Europe and the Growing Challenge of Iran’s ‘Hostage Taking'

Asharq Al-Awsat tells the story of four families fighting to bring their loved ones home

Richard Ratcliffe and his daughter Gabriella outside the FCDO, November 5. (AFP)
Richard Ratcliffe and his daughter Gabriella outside the FCDO, November 5. (AFP)
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Europe and the Growing Challenge of Iran’s ‘Hostage Taking'

Richard Ratcliffe and his daughter Gabriella outside the FCDO, November 5. (AFP)
Richard Ratcliffe and his daughter Gabriella outside the FCDO, November 5. (AFP)

Richard Ratcliffe, who has been campaigning to bring his wife home for over five years, ended a three-week hunger strike today.

He spent the last 20 nights in a tent opposite the Foreign Office building in central London, in an attempt to ramp up pressure on the government to secure the release of his wife and other dual-nationals, held in Iran as “bargaining chips”.

Surrounded by #FreeNazanin posters and artwork crafted by his mother and his daughter Gabriella’s class, Ratcliffe looked much thinner and weaker, but no less resolved to continue his campaign to bring his wife home.

He said in a Twitter post: “Today I have promised Nazanin to end the hunger strike. Gabriella needs two parents.”

Zaghari-Ratcliffe was arrested in Tehran in April 2016, as she was returning home to the UK after visiting family with her daughter Gabriella.

She was accused of plotting to overthrow Iran’s government, a charge she categorically denies, and served a five-year sentence which ended earlier this year.

She was not however allowed to go back to the UK, and was sentenced to a further year in prison and a one-year travel ban, on charges of spreading “propaganda against the system”, for having participated in a protest outside the Iranian Embassy in London in 2009.

She appealed the verdict, but the decision was upheld by a court in Tehran last month.

Like Ratcliffe, many families condemn Iran's "hostage taking", and call on their governments to protect dual nationals from being used as "bargaining chips".

Asharq Al-Awsat speaks to four families campaigning to bring their loved ones home.

Two hunger strikes in 3 years

There was growing concern amongst Ratcliffe’s family and supporters about his health, but he was determined to last as long as it was medically safe to do so.

“It felt like either we escalate now, or the Revolutionary Guards do,” Ratcliffe told Asharq Al-Awsat explaining his decision to go on a second hunger strike in three years.

“I asked the Foreign Secretary when I spoke to her (last month) about the consequences (the UK would impose) after Nazanin’s sentence. There were none.”

He noted that “there might be consequences if they put her back in prison, but (for us) that would be too late. This is what triggered this hunger strike.”

He continued: “This is something we can do, we do not have to wait for the government. I am hoping to make the point that I am not going to let this drift, (the government) needs to resolve this.”

Ratcliffe was fully aware of the dangers of going on a hunger strike in near-freezing temperatures, when he made the decision.

“It takes a few days to adjust to sleeping on the streets, it is precarious, it is cold,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat on his second day without food.

Fast forward to day 20, Ratcliffe does not feel hungry anymore, but feels the cold more. “I can feel it in my fingers and toes. I am definitely slower and rougher,” he said.

His last hunger strike, which was in solidarity with his wife, lasted 15 days and resulted in his daughter being returned to the UK.

“This time, it was my decision,” he explained.

Four demands

Ratcliffe presented four demands to Boris Johnson’s government, “three sticks and one carrot”.

The sticks include “being honest that this is a hostage situation, punishing the perpetrators by imposing Magnitsky-style sanctions on them, and working with allies within the JCPOA negotiations to commit Iran to stop taking hostages.”

As for the carrot, Ratcliffe calls on the government to pay a decades-old debt owed to Iran, which he links to his wife’s detention.

“It is unconscionable that the government doesn’t solve that,” he says.

An outstanding debt

Ratcliffe considers that his wife is being used as “leverage” by Iran, with regard to the UK's failure to pay an outstanding £400 million debt to Iran, part of a 1971 arms deal dispute. On the other hand, the UK considers it “unhelpful” to connect wider bilateral issues with those arbitrarily detained in Iran.

The government says that it continues to explore options to resolve this 40-year-old case, and that discussions are ongoing.

Following a meeting with UK Minister for the Middle East and North Africa, James Cleverly, in London earlier this week, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Ali Bagheri Kani said the size of the payment to Iran, including interest, had been agreed by the two sides, revealing it was less than £500m, according to the Guardian.

London and Tehran seemed close to an agreement last summer, before talks came to a halt.

“We had reasons to be hopeful over the summer, there was quite a lot of negotiations going on. Those have obviously hit a wall and stopped,” Ratcliffe confirms. Dr. Carla Ferstman, a senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law and Human Rights Centre, said that it was “important for the UK government to repay the debt in accordance with court judgments, which have affirmed that the UK has this obligation. The obligation to repay the debt exists irrespective of the hostage situation.”

She adds that while “one would not want to take action that will simply encourage more hostage-taking,” it is “at the same time vital for states to also take into account the humanitarian consequences and the extreme suffering of the persons detained and their families.”

“What is important is for the many states who find themselves in this situation to coordinate their actions to maximize their collective impact.”

A detained father

Like Ratcliffe, Elika Ashoori, daughter of Anoosheh Ashoori, a 66-year-old British-Iranian jailed for spying charges in the notorious Evin prison, connects her father’s case to the outstanding debt.

She and her brother Aryan Ashoori have joined Ratcliffe a few nights in his camping site outside the Foreign Office.

Recalling the story of Ashoori’s arrest, Elika tells Asharq Al-Awsat: “My father went to Iran in the summer of 2017, to visit his mum who was 86 years old at the time. She was going to undergo knee surgery, and he went to nurse her.”

Unsuspecting of his fate, Ashoori was arrested on his way to the shops in August 2017. “A van pulled up, they asked his name, and once he confirmed it, they put a bag over his head and they took him in.”

The retired engineer, who holds British and Iranian passports, was directly taken to Evin prison. He was tried there on charges of spying for the Mossad, and is now serving a 10-year sentence.

“He was in solitary confinement for two and a half months, and was then taken to the general ward, where he has been until this day.”

Elika explains that her family tried to go through an appeals process in Iran to overturn her father’s sentence. “But obviously, it is not a real sentence, nor a real charge. So they have rejected that.”

She adds that “we have since discovered that this is the {basic charge} used by the Iranian government to arrest dual nationals taken as hostages for Tehran’s gains.”

Elika sees a clear link between her father’s imprisonment and the historic outstanding debt that the UK owes Iran since 1979.

“It is not a secret anymore,” she says. “There have been talks between governments, to settle this debt. But we had Covid-19 and Brexit happening in the last couple of years, which contributed to delaying the process.”

She adds: “Both governments have at some point publicly acknowledged the situation as what it is now. There have been deals that were close to being made, but they have fallen through for reasons we are not told.”

Elika believes that her father is “collateral damage” between countries trying to make deals that would benefit them.

Since Ashoori’s arrest, his family and representatives have held multiple meetings with the FCDO, but these have seldom resulted in tangible progress, Elika says.

She explains: “We had meetings with both Jeremy Hunt and Dominic Raab. The nature of these meetings is always similar. They give us an update on ongoing negotiations, and confirm that the dual-national cases are important to them, and that they are doing their best.”

She laments that they have been hearing “the same forms of response for four years."

French tourist facing espionage charges

On the other side of the Channel, a family is breaking their silence after the detention of Benjamin Brière (35 years old), a French national who traveled by himself to Iran, onboard a van.

His sister Blandine Brière stopped receiving updates from him in May 2020, until her and her family discovered that he was arrested not far from the city of Mashhad, where he was visiting a natural park.

He was accused of flying a drone and taking photographs in a “prohibited area”. He has since been charged of espionage and propaganda against the Iranian regime.

Denying the charges, Blandine maintains that her brother, who’s been in prison in the city of Mashhad for over 14 months, was “an ordinary French tourist, who bought a tourist drone from a supermarket”.

She tells Asharq Al-Awsat: “He went traveling in Iran, fell in love with the country and its people. And found himself jailed overnight.”

Benjamin receives regular consular visits, usually once every two months.

“We pleaded time and time again with the French government, and with President (Emmanuel) Macron, to intervene on behalf of Benjamin, but we continue to be in the dark about his case,” laments Blandine.

“We receive no word of progress from the authorities, other than {Benjamin is doing fine, do not worry, he is not mistreated}.”

In terms of communicating directly with Benjamin, Blandine says that throughout the past year, she could only speak to him three times. But over the last few months, “things have improved and I am able to speak to him every two to three weeks over the phone.”

Blandine notes that her brother should have access to a phone call a day, and that he “fights” daily for his right to speak to his family.

That said, Benjamin can still contact the French consul freely. Benjamin is the only foreign prisoner, publicly acknowledged by Iran, not to have dual citizenship. He only holds a French passport.

Faced with silence from the French authorities, Benjamin’s family decided to raise his case public a few months ago, “to try and move things along.”

Blandine explains: “We have been asked to keep quiet about Benjamin’s imprisonment in the beginning, in the hope that his case gets sorted out. However, had we continued with our silence, things would still not have improved. So, we have decided to raise my brother’s case publicly. The situation is obscure; we are deprived of all information.”

Blandine, like the other families fighting to bring their loved ones’ home, believes that he brother could be a “bargaining chip” used by Iran to advance its interests.

She says: “Given that we have no information about the judicial process in Iran, no ruling on Benjamin’s case, this is the only scenario that makes sense. We now just ask our government to do what is necessary to bring him home.”

Blandine adds: “we can now clearly say that Benjamin is hostage of negotiations between countries, and that he serves as leverage”.

A 'hostage' on death row

Vida Mehran-nia’s Swedish-Iranian husband, Ahmadreza Djalali, was arrested by officials from Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence while travelling by car from Tehran to Karaj in April 2016.

Ahmadreza, who works at a medical university in Stockholm, went to Iran after receiving an invitation to attend a workshop on disaster medicine.

“He planned to stay in the country for two weeks and to return to Sweden on 28 April 2016. However, he has still not returned,” his wife tells Asharq Al-Awsat.

“At the time of his arrest, the Iranian officials did not present an arrest warrant, nor did they inform Ahmadreza of the reason for his arrest”.

She continues: “Approximately two weeks later, they claimed that Ahmadreza had collaborated with Israel."

He was later sentenced to death for allegedly passing on classified information to Israel's Mossad intelligence agency.

Ahmadreza and his family vehemently deny the “baseless charges”.

“Until today, not one document of proof or evidence has been presented by Iran's judicial power or the ministry of Intelligence. On the contrary, they have ignored all the undeniable evidence and documents that Ahmadreza and his lawyers provided as proof of his innocence,” maintains his wife.

Vida was denied all contact with her husband for many months.

She says: “It has been almost a year the Evin prison officials have blocked contact between us and Ahmadreza. However, just about four months ago, when his mother passed away, officials unblocked his contact with his family inside Iran. He is still denied contact with us in Sweden."

Ahmadreza’s treatment in Evin prison has been particularly cruel, and “has involved various inhuman” tactics, Vida says.

She continues: “It is enough to refer to a sentence used by UN human rights experts that stated: {There is only word to describe the severe physical and psychological ill-treatment of Djalali, and that is torture}".

Like the families of Nazanin, Anoosheh and Benjamin, Vida believes that her husband is being used as a bargaining chip.

She says: “As we clearly see in international media, it seems that Ahmadreza is being used as a bargaining chip to mount political pressure on the EU, Belgium and Sweden in particular. There are a couple of legal challenges and trials in these countries that outrage the Iranian regime”..

“It is assumed by the media and various entities that Ahmadreza is a hostage,” she concludes.

A worsening phenomenon

Hostage taking is not a new phenomenon, but Dr. Ferstman believes it is fair to say, that the practice “has increased in recent years.”

She explains: “Part of the increased media attention stems from the fact that the families affected are in more contact with each other. This has improved solidarity, but has also increased knowledge about the scale of the problem and heightened media interest.”

As to whether state-sponsored hostage taking usually works, Ferstman says that “it depends what one considers to be the objective. It is rarely just about the immediate trade or concession.”

She continues: “What the practice does do is heighten mistrust, complicate international relations and also (at least in the case of dual-nationals) instill fear in persons living abroad to come back to Iran to visit family or to engage professionally or economically with Iran.”

“This has long-term ramifications on the country and ultimately fosters Iran's isolation.”

Ferstman considers that the UN has an important role.

“The UN human rights machinery - including the UN Special Rapporteur on Iran and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention have regularly commented on the practice."

She adds: “But equally, given the international dimension of the problem and the targeting of nationals from an array of countries impacting peace and security, both the general assembly and the security council also have an important role to play.”



Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
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Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)

The fragile global legal framework for nuclear weapons control faces further setbacks in 2026, eroding guardrails to avoid a nuclear crisis.

The first half of the year will see two key events: the US-Russia bilateral treaty, New START, expires on February 5, and in April, New York hosts the Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) -- the cornerstone of global nuclear security frameworks.

The RevCon, held every four to five years, is meant to keep the NPT alive. But during the last two sessions, the 191 signatory states failed to agree on a final document, and experts expect the same outcome in April.

"I think this is going to be a difficult RevCon," said Alexandra Bell, head of US-based global security nonprofit the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, at a UN-hosted online conference in early December.

"In terms of the current state and near future prospects of nuclear arms control architecture, things are bleak," she added.

Anton Khlopkov, director of Russian think-tank the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), took an even starker point of view, saying at the same event that "we are at the point of almost complete dismantlement of arms control architecture".

"We should be realistic in the current circumstances. At best, I think we should try to preserve what we have," he said.

- 'Crumbling' safeguards -

From US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites to Russia's test of the new Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and US President Donald Trump's remarks about possibly resuming nuclear tests -- the international nuclear landscape darkened in 2025.

At the same time, "the arms control architecture is crumbling", Emmanuelle Maitre of France's Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) told AFP.

A key challenge hinges on a shift in global relations.

Nuclear control had been built over decades around a Moscow-Washington axis, but China's growing power and rapid technological advances have shifted the international playing field, which is simultaneously increasingly strained.

"The growing interlinkage between nuclear and conventional forces and the emergence of disruptive technologies (such as the US Golden Dome defense system and new hypersonic weapons) have transformed traditional nuclear deterrence into a multi-domain concept, especially in a multipolar world," said Peking University's Hua Han.

"This trilateral configuration introduces complexities far beyond the Cold War-era bilateral model. Increasing China-Russia cooperation further complicates deterrence calculations, particularly in the two main theaters of concern: Europe and the Asia-Pacific," she added, according to the minutes of an April event held by Pakistan's Center for International Strategic Studies.

A likely result of the changing landscape is the lapse of New START, which sets weapon limits and includes inspection systems.

"The entire inspection component is no longer functioning, the notifications when a missile is moved, etc, all of that has vanished. What remains is only the voluntary commitment to stay within the limits," said Maitre.

- 'Collective solutions' -

But allowing New START to lapse is "in American interest", according to Robert Peters of the influential Heritage Foundation, reflecting the stance of much of the US strategic community to avoid tying Washington's hands to Moscow alone.

Beijing, which currently has fewer weapons, has so far refused to engage in trilateral disarmament talks.

"China is the fastest growing nuclear power on the planet. It's building 100 new warheads a year and now has more ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) silos than the US has active Minuteman III silos," Peters said at a recent online International Institute for Strategic Studies event.

"New START does nothing to address" that issue, he added.

However, Maitre said, a New START lapse doesn't mean the world should expect serious consequences as early as February 6.

In both Washington and Moscow, "there is a small margin to bring some weapons back into service, but the numbers cannot be very significant. There are bottlenecks" that will slow any buildup, she said.

Nor will the lack of a final document from the RevCon cause "immediate or damaging consequences" to the NPT, she said.

But, she warned, fewer safeguards risks leaving the world without diplomatic tools to resolve tensions.

"The less functional the NPT becomes, the harder it is to forge collective solutions in the event of a crisis."


Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.


What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.