Drying Euphrates Threatens Disaster in Syria

Aid groups and engineers are warning of a looming humanitarian disaster in northeast Syria, where waning river flow is compounding woes after a decade of war. AFP
Aid groups and engineers are warning of a looming humanitarian disaster in northeast Syria, where waning river flow is compounding woes after a decade of war. AFP
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Drying Euphrates Threatens Disaster in Syria

Aid groups and engineers are warning of a looming humanitarian disaster in northeast Syria, where waning river flow is compounding woes after a decade of war. AFP
Aid groups and engineers are warning of a looming humanitarian disaster in northeast Syria, where waning river flow is compounding woes after a decade of war. AFP

Syria's longest river used to flow by his olive grove, but today Khaled al-Khamees says it has receded into the distance, parching his trees and leaving his family with hardly a drop to drink.

"It's as if we were in the desert," said the 50-year-old farmer, standing on what last year was the Euphrates riverbed.

"We're thinking of leaving because there's no water left to drink or irrigate the trees."

Aid groups and engineers are warning of a looming humanitarian disaster in northeast Syria, where waning river flow is compounding woes after a decade of war.

They say plummeting water levels at hydroelectric dams since January are threatening water and power cutoffs for up to five million Syrians, in the middle of a coronavirus pandemic and economic crisis.

As drought grips the Mediterranean region, many in the Kurdish-held area are accusing neighbor and archfoe Turkey of weaponizing water by tightening the tap upstream, though a Turkish source denied this.

Outside the village of Rumayleh where Khamees lives, black irrigation hoses lay in dusty coils after the river receded so far it became too expensive to operate the water pumps.

Instead, much closer to the water's edge, Khamees and neighbors were busy planting corn and beans in soil just last year submerged under the current.

The father of 12 said he had not seen the river so far away from the village in decades.

"The women have to walk seven kilometers just to get a bucket of water for their children to drink," he said.

Reputed to have once flown through the biblical Garden of Eden, the Euphrates runs for almost 2,800 kilometers across Turkey, Syria and Iraq.

In times of rain, it gushes into northern Syria through the Turkish border, and flows diagonally across the war-torn country towards Iraq.

Along its way, it irrigates swathes of land in Syria's breadbasket, and runs through three hydroelectric dams that provide power and drinking water to millions.

But over the past eight months the river has contracted to a sliver, sucking precious water out of reservoirs and increasing the risk of dam turbines grinding to a halt.

At the Tishrin Dam, the first into which the river falls inside Syria, director Hammoud al-Hadiyyeen described an "alarming" drop in water levels not seen since the dam's completion in 1999.
"It's a humanitarian catastrophe," he said.

Since January, the water level has plummeted by five meters, and now hovers just dozens of centimeters above "dead level" when turbines are supposed to completely stop producing electricity.

Across northeast Syria, already power generation has fallen by 70 percent since last year, the head of the energy authority Welat Darwish says.

Two out of three of all potable water stations along the river are pumping less water or have stopped working, humanitarian groups say.

Almost 90 percent of the Euphrates flow comes from Turkey, the United Nations says.

To ensure Syria's fair share, Turkey in 1987 agreed to allow an annual average of 500 cubic meters per second of water across its border.

But that has dropped to as low as 200 in recent months, engineers claim.

Inside Syria, the Euphrates flows mostly along territory controlled by semi-autonomous Kurdish authorities, whose US-backed fighters have over the years wrested its dams and towns from ISIS.

Turkey however regards those Kurdish fighters as linked to its outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and has grabbed land from them during Syria's war.

Syria's Kurds have accused Ankara of holding back more water than necessary in its dams, and Damascus in June urged Turkey to increase the flow immediately.

But a Turkish diplomatic source told AFP Turkey had "never reduced the amount of water it releases from its trans-boundary rivers for political or other purposes".

"Our region is facing one of the worst drought periods due to climate change," and rainfall in southern Turkey was "the lowest in the last 30 years", this source said.

Analyst Nicholas Heras said Turkey did hold leverage over Syria and Iraq with the huge Ataturk Dam just 80 kilometers from the Syrian border, but it was debatable whether Ankara wanted to use it.

That would mean "international complications for Ankara, both with the United States and Russia", a key Damascus ally across the table in Syria peace talks.

"The easier, and more frequently utilized, water weapon that Ankara uses is the Alouk plant" that it seized from the Kurds in 2019, Heras said.

Fresh water supply from the station on another river has been disrupted at least 24 times since 2019, affecting 460,000 people, the United Nations says.

But Syria analyst Fabrice Balanche said the drought did serve Ankara's long-term goal of "asphyxiating northeast Syria economically".

"In periods of drought, Turkey helps itself and leaves the rest for the Kurds, in defiance and in full knowledge of the consequences," he said.

Wim Zwijnenburg, of the PAX peace organization, said Turkey was struggling to provide enough water for "megalomanic" agricultural projects set up in the 1990s, a challenge now complicated by climate change.

"The big picture is drought is coming," he said.

"We already see a rapid decline in healthy vegetation growth on satellite analysis" in both Syria and Turkey.

A UN climate change report this month found human influence had almost definitely increased the frequency of simultaneous heatwaves and droughts worldwide.

These dry spells are to become longer and more severe around the Mediterranean, the United Nations has warned, with Syria most at risk, according to the 2019 Global Crisis Risk Index.
Downstream from the Tishrin Dam, the Euphrates pools in the depths of Lake Assad.

But today Syria's largest fresh water reservoir too has withdrawn inwards.

On its banks, men with tar-stained hands worked to repair generators exhausted from pumping water across much further distances than in previous years.

Agricultural worker Hussein Saleh, 56, was desperate.

"We can no longer afford the hoses or the generators," said the father of 12.

"The olive trees are thirsty and the animals are hungry."

At home, in the village of Twihiniyyeh, power cuts had increased from nine to 19 hours a day, he said.

At the country's largest dam of Tabqa to the south, veteran engineer Khaled Shaheen was worried.

"We're trying to diminish how much water we send through," he said.

But "if it continues like this, we could stop electricity production for all except... bakeries, flour mills and hospitals."

Meanwhile, among five million people depending on the Euphrates for drinking water, more and more families are ingesting liquid that is unsafe.

Those cut off from the network instead pay for deliveries from private water trucks.

But these tankers most often draw water directly from the river -- where wastewater concentration is high due to low flow -- and these supplies are not filtered.

Waterborne disease outbreaks are on the rise, and contaminated ice has caused diarrhea in displacement camps, according to the NES Forum, an NGO coordination body for the region.

Marwa Daoudy, a Syrian scholar of environmental security, said the decreasing flow of the Euphrates was "very alarming".

"These levels threaten whole rural communities in the Euphrates Basin whose livelihood depends on agriculture and irrigation," she said.

Aid groups say drought conditions have already destroyed large swathes of rain-fed crops in Syria, a country where 60 percent of people already struggle to put food on the table.

In some communities, animals have started to die, the NES Forum has said.

The United Nations says barley production could drop by 1.2 million tons this year, making animal feed more scarce.

Balanche said Syria was likely facing a years-long drought not seen since one from 2005 to 2010, before the civil war.

"The northeast, but also all of Syria, will be short on food, and will need to import massive quantities of cereals."

Downstream in Iraq, seven million more people risked losing access to water from the river, the Norwegian Refugee Council's Karl Schembri said.

"Climate doesn't look at borders," he said.



As Israel Expands Strikes on Beirut, Delivery Drivers Steer Clear of Danger

 People who work as delivery drivers for the Toters delivery app stand outside a delivery center in Beirut, Lebanon, March 18, 2026. (Reuters)
People who work as delivery drivers for the Toters delivery app stand outside a delivery center in Beirut, Lebanon, March 18, 2026. (Reuters)
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As Israel Expands Strikes on Beirut, Delivery Drivers Steer Clear of Danger

 People who work as delivery drivers for the Toters delivery app stand outside a delivery center in Beirut, Lebanon, March 18, 2026. (Reuters)
People who work as delivery drivers for the Toters delivery app stand outside a delivery center in Beirut, Lebanon, March 18, 2026. (Reuters)

Lebanese food courier Hamza Hareb now keeps his distance if he spots a car with tinted windows while on a delivery run in Beirut. Hezbollah is rumored to use such cars, and Hareb wants to steer clear of any Israeli strikes targeting the armed group.

Israel has expanded its air campaign to new parts of Beirut in recent days, hitting apartments and downing entire buildings in strikes it says are targeting Hezbollah, which pulled Lebanon into the regional war on March 2 by firing into Israeli territory.

On Wednesday, Israel struck different neighborhoods in the heart of Beirut, leaving mounds of rubble hundreds of meters away from government buildings, restaurants and roads usually clogged with traffic.

As residents of the capital stay home in fear, they are ordering delivery for dinner - and drivers like Hareb are navigating a maze ‌of risks to ‌make it happen.

"Of course, we are afraid. That is ever-present," said Hareb, one ‌of ⁠3,000 couriers in ⁠Beirut who work for Toters, among Lebanon's most popular delivery apps.

Like most gig workers, Toters drivers are paid per delivery. For many, the job is an economic lifeline in the heavily indebted country, which is suffering from years of economic crisis and political instability following a financial collapse in 2019.

"You don't know when the strikes will come, so we have adapted to everything," Hareb said.

'NAVIGATING INTO UNCERTAINTY'

Israel sometimes issues evacuation warnings before striking, telling residents to leave the area. But three of Wednesday's four strikes on Beirut came without notice.

"Right now they're increasingly ⁠striking without warning, and of course this is instilling a sense of ‌fear among us (since) we spend most of our time out ‌in the street," Hareb told Reuters.

If Beirut is rocked by an unexpected strike, drivers pull over to figure out which ‌neighborhood was targeted and how to amend their routes if needed. If an evacuation warning is issued, ‌drivers pass it on through work channels so colleagues can avoid targeted areas.

Toters' director of operations Roland Ghanem said the company did not deliver to neighborhoods that fall within Israel's evacuation orders and has barred drivers from using risky roads near possible targets.

"These drivers navigate into uncertainty... just to make sure that others can still have access to food ‌and basic needs," Ghanem said. "They understand that behind every order, there is a family that has been displaced, or an elderly person that cannot go to ⁠the store and get ⁠some food, or just a regular person trying to get through the day."

WORKING IN A WAR

Israeli strikes have killed nearly 1,000 people and displaced another million across Lebanon, according to Lebanese authorities.

For some drivers, the war has hit close to home - literally. Mahmoud al-Benne, 34, had to flee his home in Beirut's southern suburbs earlier this month when Israel issued a blanket evacuation order for the entire area and began bombing it heavily.

But he still needs to work.

"Whether you are displaced or not displaced, you need to earn money," Benne said. "You have responsibilities. We are in a state of war, but at the end of the day we want to work."

Marie Katanjian stands out among her colleagues as a rare female delivery driver. Her husband delivers for Toters and she was inspired to do the same.

"We have to work in this situation because we have families. We're helping each other out, hand in hand," she said.

Still, she's yearning to drive safely through her city's streets again.

“We want the war to end, so we can take a breath.”


What Remains of Hezbollah’s Military Arsenal?

Damage after a rocket fired by Hezbollah toward Nahariya (Reuters)
Damage after a rocket fired by Hezbollah toward Nahariya (Reuters)
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What Remains of Hezbollah’s Military Arsenal?

Damage after a rocket fired by Hezbollah toward Nahariya (Reuters)
Damage after a rocket fired by Hezbollah toward Nahariya (Reuters)

The rockets that Hezbollah continues to fire, since its decision to join what it calls a support war for Iran, have surprised observers with their intensity and type, particularly in Israel.

Israeli media have expressed astonishment that the group still retains such military capabilities, despite the ongoing war against it since September 2023.

Previous Israeli assessments suggested that a large part of Hezbollah’s arsenal had been eroded during the last war and the bombardment campaigns that followed, which continued for 15 months against its depots and positions.

However, the pace of launches since the start of the new round of fighting has raised serious questions about the actual size of this arsenal, its sources, how it has been preserved, where the remaining stockpiles are located, and how they are managed and used under these complex conditions.

This comes as the Lebanese army had also seized a considerable portion of these weapons in the area south of the Litani River.

Questions also extend beyond the military stockpile to Hezbollah’s ability to fill leadership vacancies after assassination operations that targeted hundreds of its commanders and fighters, and how large numbers of these fighters have been able to reach and take part in ground combat in border villages and towns.

Secret storage sites

Most military experts believe these fighters have not left their towns and villages during this period, keeping their weapons in private facilities that have not been raided.

Riad Kahwaji, a researcher and writer on security and defense affairs, said Israeli estimates indicate that between 50% and 70% of Hezbollah’s arsenal was destroyed during the previous war and subsequent operations over the past 15 months.

He added that if the group possessed around 100,000 rockets, as prevailing narratives claim, then even if 70% were eliminated, about 30,000 would remain, which is not a small number.

He added that the arsenal in the Bekaa Valley has not yet been used.

On the locations of the rockets and storage sites, Kahwaji told Asharq Al-Awsat that Israel had often destroyed the entrances to some tunnels, whether in the south or along the eastern mountain range, but had not been able to destroy them entirely, meaning their contents likely remain intact.

This, he said, explains talk of intentions to reach these tunnels through ground operations to seize them.

Kahwaji also said Hezbollah had not cooperated with the Lebanese army, either south or north of the Litani River. As a result, most army raids targeted sites identified by Israel and the mechanism committee, meaning many other locations remain untouched.

He added that Hezbollah fighters had not left south of the Litani and remained with their weapons in private facilities that the Lebanese army had refused to enter, which had long cast doubt on claims that the area had been fully cleared. Recent developments, he said, showed that this was not the case.

Kahwaji added that Hezbollah also has facilities for manufacturing Katyusha and Grad rockets and assembling drones. He noted that most of the rockets fired recently belong to these types, which the group possesses in large quantities.

By contrast, the number of long-range missiles in its possession is limited, although some have been fired as far as 150 km into Israel. He also pointed to smuggling operations that had taken place via Syria to bolster its arsenal with guided missiles such as the Kornet.

Tunnels and underground centers

Retired Brig. Gen. Khalil Helou, a lecturer in geopolitics, said it was not surprising that Hezbollah still possesses such an arsenal and capabilities despite what it has faced over the past two years and the closure of the Syrian border.

He noted that from 2006 to 2023, over 17 years, Hezbollah had dug tunnels and underground facilities and stockpiled weapons arriving from Iran via Damascus and Aleppo airports, before being transported by land into Lebanon around the clock.

Israel, he said, had been unable to effectively target these supply lines over the years, intercepting only about 50%, according to Israeli sources.

Helou told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah had made extensive preparations at all levels, not only in terms of weapons, but also logistically and medically.

Although Israel destroyed a large portion of these weapons and facilities during the last war, and supply lines through Syria have since been cut, some capabilities remain intact.

He added that while the Lebanese army in the south had raided sites it was able to identify, other locations likely remain undiscovered.

He said rockets currently being fired are launched either from the Bekaa Valley or areas north of the Litani River, as battlefield developments indicate that much of the area south of the Litani was in fact largely devoid of weapons.


Esmail Khatib, Iran Spy Chief, from Shadow War to Assassination

A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year
A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year
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Esmail Khatib, Iran Spy Chief, from Shadow War to Assassination

A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year
A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year

Within Iran’s ruling structure in Tehran, the post of intelligence minister is far from a routine cabinet role. The ministry, established after the 1979 revolution, is a central pillar of the security system, overseeing a wide network of intelligence operations at home and abroad.

While the president formally nominates the minister, the appointment is effectively decided with the Supreme Leader's approval, placing the role within a security structure closely tied to his office.

From this position, conservative cleric Esmail Khatib rose to lead Iran’s intelligence apparatus in 2021, after more than four decades in the Islamic Republic’s security and judicial institutions.

His career ended dramatically during the Iran-Israel war. On the 19th day of the conflict, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said the Israeli air force had carried out a strike in Tehran that killed Khatib.

The Israeli military said Khatib oversaw an apparatus responsible for espionage and covert operations, and played a role in suppressing protests inside Iran.

The announcement came days after his name surfaced outside Iran, when the US State Department’s Rewards for Justice program offered up to $10 million for information on several senior Iranian officials linked to the Revolutionary Guards and the Supreme Leader’s office, including Khatib.

For years, Khatib operated largely in the shadows within intelligence institutions. He moved to the center of the Iran-Israel confrontation as the shadow conflict between the two sides escalated in recent years.

The announcement of his death added his name to a list of figures from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council killed in the conflict, including Secretary Ali Larijani and Mohammad Bagher Pakpour, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

From seminary to state institutions

Esmail Khatib was born in 1961 in Qaenat, South Khorasan province, eastern Iran. In the mid-1970s, he moved to the seminary in Qom, where he studied Islamic jurisprudence under senior clerics.

His teachers included Mohammad Fazel Lankarani, Nasser Makarem Shirazi and Mojtaba Tehrani. He also attended jurisprudence lessons taught by Ali Khamenei before he became the supreme leader. This religious path was common for clerics who entered state institutions after the 1979 revolution that toppled the Shah.

After the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khatib quickly joined the new system. At 19, he enlisted in the Revolutionary Guards and worked in intelligence and operations units during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Reports indicate he was wounded, later placing him among recognized veterans, a status that carries political weight in Iran.

Entry into the intelligence ministry

In the mid-1980s, after the creation of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security in 1983, Khatib moved to the new body, which became Iran’s main civilian intelligence agency. He worked in several departments, including foreign affairs and intelligence analysis.

He gained prominence in the 1990s when he was appointed head of intelligence in Qom province.

Qom, a stronghold of the clerical establishment, is among Iran’s most sensitive provinces due to its religious institutions. Managing security there required navigating complex balances among clerics and political factions.

Khatib held the post for more than a decade, during a period marked by political tensions in the city, including developments linked to senior cleric Hossein Ali Montazeri, once seen as a potential successor to Ruhollah Khomeini before being sidelined.

Closer to the center of power

Over time, Khatib moved into roles closer to decision-making centers. In 2010, he joined the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a unit responsible for his security and protection, a position reserved for senior intelligence officials.

Two years later, he was appointed head of the judiciary’s protection and intelligence center, tasked with monitoring judicial institutions and ensuring their political loyalty.

He remained in the role until 2019, during the tenure of judiciary chief Sadeq Larijani. With Ebrahim Raisi’s later appointment as head of the judiciary, ties between the two men strengthened.

The Astan Quds phase

In 2019, Khatib moved to Astan Quds Razavi in Mashhad, one of Iran’s largest economic and religious institutions, which oversees the Imam Reza shrine.

He took charge of security and protection within the organization, part of a network of institutions directly linked to the supreme leader’s office. He remained there until 2021, when he returned to the intelligence ministry, this time as its head.

Intelligence minister

In August 2021, after Ebrahim Raisi was elected president, he nominated Khatib as intelligence minister. As is customary, the appointment came after approval from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who had the final say on sensitive security posts.

Khatib became the eighth intelligence minister since the ministry’s establishment. He took office as Iran faced multiple security challenges, including sabotage at nuclear facilities, assassinations of scientists and officials, and an escalating intelligence confrontation with Israel.

Iran’s political landscape shifted after President Ebrahim Raisi died in May 2024 in a helicopter crash in the northwest. After subsequent elections, President Masoud Pezeshkian formed a new government.

Khatib was among the few ministers to retain his post. Pezeshkian renominated him, a move analysts said reflected the sensitivity of the role.

His retention drew criticism from some political and reformist circles that had hoped for changes in the leadership of security agencies.

Rivalry within the security apparatus

At the start of his tenure, Khatib worked to manage a key issue within the security establishment, the complex relationship between the intelligence ministry and its parallel counterpart, the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Organization.

The two bodies have overlapping mandates and often compete over major security files. Khatib sought to improve coordination, particularly in countering what the system described as foreign infiltration. The balance, however, remained complicated, reflecting ties to different power centers.

Protests and sanctions

Khatib’s tenure saw one of Iran’s largest protest waves in the past decade. In 2022, demonstrations erupted after the death of Mahsa Amini while in the morality police custody.

Security agencies, including the intelligence ministry, played a central role in responding through arrests, investigations and the pursuit of activists.

Khatib echoed the official line, describing the protests as driven by foreign interference and accusing the United States, Britain and Israel of involvement.

In September 2022, the United States imposed sanctions on Khatib and the ministry, accusing it of running cyberattack networks targeting governments and companies in multiple countries, including Albania.

Security failures

Despite repeated announcements of dismantling espionage networks, Iran’s security apparatus faced criticism over several failures.

Among the most notable was a deadly attack in Kerman in 2024 during a ceremony marking the anniversary of Qassem Soleimani’s killing, which left dozens dead.

Assassinations inside Iran, including those targeting figures linked to the so-called resistance axis, also exposed vulnerabilities.

These incidents sparked debate within Iran’s elite over the system’s ability to counter external infiltration.

Criticism intensified after the killing of numerous Iranian officials, including military commanders and nuclear scientists, during the 12-day war in June, amid reports of extensive intelligence breaches.

End of a security career

Throughout his career, Esmail Khatib remained largely out of the spotlight. He was not a mass political figure, but a security official who rose steadily through state institutions.

The Iran-Israel war in 2026, however, thrust him into the center of the confrontation. The Israeli announcement of his killing on the 19th day of the war ended a career spanning more than 40 years in the security services.

Whether seen as a major intelligence blow or another chapter in the regional conflict, Khatib’s trajectory reflects a common path within Iran’s complex security establishment: a cleric who began in the seminary, joined the Revolutionary Guards in the early years of the revolution, and rose through the ranks to one of the most sensitive posts in the Iranian state.