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Taher Al-Masry’s Memoirs: Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement Angered Hafez al-Assad

US President Ronald Reagan receives Al-Masry at the White House.
US President Ronald Reagan receives Al-Masry at the White House.
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Taher Al-Masry’s Memoirs: Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement Angered Hafez al-Assad

US President Ronald Reagan receives Al-Masry at the White House.
US President Ronald Reagan receives Al-Masry at the White House.

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes excerpts from the memoirs of former Jordanian Prime Minister Taher Al-Masry, for which he chose the title, “Al-Haqiqa Baydaa (The Truth is White), reveals information and events in Jordan’s political history since 1973 and his clash with those in power.

Taher Al-Masry, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, was known for his adherence to a comprehensive national identity, and formed a bridge in the relationship between the two countries.

He was appointed minister in 1973, then an ambassador to major capitals, and he later assumed the position of minister of foreign affairs in the 1980s. He was elected deputy in parliament in 1989. Al-Masry was appointed prime minister in 1991 and parliament speaker in 1993. He assumed the presidency of the Senate in 2009.

Asharq Al-Awsat chose excerpts from his book, which presented a detailed account of the opportunity to rebuild the relationship between late King Hussein and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its leader Yasser Arafat in 1984.

He touched on the efforts to formulate a Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, with Arab support, that would pave the way for an international peace conference.

During that period, in which he was minister of foreign affairs, Al-Masry explains the historical framework of the agreement, and its failure for reasons related to differences within the organization. He talks about the Jordanian decision to dismantle the legal and administrative link with the West Bank after the Algiers summit in 1988, a move that Al-Masry opposed, warning against harming the unity between the two brotherly peoples.

Al-Masry recounts: “When Ahmed Obeidat was assigned to form the cabinet in January 1984, to succeed Mudar Badran’s government, King Hussein’s politically flexible and far-reaching vision was looking for opportunities to improve the country’s situation and prepare for the challenges posed by regional circumstances. […] I would like to point out here that the King’s vision is based on the fact that Jordan and Palestine are the countries that are more concerned with solving the Palestinian issue, and if harmony, coordination or agreement is achieved between them, it will facilitate the unification of an Arab position towards the negotiations.”

“At that time, the convening of the 17th Palestinian National Council conference in Amman was a first and preliminary step for what would happen next, and I think that Ahmed Obeidat did not value the importance of that picture. The exit of the PLO from Beirut in 1982 was of paramount importance to Jordan, especially with the ‘displacement’ of PLO leader Yasser Arafat among the Arab capitals. His instability generated bitterness for the Palestinian leadership, and affected the morale of the Palestinians. King Hussein saw the opportunity to save Yasser Arafat, who was in dire need of convening the Palestinian National Council in order to organize the affairs of the organization, and confirm its legitimacy and presence on the Palestinian political and national scene.”

Al-Masry said Arafat agreed without hesitation, which angered Syria. Hafez al-Assad tried to prevent the convening of the council by making threats and offering incentives.

Nonetheless, the conference was held in Amman from Nov. 22-29, 1984, in the presence of the Jordanian monarch at the opening session.

In parallel, Syria was rallying its ground forces on the northern Jordanian border, threatening military action against the country.

According to Al-Masry’s memoirs, King Hussein began to take new steps towards a Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, which he was convinced was the cornerstone for reaching the international conference. He relied on King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s project calling for the settlement of the Palestinian issue, which was announced during the second Fez Summit.

“King Hussein was keen on informing Saudi Arabia of his first steps regarding the agreement. Marwan al-Qasim was in charge of communicating with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal. […] King Hussein’s goal behind obtaining Saudi Arabia’s clear and public support for this agreement was to strengthen the Jordanian and Palestinian positions, and for King Fahd to persuade the administration of President Ronald Reagan of the new Jordanian strategy.

“After the convening of the Palestinian National Council and King Hussein’s success in this important step, the features of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement began to crystallize, but involved several disagreements before reaching its final form. Arafat put his initials on it on Feb. 11, 1985, claiming that he wanted to seek the opinion of the Palestinian leadership. He left for Kuwait and did not return to Amman.”

According to Al-Masry, the text of the agreement, before its amendment, included five clauses:

1- Land for peace, as stated in United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions;

2- The right of self-determination for the Palestinian people;

3- Solving the Palestinian refugee problem according to United Nations resolutions;

4- Solving the Palestinian issue in all its aspects;

5- On this basis, peace negotiations take place in the light of an international conference, attended by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all parties to the conflict, including the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, within a joint (Jordanian-Palestinian) delegation.

“An agreement was reached on that day (Feb. 11, 1985) on the text and content, and Prince Saud Al-Faisal was contacted and informed of its details. […] News circulated about differences within the Palestinian leadership over some of the wording in the text. Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) supported the agreement, while Farouk Qaddoumi was against it. A few weeks after the signing ceremony, influential Palestinian leaders announced their rejection of the agreement.”

Consequently, Al-Masry said Arafat dispatched three people from the leadership: Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Mahmoud Abbas, and Abdul Razzaq Al-Yahya, to discuss the agreement with the Jordanias. As a result, two clauses were amended.

Al-Masry recalled how Syria strongly opposed and denounced the agreement. Damascus believed that it transferred the Palestinian “card” from Syria’s hands to Jordan’s, and that Amman wanted to “kidnap” the PLO to become supportive of its policies, to thus seek negotiations with the United States and Israel to permanently distance itself from Damascus, which could weaken Syria’s negotiating position.

On the international level, the Soviet Union was also opposed to this agreement. According to Al-Masry, Moscow believed that Jordan was exploiting the difficult Palestinian circumstances that followed the organization’s exit from Beirut in 1982 and its repercussions, “to encourage Yasser Arafat to transfer the rifle from the shoulder of the Soviet Union and the socialist system to the shoulder of the United States.”

Moscow’s analysis prompted it to declare war on the agreement. The battle erupted inside the PLO Executive Committee, which witnessed stormy quarrels between supporters and opponents. Fahd al-Qawasmi paid his life for that.

“King Hussein and the palace officials dealt with the PLO to reach the Jordanian-Palestinian arrangement, and at that time I was more involved in this file than Ahmed Obeidat, but I kept him informed of the developments, as I was the only participant from the Council of Ministers in the relevant discussions,” said Al-Masry.

“After the resignation of the Obeidat government, we completed our duty with the government of Zaid Al-Rifai in promoting the Jordanian-Palestinian understanding. We went with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to Algeria, then Rome, Paris and London.”

The Jordanian diplomat continued: “I carried royal messages about the goals of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement to the Arab Gulf states, and asked them to support it and understand its reasons, so I went to Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, southern and northern Yemen, and the UAE.”

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Iranians Have Long Sought Work and Relative Stability in Türkiye. The War Could Force Some to Return

Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
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Iranians Have Long Sought Work and Relative Stability in Türkiye. The War Could Force Some to Return

Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

Sadri Haghshenas spends her days selling borek — a layered, savory pastry — at a shop in Istanbul, but her mind is on her daughter in Tehran.

The family had to send her home to Iran after they ran into difficulties renewing her visa, despite fears that a shaky ceasefire could soon collapse.

For years, short-term residency permits have allowed tens of thousands of Iranians to pursue economic opportunities and enjoy relative stability in neighboring Türkiye. But it's a precarious situation, and the war has raised the stakes.

“I swear, I cry every day,” Haghshenas said, raising her hands from behind the counter of the pastry shop. “There is no life in my country, there is no life here, what shall I do?”

Haghshenas and her husband moved to Türkiye five years ago with their then-teenage daughters and have been living on tourist visas renewable every six months to two years.

They could not afford a lawyer this year, because her husband is out of work due to health problems. As a result, they missed the deadline to apply for a new visa for their 20-year-old daughter, Asal, who is still in her final year of high school.

Asal was detained at a checkpoint earlier this month and spent a night at an immigration facility. Her mother found a friend to take her back to Tehran rather than face deportation proceedings that could complicate her ability to return to Türkiye. They hope she can come back on a student visa.

Haghshenas has been unable to talk to her daughter since she left because of a monthslong internet blackout in Iran.

A man walks past an Iranian grocery shop in Istanbul on Tuesday, April 14, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

Türkiye has not seen an influx of refugees, as most Iranians have sought safety within their country. Many who have crossed the land border were transiting to other countries where they have citizenship or residency.

Nearly 100,000 Iranians lived in Türkiye in 2025, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute. Around 89,000 have entered Türkiye since the start of the war, while around 72,000 have departed, according to the United Nations' refugee agency.

Some Iranians have used short-term visa-free stays to wait out the war, but there are few options for those who want to stay longer.

Sedat Albayrak, of the Istanbul Bar Association’s Refugee and Migrant Rights Center, said that getting international protection status can be difficult, and the system encourages Iranians to apply for short-term permits instead.

“There are people who have lived on them for over 10 years," The Associated Press quoted him as saying.

Nadr Rahim, right, sits with a friend at an Iranian coffee shop in Istanbul on Tuesday, April 14, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

If the war continues, more may have to return Nadr Rahim came to Türkiye for his children’s education 11 years ago. Now, the war may force him to go home.

Because of the difficulty of getting a permit to start a business or work legally in Türkiye, he lived off the profits of his motorcycle salesroom in Iran. But there have been no sales since the war started, and international sanctions — and the internet outage — make it extremely difficult to transfer funds.

His family only has enough money to stay in Türkiye a few more months. His children grew up in Türkiye and don't read Farsi or speak it fluently. He worries about how they would adapt to living in Iran, but said “if the war continues, we will have no choice but to return.”

In the meantime, he spends most of his days scrolling on his phone, waiting for news from his parents in Tehran or discussing the war over waterpipes with Iranian friends.

A 42-year-old Iranian woman came to Türkiye eight months ago, hoping to make money to support her family. She and her daughter registered as university students to get study visas.

She attends classes in the morning to keep her legal status before rushing to service jobs, sometimes working until 3 a.m.

They share a room with six other people at a women's boarding house, she said, speaking on condition of anonymity out of fear for her security should she return to Iran.

“I truly love Iran. If necessary, I would even go and defend it in war,” she says. But she sees no future there, while in Türkiye, she’s barely scraping by and only able to send small amounts of money to her parents.

“I have a bad life in Türkiye, and my parents have a bad life in Iran,” she said. “I came to Türkiye with so much hope, to support my parents and build a future. But now I feel hopeless.”

A 33-year-old freelance architect from Tehran traveled to Türkiye during Iran's violent crackdown on mass protests in January. She had planned to return after the situation calmed down, but then the United States and Israel went to war with Iran at the end of February.

“I started to believe that it’s a very bad situation, worse than I expected,” she said, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of persecution if she returns to Iran.

She has been unable to work for her usual clients back in Iran because of the internet blackout. With the end of her 90-day visa-free window approaching, she can't afford to apply for a longer stay in Türkiye.

Instead, she has decided to go to Malaysia, where she will get free accommodation in return for building shelters during a month of visa-free stay.

She has no plan for what comes next.

Features

Strait of Hormuz Blockade Step by Step: What Do We Know?

A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
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Strait of Hormuz Blockade Step by Step: What Do We Know?

A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)

Shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained mostly at a standstill on Monday, with just three vessels crossing the vital waterway, according to Kpler, a maritime data firm.

On Sunday, a US Navy destroyer attacked and seized an Iranian-flagged cargo ship that US President Donald Trump said had tried to evade the US blockade on ships traveling to and from Iranian ports.

In a separate incident, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations center, which is administered by Britain’s Royal Navy, said that two vessels had been hit while trying to cross the Strait of Hormuz, according to a notice published on Saturday.

In one instance, gun ships operated by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps fired at a tanker without radio warning, the British organization said. In the second incident, a container ship was hit by “an unknown projectile” that damaged some of the containers.

On Tuesday, the US military said it had seized an Iran-linked tanker in international waters, in what appears to be the latest move to enforce a blockade as the ceasefire deadline looms.

The US military said it had boarded the tanker Tifani “without incident.”

The ship, capable of carrying 2 million barrels of crude, last reported its position on Tuesday morning near Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, according to MarineTraffic tracking data. It was close to fully loaded and had signaled Singapore as its destination.

A two-week ceasefire between the US and Iran is set to expire early Wednesday.

Latest developments

The US Navy has turned back 27 ships trying to enter or exit Iranian ports since an American blockade outside the contested Strait of Hormuz began about a week ago, the military’s Central Command said on Monday.

On Sunday, a Navy destroyer disabled and seized the Touska, an Iranian cargo ship, in the Gulf of Oman after it tried to evade the blockade. It was the first time a vessel was reported to have tried to evade the US-imposed blockade on any ship entering or exiting Iranian ports since it took effect last week.

The guided-missile destroyer Spruance, one of more than a dozen Navy warships enforcing the US blockade, ordered the vessel’s crew to evacuate its engine room.

The Spruance then fired several rounds from its Mk-45 gun into the ship’s propulsion system as it steamed toward the port of Bandar Abbas in Iran, Central Command said in a statement that included a video of the firing.

American officials will determine what to do with the disabled vessel once the search is completed, a US military official said on Monday, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters, according to the New York Times. One option would be to tow the stricken ship to Oman, independent specialists said. An alternative would be to let the Touska steam to an Iranian port, if it can.

A spokesman for Iran’s military reiterated a threat on Monday to “take the necessary action against the US military” in response to the ship’s seizure, Iran’s state broadcaster reported.

How is the US imposing the blockade?

According to CENTCOM, more than 10,000 US personnel, including sailors, marines, and airmen, are participating in the operation, supported by over a dozen warships and dozens of aircraft. The effort spans key waterways surrounding Iran, including the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

The US blockade on Iranian ports does not have a defined geographic boundary, and the United States can interdict vessels almost anywhere in international waters until they arrive at their final port.

Analysts say modern technology allows blockade enforcement at great distances.

Can ships evade the blockade?

Maritime intelligence experts say that more ships in and around the Strait of Hormuz seem to be adopting “spoofing” tactics to avoid detection.

Under international maritime law, most large commercial vessels travel with a transponder that automatically transmits the ship’s name, location, route and other identifying information. That includes a nine-digit number with a country code, which serves as a digital fingerprint for a ship.

The tactics were used by Russian “shadow fleet” vessels evading sanctions related to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

When a ship is engaged in spoofing, its captain can type in a false origin or destination or can pretend to be piloting another ship altogether. Vessels can also temporarily turn off their transponders, seeming to disappear in one place and reappear in another.

The strait is “a contested information environment,” said Erik Bethel, a partner at Mare Liberum, a maritime technology venture capital fund.

Still, whatever ruses they employ, vessels going to and from Iran may get only so far. It is difficult to pass between the open ocean and a waterway as narrow as the Strait of Hormuz without being detected.

“My expectation is that the US Navy can sit out in the Gulf of Oman,” said Ami Daniel, the chief executive of Windward, a maritime intelligence data provider. “I don’t think there’s a way to breach the blockade.”

What are the US and Iranian strategies?

The US blockade sets up a significant test in the Iran war: Which side can endure more economic pain?

Instead of directing missiles and bombs, Trump is trying to choke off Iran’s oil exports, which make up just about all of the government’s revenue.

Some experts questioned whether the US blockade would work.

“Iran is already hurting, and they have shown that they are willing to take more than a couple of hits,” said Ahmet Kasim Han, a professor of international relations at TED University in Ankara, Türkiye.

Iran’s strategy appears to be using its leverage over global energy markets, where Tehran has discovered new powers that can cause pain in the US economy through spikes in the price of gasoline and other staples.

Why is the strait so important?

The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic waterway connecting the Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. It is the only sea route for moving oil, natural gas and other cargo out of the Gulf. Iran’s coastline runs along the entire route.

At the strait’s narrowest and most vulnerable point — between Iran to the north and the Musandam Peninsula of Oman to the south — the navigable channel is about two miles wide each for inbound and outbound traffic, according to the International Energy Agency.

The legal status of the strait is complex. It lies within the territorial waters of Iran and Oman, but under international law it is treated as an international waterway where ships are generally guaranteed passage.

Iran has signed but not ratified that framework and has disputed the extent of those rights.

Before the war, about 20% of global oil and liquid natural gas passed through the strait. Most of the fossil fuels are bound for Asia, especially China, India, Japan and South Korea.

Other large vessels also use the strait, including car carriers and container ships.

Crucial industrial goods traveling through Hormuz include helium from Qatar, fertilizer from Oman and Saudi Arabia, and plastic feedstocks from Saudi Arabia and Emirati petrochemical plants.

How does Iran control the strait?

Iran’s military can threaten shipping traffic throughout the Strait of Hormuz, even though much of its navy has been destroyed by US and Israeli strikes.

The United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on the argument that if Iran one day got a nuclear weapon, it would have the ultimate deterrent against future attacks.

It turns out that Iran already has a deterrent: geography.

“The Iranians have thought a lot about how to utilize the geography to their benefit,” said Caitlin Talmadge, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who studies Gulf security.

*The New York Times

Features

US-Iran Talks Test Power Balances in Tehran as National Security Council Comes to the Forefront

Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
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US-Iran Talks Test Power Balances in Tehran as National Security Council Comes to the Forefront

Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)

After US-Israeli bombardment eliminated Iran’s supreme leader and much of its top echelons, the country’s leadership didn’t fall apart — but negotiations to end the war offer a new test.

For decades, the supreme leader successfully managed several powerful factions, bringing to heel those who challenged his authority while listening to rival opinions. It’s now unclear who wields that kind of authority over the collection of civilian figures and powerful generals from the Revolutionary Guard who appear to be in charge.

They have found unity — for now — by taking a tough line. But disagreements over how much to concede in negotiations with the United States could reveal fault lines, as Pakistani mediators try to host a new round of talks this week, according to The Associated Press.

Who is in charge?

In the past, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was able to impose his will on the country's disparate power centers. After Israeli strikes killed him on the first day of the war, his son Mojtaba Khamenei succeeded him.

But doubts continue to swirl over the younger Khamenei’s role after reports he was wounded in the strikes. Still in hiding, he has not appeared in public since becoming supreme leader and how he gives orders to top leaders is a mystery.

At the center of power now is a politburo-like body known as the Supreme National Security Council, which includes Iran’s top civilian and military officials. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the parliament speaker and a veteran insider with strong contacts on all sides, has emerged as its face and the chief negotiator with the US.

The late Khamenei began giving more authority to the council before his death, but the war has consolidated its power.

The council contains a range of political opinions and often acute rivalries. A political rival of Qalibaf and uncompromising opponent of the US, Saeed Jalili, represents the supreme leader on the council, while the body’s nominal head is reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian.

Hard-liner members include the Guard’s new chief commander, Ahmad Vahidi, and the council’s new secretary, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, also a commander in the Guard.

But Israel’s strategy of eliminating top leaders points to a misreading of how the Iranian regime works, experts say.

Iran’s leadership survived “precisely because there are multiple power centers with overlapping authorities,” said Ali Vaez, Iran director at the International Crisis Group. “Factionalism is just built into the DNA of this system.”

But since the war, the Guard’s growing clout on the council has also stoked speculation that a fundamental change could be coming.

Negotiations with the US will stress test the power structure

The council now faces potentially divisive questions over how far to go to reach a deal with the US, which is demanding Iran make major concessions aimed at ensuring it is never able to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran has long insisted its program is peaceful while saying it has the right to uranium enrichment.

In an interview with Iranian state TV on Sunday, Qalibaf said Iran wants a comprehensive accord that brings “a lasting peace” where the US no longer attacks the country.

“This dangerous loop needs to be cut,” he said. The US has twice launched strikes on Iran during high-level negotiations: once in the 12-day war in June, then again in the current conflict.

Council members have projected confidence that Iran holds the upper hand now, particularly because its grip on the Strait of Hormuz — a crucial passage for the world’s oil — enables it to drive up fuel prices, thus threatening the global economy and exerting political pressure on US President Donald Trump back home.

Senior officials have insisted they can hold out for assurances that Iran won’t be attacked again — even risking the war reigniting — because they believe Iran can endure the pain longer than the United States and its allies.

But ultimately, the leadership’s priority remains its own survival. The war and the US blockade, which is threatening Iran’s oil trade, are tightening the screws on the country’s cratering economy.

Economic hardship has fueled waves of unrest over the past two decades, including protests in January that openly called for the regime’s overthrow. A deal with the West lifting sanctions could help it keep its grip at home.

Signs of disagreement

Events over the weekend surrounding the Strait of Hormuz gave an indication of serious differences over how much to concede in negotiations. Engagement with Washington has long divided Iran’s top ranks, despite a shared deep mistrust of the US.

On Friday, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced in a posting on X that Iran was opening the strait to commercial traffic as part of the ceasefire agreement with the US. Hours later, Trump proclaimed that the US would continue its blockade to keep pressure on Iran to reach a deal over its nuclear program.

On Saturday morning, Iran’s military announced that it was reclosing the strait in retaliation for the blockade.

Some Iranian media criticized Araghchi, suggesting his post created the impression Iran was showing weakness and revealing the differing positions behind the scenes. A report by the Tasnim news agency, seen as close to the Guard, said the position on the strait should have come from the National Security Council itself.

Araghchi’s office pushed back, saying the Foreign Ministry “does not take any action without coordinating with higher-level institutions.”

In his interview Sunday, Qalibaf tried to paper over any divisions, emphasizing that everyone in the leadership was on the same page on Iran’s strategy in US talks.

A possible bridge builder

The 64-year-old Qalibaf is best positioned to bridge divides among Iran’s factions.

Qalibaf is a former general in the Guard and national police chief and kept close to the Guard throughout his long political career. As Tehran’s mayor from 2005 to 2017, Qalibaf gained a reputation as a pragmatist able to get things done, like overhauling an ailing public transport system, even as he faced major corruption and human rights abuse allegations.

Ali Rabie, a well-known reformist and an assistant to the president, wrote last week in a newspaper editorial that Qalibaf was “the representative of the country and the regime.”

At the same time, Qalibaf is close to the Khamenei family both hailing from the area of the eastern city of Mashhad, said Mohsen Sazegara, one of the founders of the Revolutionary Guard in the 1980s who is now an opposition figure living in the US.

During his father’s rule, Mojtaba Khamenei backed Qalibaf’s several unsuccessful attempts to run for president.

Qalibaf is also close to the senior Guard figures who stepped in to replace those killed by Israel and who are widely seen as holding the key to any future agreement with the US. His cross-factional backing could enable him to ensure support at home for a deal against blowback from ideologues who will resist compromise.