Gulf Countries Confronted by Complex Yemeni Scene that Is Run by Iran

A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)
A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)
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Gulf Countries Confronted by Complex Yemeni Scene that Is Run by Iran

A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)
A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)

The Iran-backed Houthi militias' widening of their attacks to include the United Arab Emirates reflects the losses they are incurring in their battles in Yemen, said Gulf strategic analysts.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, they said it was Iran who ordered the Houthis to carry out the attacks against the UAE, saying it was a strategic move that serves its strategic interests.

They added that the Saudi and Emirati response to the attacks was decisive, deterrent, strong and immediate, stemming from their understanding of Iran's strategic calculations and the Houthi threat.

The experts warned that the situation in Yemen is becoming increasingly complex on the political, military and humanitarian levels and that the war will not end any time soon.

They held the Houthi militias responsible politically and morally for the ongoing war because of their rejection of all peacemaking efforts.

Bin Sager: Houthis did not take military escalation decision

Chairman of the Gulf Research Center, Dr. Abdulaziz bin Sager said targeting the UAE is one of the critical strategic decisions that cannot be taken by the Houthi leadership alone, especially since it is subordinate to Iran.

Bin Sager stressed that the decision was taken by the Iranian leadership and aimed at serving its strategic interests.

There is no doubt that the Iranian calculations include the situation in Iran and the Houthis in Yemen. They also include Iran's influence in the Arab world and its regional and international relations, he went on to say.

The decision to expand the military operations in the Arabian Peninsula stems from strategic setbacks Iran has faced on several fronts, such as the Vienna nuclear talks and challenges to its influence in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, he added.

The Iranian leadership is seeking to prove that it can defy the international community, escalate its actions and take risks by expanding its attacks in the region, he explained.

By adopting this behavior, he added, Tehran is attempting to improve its negotiating position on all fronts. It is keen to prove its ability to use its regional proxies to destabilize regional and international security.

Moreover, he charged that Tehran is taking advantage of the international community's shortcomings in understanding its behavior, mindset and calculations.

Bin Sager added, however, that the recent Houthi losses in Yemen have also prompted Iran to lash out.

The militias have been suffering major losses since June 2021. They are on the verge of losing the Marib province and are now on the defense, when they used to be on the offense. The legitimate forces last month liberated the Shabwah province from the militias.

These defeats have alarmed Tehran, which is providing the Houthis with military gear and weapons, bin Sager remarked.

The Iranians are concerned that the loss of Marib will leave the ground open for the legitimate forces to advance on neighboring Sanaa, thereby threatening the Houthis' entire hold on northern Yemen.

Shulaimi: Western Countries’ Interest

President of the Gulf Security and Peace Forum Dr. Fahad al-Shulaimi echoed bin Sager's remarks that the Houthi escalation against the UAE stems from their successive defeats on several internal fronts, including Shabwah, Marib and some areas in Taiz and the al-Bayda provinces.

The Houthis believe that targeting some areas in the UAE may threaten Western interests, such as private companies and the energy market, and may eventually lead the Emirati leadership to halt its support to the southern Giants Brigades, which have dealt the Houthis a series of blows in the years-long conflict.

Furthermore, he stressed that the Houthis could not have launched the missile attacks against the UAE without Tehran's approval.

The attacks were deliberately carried out while Iran was negotiating with world powers in Vienna, he continued. Iran is trying to give off the impression that should the talks fails, it can "blow up" the region through its proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq.

Dr. Fawaz: Military operations expand and continue

Saudi Strategic and Security Analyst Dr. Fawaz bin Kasib al-Anzi told Asharq Al-Awsat that this wasn't the first time that the Houthis attempted to widen their terrorist operations by launching drone and missile attacks against the UAE.

He revealed that the militias had targeted the UAE with missiles and armed drones since the launch of the military operations in Yemen in 2016.

The attacks stopped eventually, but resumed when the UAE announced its support for the Giants Brigades, which have the proven experience to defeat the Houthis, he added.

The militias have opted to meet escalation with escalation, he stated.

The Giants Brigades achieved significant goals in Shabwah and Marib through direct support from the UAE, prompting the Houthis to retaliate by threatening the Gulf country. He predicted that the Houthi escalation will continue and so will the Giants Brigades operations that have been supported by Yemeni tribes and the Saudi-led Arab coalition.

Fawaz also highlighted the disappearance of Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi from the political and media scenes in Yemen and the death of Iran's so-called ambassador to Sanaa, Hassan Irloo, who was the effective Iranian commander of the Houthi battles.

These developments have had a massive impact on the morale of the militias, said Yemeni analysts.

The coalition forces must take advantage of this situation to strike more victories, urged Fawaz.

Response to Houthi attack

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are in agreement over the strategic threat the situation in Yemen poses to the whole Arabian Peninsula, said bin Sager. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries will not be spared the risks should the Houthis continue to control Yemen and Iran continue to control the Houthis.

Common risks often lead to unity among those threatened by them, he added.

The Saudi and Emirati leaderships believe that they share a common destiny since the Iranian-Houthi threat is an expansionist risk that is not limited to one country, but covers the entire region.

The Saudi and Emirati decision to defy the Iranian-Houthi threats in Yemen demonstrates that their leaderships have adopted long-term strategic calculations, he continued.

"Ignoring the fact that the Houthi militias illegally seized power in Yemen and that they are gangs that follow the orders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and are crucially linked to the Iranian support and strategy will have a great and long-term impact on the security and stability of the GCC countries," bin Sager warned.

He said it will also affect the freedom and independence of all countries of the region and the GCC states’ political decisions and sovereign rights and turn Yemen into a hub for Iranian aggression and threats in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula.

Bin Sager underscored the importance of deriving lessons from what happened in Lebanon.

"The indifference and failure in confronting the growing influence and control of the Lebanese Hezbollah militias over the ruling authority in Lebanon has turned them into a regional power that interferes and threatens the entire security and stability of the Arab Mashreq region in service of the IRGC and the strategic interests of the expansionist colonial Persian Empire," he noted.

Shulaimi warned that by attacking the UAE, the Houthis may even go further and target other Gulf countries.

Meanwhile, Fawaz expected Saudi Arabia and the UAE to continue their operations in Yemen especially amid the growing political support and changing international position towards the Houthis.

He cited last year's Houthi attack on the American embassy in Sanaa and US President Joe Biden stating in January that his administration was reconsidering restoring the terrorist designation of the Houthis.

These developments will no doubt lead to more pressure on the Houthi militias in the coming period.

How GCC states should address the situation in Yemen

The GCC states still do not acknowledge the dangers and threats posed by Iran’s meddling and expansionist policy, bin Sager lamented.

He pointed to the long-term threats posed by Iran's policies of establishing and supporting armed sectarian militias, weakening official state authorities and creating a state within the state in countries where it wields influence. He noted its undermining of the identity and religious and national loyalties of Arabs by deepening their sectarian affiliation to serve its interests at the expense of their national ones.

Bin Sager expressed regret that some Arab and Gulf states have adopted lenient and perhaps reckless positions towards Iran’s regional policy and have avoided condemning its expansionist and intrusive behavior.

This is both alarming and disappointing, he said.

He said the GCC states, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, believe and have publicly declared that the Yemeni conflict should be settled politically and through negotiations.

After successive negotiations with the Houthis, they have come to realize that the militias' real and final decision-making comes from Iran, he continued.

Iran's interest lies in sabotaging any solution or political settlement in Yemen if they undermine its strategic interests, he remarked.

Therefore, the Gulf countries must take a firm and united stance that reflects their deep understanding of the crisis in Yemen. They must adopt a practical policy and stances that reflect their actual understanding of the extent of the threat posed by the conflict in Yemen, he urged.



Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.


What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.


Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
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Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)

More than a month after Iraq's parliamentary elections, the country's top leaders remain locked in talks to form a government while facing pressure from Washington to exclude Tehran-backed armed groups.

Amid seismic changes in the Middle East, where new alliances are forming and old powers waning, Iraqi leaders face a daunting task: navigating relations with US-blacklisted pro-Iranian factions.

The US has held significant sway over Iraqi politics since leading the 2003 invasion that ousted long-time ruler Saddam Hussein.

But another specter also haunts Iraq's halls of power: Washington's arch-foe, Iran.

Iraq has long been caught between the two, with successive governments negotiating a delicate balance.

Now, after November's election, Washington has demanded the eventual government must exclude Iran-backed armed groups and instead move to dismantle them, Iraqi officials and diplomats told AFP.

A State Department spokesperson, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: "Iraqi leaders well know what is and is not compatible with a strong US-Iraq partnership".

Washington, the spokesperson said, "will continue to speak plainly to the urgency of dismantling Iran-backed militias".

But some of these groups have increased their presence in the new chamber and have joined the Coordination Framework, an alliance of Shiite parties with varying ties to Iran and which holds the majority.

For weeks, the Coordination Framework has been embroiled in talks to nominate the next prime minister.

"The US has put conditions that armed factions should not be part of the new government," a senior Iraqi official said. The factions must disarm and "sever ties with Iran's Revolutionary Guard," he added.

In recent tweets, the US special envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya said that Iraqi leaders are at a "crossroads".

Their decision "will send a clear and unmistakable signal to the United States... that Iraq is ready to claim its rightful place as a stable and respected nation in the new Middle East.

"The alternative is equally clear: economic deterioration, political confusion, and international isolation," Savaya said.

The US has blacklisted as "terrorist organizations" several armed groups from within the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces, a former paramilitary alliance now integrated into the armed forces.

They are also part of the Iran-backed so-called "Axis of Resistance" and have called for the withdrawal of US troops -- deployed in Iraq as part of an anti-ISIS coalition -- and launched attacks against them.

Most of these groups hold seats in parliament and have seen their political and financial clout increase.

The Asaib Ahl al-Haq faction, led by Qais al-Khazali, who is a key figure in the Coordination Framework, won 27 seats in the latest election, making it harder to exclude it from the government.

A potential compromise is to deny it a key portfolio, as in the current government.

"The US has turned a blind eye before, so they might after all engage with the government as a whole but not with ministries held by armed groups," a former Iraqi official said.

Other blacklisted groups are:

+ Kataeb Hezbollah, one of the most powerful armed groups, supports a parliamentary bloc (six seats).

+ Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kataeb Imam Ali and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya.

+ The al-Nujaba movement is the only group that has steered clear of elections.

Iraq has its economic growth to worry about.

After decades of turmoil, it has only begun to regain a sense of normalcy in recent years.

Washington has already imposed sanctions on several Iraqi entities and banks, accusing them of helping Tehran evade sanctions.

But Iraqi leaders hope for greater foreign investments and support partnerships with US companies.

The most striking endorsement came from Khazali, an opponent of the US military presence who now argues that it would be in Baghdad's interest for major US companies to invest.

Since the Israel's war with Hamas in Gaza began in October 2023, Iraq has remained relatively unscathed by the turmoil engulfing the Middle East.

Iraqi armed groups did launch attacks on US troops and largely unsuccessful ones on Israel. Washington responded with heavy strikes, and the attacks have long since halted.

Iraq remained the only close regional ally of Iran to stay out of Israel's crosshairs.

So far, the US has acted as a buffer, helping to prevent an Israeli attack, but Iraqis have been warned of strikes against the armed groups, multiple sources said.

But as the presence of American forces dwindles, fears are growing.