Gulf Countries Confronted by Complex Yemeni Scene that Is Run by Iran

A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)
A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)
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Gulf Countries Confronted by Complex Yemeni Scene that Is Run by Iran

A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)
A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)

The Iran-backed Houthi militias' widening of their attacks to include the United Arab Emirates reflects the losses they are incurring in their battles in Yemen, said Gulf strategic analysts.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, they said it was Iran who ordered the Houthis to carry out the attacks against the UAE, saying it was a strategic move that serves its strategic interests.

They added that the Saudi and Emirati response to the attacks was decisive, deterrent, strong and immediate, stemming from their understanding of Iran's strategic calculations and the Houthi threat.

The experts warned that the situation in Yemen is becoming increasingly complex on the political, military and humanitarian levels and that the war will not end any time soon.

They held the Houthi militias responsible politically and morally for the ongoing war because of their rejection of all peacemaking efforts.

Bin Sager: Houthis did not take military escalation decision

Chairman of the Gulf Research Center, Dr. Abdulaziz bin Sager said targeting the UAE is one of the critical strategic decisions that cannot be taken by the Houthi leadership alone, especially since it is subordinate to Iran.

Bin Sager stressed that the decision was taken by the Iranian leadership and aimed at serving its strategic interests.

There is no doubt that the Iranian calculations include the situation in Iran and the Houthis in Yemen. They also include Iran's influence in the Arab world and its regional and international relations, he went on to say.

The decision to expand the military operations in the Arabian Peninsula stems from strategic setbacks Iran has faced on several fronts, such as the Vienna nuclear talks and challenges to its influence in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, he added.

The Iranian leadership is seeking to prove that it can defy the international community, escalate its actions and take risks by expanding its attacks in the region, he explained.

By adopting this behavior, he added, Tehran is attempting to improve its negotiating position on all fronts. It is keen to prove its ability to use its regional proxies to destabilize regional and international security.

Moreover, he charged that Tehran is taking advantage of the international community's shortcomings in understanding its behavior, mindset and calculations.

Bin Sager added, however, that the recent Houthi losses in Yemen have also prompted Iran to lash out.

The militias have been suffering major losses since June 2021. They are on the verge of losing the Marib province and are now on the defense, when they used to be on the offense. The legitimate forces last month liberated the Shabwah province from the militias.

These defeats have alarmed Tehran, which is providing the Houthis with military gear and weapons, bin Sager remarked.

The Iranians are concerned that the loss of Marib will leave the ground open for the legitimate forces to advance on neighboring Sanaa, thereby threatening the Houthis' entire hold on northern Yemen.

Shulaimi: Western Countries’ Interest

President of the Gulf Security and Peace Forum Dr. Fahad al-Shulaimi echoed bin Sager's remarks that the Houthi escalation against the UAE stems from their successive defeats on several internal fronts, including Shabwah, Marib and some areas in Taiz and the al-Bayda provinces.

The Houthis believe that targeting some areas in the UAE may threaten Western interests, such as private companies and the energy market, and may eventually lead the Emirati leadership to halt its support to the southern Giants Brigades, which have dealt the Houthis a series of blows in the years-long conflict.

Furthermore, he stressed that the Houthis could not have launched the missile attacks against the UAE without Tehran's approval.

The attacks were deliberately carried out while Iran was negotiating with world powers in Vienna, he continued. Iran is trying to give off the impression that should the talks fails, it can "blow up" the region through its proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq.

Dr. Fawaz: Military operations expand and continue

Saudi Strategic and Security Analyst Dr. Fawaz bin Kasib al-Anzi told Asharq Al-Awsat that this wasn't the first time that the Houthis attempted to widen their terrorist operations by launching drone and missile attacks against the UAE.

He revealed that the militias had targeted the UAE with missiles and armed drones since the launch of the military operations in Yemen in 2016.

The attacks stopped eventually, but resumed when the UAE announced its support for the Giants Brigades, which have the proven experience to defeat the Houthis, he added.

The militias have opted to meet escalation with escalation, he stated.

The Giants Brigades achieved significant goals in Shabwah and Marib through direct support from the UAE, prompting the Houthis to retaliate by threatening the Gulf country. He predicted that the Houthi escalation will continue and so will the Giants Brigades operations that have been supported by Yemeni tribes and the Saudi-led Arab coalition.

Fawaz also highlighted the disappearance of Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi from the political and media scenes in Yemen and the death of Iran's so-called ambassador to Sanaa, Hassan Irloo, who was the effective Iranian commander of the Houthi battles.

These developments have had a massive impact on the morale of the militias, said Yemeni analysts.

The coalition forces must take advantage of this situation to strike more victories, urged Fawaz.

Response to Houthi attack

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are in agreement over the strategic threat the situation in Yemen poses to the whole Arabian Peninsula, said bin Sager. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries will not be spared the risks should the Houthis continue to control Yemen and Iran continue to control the Houthis.

Common risks often lead to unity among those threatened by them, he added.

The Saudi and Emirati leaderships believe that they share a common destiny since the Iranian-Houthi threat is an expansionist risk that is not limited to one country, but covers the entire region.

The Saudi and Emirati decision to defy the Iranian-Houthi threats in Yemen demonstrates that their leaderships have adopted long-term strategic calculations, he continued.

"Ignoring the fact that the Houthi militias illegally seized power in Yemen and that they are gangs that follow the orders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and are crucially linked to the Iranian support and strategy will have a great and long-term impact on the security and stability of the GCC countries," bin Sager warned.

He said it will also affect the freedom and independence of all countries of the region and the GCC states’ political decisions and sovereign rights and turn Yemen into a hub for Iranian aggression and threats in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula.

Bin Sager underscored the importance of deriving lessons from what happened in Lebanon.

"The indifference and failure in confronting the growing influence and control of the Lebanese Hezbollah militias over the ruling authority in Lebanon has turned them into a regional power that interferes and threatens the entire security and stability of the Arab Mashreq region in service of the IRGC and the strategic interests of the expansionist colonial Persian Empire," he noted.

Shulaimi warned that by attacking the UAE, the Houthis may even go further and target other Gulf countries.

Meanwhile, Fawaz expected Saudi Arabia and the UAE to continue their operations in Yemen especially amid the growing political support and changing international position towards the Houthis.

He cited last year's Houthi attack on the American embassy in Sanaa and US President Joe Biden stating in January that his administration was reconsidering restoring the terrorist designation of the Houthis.

These developments will no doubt lead to more pressure on the Houthi militias in the coming period.

How GCC states should address the situation in Yemen

The GCC states still do not acknowledge the dangers and threats posed by Iran’s meddling and expansionist policy, bin Sager lamented.

He pointed to the long-term threats posed by Iran's policies of establishing and supporting armed sectarian militias, weakening official state authorities and creating a state within the state in countries where it wields influence. He noted its undermining of the identity and religious and national loyalties of Arabs by deepening their sectarian affiliation to serve its interests at the expense of their national ones.

Bin Sager expressed regret that some Arab and Gulf states have adopted lenient and perhaps reckless positions towards Iran’s regional policy and have avoided condemning its expansionist and intrusive behavior.

This is both alarming and disappointing, he said.

He said the GCC states, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, believe and have publicly declared that the Yemeni conflict should be settled politically and through negotiations.

After successive negotiations with the Houthis, they have come to realize that the militias' real and final decision-making comes from Iran, he continued.

Iran's interest lies in sabotaging any solution or political settlement in Yemen if they undermine its strategic interests, he remarked.

Therefore, the Gulf countries must take a firm and united stance that reflects their deep understanding of the crisis in Yemen. They must adopt a practical policy and stances that reflect their actual understanding of the extent of the threat posed by the conflict in Yemen, he urged.



‘Too Dangerous to Go to Hospital’: A Glimpse into Iran’s Protest Crackdown

Iranians walk along a street in Tehran, Iran, 27 January 2026. (EPA)
Iranians walk along a street in Tehran, Iran, 27 January 2026. (EPA)
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‘Too Dangerous to Go to Hospital’: A Glimpse into Iran’s Protest Crackdown

Iranians walk along a street in Tehran, Iran, 27 January 2026. (EPA)
Iranians walk along a street in Tehran, Iran, 27 January 2026. (EPA)

Young protesters shot in the back, shotgun pellets fired in a doctor's face, wounded people afraid to go to hospital: "Every family has been affected" by the deadly crackdown on Iran's recent wave of demonstrations, said one protester.

Speaking to AFP in Istanbul, this 45-year-old engineer who asked to be identified as Farhad -- not his real name -- was caught up in the mass protests that swept his home city of one million people just outside Tehran.

With Iran still largely under an internet blackout after weeks of unrest, eyewitness testimony is key for understanding how the events unfolded.

Angry demonstrations over economic hardship began late last year and exploded into the biggest anti-government protests since the 1979 revolution.

"On the first day, there were so many people in the streets that the security forces just kept their distance," he told AFP.

"But on the second day, they understood that without shooting, the people were not going to disperse."

As the protests grew, the security forces began a major crackdown under the cover of a communications blackout that began on January 8.

In an interview on the European side of Istanbul, this quietly-spoken oil industry worker said he was in his car with his sister on the night when the shooting began.

"We saw about 20 military people jumping from cars and start shooting at young people about 100 meters away. I saw people running but they were shooting at their backs" with rifles and shotguns, he told AFP.

"In front of my eyes, I saw a friend of ours, a doctor, being hit in the face by shotgun pellets," Farhad said. He does not know what happened to him.

Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have accused the security forces of firing rifles and shotguns loaded with metal pellets directly at protesters' heads and torsos.

"I saw two people being carried, they were very badly injured, maybe dead," Farhad said.

A lot of people also died "in their cars because the bullets were coming out of nowhere".

- 'Afraid to go to hospital' -

The scale of the crackdown is only slowly emerging.

Despite great difficulty accessing information, the Norway-based NGO Iran Human Rights says it has verified the deaths of 3,428 protesters killed by the security forces, but warned the final toll risks reaching 25,000.

Those who were injured were often too afraid to go to hospital, Farhad said.

"People can't go to the hospital because the authorities and the police are there. Anyone with injuries from bullets or shotgun (pellets) they detain and interrogate," he said.

"Doctors have been going to people's houses to give them medical assistance."

He himself was beaten with a baton by two people on a motorbike and thought his arm was broken, but did not go to hospital because it was "too dangerous".

Many "opened their homes to let the demonstrators inside and give them first aid", including his sister and her friend who took in "around 50 boys, and gave them tea and cake".

There were a lot of very young people on the streets and "a lot of girls and women", he told AFP, saying he had seen children of "six or seven" shouting slogans against Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei.

The security forces were also staging spot checks for anyone with protest-related injuries or footage on their phones, he said.

"It's so dangerous because they randomly check phones. If they see anything related to this revolution, you are finished. They are also making people lift their shirts to look for signs of bullet or shotgun injuries.

"If they see that, they are taken for interrogation."

Speaking just before he flew back to Iran -- "because I have a job to go to" -- he insisted he was "absolutely not afraid".

Despite everything, people were still ready to protest "because they are so angry", he explained.

He is convinced US President Donald Trump will soon make good on his pledge to intervene, pointing to recent reports of US warships arriving in the region.

"The system cannot survive -- in Iran everybody is just overwhelmed with this dictatorship. We have had enough of them."


Trump Balances War Threats and Brinkmanship with Iran

US fighter jets aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
US fighter jets aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
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Trump Balances War Threats and Brinkmanship with Iran

US fighter jets aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
US fighter jets aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AFP)

All indications suggest that US military action against Iran may be imminent. Yet the paradox is that edging toward the brink of confrontation may itself be part of negotiations being conducted under intense pressure.

Mutual threats, naval and air deployments, and deterrence messages are carefully calibrated to demonstrate seriousness without sliding into a war that President Donald Trump’s administration does not want.

Trump has repeatedly spoken of an “armada” in the region, while at the same time saying Tehran is sending signals of readiness to negotiate, a deliberate dual track aimed at keeping the adversary uncertain.

This tension between preparing for a strike and keeping the door to a deal ajar aligns with Farzin Nadimi's assessment. Nadimi is a senior Iran analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Nadimi said he cannot predict what the US president will ultimately decide, adding that regardless of what Trump says to the media, the military buildup points to limited, focused strikes or a scaled-down military campaign.

According to Nadimi, such a campaign would intend to punish and deter the Iranian regime, weaken its ability to retaliate against the United States and its allies, and or disrupt oil flows from the Gulf.

The implication is that the buildup is not mere showmanship but the creation of an operational environment that enables a rapid strike if the political channel fails, without becoming mired in a prolonged war.

Calibrated options

The entry of the US aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and its strike group into the US Central Command area of operations in the western Indian Ocean shortens the timeline for possible action if a political decision is taken.

This has coincided with additional air reinforcements, including the deployment of F-15 fighter jets.

Together, these elements give Washington a ladder of options: a limited strike, a series of time-phased military strikes, or a defensive posture designed to raise the cost of any Iranian retaliation against US bases and allies.

But a “limited strike” is not just a technical choice; it is a political one, conditioned on answering a central question: what exactly does Washington want to achieve, and what is the “off-ramp” that would allow it to declare success and return to negotiations?

Here, Nadimi voices skepticism. He expressed doubts about the ability to achieve these objectives with such limited means.

A “mini” campaign may appear attractive because it avoids full-scale war, but it may not ensure deterrence or protect energy flows if Tehran opts for asymmetric retaliation, explained Nadimi.

Iran’s threats as a constraint

On the other side, Tehran and its regional allies have raised the tone of their threats. Iranian officials have warned of a “more painful” response if attacked, while statements from Hezbollah, Iraqi factions, and Yemen’s Houthis signal readiness to join any confrontation.

Such rhetoric serves the purpose of deterrence and boosting morale within the axis, but it carries a structural risk: the higher the ceiling of threats, the narrower the space for de-escalation.

The likelihood grows that an undisciplined actor, a faction or militia, could ignite an action that forces everyone into a “a cycle of retaliation,” widening the conflict beyond the calculus of a “limited” strike.

This is why Washington, according to reports, has focused on sending warning messages to Baghdad and to armed actors that any targeting of US forces would be met with direct retaliation against militias. The aim is to curb slippage that could turn a single strike into multiple fronts.

At the core of US concern is not only Iran’s ability to retaliate, but where it might do so. US bases across Iraq, Syria, and the Gulf are vulnerable targets in any escalation.

The buildup, therefore, has a clear defensive dimension, reinforcing interception systems and maritime and air defenses to contain missiles and drones.

While this is meant to protect forces, it also seeks to keep escalation in check: deterring or neutralizing retaliatory strikes so they do not force Washington into larger steps.

Alternatives to war

If force is used, the most likely scenario would involve limited, time-phased strikes targeting air defenses, missile sites, command-and-control nodes, and possibly sensitive facilities, before stopping at a point that allows a return to the political track.

The stated or implicit goal would be “punishment” and “deterrence” without ground entanglement.

Iran, however, always retains room to respond below the threshold but in painful ways, through proxies, disruption of shipping, or gradual attrition that embarrasses Washington and its allies and pushes them toward harder choices.

Here again, Nadimi questions whether limited tools would suffice, noting that success is not measured by the number of missiles launched on the first night, but by Washington’s ability to prevent Tehran from redefining the battlefield and its timing.

Targeting the leadership

In such crises, the question of “decapitation” often arises: could Washington move to target Iran’s leadership?

Nadimi addresses this cautiously, saying that targeting the supreme leader would be conceivable only “if there were a high probability of success and a low risk of casualties among US forces.”

He stresses the need to remember “the fundamental differences between Iran and Venezuela,” underscoring that what might be imagined in one political or security environment cannot be simply transplanted into Iran’s far more fortified and complex system.

Still, Nadimi adds that “the possibility of an internal operation should not be ruled out,” a phrase suggesting that the most dangerous scenarios may not begin with a missile, but with an internal rupture or movement intersecting with external pressure.

The heaviest factor in Washington’s calculations is not fear of immediate military defeat, but uncertainty about “the day after” if the system were shaken or lost control.

Iran is a large country with a complex institutional and security structure. Any major fracture could unleash a chain of scenarios, including factional conflict, security vacuums, economic turmoil, refugee flows, and immediate shocks to energy markets and the region.

Seen through this lens, the US buildup is also a negotiating tool: a threat sufficient to open doors without assuming responsibility for the consequences of collapse.

In sum, the Trump administration appears to be holding two threads at once: building up forces to make a strike an immediate option, and signaling enough pressure to force Tehran to consider negotiations, while trying to keep any confrontation below the threshold of a “mini campaign,” not a full-scale war.


Gazans Long for Reopening of ‘Lifeline’ Rafah Crossing

A gate at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, in Rafah, Egypt, January 27, 2026. (Reuters)
A gate at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, in Rafah, Egypt, January 27, 2026. (Reuters)
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Gazans Long for Reopening of ‘Lifeline’ Rafah Crossing

A gate at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, in Rafah, Egypt, January 27, 2026. (Reuters)
A gate at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, in Rafah, Egypt, January 27, 2026. (Reuters)

With Gaza's vital Rafah border crossing expected to soon reopen, residents of the war-shattered territory are hoping to reunite with family members, or are looking to leave themselves.

The Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt is the Palestinian territory's only gateway to the outside world that does not lead to Israel and is a key entry point for both people and goods.

It has been closed since Israeli forces took control of it in May 2024, except for a limited reopening in early 2025, and other bids to reopen failed to materialize.

Following a US-brokered ceasefire that took effect in October, Rafah is expected to reopen for pedestrians, after visiting US envoys reportedly pressed Israeli officials to reopen the crossing.

"Opening the Rafah crossing means opening the door to life for me. I haven't seen my wife and children for two years since they left at the beginning of the war and I was prevented from travelling," said 48-year-old Mahmud al-Natour, who hails from Gaza City.

"My children are growing up far away from me, and the years are passing by as if we are cut off from the world and life itself," he told AFP.

Randa Samih, 48, also called the crossing "the lifeline of Gaza," but is worried about whether she would be able to leave.

She had applied for an exit permit to get treatment for her injured back, which she fears might not be serious enough to be allowed out.

"There are tens of thousands of injuries in Gaza, most of them more serious than mine," she said.

"We'll die or our health will decline before we get to travel."

- 'Limited reopening' -

Gaza, a tiny territory surrounded by Israel, Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea, has been under Israeli blockade even before Hamas's attack sparked the war.

Palestinian gunmen took 251 people hostage on October 7, 2023, in an attack that killed 1,221 others, most of them civilians.

Israel's retaliatory offensive has killed at least 71,662 Palestinians, according to figures from the health ministry in Hamas-run Gaza that the United Nations considers reliable. The ministry does not say how many of the dead were fighters, though its data shows that more than half were women and children.

Ali Shaath heads the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), created as part of the ceasefire agreement. He announced last week that Rafah would reopen in both directions.

Israel said it would only allow pedestrians to travel through the crossing as part of its "limited reopening" once it had recovered the remains of the last hostage, Ran Gvili.

His remains were brought back to Israel later on Monday.

A Palestinian official told AFP on condition of anonymity that "estimates indicate that the Rafah crossing could be opened in both directions by the end of this week or early next week".

A member of the NCAG told AFP that the technocratic committee would be responsible for sending lists of travelers' names to the Israeli authorities for approval.

Outward travel will initially be limited to patients, the injured, students with university admission and visas, and holders of Egyptian citizenship or other nationalities and residency permits, the source said.

- 'Burning with anticipation' -

Gharam al-Jamla, a displaced Palestinian living in a tent in southern Gaza, told AFP she counted on the crossing's opening for her future.

"My dreams lie beyond the Rafah crossing. I applied for several scholarships to study journalism in English at universities in Türkiye. I received initial acceptance from two universities there," the 18-year-old said.

She added she would then want to return to Gaza "to be one of its voices to convey the truth to the world."

Gaza's civil defense agency spokesman, Mahmud Bassal, appealed for the full reopening of Rafah to allow the entry of unlimited aid and equipment for reconstruction.

"There are thousands of bodies under the rubble, including children, women and people with disabilities, which have not been recovered since the beginning of the war," he said.

The civil defense is a rescue force operating under Hamas authority.

Mohammed Khaled, 18, said he wanted to move on from the war.

"I'm burning with anticipation," he told AFP.

"I haven't seen my mother and sisters for two years. My mother traveled for medical treatment, and they only allowed my sisters to accompany her."

Khaled said he also hoped to be able to travel to have surgery for a shrapnel injury sustained during the war.