Towards a Bigger Country for Culture: Six Steps Towards the Future

Saad Al-Bazei
Saad Al-Bazei
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Towards a Bigger Country for Culture: Six Steps Towards the Future

Saad Al-Bazei
Saad Al-Bazei

For many years, I was part of a group of Saudi academics, writers, and people engaged in all kinds of cultural work, who would head to Arab capitals such as Cairo, Beirut, Tunis and Casablanca, as well as various Gulf capitals, to attend conferences or seminars or to participate in festivals.

Throughout, we would compare what we have in Saudi Arabia with what our Arab brothers have, and our conversations would revolve around the lack of a Ministry of Culture or a similar body. When it was decided that a Ministry of Culture would be established and merged with the Ministry of Information, we smiled. However, it was half a smile, as half of what we aspired to had been achieved, only half of our dreams had been achieved. The dream was to see the establishment of an independent Ministry of Culture that would bring all the institutions together and provide serious and dedicated support to creatives, be they writers, artists or thinkers.

The cultural scene in the Kingdom is rich and extremely diverse. To those who do not know much about it, I say that, like many Arab scenes in particular, it is divided into three sectors:

The public sector, the private sector, and what is now known as the third sector. The first encompasses government-provided services, be they provided directly or indirectly, to cultural activities. The private sector encompasses institutions, publishing houses, literary salons and art galleries.

As for the third, it is represented in three sides: literary clubs, the Saudi Arabian Society for Culture and Arts, and the media in both its traditional (the press, radio and television) and new (social media) forms. All of them produce a culture. Literary clubs are numbered at around 17, and the Saudi Arabian Society for Culture and Arts has 16 branches, which are spread across the Kingdom. The third space has been playing a pivotal role in developing cultural life in the Kingdom since the 1970s, and its institutions have nurtured intellectual, literary and artistic production more than any others over the past half-century. It is a third sector or space because its institutions are somewhere in the middle between being government and private sector institutions, and the former thus receive some support from the government and some donors from the business sector and others.

As for social media, it is still difficult to discern the impact it has had and is having, but all indications point to that impact being profound and extremely significant.

That was the case until 2018 and the issuance of a royal decree establishing a Ministry of Culture - that is, separating culture from the media and making the Ministry of Culture an independent institutional state entity. Here, those in the Kingdom working within the cultural field in all its stripes could broaden their smiles and see a different future on the horizon. Indeed, three years on, the future is different. I used the phrase “broaden their smiles,” which indicates that they should be optimistic about what is to come, and this optimism was indeed justified because the new institution operates under a genuinely different vision, one that differs from even what Saudi intellectuals had expected or aspired to.

The Ministry of Culture has a different vision, and its management and organization of culture differ from that which prevails at the regional and Arab levels. It is not a copy of other ministries of culture. Rather, it drew from experiences around the world that UNESCO had played a role in shaping. The ministry includes 11 commissions that encompass the various cultural sectors, some of which no one expected would be included. As well as literature, translation, theater, music and the plastic arts, it encompasses spaces for forms of cultural production that had not been familiar or thought of, like fashion and culinary arts. The eleven commissions cover 16 sectors. Literature, translation and publishing were covered by one commission, and the performing arts sector (such as dances and other folk arts) is part of the theater sector. It is worth noting, here, that the management of these commissions differs sharply from that of government bodies, with the formation of commissions organizing and supporting particular activities bringing something novel to the table.

Although it is beyond the scope of this article to go into the details of how the ministry and its commissions operate, we can say, generally, that these commissions carry out their tasks with the framework of internal rules and regulations overseen by boards of directors and executive committees, and through contractors and associations that work in culture. Whoever wants to hold a cultural event, lecture or symposium, and wants support for it must reach an agreement with a ministry-supported association, and whoever wants to publish a book or a translation of a text has to reach an agreement with a publisher before receiving support to write or translate, and so on. The bodies do not deal with the public directly. Instead, they work with intermediary institutions. With this approach, the ministry, with its various bodies, aspires to leave bureaucracy behind and avert administrative corruption.

In all of this, there is a lot to smile about. I say this as someone involved in what is going on, observing and taking part in it, though only partly through my membership in the Board of Directors of the Literature, Publishing and Translation Commission. It is chaired by his excellency the Minister of Culture and includes a number of women and men stakeholders, as well as a CEO tasked with managing operations alongside a large team that is also composed of both men and women. It has a work environment that had never been seen before in a public institution, as there is an abundance of space for productive administrative engagement.

However, culture, as is well known, is not created by institutions, regardless of their number, variation and capacities. Institutions are incubators that can support cultural production or not support it, but they never produce culture. It is individuals, whether they work individually or collectively, who produce works of culture, literature, arts and thought. The accumulation of cultural works that the Kingdom has seen since it was founded by King Abdulaziz in the 1920s would not have been witnessed without individual efforts at the end of the day, those of the pioneers and those who succeeded them. And these efforts would have yielded nothing if it weren’t for a number of foundations and frameworks, which are the sum of the values that they believed in and that crystallized through engagement with local communities first, the Arab world second, and then the rest of the world. Belief in a creed, a homeland, and a common identity are perhaps at the forefront of these values.

The future whose contours were outlined by the major development plan. known as Vision 2030, which is being spearheaded by Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, will not come about culturally if it is not founded on these values. We will not see such a future if individual creatives, intellectuals and cultural producers are not given a space that they play a role in shaping and in which they have the chance to work under suitable and comfortable conditions that ensure moral and material support. The fact that this plan includes the establishment of a Ministry of Culture that is supported with human and material resources is a strong indication that, God willing, we are moving straight in that direction. However, some things that must be taken into account in supporting this trend and maintaining balance:

The first: Perceiving culture to be an intellectual and creative pinnacle that one aspires to achieve through various channels and means. It is a pinnacle insofar as it is the realization of our humanity and what elevates human existence on this earth. This means not succumbing to the temptation of populism or lowering quality standards to appease some producers and consumers regardless of their number. It is true that the opposite extreme to this, i.e., elitism, has many disadvantages, foremost of which is the abandonment of the popular base and condescending to it. However, the alternative is not to privilege quantity over quality, but it is cultural work that continuously strives for better, supporting works that meet these standards and encouraging those who are not up to par to meet those standards.

There are two aspects to every cultural work, and the work could reach a high standard in one aspect and a lower standard in the other. Philosophy, which is considered the most sublime form of cultural output, may descend towards becoming, for some, a matter of mere opinions about life. It could also be elevated to address the most arduous and consequential questions and issues in our material and intellectual lives. This is also the case for the fields of science, literature, and the various arts. Top-down standards for such things cannot be imposed, nor should they be. Instead, they must be consulted and adopted as goals for cultural work, be it governmental, private, or other.

Second: Nurture the Arabic language, as it is the largest - and the primary - medium and incubator for cultural production. And enforce official decisions that promote Arabic’s vital and essential role in this production. That includes improving Arabic learning in the educational sphere and working to promote its adoption in all contexts, including academia, the media, business and commerce, etc. Conversely, we are witnessing a marked decline of the Arabic language, among the younger generations especially, with excessive commercial use of English for marketing and to draw audiences. Moreover, many activities and events, including official ones, embrace foreign languages and see no harm in adopting them to gain more exposure or profit. Arabic is the future of our culture, simply because the culture we have is an Arab culture.

Third: Expand the scope of freedom of expression and production and mitigate fears and sensitivities surrounding what people say and the content produced. Those fears and excessive sensitivities have obscured some of our most important cultural productions, as our cultural history has seen many individuals who opted to travel and live abroad, taking their cultural works with them. For this reason, publishing houses and printing presses throughout the Arab world are brimming with writings and productions by Saudis, be they intellectuals, scholars, writers, or artists. Thankfully, there are many indications of positive changes in this regard. Nonetheless, we need more to make the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the major incubator for its people’s cultural production, as well as that of others.

Fourth: Consider culture as an investment environment and thus a source of national wealth in the broad sense, beyond finances and extending to minds. In his first meeting with Saudi intellectuals in the city of Jeddah, the Crown Prince emphasized this aspect when he said that the ambition is for culture to become a national source of revenue, which we all hope for. Achieving this requires collective effort and the adoption of a vision that renders the Kingdom the primary destination for intellectuals from the Arab and Islamic world, as well as attracting the world’s intellectuals on a broader scale.

One of the paths towards this outcome is the expansion of the space for publishing, not only for Saudis but for others as well, by making the Kingdom attractive to the publishing industry. One of the means for this is facilitating the procedures required to distribute books and hold cultural or scientific conferences and symposiums. As such, the cities and regions of Saudi Arabia can become a home and destination for productive and creative minds from across the world – of course, within the framework of well-defined legal controls and values. The recent inauguration of the most important book fair in the Arab world and the conclusion of two major conferences for philosophy and translation are undoubtedly steps in the right direction, and more must follow.

Fifth: In light of the current project to develop the cultural incubators that have historically been the most significant, namely literary clubs and culture and arts societies, it is important for support to go beyond its previous levels and for their historical heritage to safeguard and preserve, even if they take new forms, their active role in cultural development.

Sixth: Urging academic and research institutions to contribute further to the production of culture accessible to the general public rather than only to academic or scientific experts. Of course, universities must be mentioned here, and they must be urged to integrate into the cultural and scientific scenes of society at large, breaking with the academic isolation that many of them unfortunately currently adopt. Universities have been active forces in the Arab renaissance since its beginnings at the turn of the 20th century, and they have played a pivotal role in the Kingdom’s cultural history. However, they have retreated from it in recent decades. It is important to restore the role of universities in popular culture because it is impossible to imagine a real cultural movement or a vibrant creative future without universities being involved. They are the great incubators of science, thought and literature and the most important strongholds for enlightenment, awareness and development.

These, in my view, are the contours of what can be done to arrive at a bright future for culture in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. They are the continuation of constructive steps that have already been taken with the aim of elevating our culture to higher pinnacles in a homeland that is more expansive and inclusive.



Ghalibaf: Ambitious ‘Public Face’ of Post-Ali Khamenei Iran

Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (R) meets with Pakistan’s Army Chief Syed Asim Munir in Tehran, Iran, May 23, 2026. (AFP)
Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (R) meets with Pakistan’s Army Chief Syed Asim Munir in Tehran, Iran, May 23, 2026. (AFP)
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Ghalibaf: Ambitious ‘Public Face’ of Post-Ali Khamenei Iran

Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (R) meets with Pakistan’s Army Chief Syed Asim Munir in Tehran, Iran, May 23, 2026. (AFP)
Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (R) meets with Pakistan’s Army Chief Syed Asim Munir in Tehran, Iran, May 23, 2026. (AFP)

Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has emerged as the key negotiator and one of the most high-profile figures in the epublic's leadership as it enters a new phase after the US-Israeli war.

A pillar of the Iranian establishment for some three decades and one of its most prominent non-clerical figures, Ghalibaf, 64, had spearheaded the war effort and led the high-stakes negotiating process that culminated with an agreement announced Monday to halt the hostilities.

Ghalibaf survived more than five weeks of US-Israeli attacks on Iran that killed supreme leader Ali Khamenei, top security official Ali Larijani and a host of other key figures.

He came into public view for the first time in weeks in April to lead the Iranian delegation in talks in Islamabad with the United States, meeting Vice President JD Vance, the highest-level contact between the two foes since before the 1979 revolution.

An image published on social media by Iranian embassies abroad put Ghalibaf center stage in the Iranian negotiating team, looking animated and gesturing with his hand, as Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi busied himself with teacups.

The workings of the Iranian leadership without Khamenei, who dominated it for nearly four decades, remain unclear.

Khamenei's son Mojtaba was named as his successor but has yet to appear publicly after he was reportedly wounded in an airstrike.

"Following Larijani's assassination, Ghalibaf has emerged as the new public face of the regime's war effort and diplomacy," said Farzan Sabet, a managing researcher at the Geneva Graduate Institute.

"But we shouldn't overstate the extent to which he's in the driver's seat: He still answers to higher powers in Tehran," he added.

These include Mojtaba Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards, the ideological arm of Iran's military, where Ghalibaf was a key figure as aerospace forces commander, Sabet said.

- 'Professional bargainer' -

While the trip to Islamabad was Ghalibaf's first appearance in public since before the war, he has kept a high profile online with almost daily social media posts, mixing commentary on recent developments and the negotiations with threats of harsh retaliation should the fighting resume.

His posts on X in idiomatic American English have garnered wide attention and raised questions over who is actually writing them, given Ghalibaf is not known to be a fluent English speaker.

Referring to threats of a ground invasion, a post on Ghalibaf's X account said on April 1: "You come for our home... you're gonna meet the whole family. Locked, loaded and standing tall. Bring it on."

The IranWire news site has said the posts appeared to have been written by a former adviser based in the United States, but this has not been confirmed.

While the Islamabad talks failed, The Washington Post reported that Ghalibaf left a striking impression on the US delegation after years when Washington never dealt directly with key Iranian decision makers.

Ghalibaf "impressed the American team as a refined and professional bargainer -- and potential leader of a new Iran", said the Post.

In a sign of his expanding sway, he was appointed in May to oversee Iran's vital relationship with China, the biggest buyer of Iranian oil.

- 'Ambitious and opportunistic' -

Ghalibaf's varied experience, which spans military and civilian life, has seen him work as a commander in the Revolutionary Guards, Tehran police chief, Tehran mayor and now speaker of parliament.

It is unclear if he is fully trusted by the new hardline hierarchy of the Guards.

Known to be fiercely ambitious, he has stood for the Iranian presidency on multiple occasions but has never been successful, most notably in 2005 when ultra-conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, little-known at the time, took the job.

A qualified pilot, Ghalibaf is known for boasting that he is able to captain jumbo jets.

Human rights groups have accused Ghalibaf, in his various functions, of playing a key role in suppressing protests, from the 1999 student demonstrations to the 2009 Green movement that erupted after a disputed election, right up to the nationwide protests that peaked in January 2026, just before the latest war.

"As a politician, he's shown himself to be ambitious and opportunistic, but also cautious, a trait that has helped him advance his career to the top of the country's power structure without getting purged like so many others have been," said Sabet.


What to Know About the US-Iran Peace Deal

A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)
A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)
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What to Know About the US-Iran Peace Deal

A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)
A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)

Washington: The New York Times

The United States and Iran said they were close to reaching a deal toward ending the war that has upended the Middle East for more than three months and disrupted the global economy.

Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, has said that an agreement had “never been closer.”

US officials signaled on Friday that a potential framework deal could be signed within days.

According to two Iranian officials and one regional official briefed on the terms of the agreement, Tehran and Washington have agreed to a preliminary deal that would end the fighting, reopen the crucial Strait of Hormuz and lift the US naval blockade on Iranian ports.

Both the US and Iran have sought to frame the emerging deal as a diplomatic victory.

Yet the agreement appears to push many of the thorniest issues to a 60-day negotiation period, including Iran’s nuclear program, about which major differences remain and both sides have so far held firm to longstanding red lines.

A deal would cap a week of diplomatic talks punctuated by airstrikes and Israel’s ongoing campaign in southern Lebanon.

What’s in the deal?

The two Iranian officials and one regional official briefed on the terms of the agreement gave a broad outline of the agreement. The United States has not confirmed these details:
Iran would open the Strait of Hormuz for the passage of ships and the United States would lift the naval blockade on Iran’s ports in the Arabian Gulf.

Iran and the United States would start negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. The negotiations would last a maximum of 60 days and the war would stop on all fronts, including Lebanon, for that period.

During the 60-day negotiation period, Iran and countries in the region would discuss the future management of the strait.

The two Iranian officials said the next phase of talks would include discussion of the lifting of American sanctions, including on Iran’s oil sales and international banking transactions, in exchange for concessions on the Iranian nuclear program.

Speaking on state television Friday, Araghchi said there would be a two-part agreement to end the war: The first would be the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Tehran and Washington, and the second would be for a lasting peace deal. “The nuclear issue has been left for the second round and a final agreement,” Araghchi said.

Araghchi added that the Strait of Hormuz would reopen as part of the initial agreement between the US and Iran, but the economically vital waterway would not return to its prewar status.

He told Iranian state television that all commercial ships would be guaranteed safe passage, but said Tehran would maintain its control of the passage and would eventually charge a “service fee” for vessels passing through, an arrangement the Trump administration had previously warned against.

Framework for Nuclear Talks

According to US officials and diplomats, there are four major points of negotiation on a nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran:

1. A lengthy suspension of uranium enrichment
The United States has demanded for months that Iran agree to conduct no uranium enrichment for at least 20 years. The Iranians have countered by offering a 10-year halt, but American officials believe Tehran would settle for 15 years.

2. Iran’s current stockpile of enriched uranium is diluted, or “downblended”
The United States would work with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN inspection body, to dilute or “downblend” Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, according to two US officials familiar with the negotiations. American officials envision an active role in handling the nuclear material. Iranian officials say the United States would serve only as an observer.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said repeatedly in recent weeks that any agreement would have to cover all 11 tons of enriched uranium in Iran’s possession, not just the half-ton of near-bomb-grade fuel.

The Iranians have not talked publicly about whether they are willing to give up their entire existing stockpile. But if it was downblended, rather than shipped outside the country, Iran’s leaders could say they still have possession of the fuel.

3. Iran dismantles its nuclear sites
The United States has demanded that Iran dismantle its three major nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordo and Isfahan. The United States struck all three nearly a year ago, severely damaging them.

Iran has discussed dismantling two facilities but insists on leaving one open, in part to demonstrate it has not surrendered what it views as a “right to enrich.” That could prove problematic: Critics of the Obama-era nuclear agreement with Iran focused on its failure to close down Fordo, a deep underground site, which the Iranians later revived to produce near-bomb-grade fuel.

4. Iran agrees to “snap” inspections
The United States wants international inspectors to be able to conduct “snap” inspections, anytime and anyplace inside Iran. It is not clear if the Iranian government will agree. Many of the nuclear sites are inside Revolutionary Guards military bases, where inspectors have frequently been barred at the gates.


Growing Egypt-Russia Partnership Raises Alarm in Israel

The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
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Growing Egypt-Russia Partnership Raises Alarm in Israel

The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)

Egypt’s El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant has yet to begin operations on the country’s Mediterranean coast, but Israeli media outlets supportive of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have intensified warnings that the project could pave the way for a major Russian nuclear presence in the Middle East.

Those concerns over Egypt’s capabilities, as well as its regional partnerships, which have grown since the outbreak of the Gaza war in 2023, are unlikely to subside, according to experts interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat.

They said that the rhetoric is tied to Israeli domestic politics, electoral competition and efforts to create new security threats for Israeli voters, while also exerting pressure on Cairo and its partners at a time when Israel is seeking to capitalize on tensions between Washington and Moscow.

Although Egypt’s nuclear program dates back to a 1956 agreement with the Soviet Union, the country’s first nuclear power project effectively began on Nov. 19, 2015, when Egypt and Russia signed an agreement to build the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in the Matrouh governorate on the Mediterranean coast. The project is valued at $30 billion, including a $25 billion Russian loan that Egypt is due to begin repaying in October 2029 over a 35-year period at an annual interest rate of 3%.

The plant, which is designed to generate 4,800 megawatts of electricity, will comprise four nuclear reactors. It is expected to operate for more than 60 years and is projected to supply about 10% of Egypt’s electricity needs once its first reactor comes online, currently expected between late 2027 and mid-2028.

Israeli website Natziv.net recently claimed that El Dabaa is more than an electricity-generation project, describing it as “a potential nuclear foothold for Moscow” in the Middle East. The outlet said Russia’s financing of 85% of the project’s cost - about $25 billion - along with its responsibility for fuel supplies and nuclear waste management for 60 years, could create a “long-term strategic dependence” on Moscow.

The website also warned about plans for a Russian industrial zone near the Suez Canal, describing it as a permanent presence at a key global trade hub and a sign of Cairo’s drift away from the West toward a Russia-China axis within the BRICS group, which Egypt joined in January 2024.

Despite the project’s civilian nature, the outlet claimed that the infrastructure and expertise acquired through El Dabaa could one day provide Egypt with a shorter path toward military nuclear options or fuel enrichment capabilities.

It suggested that any radioactive leak could affect Israel’s coastline and desalination facilities, while closer Egyptian-Russian ties could narrow Israel’s strategic room for maneuver and weaken traditional US influence in the region.

Similar arguments appeared in an analysis published last week by Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement that the plant’s first reactor could begin operating in 2027.

It described the notion that El Dabaa is solely an energy project as a “grave misreading,” portraying it instead as a slow-moving strategic encirclement effort in which “Israel is not incidental to the picture, but the target.”

Raouf Saad, Egypt’s former ambassador to Russia and a former assistant foreign minister, said the reports should be read within their political context. He added that Netanyahu has sought to disrupt efforts toward regional peace and has repeatedly attempted to provoke Egypt since the Gaza war, without success.

Saad dismissed the Israeli allegations as “naive and transparent” aimed at warning the United States about Russia’s return to the region, saying they reflected the weakness of Netanyahu’s position rather than any genuine security threat.

Retired Major General Samir Farag, a military and strategic analyst, said such reports are part of recurring attempts to manufacture crises and are likely to intensify as Israel approaches elections.

“Netanyahu-aligned media outlets have long tried to convince the Israeli public that Egypt seeks to acquire nuclear capabilities and pursue militarization,” Farag said, describing the claims as an effort to exploit the issue politically and divert attention from Israel’s actions in the region.

While Egypt has not officially responded to the allegations, officials and analysts continued to stress that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is a legitimate right under international law.

They noted that Egypt is fully committed to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that the El Dabaa project, like the country’s Inshas Nuclear Center, is subject to comprehensive oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency.