, Hassouna, and Badr who were waiting for him at the hall entrance, where they would all meet Hussein.

“As soon as I entered, the Iraqi president moved from his seat to greet me,” Moussa narrates, adding that he made sure to keep a serious atmosphere going on between him and Hussein. The two shared a dry, yet firm, handshake.

Moussa recalls being struck by how soft Hussein’s hands were; something you wouldn’t expect from a man with such a frightening reputation.

Hussein then kicked off the two-hour and 15-minute meeting by praising Moussa for his nationalist stances.

Moussa says he reiterated to Hussein what he had already told his senior aides. This included a complaint about the low engagement of Iraqi delegations at the Arab League.

Delivering Annan’s message, Moussa also blamed Hussein for his unfavorable dealings with UN experts tasked with leading WMDs inspections in Iraq.

Moussa warned Hussein that Iraq was losing the sympathy of two major organizations, the Arab League and the UN.

The following conversation then took place:

Moussa: Mr. President, allow me to ask you a question: Do you have nuclear weapons that you are afraid of getting inspected?

Hussein: Iraq does not have nuclear weapons, and I have said so repeatedly.

Moussa: Mr. President, allow me to ask you again the question: Do you have nuclear weapons that you are afraid of getting inspected?

Taken by Moussa’s sharp tone, Hussein repeated: No ... we don't have nuclear weapons.

Moussa: So why do you mind the presence of international inspectors so long that Iraq is not afraid of anything?

Hussein: Because there is something we fear.

Moussa: And what is that?

Hussein: All inspectors that are sent to us are CIA agents.

Moussa: What if we ensure that they are not CIA and are working for the UN? We can stress the international organization sends inspectors with integrity and impartiality. I can confirm this through a process of negotiations between you and the UN, particularly Kofi Annan.

Hussein: I accept that, and take your word for it; because you are a respectable Arab man.

Moussa: Are you okay with me passing this along to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan?

Hussein: Yes, I agree.

Informing Arabs and Annan About the Visit’s Outcomes

In the day following his meeting with Hussein, Moussa flew to Cairo and held a meeting with permanent representatives at the Arab League, briefing them on the outcomes of his talks with the Iraqi leader.

The review took place on the evening of January 20, 2002.

On the same day, Moussa contacted the royal Jordanian palace and requested a meeting with King Abdullah II, who was chairing the Arab summit at the time. He wanted to fill the Jordanian leader in on the details of his discussions with Hussein.

Also, Moussa phoned then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Maher, and Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal.

Next morning, Moussa informed Kuwait on what he had agreed on with Hussein regarding the fate of the Kuwaitis, who had gone missing or had been detained in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

The Arab League chief then agreed with Kuwaiti authorities to carry out a swift visit to Kuwait on January 22, 2002.

“I went to Kuwait and met with Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad and a number of officials. The general atmosphere was that the brothers in Kuwait were not comfortable with my visit to Iraq,” Moussa recounts.

He evokes how he explained to the Kuwaiti side that he couldn't disregard Iraq as a member of the Arab League, regardless of the anger harbored over the events of 1990.

Moussa also says he conveyed the Arab League’s interest in finding an Arab solution to the impending threat facing the stability of the Arab world.

The launch of 10 rockets by Hamas’s armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, toward Israel on Sunday surprised many observers, marking a sharp escalation in rocket fire that had largely been limited to one or two missiles since Israel broke a truce on March 18.

Most recent rocket attacks were believed to have come from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but Sunday’s barrage was claimed by Hamas, signaling a possible shift in the dynamics of the conflict.

According to Israeli claims, the rockets were fired from the al-Zawaida area, north of Deir al-Balah in central Gaza. However, field sources told Asharq Al-Awsat the rockets were launched from a different location — one that has rarely been used for such operations.

The recent rocket barrage by Hamas may have carried a deeper strategic message, the sources told Asharq Al-Awsat, suggesting the attack was intended to raise questions within Israel about the group’s ability to access its missile arsenal — or hint at a regained capacity to manufacture rockets.

Hamas sources declined to specify when the rockets used in the latest attack were produced but stressed that the decision to launch was shaped primarily by field conditions and the assessment of fighters and commanders on the ground.

“At times, we aim to send specific political messages,” said a Hamas source, who requested anonymity.

“For example, we want to underline that Israel has failed to defeat the movement and its military wing, despite carrying out assassinations of senior and field-level commanders,” they added.

Hamas has denied that its latest rocket barrage was a direct response to the recent assassinations of senior figures, saying the attack was part of its broader reaction to what it described as “ongoing massacres” committed by Israel against the Palestinian people.

“This was a routine response within the framework of confronting continuous Israeli aggression,” the Hamas source told Asharq Al-Awsat, rejecting suggestions that the assault was linked to specific events.

The timing of the rocket fire raised eyebrows, coming just hours after a rare protest in Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza, where demonstrators chanted against Hamas, condemned the rocket attacks, and demanded an end to the war.

Protesters also called for Hamas to relinquish control of the Gaza Strip and stop speaking on behalf of its residents.

Asked whether the barrage was meant to send a message to a restless population, Hamas sources denied any connection.

“The rocket fire had nothing to do with the protest in Jabalia,” one source said, pointing to similar demonstrations in recent weeks that were not followed by rocket launches.

When pressed about the implications of such protests for the group’s future in Gaza, the source said internal discussions had taken place.

“The movement recognizes people’s right to express themselves — but not at the expense of the resistance,” the source said.

“There must be clear national guidelines that prioritize ending the war while preserving the legitimacy of the resistance,” they added.

Gaza Governance

Hamas also pushed back against accusations that it is clinging to power in Gaza, placing blame on rival faction Fatah and Israel for blocking proposals aimed at resolving the territory’s political deadlock.

“Hamas has no issue stepping down from governing Gaza,” a source said. “The real obstacle lies with others who have rejected every proposal laid on the table.”

The source pointed to a proposed community support committee, formed with Egyptian mediation, which was meant to take over governance duties. “We showed maximum flexibility, but neither Fatah nor Israel accepted this mechanism,” the source added.

As for whether stepping down from power could weaken Hamas's influence in Gaza, the source appeared unconcerned. “The movement is confident in its endurance,” the source said.

“Even if Hamas relinquishes control and enters a long-term ceasefire, it will continue to exist and maintain its presence,” they affirmed.

A Fatah delegation had held talks with Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty two days ago, focusing primarily on internal Palestinian reconciliation and the future governance of Gaza, as Hamas signaled readiness to hand over administrative responsibilities to a proposed community support committee.

Multiple Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group had informed Egyptian officials of its willingness to allow a minister from the Palestinian Authority’s Ramallah-based government to head the committee, with a deputy from Gaza appointed to assist.

A Hamas delegation is expected to travel to Cairo in the coming days to continue discussions with Egyptian officials on the evolving plans for Gaza’s administration and broader efforts to resolve the internal Palestinian divide.

Amr Moussa: We Convinced Saddam Hussein to Bring Back Int’l Inspectors, But US Already Decided to Go to War