Europe and the Growing Challenge of Iran’s ‘Hostage Taking'

Asharq Al-Awsat tells the story of four families fighting to bring their loved ones home

Richard Ratcliffe and his daughter Gabriella outside the FCDO, November 5. (AFP)
Richard Ratcliffe and his daughter Gabriella outside the FCDO, November 5. (AFP)
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Europe and the Growing Challenge of Iran’s ‘Hostage Taking'

Richard Ratcliffe and his daughter Gabriella outside the FCDO, November 5. (AFP)
Richard Ratcliffe and his daughter Gabriella outside the FCDO, November 5. (AFP)

Richard Ratcliffe, who has been campaigning to bring his wife home for over five years, ended a three-week hunger strike today.

He spent the last 20 nights in a tent opposite the Foreign Office building in central London, in an attempt to ramp up pressure on the government to secure the release of his wife and other dual-nationals, held in Iran as “bargaining chips”.

Surrounded by #FreeNazanin posters and artwork crafted by his mother and his daughter Gabriella’s class, Ratcliffe looked much thinner and weaker, but no less resolved to continue his campaign to bring his wife home.

He said in a Twitter post: “Today I have promised Nazanin to end the hunger strike. Gabriella needs two parents.”

Zaghari-Ratcliffe was arrested in Tehran in April 2016, as she was returning home to the UK after visiting family with her daughter Gabriella.

She was accused of plotting to overthrow Iran’s government, a charge she categorically denies, and served a five-year sentence which ended earlier this year.

She was not however allowed to go back to the UK, and was sentenced to a further year in prison and a one-year travel ban, on charges of spreading “propaganda against the system”, for having participated in a protest outside the Iranian Embassy in London in 2009.

She appealed the verdict, but the decision was upheld by a court in Tehran last month.

Like Ratcliffe, many families condemn Iran's "hostage taking", and call on their governments to protect dual nationals from being used as "bargaining chips".

Asharq Al-Awsat speaks to four families campaigning to bring their loved ones home.

Two hunger strikes in 3 years

There was growing concern amongst Ratcliffe’s family and supporters about his health, but he was determined to last as long as it was medically safe to do so.

“It felt like either we escalate now, or the Revolutionary Guards do,” Ratcliffe told Asharq Al-Awsat explaining his decision to go on a second hunger strike in three years.

“I asked the Foreign Secretary when I spoke to her (last month) about the consequences (the UK would impose) after Nazanin’s sentence. There were none.”

He noted that “there might be consequences if they put her back in prison, but (for us) that would be too late. This is what triggered this hunger strike.”

He continued: “This is something we can do, we do not have to wait for the government. I am hoping to make the point that I am not going to let this drift, (the government) needs to resolve this.”

Ratcliffe was fully aware of the dangers of going on a hunger strike in near-freezing temperatures, when he made the decision.

“It takes a few days to adjust to sleeping on the streets, it is precarious, it is cold,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat on his second day without food.

Fast forward to day 20, Ratcliffe does not feel hungry anymore, but feels the cold more. “I can feel it in my fingers and toes. I am definitely slower and rougher,” he said.

His last hunger strike, which was in solidarity with his wife, lasted 15 days and resulted in his daughter being returned to the UK.

“This time, it was my decision,” he explained.

Four demands

Ratcliffe presented four demands to Boris Johnson’s government, “three sticks and one carrot”.

The sticks include “being honest that this is a hostage situation, punishing the perpetrators by imposing Magnitsky-style sanctions on them, and working with allies within the JCPOA negotiations to commit Iran to stop taking hostages.”

As for the carrot, Ratcliffe calls on the government to pay a decades-old debt owed to Iran, which he links to his wife’s detention.

“It is unconscionable that the government doesn’t solve that,” he says.

An outstanding debt

Ratcliffe considers that his wife is being used as “leverage” by Iran, with regard to the UK's failure to pay an outstanding £400 million debt to Iran, part of a 1971 arms deal dispute. On the other hand, the UK considers it “unhelpful” to connect wider bilateral issues with those arbitrarily detained in Iran.

The government says that it continues to explore options to resolve this 40-year-old case, and that discussions are ongoing.

Following a meeting with UK Minister for the Middle East and North Africa, James Cleverly, in London earlier this week, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Ali Bagheri Kani said the size of the payment to Iran, including interest, had been agreed by the two sides, revealing it was less than £500m, according to the Guardian.

London and Tehran seemed close to an agreement last summer, before talks came to a halt.

“We had reasons to be hopeful over the summer, there was quite a lot of negotiations going on. Those have obviously hit a wall and stopped,” Ratcliffe confirms. Dr. Carla Ferstman, a senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law and Human Rights Centre, said that it was “important for the UK government to repay the debt in accordance with court judgments, which have affirmed that the UK has this obligation. The obligation to repay the debt exists irrespective of the hostage situation.”

She adds that while “one would not want to take action that will simply encourage more hostage-taking,” it is “at the same time vital for states to also take into account the humanitarian consequences and the extreme suffering of the persons detained and their families.”

“What is important is for the many states who find themselves in this situation to coordinate their actions to maximize their collective impact.”

A detained father

Like Ratcliffe, Elika Ashoori, daughter of Anoosheh Ashoori, a 66-year-old British-Iranian jailed for spying charges in the notorious Evin prison, connects her father’s case to the outstanding debt.

She and her brother Aryan Ashoori have joined Ratcliffe a few nights in his camping site outside the Foreign Office.

Recalling the story of Ashoori’s arrest, Elika tells Asharq Al-Awsat: “My father went to Iran in the summer of 2017, to visit his mum who was 86 years old at the time. She was going to undergo knee surgery, and he went to nurse her.”

Unsuspecting of his fate, Ashoori was arrested on his way to the shops in August 2017. “A van pulled up, they asked his name, and once he confirmed it, they put a bag over his head and they took him in.”

The retired engineer, who holds British and Iranian passports, was directly taken to Evin prison. He was tried there on charges of spying for the Mossad, and is now serving a 10-year sentence.

“He was in solitary confinement for two and a half months, and was then taken to the general ward, where he has been until this day.”

Elika explains that her family tried to go through an appeals process in Iran to overturn her father’s sentence. “But obviously, it is not a real sentence, nor a real charge. So they have rejected that.”

She adds that “we have since discovered that this is the {basic charge} used by the Iranian government to arrest dual nationals taken as hostages for Tehran’s gains.”

Elika sees a clear link between her father’s imprisonment and the historic outstanding debt that the UK owes Iran since 1979.

“It is not a secret anymore,” she says. “There have been talks between governments, to settle this debt. But we had Covid-19 and Brexit happening in the last couple of years, which contributed to delaying the process.”

She adds: “Both governments have at some point publicly acknowledged the situation as what it is now. There have been deals that were close to being made, but they have fallen through for reasons we are not told.”

Elika believes that her father is “collateral damage” between countries trying to make deals that would benefit them.

Since Ashoori’s arrest, his family and representatives have held multiple meetings with the FCDO, but these have seldom resulted in tangible progress, Elika says.

She explains: “We had meetings with both Jeremy Hunt and Dominic Raab. The nature of these meetings is always similar. They give us an update on ongoing negotiations, and confirm that the dual-national cases are important to them, and that they are doing their best.”

She laments that they have been hearing “the same forms of response for four years."

French tourist facing espionage charges

On the other side of the Channel, a family is breaking their silence after the detention of Benjamin Brière (35 years old), a French national who traveled by himself to Iran, onboard a van.

His sister Blandine Brière stopped receiving updates from him in May 2020, until her and her family discovered that he was arrested not far from the city of Mashhad, where he was visiting a natural park.

He was accused of flying a drone and taking photographs in a “prohibited area”. He has since been charged of espionage and propaganda against the Iranian regime.

Denying the charges, Blandine maintains that her brother, who’s been in prison in the city of Mashhad for over 14 months, was “an ordinary French tourist, who bought a tourist drone from a supermarket”.

She tells Asharq Al-Awsat: “He went traveling in Iran, fell in love with the country and its people. And found himself jailed overnight.”

Benjamin receives regular consular visits, usually once every two months.

“We pleaded time and time again with the French government, and with President (Emmanuel) Macron, to intervene on behalf of Benjamin, but we continue to be in the dark about his case,” laments Blandine.

“We receive no word of progress from the authorities, other than {Benjamin is doing fine, do not worry, he is not mistreated}.”

In terms of communicating directly with Benjamin, Blandine says that throughout the past year, she could only speak to him three times. But over the last few months, “things have improved and I am able to speak to him every two to three weeks over the phone.”

Blandine notes that her brother should have access to a phone call a day, and that he “fights” daily for his right to speak to his family.

That said, Benjamin can still contact the French consul freely. Benjamin is the only foreign prisoner, publicly acknowledged by Iran, not to have dual citizenship. He only holds a French passport.

Faced with silence from the French authorities, Benjamin’s family decided to raise his case public a few months ago, “to try and move things along.”

Blandine explains: “We have been asked to keep quiet about Benjamin’s imprisonment in the beginning, in the hope that his case gets sorted out. However, had we continued with our silence, things would still not have improved. So, we have decided to raise my brother’s case publicly. The situation is obscure; we are deprived of all information.”

Blandine, like the other families fighting to bring their loved ones’ home, believes that he brother could be a “bargaining chip” used by Iran to advance its interests.

She says: “Given that we have no information about the judicial process in Iran, no ruling on Benjamin’s case, this is the only scenario that makes sense. We now just ask our government to do what is necessary to bring him home.”

Blandine adds: “we can now clearly say that Benjamin is hostage of negotiations between countries, and that he serves as leverage”.

A 'hostage' on death row

Vida Mehran-nia’s Swedish-Iranian husband, Ahmadreza Djalali, was arrested by officials from Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence while travelling by car from Tehran to Karaj in April 2016.

Ahmadreza, who works at a medical university in Stockholm, went to Iran after receiving an invitation to attend a workshop on disaster medicine.

“He planned to stay in the country for two weeks and to return to Sweden on 28 April 2016. However, he has still not returned,” his wife tells Asharq Al-Awsat.

“At the time of his arrest, the Iranian officials did not present an arrest warrant, nor did they inform Ahmadreza of the reason for his arrest”.

She continues: “Approximately two weeks later, they claimed that Ahmadreza had collaborated with Israel."

He was later sentenced to death for allegedly passing on classified information to Israel's Mossad intelligence agency.

Ahmadreza and his family vehemently deny the “baseless charges”.

“Until today, not one document of proof or evidence has been presented by Iran's judicial power or the ministry of Intelligence. On the contrary, they have ignored all the undeniable evidence and documents that Ahmadreza and his lawyers provided as proof of his innocence,” maintains his wife.

Vida was denied all contact with her husband for many months.

She says: “It has been almost a year the Evin prison officials have blocked contact between us and Ahmadreza. However, just about four months ago, when his mother passed away, officials unblocked his contact with his family inside Iran. He is still denied contact with us in Sweden."

Ahmadreza’s treatment in Evin prison has been particularly cruel, and “has involved various inhuman” tactics, Vida says.

She continues: “It is enough to refer to a sentence used by UN human rights experts that stated: {There is only word to describe the severe physical and psychological ill-treatment of Djalali, and that is torture}".

Like the families of Nazanin, Anoosheh and Benjamin, Vida believes that her husband is being used as a bargaining chip.

She says: “As we clearly see in international media, it seems that Ahmadreza is being used as a bargaining chip to mount political pressure on the EU, Belgium and Sweden in particular. There are a couple of legal challenges and trials in these countries that outrage the Iranian regime”..

“It is assumed by the media and various entities that Ahmadreza is a hostage,” she concludes.

A worsening phenomenon

Hostage taking is not a new phenomenon, but Dr. Ferstman believes it is fair to say, that the practice “has increased in recent years.”

She explains: “Part of the increased media attention stems from the fact that the families affected are in more contact with each other. This has improved solidarity, but has also increased knowledge about the scale of the problem and heightened media interest.”

As to whether state-sponsored hostage taking usually works, Ferstman says that “it depends what one considers to be the objective. It is rarely just about the immediate trade or concession.”

She continues: “What the practice does do is heighten mistrust, complicate international relations and also (at least in the case of dual-nationals) instill fear in persons living abroad to come back to Iran to visit family or to engage professionally or economically with Iran.”

“This has long-term ramifications on the country and ultimately fosters Iran's isolation.”

Ferstman considers that the UN has an important role.

“The UN human rights machinery - including the UN Special Rapporteur on Iran and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention have regularly commented on the practice."

She adds: “But equally, given the international dimension of the problem and the targeting of nationals from an array of countries impacting peace and security, both the general assembly and the security council also have an important role to play.”



Drones vs. Airstrikes: How the Deterrence Equation Between Israel and Hezbollah Changed

A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
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Drones vs. Airstrikes: How the Deterrence Equation Between Israel and Hezbollah Changed

A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 

Israel is pressing forward with firepower, evacuation warnings, and limited ground incursions, while Hezbollah is responding with drones and direct engagements along advanced positions north of the Litani River.

Yet behind this reciprocal escalation, the deterrence equation that governed the border throughout the years following the 2006 war appears to be facing an unprecedented test, as military operations expand and reach areas that until recently were considered beyond the immediate danger zone.

Airstrikes that now reach as far as Zahrani, clashes around Zawtar al-Sharqiya, and Israel’s gradual advance toward the outskirts of Nabatieh all indicate, according to Lebanese military assessments, that the confrontation has entered a different phase.

In this new stage, drones alone are no longer capable of maintaining a deterrent balance, while Israel is pursuing a policy of mounting military pressure aimed at reshaping realities on the ground ahead of any potential settlement or negotiations.

Drones Do Not Create Deterrence

Retired Brig. Gen. Dr. Hisham Jaber, head of the Middle East Center for Studies argued that the drones used by Hezbollah do not achieve genuine deterrence against the continued expansion of Israeli air and ground operations.

He maintained that Israel’s ongoing airstrikes and ground incursions demonstrate that the deterrence equation is no longer functioning.

Jaber also linked battlefield developments to the erosion of the deterrence that had existed after the 2006 war, arguing that “the deterrence that lasted from 2006 to 2023 was real and effective.” However, he said Hezbollah’s entry into a war of attrition after opening its support front for Gaza led to the collapse of that equation.

He further warned that Israel’s objectives may not be limited to Zawtar and its surroundings but could expand farther north.

A Policy of Depopulation and Prolonged Attrition

Jaber said Israel’s policy of warnings and evacuations is designed to empty areas of their civilian populations.

“Once Israel evacuates an area of its residents, it becomes able to strike any movement within it,” he explained. “At that point, anyone traveling by car or motorcycle becomes a potential target.”

He added: “My greatest concern is that southern Lebanon may already have entered a prolonged war of attrition, because current battlefield indicators do not suggest a quick path toward ending this escalation or returning to the previous rules of engagement.”

Assessing both the military and political landscape, he argued that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “will not stop the war in Lebanon at this stage, regardless of the losses incurred,” noting that Israel “has not yet achieved any of its declared military or political objectives.”

He added that “Tel Aviv has failed to disarm Hezbollah and has also been unable to impose the conditions it seeks on Lebanon.”

According to his assessment, current developments indicate that “things will not return to the way they were,” arguing that the conflict has entered a new phase that will have lasting consequences for southern Lebanon and the balance of power there.

As for Hezbollah, Jaber said the group also “cannot simply halt the war midway through, given the complexities of the battlefield and the interwoven regional and international calculations.”

No Deterrent Balance Exists

For his part, retired Brig. Gen. Khalil Helou argued that “the drones used by Hezbollah have failed to establish a deterrent balance against Israel’s intensive air campaign,” stressing that “Israel is inflicting far greater damage and losses than it is receiving.”

He explained that fiber-optic-guided FPV (First-Person View) drones suffer from technical limitations related to both range and payload capacity.

“In practical terms, the range of these drones is between three and 15 kilometers and may reach around 20 kilometers as a reasonable upper limit,” he said. “The cable connecting the drone adds weight and affects its operational capabilities.”

Helou argued that claims of their use at distances of up to 60 kilometers are “militarily unrealistic.”

He added that “Hezbollah is attempting to achieve battlefield effects and inflict casualties through drones, but developments on the ground show that Israel is imposing far greater damage on both Hezbollah and Lebanon.”

 

 

 


Have Hezbollah’s Drones Changed the Rules of Engagement with Israel?

Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)
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Have Hezbollah’s Drones Changed the Rules of Engagement with Israel?

Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)

The “support war” waged by Lebanon’s Hezbollah in backing Hamas in late 2023 shattered the doctrine of “deterrence” that the Iranian-backed group had embraced and promoted for nearly two decades in its confrontation with its traditional adversary, Israel. Israel, for its part, also helped reinforce this assumption, which proved entirely mistaken the following year. The new round of fighting in 2026 then offered both sides an opportunity to establish a new set of rules governing the conflict.

Israeli patience and cunning

Israel did not rush into a direct war with Hezbollah after the group launched a wave of largely “performative” attacks, beginning with rockets fired at the outskirts of Israeli military positions in the Shebaa Farms. Instead, it quietly steered the confrontation in a different direction, displaying notable restraint and considerable strategic calculation.

This approach was reflected in diplomatic efforts undertaken by Tel Aviv through Washington to persuade Hezbollah to separate the Lebanese front from the Palestinian one. In July 2024, then US envoy Amos Hochstein reportedly told Lebanese officials that he was prepared to deliver what would amount to a political victory for Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah if the group halted its operations.

Nasrallah immediately rejected the proposal. According to those who relayed the message to him, he replied that the war in Gaza would first have to end. After that, other matters could be discussed.

This was not Hezbollah’s first strategic misjudgment. The shape of the new conflict unfolding in Lebanon’s border villages quickly revealed a clear Israeli technological and military advantage. A senior Hezbollah official later disclosed that in previous confrontations, fighters could launch a rocket, calmly gather their equipment after informing command that the launch had been successful, and leave the site before Israeli aircraft arrived.

People react while attending the funeral of an Israeli soldier Captain Doctor Ori Yosef Silvester, a 30-year-old army doctor for the Givati Brigade's Shaked Battalion, who was killed in southern Lebanon, at the Segula Cemetery in Petah Tikva on June 2, 2026. (AFP)

In the new conflict, however, the window between launch and retaliation had narrowed to between five and twenty seconds. As a result, the official said, fighters often dug into the ground and sought immediate cover after firing in the hope of surviving. Every launch effectively became a near-suicidal operation.

Subsequent developments underscored Israel’s superiority even more clearly. Israeli forces carried out a series of precise assassinations targeting Hezbollah military commanders, culminating in a strike that eliminated most of the leadership of the Radwan Force, the group’s elite unit.

Israel then killed Hezbollah’s military commander and launched the “pager operation,” which put thousands of Hezbollah operatives out of action at the push of a button. This was followed by the assassination of Nasrallah in a massive airstrike on Beirut’s southern suburbs and, later, the killing of his successor, Hashem Safieddine.

Instruments of war

According to field sources, the weapons and tactics employed by both sides suggest that they prepared for a prolonged war of attrition rather than a decisive battle.

Beginning in the first week after the latest ceasefire agreement, Hezbollah reduced its reliance on rockets, scaled back the use of suicide drones, and curtailed the deployment of guided anti-tank missiles, whose operators were often vulnerable to detection. Instead, it introduced first-person-view (FPV) drones.

These drones are typically operated within a range of 10 to 15 kilometers in southern Lebanon and are guided through fiber-optic cables linking the aircraft directly to its operator. A thin wire connects the control station to the drone carrying the explosive payload, allowing it to evade electronic jamming.

An Israeli self-propelled howitzer artillery gun fires rounds towards southern Lebanon from a position in the upper Galilee in northern Israel near the border on March 15, 2026. (AFP)

Hezbollah in 2026: A war of drones

Hezbollah sought to regain the initiative in the latest conflict, which erupted in March and coincided with the war with Iran. Israel conveyed a message that it was not interested in opening a front with Lebanon so long as Hezbollah remained on the sidelines.

The group reassured officials in Beirut that it would not initiate hostilities. It nevertheless surprised observers by launching rockets toward northern Israel, prompting a fierce Israeli response.

Unlike the image it initially projected through the launch of six rudimentary rockets, Hezbollah appeared far more organized and capable in the fighting that followed, revealing capabilities that had remained concealed during 15 months of relative calm. The group claimed to be carrying out as many as 100 operations a day against Israeli forces and introduced new weapons systems to the battlefield.

Its ground strategy also evolved. Rather than relying on static defenses or attempting to halt Israeli advances outright, Hezbollah focused on inflicting the greatest possible damage on advancing forces.

Rise of drones

Rockets no longer dominate the battlefield between Israel and Hezbollah. After weeks of fighting that erupted in the spring of 2026, a notable shift emerged in the military operations, with attack and suicide drones moving to the forefront and becoming one of the most influential factors shaping combat on both sides of the border.

For years, Hezbollah’s military identity was closely associated with its vast rocket arsenal, which represented Israel’s primary security concern. The current conflict, however, has shown that the group no longer relies exclusively on rockets. Instead, it has expanded its use of drones on a large scale.

According to Israeli assessments, a substantial share of Hezbollah’s recent attacks has involved attack and suicide drones, while conventional rockets have assumed a less prominent role than before.

Israeli researchers argue that this shift reflects lessons drawn from recent conflicts, particularly the war in Ukraine, where inexpensive drones demonstrated their ability to inflict significant losses on technologically superior forces.

According to Israeli reports and military studies published since the outbreak of the war in March, Hezbollah’s principal weapon is no longer its rocket arsenal alone but the attack and suicide drones that have become the primary threat facing Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

Israeli soldiers operate a drone. (Israeli army)

Foremost among these are FPV suicide drones guided by thin fiber-optic cables, making them effectively immune to electronic jamming. Their small size, low-altitude flight profiles, and erratic maneuverability pose additional challenges for Israeli radar and air-defense systems.

These drones carry relatively small explosive payloads, typically weighing no more than five kilograms. A Lebanese security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah employs three different types of warheads depending on the intended target—whether a tank, a conventional vehicle, or personnel.

Former Israeli officers say the threat posed by these drones extends beyond fixed military targets. They are also capable of tracking moving forces and striking tanks, vehicles, and field command centers, placing continuous pressure on Israeli ground units in southern Lebanon.

No definitive figures are available regarding the number of suicide drones Hezbollah has used since the beginning of the war. Unofficial Israeli estimates, however, suggest that the number may range from several hundred launches to more than a thousand.

Israel recently stated that Hezbollah had launched more than 120 drones of this type. The group, meanwhile, has released dozens of videos purporting to show drones striking vehicles, armored platforms, electronic systems, and personnel in the field.

Israel says Hezbollah’s operations have killed 20 soldiers and wounded dozens more since March.

In addition, Hezbollah has claimed responsibility for detonating explosive devices against Israeli vehicles deep inside operational areas and for repelling Israeli incursions using light and medium machine guns, as well as rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

A screengrab image taken from a handout video released by the Israeli army and created on April 27, 2026, shows Israeli army footage of what it says is the destruction of Hezbollah infrastructure in Lebanon, where a ceasefire has been in place since mid-April. (Israel Army / AFP)

Anti-armor missiles

Anti-armor missiles remain the backbone of Hezbollah’s ground warfare capability and have been used against Israeli tanks, vehicles, and fortifications.

Israeli sources point in particular to the Almas missile family, derived from Israel’s Spike missile system. According to those sources, Iran reverse-engineered the weapon after Hezbollah fighters captured an Israeli missile during the 2006 war. Russian-made Kornet systems and other anti-tank platforms also remain in service.

A third category of weapons consists of short- and medium-range rockets and artillery projectiles used extensively against military positions, troop concentrations, and bases in the Galilee and northern Israel. Their use, however, declined relative to drones during many phases of the 2026 conflict.

Reconnaissance and attack drones

Reconnaissance and attack drones rank fourth among Hezbollah’s principal battlefield systems.

Not all of them are suicide drones. Some are used for surveillance, fire correction, and target acquisition, while others carry small munitions and return to base after completing their missions.

Israeli sources have also reported limited use of anti-aircraft missiles and air-defense fire directed at Israeli aircraft.

Nevertheless, these systems have not proven as decisive as drones and anti-armor missiles in the current conflict.

A photograph taken from the southern area of Marjeyoun shows flares fired by the Israeli military descending over the village of Arnoun late on May 13, 2026. (AFP)

Evolving tactics

Israel, too, has adapted its methods of warfare.

Rather than relying primarily on armored formations advancing under air cover, it has sought to reduce casualties and increase mobility.

Lebanese security sources said the Israeli military has adopted tactics centered on small special forces teams moving along unpaved routes to avoid mines and ambushes. At the first sign of resistance, these units withdraw while combat aircraft strike hostile firing positions.

Alongside heavy air raids conducted by fighter jets and precision strikes carried out by drones against individuals traveling in cars and motorcycles, Israel has introduced two additional systems to the battlefield.

The first consists of loitering munitions, which have appeared in footage targeting motorcycles and personnel in the field.

The second is the extensive use of guided artillery rounds in 155 mm and 240 mm calibers, according to field sources in southern Lebanon. These systems have been employed against villages located well beyond the border zone.

The sources described the rounds as laser-guided, providing greater accuracy and enabling strikes at distances reaching up to 30 kilometers inside Lebanese territory.

According to Israeli statements and observations by military research centers during the 2026 war, unmanned aerial systems have been among the most heavily utilized assets in Lebanon. Israel maintains an extensive drone network covering both front-line and rear areas, including the Hermes 900 and Hermes 450 platforms, as well as smaller Skylark reconnaissance drones.

These systems have been used for surveillance, target acquisition, fire direction, and precision strikes against both mobile and fixed targets.

A beachgoer stands in the water against the backdrop of smoke rising from the site of an Israeli strike that targeted the southern Lebanese village of al-Mansouri on May 22, 2026. (AFP)

Precision munitions and guided missiles

Israel has also employed long-range missiles from the Spike NLOS family, as well as precision-guided aerial munitions launched from aircraft and drones against command centers and launch sites.

Tanks and armored units remain central to Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon, although many have come under attack from drones and anti-armor missiles.

Israel has also employed artillery, surface-to-surface missiles, long-range rocket launchers, and self-propelled guns to strike targets deep inside Lebanon, along with precision ground-to-ground missiles against preselected objectives.

Air-defense systems

Israel possesses several major air-defense systems, most notably Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow.

Yet Israeli reports themselves acknowledge that these systems have faced difficulties countering the small suicide drones used by Hezbollah, particularly those guided through fiber-optic cables.

Israeli media previously reported that the military had introduced the Ro’em artillery system into service in southern Lebanon. The Israeli-made 155 mm system is wheel-mounted for enhanced mobility, features automatic loading, requires a crew of only three rather than seven personnel, offers a firing range of up to 40 kilometers, and incorporates advanced command-and-control capabilities.

Heavy machinery clears the rubble at the site of an overnight Israeli strike in the southern city of Tyre, Lebanon, May 23, 2026. (Reuters)

Rules of engagement

Since the ceasefire took effect, Hezbollah has sought to establish rules of engagement that would confine the fighting to occupied territory by refraining from targeting Israeli towns and settlements in the north. The Israeli military, however, gradually expanded the battlefield through sustained airstrikes and bombardment reaching the outskirts of Sidon.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, retired Brig. Gen. Said Kozah said Hezbollah has been attempting since the ceasefire to establish a new operational equation with Israel based on the principle that every Israeli strike should trigger a response. However, he argued, Israel continues to work against this.

Kozah noted that describing the situation as “rules of engagement” is not entirely accurate because the term is generally used between regular armies or within a clearly defined military framework.

“In practice,” he said, “Hezbollah is attempting to entrench a new set of rules under which any Israeli attack would be met with retaliation—whether through strikes against Israeli positions in occupied Lebanese territory or through rocket fire directed into Israel.”

He added that Hezbollah had recently carried out operations against Israeli positions in the border area, some involving drones and others consisting of infiltration attempts or direct attacks.

He also remarked that rocket launches into Israel had declined in recent days and that many had been intercepted because of the relatively limited numbers employed.

According to Kozah, Hezbollah seeks through these operations to reinforce the legitimacy of retaining its weapons under the banner of resisting occupation within Lebanese territory. At the same time, the group avoids addressing the factors that led to the current level of escalation and occupation.

As for whether Hezbollah has succeeded in imposing this new equation, Kozah said the situation suggests Israel remains the one setting the rules.

“The Israeli military is not limiting its operations to the buffer zone or the so-called ‘Yellow Line,’” he said. “It continues to conduct operations, clearing activities, and strikes against villages north of that line, effectively rejecting the balance Hezbollah is trying to establish.”


Report: World Conflicts Hit Peak in 2025

Palestinians assess damage at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinians assess damage at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
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Report: World Conflicts Hit Peak in 2025

Palestinians assess damage at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinians assess damage at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on June 7, 2026. (AFP)

The world saw the highest number of state conflicts since the Second World War in 2025, a Norwegian study said on Tuesday, warning of a surge in attacks targeting civilians.

The annual "Conflict Trends" report from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) said 65 conflicts involving at least one state were recorded worldwide last year, a new high since 1946.

Conflicts between states also hit a new 80-year peak, doubling from the year before to eight -- including border clashes between India and Pakistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Cambodia and Thailand, as well as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Israeli military operations against Syria.

"Unfortunately, there are not a lot of positive things," researcher Siri Aas Rustad told a group of media outlets, including AFP.

"Usually, I'm able to sort of squeeze something positive out of it, but this year it's shocking, the numbers."

Last year was the third deadliest since the end of the Cold War, with around 245,000 deaths directly related to fighting or political violence -- nearly 76,500 of them attributed to attacks directly targeting civilians, compared with 14,200 in 2024.

The sharp increase in civilian deaths is due to the conflict between the army and paramilitaries in Sudan, where the siege and massacres carried out in El-Fasher city in the Darfur region are estimated to have left some 60,000 people dead.

Since the end of the Cold War, only 1994 and 2021 have seen more bloodshed, due to the Rwanda genocide and the war in Ethiopia's Tigray region respectively.

- Africa worst affected -

"What has happened in the past five or six years is that we have several big conflicts going on at the same time and they seem to take over from each other. The world doesn't get any break," Rustad said.

"And that's different from previously -- this continuous high intensity level of conflict globally."

The PRIO study is based on figures compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), attached to Uppsala University.

It distinguishes between three main types of organized violence: conflicts involving at least one state, non-state conflicts, and one-sided violence against civilians.

Africa remained the region most affected by the first type of conflict with 29, followed by Asia, the Middle East, the Americas, and Europe.

Rustad said Israel was "clearly one of the most aggressive countries in the world at the moment", pointing to its involvement in different types of conflicts in Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, against Iran, and against Houthi militants.

She also pointed to the United States, saying President Donald Trump's return to power had brought "not just attacking and increasing violence, but also the trade barriers they're putting up."

"We are putting a lid on collaboration. The (UN) Security Council doesn't work at the moment. We get a much more polarized world," she said.