Gulf Countries Confronted by Complex Yemeni Scene that Is Run by Iran

A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)
A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)
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Gulf Countries Confronted by Complex Yemeni Scene that Is Run by Iran

A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)
A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)

The Iran-backed Houthi militias' widening of their attacks to include the United Arab Emirates reflects the losses they are incurring in their battles in Yemen, said Gulf strategic analysts.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, they said it was Iran who ordered the Houthis to carry out the attacks against the UAE, saying it was a strategic move that serves its strategic interests.

They added that the Saudi and Emirati response to the attacks was decisive, deterrent, strong and immediate, stemming from their understanding of Iran's strategic calculations and the Houthi threat.

The experts warned that the situation in Yemen is becoming increasingly complex on the political, military and humanitarian levels and that the war will not end any time soon.

They held the Houthi militias responsible politically and morally for the ongoing war because of their rejection of all peacemaking efforts.

Bin Sager: Houthis did not take military escalation decision

Chairman of the Gulf Research Center, Dr. Abdulaziz bin Sager said targeting the UAE is one of the critical strategic decisions that cannot be taken by the Houthi leadership alone, especially since it is subordinate to Iran.

Bin Sager stressed that the decision was taken by the Iranian leadership and aimed at serving its strategic interests.

There is no doubt that the Iranian calculations include the situation in Iran and the Houthis in Yemen. They also include Iran's influence in the Arab world and its regional and international relations, he went on to say.

The decision to expand the military operations in the Arabian Peninsula stems from strategic setbacks Iran has faced on several fronts, such as the Vienna nuclear talks and challenges to its influence in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, he added.

The Iranian leadership is seeking to prove that it can defy the international community, escalate its actions and take risks by expanding its attacks in the region, he explained.

By adopting this behavior, he added, Tehran is attempting to improve its negotiating position on all fronts. It is keen to prove its ability to use its regional proxies to destabilize regional and international security.

Moreover, he charged that Tehran is taking advantage of the international community's shortcomings in understanding its behavior, mindset and calculations.

Bin Sager added, however, that the recent Houthi losses in Yemen have also prompted Iran to lash out.

The militias have been suffering major losses since June 2021. They are on the verge of losing the Marib province and are now on the defense, when they used to be on the offense. The legitimate forces last month liberated the Shabwah province from the militias.

These defeats have alarmed Tehran, which is providing the Houthis with military gear and weapons, bin Sager remarked.

The Iranians are concerned that the loss of Marib will leave the ground open for the legitimate forces to advance on neighboring Sanaa, thereby threatening the Houthis' entire hold on northern Yemen.

Shulaimi: Western Countries’ Interest

President of the Gulf Security and Peace Forum Dr. Fahad al-Shulaimi echoed bin Sager's remarks that the Houthi escalation against the UAE stems from their successive defeats on several internal fronts, including Shabwah, Marib and some areas in Taiz and the al-Bayda provinces.

The Houthis believe that targeting some areas in the UAE may threaten Western interests, such as private companies and the energy market, and may eventually lead the Emirati leadership to halt its support to the southern Giants Brigades, which have dealt the Houthis a series of blows in the years-long conflict.

Furthermore, he stressed that the Houthis could not have launched the missile attacks against the UAE without Tehran's approval.

The attacks were deliberately carried out while Iran was negotiating with world powers in Vienna, he continued. Iran is trying to give off the impression that should the talks fails, it can "blow up" the region through its proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq.

Dr. Fawaz: Military operations expand and continue

Saudi Strategic and Security Analyst Dr. Fawaz bin Kasib al-Anzi told Asharq Al-Awsat that this wasn't the first time that the Houthis attempted to widen their terrorist operations by launching drone and missile attacks against the UAE.

He revealed that the militias had targeted the UAE with missiles and armed drones since the launch of the military operations in Yemen in 2016.

The attacks stopped eventually, but resumed when the UAE announced its support for the Giants Brigades, which have the proven experience to defeat the Houthis, he added.

The militias have opted to meet escalation with escalation, he stated.

The Giants Brigades achieved significant goals in Shabwah and Marib through direct support from the UAE, prompting the Houthis to retaliate by threatening the Gulf country. He predicted that the Houthi escalation will continue and so will the Giants Brigades operations that have been supported by Yemeni tribes and the Saudi-led Arab coalition.

Fawaz also highlighted the disappearance of Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi from the political and media scenes in Yemen and the death of Iran's so-called ambassador to Sanaa, Hassan Irloo, who was the effective Iranian commander of the Houthi battles.

These developments have had a massive impact on the morale of the militias, said Yemeni analysts.

The coalition forces must take advantage of this situation to strike more victories, urged Fawaz.

Response to Houthi attack

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are in agreement over the strategic threat the situation in Yemen poses to the whole Arabian Peninsula, said bin Sager. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries will not be spared the risks should the Houthis continue to control Yemen and Iran continue to control the Houthis.

Common risks often lead to unity among those threatened by them, he added.

The Saudi and Emirati leaderships believe that they share a common destiny since the Iranian-Houthi threat is an expansionist risk that is not limited to one country, but covers the entire region.

The Saudi and Emirati decision to defy the Iranian-Houthi threats in Yemen demonstrates that their leaderships have adopted long-term strategic calculations, he continued.

"Ignoring the fact that the Houthi militias illegally seized power in Yemen and that they are gangs that follow the orders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and are crucially linked to the Iranian support and strategy will have a great and long-term impact on the security and stability of the GCC countries," bin Sager warned.

He said it will also affect the freedom and independence of all countries of the region and the GCC states’ political decisions and sovereign rights and turn Yemen into a hub for Iranian aggression and threats in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula.

Bin Sager underscored the importance of deriving lessons from what happened in Lebanon.

"The indifference and failure in confronting the growing influence and control of the Lebanese Hezbollah militias over the ruling authority in Lebanon has turned them into a regional power that interferes and threatens the entire security and stability of the Arab Mashreq region in service of the IRGC and the strategic interests of the expansionist colonial Persian Empire," he noted.

Shulaimi warned that by attacking the UAE, the Houthis may even go further and target other Gulf countries.

Meanwhile, Fawaz expected Saudi Arabia and the UAE to continue their operations in Yemen especially amid the growing political support and changing international position towards the Houthis.

He cited last year's Houthi attack on the American embassy in Sanaa and US President Joe Biden stating in January that his administration was reconsidering restoring the terrorist designation of the Houthis.

These developments will no doubt lead to more pressure on the Houthi militias in the coming period.

How GCC states should address the situation in Yemen

The GCC states still do not acknowledge the dangers and threats posed by Iran’s meddling and expansionist policy, bin Sager lamented.

He pointed to the long-term threats posed by Iran's policies of establishing and supporting armed sectarian militias, weakening official state authorities and creating a state within the state in countries where it wields influence. He noted its undermining of the identity and religious and national loyalties of Arabs by deepening their sectarian affiliation to serve its interests at the expense of their national ones.

Bin Sager expressed regret that some Arab and Gulf states have adopted lenient and perhaps reckless positions towards Iran’s regional policy and have avoided condemning its expansionist and intrusive behavior.

This is both alarming and disappointing, he said.

He said the GCC states, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, believe and have publicly declared that the Yemeni conflict should be settled politically and through negotiations.

After successive negotiations with the Houthis, they have come to realize that the militias' real and final decision-making comes from Iran, he continued.

Iran's interest lies in sabotaging any solution or political settlement in Yemen if they undermine its strategic interests, he remarked.

Therefore, the Gulf countries must take a firm and united stance that reflects their deep understanding of the crisis in Yemen. They must adopt a practical policy and stances that reflect their actual understanding of the extent of the threat posed by the conflict in Yemen, he urged.



Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
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Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)

Only weeks after Iranian diplomat Mohammad Reza Sheibani returned to Beirut as ambassador, his name has become the focus of a diplomatic crisis.

Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry withdrew its approval and declared him “persona non grata”, reflecting rising tensions between Beirut and Tehran and drawing renewed attention to a career tied to some of the Middle East’s most complex issues.

The decision swiftly ended the mission of a diplomat Tehran had sent back to Beirut, relying on his long experience on Lebanon and Syria.

His return had collided with a Lebanese political climate increasingly sensitive to the limits of foreign diplomatic roles.

War experience and regional role

Sheibani is no stranger to Lebanon. He served as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut from 2005 to 2009, a period that coincided with the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, giving him direct experience managing ties under complex security and political conditions.

His reappointment in early 2026 reflected an Iranian preference for seasoned diplomats in areas where politics and security overlap.

He replaced former ambassador Mojtaba Amani, who was injured in a pager explosion in Beirut, at a time of regional escalation, giving his return added weight beyond routine diplomacy.

Between Beirut and Damascus

Born in 1960, Sheibani joined Iran’s Foreign Ministry in the 1980s and rose through its ranks, focusing on Middle East affairs.

He served as chargé d’affaires in Cyprus and as head of Iran’s interests section in Egypt, before being appointed ambassador to Lebanon and later to Syria from 2011 to 2016, during which he covered the early years of the war.

He later served as ambassador to Tunisia and non-resident ambassador to Libya, and as assistant foreign minister for Middle East affairs.

He also worked as a senior adviser and researcher at the Institute for Political and International Studies at the Foreign Ministry, before returning to the forefront amid rising regional tensions.

Roles during escalation

In October 2024, he was named special representative of the Iranian foreign minister for West Asia, and in January 2025, he was appointed special envoy to Syria following developments in Damascus, including the closure of Iran’s embassy.

He was also tasked with following the Lebanese file as a special envoy during a sensitive phase, reinforcing his role as a crisis diplomat.

His career reflects a distinction within Iran’s diplomatic structure, as he is linked to the Ministry of Intelligence rather than the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, highlighting a division of roles in foreign policy.

Legal and constitutional debate

The move by Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry has also sparked legal debate over how such decisions are made and enforced.

Constitutional expert Saeed Malek said the decision is based on Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which allows a state to declare a diplomat persona non grata without a specific procedure.

He said the measure does not amount to a break in diplomatic ties but falls within the management of diplomatic representation, adding that such decisions fall within the foreign minister’s authority under Article 66 of the constitution.

Malek said the decision is binding, and once the deadline to leave Lebanon expires, the ambassador’s presence becomes unlawful.

He added that security forces are required to enforce the decision and remove him once located.

However, he said enforcement remains bound by international rules, as the ambassador’s presence inside the embassy prevents Lebanese forces from entering under diplomatic immunity, meaning his expulsion can only be carried out once he leaves the premises.


Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
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Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.

Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr was not an unfamiliar figure when he was appointed on Tuesday as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. One week after the killing of Ali Larijani, and amid a war that has thinned the ranks of Iran’s top leadership, authorities turned to a man shaped within one of the deepest layers of the “Islamic Republic’s” power structure.

Mehdi Tabatabaei, the Iranian president’s deputy communications director, said on Tuesday that General Zolghadr had been appointed to replace Larijani. He wrote on X that Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had approved the decision.

The Supreme National Security Council, formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, coordinates security and foreign policy. It includes senior military, intelligence and government officials, as well as representatives of the Supreme Leader, who has final authority in state affairs.

Zolghadr’s appointment appears to reflect state priorities in a time of crisis. A further decree is expected to name him as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the council, allowing him to vote under the constitution.

Unlike politicians who rise through elections or public platforms, Zolghadr belongs to a different category: a figure who boasts internal networks that predate the state and later embedded themselves within it. He accumulated power within the agencies instead of confronting them. His career resembles less a sequence of administrative posts and more a continuous thread linking some of the most entrenched centers of power in Iran.

His elevation to one of the country’s top security posts is significant not only for the positions he has held, but for the role he has played within the system. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he developed expertise in organization and network-based operations, consolidating his position within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later extending his influence through the interior ministry, judiciary and Expediency Council.

The appointment signals a broader logic within Iran’s ruling establishment: in moments of heightened pressure, figures rooted in institutional networks tend to take precedence over those with a public political profile.

Early career

Zolghadr’s career is closely tied to the political environment from which he emerged. He belongs to a generation associated with the “Mansouroun” network, an early group that later produced influential figures within the IRGC, including Mohsen Rezaei, Ali Shamkhani, Gholam Ali Rashid, and Mohammad and Ahmad Forouzandeh.

The significance of this affiliation lies not only in early organizational ties, but in the nature of the group itself: an ideologically driven pre-revolutionary network that repositioned itself within the state through the IRGC.

Zolghadr’s rise was not an individual climb through institutional ranks, but growth within a web of relationships and loyalties embedded at the core of the system. He emerged not simply as a professional military officer, but as part of a generation that viewed security and politics as intertwined domains in safeguarding the regime. This gave him the rare ability to “reposition” himself and retain power as successive government ruled Iran.

War and the ‘Ramadan’ headquarters

After the fall of the Shah, Zolghadr, like other members of Mansouroun, initially operated through revolutionary committees before joining the IRGC. His most defining wartime role was leading the “Ramadan Headquarters,” a key unit during the Iran-Iraq war.

This post was central to his political and security development. The Ramadan Headquarters served as a nucleus for external operations, coordinating cross-border activities with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and managing operations inside Iraq. It later evolved into what became the Quds Force, the IRGC’s current foreign arm.

There, Zolghadr developed a hallmark approach: operating at the intersection of military, intelligence and political spheres. The role involved not only managing battlefield operations, but also building networks, cultivating allies and leveraging conflict to generate long-term influence.

This model — combining military structure, indirect operations and proxy management — became a defining feature of Iran’s regional strategy. Within this environment, Zolghadr gained a reputation as a manager and strategist rather than a public-facing commander.

Rise within the IRGC

Following the end of the war in the late 1980s, Zolghadr spent 16 years at the top of the IRGC hierarchy: eight years as chief of the joint staff and eight years as deputy commander-in-chief.

These roles emphasized administration, coordination and institutional discipline rather than field command. His influence was rooted not in public charisma but in his position within the IRGC’s internal machinery.

Over time, he became firmly aligned with Iran’s conservative camp. His political role became more visible during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when tensions between reformists and hardline institutions intensified.

Reform era

During the late 1990s, Zolghadr was among military figures associated with the conservative bloc within the IRGC. His name was linked to a letter sent by IRGC commanders to President Khatami, widely seen as a signal of military intervention in political affairs at a time of unrest. He was also associated with hardline opposition to the reform movement and the student protests of that period.

This phase highlighted a structural aspect of his career: his political role did not begin after leaving the military, but was embedded within the IRGC itself as it became increasingly politicized during its confrontation with reformists.

Interior Ministry under Ahmadinejad

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Zolghadr was appointed deputy interior minister for security affairs. The position placed him at the heart of internal security, overseeing provincial governors and managing crises, protests and local tensions. It marked a transition from military service to the executive branch, while maintaining a focus on security.

His move illustrated a broader pattern: shifting from protecting the system through force to safeguarding it through security bureaucracy, expanding his network within the state apparatus.

Basij

Zolghadr left the interior ministry in 2007 amid reports of differences with Ahmadinejad, but his departure did not signal a loss of influence. In December of that year, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him deputy chief of staff of the armed forces for Basij affairs, a newly created role.

The Basij, a paramilitary force, plays a key role in ideological mobilization and maintaining the IRGC’s presence in Iranian society. The decree emphasized strengthening and expanding the Basij’s reach, underlining the importance of Zolghadr’s assignment.

Judiciary and expanding influence

In 2010, Zolghadr moved to the judiciary, serving first as deputy for social prevention and crime reduction, and later as strategic deputy to the head of the judiciary until 2020.

The shift did not represent a departure from security work, as Iran’s judiciary operates closely under the authority of the Supreme Leader. Instead, it broadened his influence across another pillar of the state.

In September 2021, he was appointed secretary of the Expediency Council, succeeding Mohsen Rezaei. The role involves overseeing the council’s committees and acting as a link to the highest levels of decision-making.

Zolghadr also has family ties that extend his influence. He is the father-in-law of Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs and a prominent figure in nuclear negotiations.

Gharibabadi previously served as Iran’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

From Larijani to Zolghadr

Larijani’s death deprived Iran of a political figure skilled in navigating between power centers. The choice of Zolghadr suggests a shift in priorities.

While Larijani represented balance and negotiation, Zolghadr embodies institutional discipline and internal cohesion. His selection follows speculation over other candidates, including former defense minister Hossein Dehghan, who was ultimately not appointed.

The decision reflects the system’s preference, in wartime conditions, for figures trusted by security networks over those known for political flexibility.

He may not be a prominent public figure, but he represents a type of official often relied upon in times of crisis: a man with internal networks, brought back to the forefront as Iran faces one of its most challenging periods.


Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
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Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)

Diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Iran have entered a new phase with Beirut’s unprecedented withdrawal on Tuesday of its approval of the accreditation of Tehran’s new ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon and informed him of “the Lebanese state's decision to withdraw approval of the accreditation of the appointed Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, and declare him persona non grata, demanding that he leave Lebanese territory no later than next Sunday.”

The ministry said it had also summoned Lebanon's ambassador to Iran “in light of what the Lebanese state described as Tehran's violation of diplomatic norms and established practices between the two countries”, after Beirut accused Iran's Revolutionary Guards of commanding Hezbollah's operations in its war against Israel.

The government has accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon to war after it fired rockets at Israel on March 2 in wake of the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei at the beginning of the conflict.

Crisis

After three decades of calm, relations between Lebanon and Iran started to grow strained after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared at the time that Tehran was ready to negotiate with Paris about the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 in Lebanon, sparking condemnation from Lebanon.

Then Prime Minister Najib Mikati slammed it as flagrant meddling in Lebanon’s sovereign affairs. He informed the foreign minister at the time to summon Iran’s charge d’affaires to file a formal complaint.

Relations became more strained in 2025 after Ambassador Mojtaba Amani’s suitcases were searched at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.

Youssef Raggi, who became Lebanon’s foreign minister in 2025, summoned the Iranian ambassador for the first time since the 1990s last year. In April, he summoned Amani after he posted that the “project to disarm Hezbollah is an obvious conspiracy.”

The Lebanese government had issued a decision on the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah last year.

In December, media close to Hezbollah reported that Raggi had suspended procedures on approving the accreditation of the new Iranian ambassador.

Last week, he summoned the charge d’affaires over statements attributed to the Iranian mission in Beirut and Iranian officials over security and military developments in Lebanon.

Ties between Raggi and Iranian officials have been strained for months. Last year he declined an official invitation from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqhchi to visit Tehran, suggesting that they meet in a third neutral country.

The withdrawal of accreditation is rare and it effectively means that a country refuses to welcome a diplomatic representative, reflecting deep political disapproval of the concerned country’s behavior.

The withdrawal was the latest Lebanese measure against Iran.

On March 5, the government took a series of steps that reflect a hardening approach towards Tehran. It imposed visas on visiting Iranians that had been suspended since 2011 in an effort to encourage trade and tourism between Beirut and Tehran.

The government also banned any activity by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Dozens of Iranians have since been deported from Lebanon.

‘Correcting’ relations

Lebanon had in the early 1990s launched a phase to “correct” relations with Iran after the end of the Lebanese civil war.

Then Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz was responsible for “reorganizing diplomatic work in line with the Vienna Convection”, said Lebanese sources.

During the 1975-90 civil war, Iranian officials would move freely to Lebanon through Syria and meet with Hezbollah officials in Beirut. Lebanese authorities had opposed the behavior.

In previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Boueiz said Iranian delegations would travel to Lebanon through Syria without coordinating with the state.

The situation was later addressed through official diplomatic channels, he added.

The Iranian ambassador at the time was informed of the authorities’ objection and the stance was relayed to then Iranian FM Ali Akbar Velayati, said Boueiz.

Two days later, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry received an approval to “correct relations”, leading to an exchange in official visits and the signing of agreements that “regulated” the ties.