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How to Use Syrian Oil as an 'Entry Point' to Breaking the Deadlock

A US military vehicle near an oil field in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province on July 1, 2020. (Reuters)
A US military vehicle near an oil field in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province on July 1, 2020. (Reuters)
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How to Use Syrian Oil as an 'Entry Point' to Breaking the Deadlock

A US military vehicle near an oil field in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province on July 1, 2020. (Reuters)
A US military vehicle near an oil field in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province on July 1, 2020. (Reuters)

In the face of the stability of the “borderlines” between the three Syrian zones of influence for two years, the continuation of the political stalemate and the emergence of a global energy crisis, a set of ideas is being circulated aimed at turning Syrian oil into a point of consensus between the players and an “entry point to break the deadlock”. This can be achieved through understandings that lead to an increase in oil production to about 500,000 barrels per day within three years to provide about 20 billion US dollars annually, distribute the revenues for the benefit of all Syrians, and support “early recovery” projects in accordance with the international resolution on humanitarian aid.

'Warlords'

After the eruption of the conflict in 2011, Western countries imposed sanctions on the Syrian oil sector, and foreign companies, which were producing about 400,000 barrels per day, left the country.

Currently, the Syrian Democratic Forces, with the support of the US-led coalition, control a quarter of Syria's area, but significantly 90 percent of the oil and more than half of the gas.

Syrian Oil Minister Bassam Tohme said a few days ago that the oil sector's losses since the beginning of the crisis amounted to $91.5 billion. He revealed that the direct losses to equipment in the oil sector amounted to 19.3 billion dollars, "of which 3 billion are the value of damages inflicted by the international coalition's strikes."

The indirect losses amounted to 72 billion dollars. The minister said the daily production of oil last year amounted to 89,000 barrels, the majority of which took place in Kurdish-controlled areas and is described by Tohme as “stolen”.

Since early 2017, the SDF has taken over oil fields east of the Euphrates River and their infrastructure owned by contracts with the government by foreign companies, including Gulfsands, Total, and Shell. Oil wells and facilities were also cordoned off. The Autonomous Administration of the SDF uses some of the production locally. Mediators and warlords transfer some of the oil to government areas to refine an amount and keep the other. Oil is also smuggled into Iraqi Kurdistan, for local consumption or for smuggling to Turkey. Oil is sold at very low prices, and wells are damaged

'Oil protection'

On October 6, 2019, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham played a role in persuading President Donald Trump to keep 900 members of the US military in eastern Syria, after his decision to withdraw from the border with Turkey. Trump later said that "a small number of soldiers will remain in the areas that contain oil," stressing that "we have ensured the security and protection of oil."

In July 2020, Graham, who is close to Trump, announced before Congress that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi informed him of the signing of an agreement with the American company Delta Crescent Energy to invest in oil after obtaining an exception from the Treasury Department (which was not extended by the administration of Joe Biden).

He added: "The American company will work to improve the feasibility of the oil fields to make them more productive. It makes sense that, rather than just writing checks, we should help people help themselves." Meanwhile, then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that "the agreement took more time than expected" and aims to "modernize oil."

The situation embarrassed the Syrian Ministry of Defense, which said that "Syrian oil belongs to the Syrian people, and we remain committed to the unity and territorial integrity of Syria." It added that "the United States government does not own, control, or manage the oil resources in Syria, and the population in areas liberated from ISIS make their own decisions regarding local governance."

After that, US Defense Secretary Mark Esper announced: "We are taking measures to strengthen our position in Deir Ezzor to prevent ISIS access to the oil fields." The Pentagon confirmed sending reinforcements and mechanisms to protect the oil fields, so that about 500 soldiers remained east of the Euphrates, with an increase in the number and quality of military equipment to provide protection for the oil wells.

'Quadruple rage'

The oil agreement, brokered by the US, was widely criticized by Damascus, Moscow, Tehran and Ankara as "political recognition of the Kurdish administration". They said it "contradicts the understanding of the guarantors of Astana, Russia, Iran and Turkey, to oppose any separatist agenda in Syria." Moscow considered it "a theft of Syrian wealth." It also angered foreign companies that hold sovereign rights in the oil fields.

Among those companies is Gulfsands, which had signed a contract with the Syrian government in 2003 to invest and develop Block 26 east of the Euphrates. According to its 2019 Annual Report, unauthorized production since early 2017 has been around 20,000 barrels a day, meaning that around 35 million barrels have been produced since then. Gulfsands expressed "concern" about this unlawful activity, and particularly the involvement of Delta Crescent Energy.

Profits...and ideas

According to experts' estimates, the Autonomous Administration receives 16 dollars per barrel, and 15 dollars goes to the Syrian government. The rest, which could amount to up to 50 dollars per barrel, is "lost" and ends up in the hands of war profiteers.

It is again reported in the Gulfsands Annual Report that Block 26 could, with appropriate investment, be increased in production from 20,000 to 100,000 barrels per day. If this could be replicated across the region, it could mean an industry that produces 500,000 barrels per day which at todays' high oil prices could raise round 18 billion dollars of gross revenue per year.

Challenges

Rebuilding the Syrian oil industry this way faces many obstacles. It would need agreement between the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and Damascus and also require international support. In particular, this project requires political understandings between the US, which imposes sanctions on the oil sector, and Russia, which accuses Washington of "stealing oil."

Some experts suggest the establishment of a structure that falls within the context of UN envoy Geir Pedersen's proposal for "step-for-step" measures, to include aspects of financing "early recovery" projects under the new Security Council resolution for humanitarian aid drafted by Washington and Moscow, and providing new sources of relief funding from Syria. Significantly, the European Union had in the past 11 years allocated 25 billion euros to Syrians, 14 billion dollars from America, and 3.7 billion pounds from Britain. A fully functioning and revitalized oil industry could exceed these contributions.

The proposal suggests a formal structure of specially selected and audited service providers, such as. returning foreign oil companies, preferred oil traders, and financiers who, in exchange for sanctions exemptions and approvals, would ensure full transparency and accountability for the exploration, development, production, marketing and sale of oil and gas through established international channels.

There is no doubt that such an initiative is ambitious and would need to navigate international sanctions, as well as provide transparency and benefits for all participants to them to have confidence in its implementation and provide their support. However, the prize is huge, particularly for the Syrian people, and surely is worth attention and consideration from all sides.

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Lebanon’s Latest Conflict Brings Rare Public Backlash Against Hezbollah as War Flares Again

Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)
Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)
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Lebanon’s Latest Conflict Brings Rare Public Backlash Against Hezbollah as War Flares Again

Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)
Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)

The Lebanese mother of two had just awakened to prepare the pre-dawn meal before another day of fasting during the holy month of Ramadan when Israeli warplanes began attacking southern Lebanon in retaliation for rockets and drones launched by Hezbollah.

The family quickly packed up and headed toward Beirut, seeking safety from another deadly war between Israel and Hezbollah. With tens of thousands of others fleeing on that March 2 day, the usually one-hour trip from the southern city of Nabatiyeh took 15 hours.

“I am against giving pretexts to Israel,” said the 45-year-old woman, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals from the Hezbollah supporters she lives among.

“I am totally against Hezbollah’s decision to start with the first strike,” said the woman, who is now living with her husband, their 17- and 12-year-old children, and her mother-in-law inside a school turned into a shelter in the Lebanese capital.

As Hezbollah enters a new round of fighting with Israel just 15 months after the last Israel-Hezbollah war ended with a November 2024 US-brokered ceasefire, the Iran-backed group and political party is facing increasing grassroots discontent within its base and problems with the Lebanese authorities.

Population still reeling from the previous war

On March 2, two days after Israel and the US launched attacks on Iran, igniting a war in the Middle East, Hezbollah fired missiles and drones into Israel for the first time in more than a year.

Hundreds of thousands of residents of southern Lebanon, the eastern Bekaa valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs have fled their homes after Israeli warnings that their neighborhoods, towns and villages would be targeted.

The new round of fighting comes as Shiite communities that suffered the brunt of the last conflict are still reeling from it. The last Israel-Hezbollah war killed more than 4,000 people in Lebanon and caused $11 billion in damage, according to the World Bank.

Unlike in the past, when many people were afraid to publicly criticize Hezbollah, some Lebanese Shiites are openly blaming the group for their current misery as they find themselves living in the street, on public squares, or with relatives or friends amid cold weather and fasting during Ramadan.

For Hussein Ali, it was the second time in less than two years that he was forced to leave his house in Beirut’s southern suburb of Haret Hreik. During the last Israel-Hezbollah war, the apartment where he lived was destroyed and now the vegetable vendor is worried the same thing will happen again.

“No one wanted this war,” said the man, who is also staying in the school and relying on aid to survive. “People haven’t recovered from the previous war."

Government takes a harsher stance

After the end of Lebanon's civil war in 1990, militias were required to disarm, but Hezbollah was exempted because it was fighting Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon at the time.

Now the Lebanese government has sought to crack down on the group’s armed wing and end its status as a parallel armed force outside of state control.

The shift was clear when, on March 2, the Lebanese government moved to declare Hezbollah’s military activities illegal, with all but two of the 24 Cabinet ministers voting in favor; only the two Hezbollah ministers voted no. Even ministers from Hezbollah’s strongest ally, the Amal group of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, voted to approve the measure.

“The government confirms that the decision of war and peace is only in the hand of the state,” Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said, adding that the government “orders the immediate ban on all of Hezbollah’s military activities as they are illegal and it should be forced to hand over its weapons to the Lebanese state.”

The Lebanese army has since begun to crack down and last week arrested three Hezbollah members who were found transporting weapons at a checkpoint. But the men were released on bail Monday.

Government officials have accused Hezbollah of repeatedly taking unilateral military actions that should be under state authority. On Oct. 8, 2023, the group began attacking Israel a day after the assault led by the Iranian-backed Hamas on southern Israel triggered the war in Gaza.

Now, the group has entered the fray on behalf of Iran to avenge the killing of its supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, as well as in retaliation, it says, for Israeli violations of the November 2024 ceasefire.

Some Hezbollah supporters see the war as justified

Ali al-Amin, a Lebanese journalist who is a harsh critic of Hezbollah, said that while some people are now criticizing the armed group more than in the past, many still remain quiet out of fear for their safety.

“Criticism could have a high cost and not all people express their opinions,” said al-Amin, a Shiite from south Lebanon, who added that many poor Shiites rely on assistance that could be cut off anytime by Hezbollah or the allied Amal movement.

In the past, people who criticized Hezbollah on social media were sometimes roughed up by its supporters and forced to make new videos saying they were wrong.

But the group still has many supporters. They say that Hezbollah's decision to strike was justified because Israel had not abided by the November 2024 ceasefire.

Since the ceasefire, Israel has continued to carry out almost daily airstrikes against Hezbollah, which have killed about 400 people, including dozens of civilians, and that have also prevented the reconstruction of destroyed areas.

“We cannot tolerate that anymore,” said Ali Saleh who was displaced from a southern village near Nabatiyeh. “I pray for God to protect our young men and make them victorious against Israel."

Even the Shiite woman who criticized Hezbollah's move to strike first said that if the party hadn't, the result might have been the same.

“If we attack they will attack us and if we don’t attack they would have attacked us,” she said.

Sadek Nabulsi, a political science professor at the Lebanese University whose thinking aligns with Hezbollah, said the latest complaints are nothing new and don’t represent a fissure in grassroots support for the Iranian-allied groups. There was a similar outcry during the 14-month Israel-Hezbollah war that ended in 2024 and the monthlong war in 2006, he said.

“Hezbollah’s base of support is known for ... tolerating pain,” Nabulsi said. “If you look at this base of support, despite all the harsh conditions, it is still coherent, patient and waiting for salvation.”

Features

Gaza Patients Face Death Again as Rafah Crossing Stays Closed

Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
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Gaza Patients Face Death Again as Rafah Crossing Stays Closed

Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)

Patients and wounded in Gaza are facing increasingly harsh conditions after Israeli authorities again closed the Rafah land crossing, which had been partially reopened for a short period under a ceasefire agreement following a prolonged shutdown that prevented tens of thousands from leaving for medical treatment.

The crossing’s reopening at the beginning of February had raised hopes among patients and the wounded that they would be able to travel abroad for treatment. However, Israeli restrictions on the number of people permitted to leave further complicated the situation.

Those hopes faded when the crossing was closed again following the start of the war with Iran on the 28th of last month.

Twelve-year-old Asmaa al-Shawish, who suffers from a rare disease known as Sanfilippo syndrome, has for years faced the threat of death as her health has recently deteriorated sharply, her mother told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Her mother said the girl had obtained a medical referral to receive treatment abroad in 2023, shortly before the war began, but did not manage to travel in time. She remained inside Gaza, and her condition has continued to worsen day by day.

She said her daughter is losing the ability to drink water and suffers from brain atrophy as well as enlargement of the liver and spleen. The child also experiences constant seizures and requires daily treatment in hospitals in an effort to keep her alive as long as possible. Her condition, she added, is deteriorating rapidly.

“When the Rafah crossing opened, we felt a little hope that we might be able to travel again,” she said. “But the large number of patients and wounded waiting like us delayed our departure until the occupation closed it again, leaving us to face our fate on our own.”

“Every time I see my daughter in this condition, I grieve over her harsh circumstances,” she added. “I see her taking her last breaths, and she could die at any moment.”

20,000 Patients

According to the Gaza Health Ministry, more than 20,000 patients and wounded people urgently need treatment abroad. Deaths are already being recorded among those waiting for the crossing to reopen regularly, as it operated before the war, so they can travel and save their lives.

The ministry said hospitals in the enclave lack the medical capabilities needed to save these patients amid the difficult conditions imposed by the Israeli blockade. It added that some medicines have completely run out, while others are close to being depleted.

According to the government media office, the total number of travelers and returnees during the period when the Rafah land crossing was partially open reached 1,148 out of the 3,400 expected to travel in both directions. This represents about 33% compliance with the agreement that was supposed to be implemented after the ceasefire.

Government sources from Hamas told Asharq Al-Awsat that there are “no promises to reopen the Rafah land crossing, even partially.”

Hazem Qassem, a spokesman for Hamas, said the continued closure of the Rafah crossing “under flimsy security pretexts and false claims” represents a “blatant and dangerous violation” of the ceasefire agreement and a retreat from commitments made to mediators, particularly Egypt.

He said the move is part of efforts to “tighten the blockade” imposed on the enclave, preventing tens of thousands of wounded people from traveling to receive what he described as their natural right to medical treatment.

Continued Killings

On the ground, Israel has continued its escalation, killing more Palestinians and striking multiple targets across the enclave.

The Israeli military said on Tuesday it had killed six Palestinians, three of whom it said had crossed the “yellow line” north of the enclave, and three armed Hamas members in tunnels in Rafah.

The number of Palestinian deaths since the ceasefire has risen to more than 656, including at least 20 killed since the start of the war with Iran. The cumulative toll since Oct. 7, 2023, has reached 72,134 deaths.

This coincided with Israeli airstrikes, artillery shelling and gunfire in several areas on both sides of the yellow line in the enclave. For the second consecutive day, bulldozers were seen demolishing what remained of homes east of Khan Younis, about 20 meters from Salah al-Din Road.

A warplane also struck a house whose residents had evacuated following an Israeli order in northern Khan Younis. Another strike hit a mobile phone charging point and an internet service station in an empty area next to tents housing displaced people southwest of Gaza City.

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Trump’s Tough Test: Is Military Success Enough to End the War?

US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
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Trump’s Tough Test: Is Military Success Enough to End the War?

US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)

On the eleventh day of the war, the conflict with Iran looks closer to a military decision than a political settlement. By most circulating estimates, the US and Israel have dealt heavy blows to Iran’s missile infrastructure, air defenses and military command structure, sharply reducing Tehran’s ability to strike its neighbors as it did in the opening days.

But the key question remains unanswered: is military success enough to end the war?

Here, the ambiguity of US President Donald Trump comes into view. He says the war “will end soon” and suggests he could talk to Iran. Yet he also insists Washington “has won in many ways, but not enough,” warning of tougher strikes if Tehran continues threatening shipping and energy flows.

The contradiction is not just rhetorical. It reveals a real dilemma: a battlefield achievement that still lacks the political formula to turn it into a stable endgame.

Iran, meanwhile, does not appear to be winning militarily. The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as a new supreme leader, widely read as a defiant signal, was followed by statements from senior officials pledging to continue the fight and rejecting negotiations.

The regime’s response to the strikes has not been compromise but tighter alignment with the Revolutionary Guards.

Tehran’s calculation is straightforward: political survival matters more than battlefield losses. If it prevents its adversaries from forcing total surrender, endurance itself can be seen as a form of victory.

Oil: Iran’s Most Powerful Card

As Iran loses conventional military tools, oil remains its most potent weapon. The Strait of Hormuz is not merely a shipping lane; it is a critical chokepoint for global energy markets. Any disruption there reverberates instantly through prices, shipping costs, insurance premiums and political nerves in Washington and Western capitals.

That is why markets have quickly become part of the war.

Iran knows it cannot match the United States and Israel in airpower or technology. What it can do is raise the economic and political price of the conflict, for both its adversaries and the world.

As oil prices climb, pressure builds inside the United States and Europe to end the war quickly. Not because Iran has prevailed militarily, but because it has turned energy into a strategic lever.

This is what makes the decision to stop the bombing so sensitive. If Washington halts the war simply because oil prices spike or political pressures grow, Tehran will draw a clear lesson: threatening energy flows ensures survival.

That would be more consequential than any short-term battlefield gain. It would mean Iran, even after losing much of its arsenal, still holds a deterrent capable of helping it rebuild its position later.

If, however, the US and Israel continue the pressure until Iran loses the ability to threaten shipping and disrupt energy markets, the regime would be stripped of its last major lever. Only then would halting the strikes resemble ending a war rather than freezing it.

The “Day After” Question

The central criticism aimed at Trump in Washington and abroad is simple: he lacks a coherent plan for the day after.

Who governs Iran? Who prevents chaos? Who signs ceasefire arrangements and nuclear restrictions? And who ensures the country does not slide into instability like that in Iraq or Syria?

The question is legitimate, but it may not match Trump’s own logic.

The US president does not appear interested in rebuilding Iran or managing a political transition there, as Washington attempted in earlier post-September 11 interventions. His approach seems simpler and harsher: destroy the regime’s ability to threaten US and regional interests.

What happens to power in Tehran afterward may not be a direct American responsibility.

In that sense, Washington does not seem intent on toppling the regime and then inheriting the burden of governing the country. The objective appears to be weakening it enough that it can no longer pose the same threat.

If the regime collapses internally, that would be an added bonus. If it survives but with far fewer capabilities, that too can be framed as a win.

This approach is less about nation-building and more about strategic punishment followed by withdrawal.

But such a method carries risks. There is no strong evidence that the regime is close to collapse despite visible fractures in its leadership. Nor is there an organized alternative ready to take its place.

Pushing Iran toward internal fragmentation or civil conflict could open the door to far wider instability, displacement and regional violence.

For that reason, the absence of a detailed day-after plan may not mean the administration lacks a goal. It may simply mean it has deliberately lowered its political ambitions.

The promise is not a new, stable and democratic Iran—only a weaker one.

Such a gamble will succeed only if Iran accepts the new reality, or proves unable to resist it. So far, Tehran shows little sign of doing so.

Three Possible Endings

The first scenario is a conditional ceasefire after the core strikes are completed. Operations would continue for days or weeks until Washington and Tel Aviv conclude that Iran’s missile, nuclear and military structures have been damaged enough. Indirect channels would then open to impose a ceasefire formula on US-Israeli terms.

This is the most rational outcome. It would allow Trump to claim victory without becoming trapped in a regime-change operation or the occupation of a large, complex country.

The second scenario is a longer war than Washington wants. That would happen if Mojtaba Khamenei rejects any settlement that looks like surrender and continues betting on exhausting markets and raising costs for the Gulf and the wider world.

Iran might not win militarily. But it could pursue a political objective: pushing the US to stop before turning its battlefield gains into a full strategic victory.

The third, and perhaps most likely, scenario is a victory without resolution.

The US and Israel would destroy a significant share of Iran’s capabilities and curb its ability to threaten shipping and its neighbors. Yet the regime survives – more hard-line and more tightly bound to the Revolutionary Guard, convinced that survival requires rebuilding deterrence later.

In that case, the conflict is not solved at its roots. It is merely postponed. What changes is the balance of power, not the conflict itself.

Will Trump Stop the Bombing Now?

The most realistic answer: not yet, but not indefinitely either.

Stopping now under pressure from oil markets and financial panic would allow Tehran to claim it succeeded in setting limits on Washington. Continuing indefinitely without a political horizon could turn military success into an open-ended drain.

Trump is therefore operating in the gray zone between those outcomes: seeking enough strikes to claim a decisive military victory while avoiding the burdens of the “day after” that previous US administrations accepted.

The risk is that this middle path produces only an incomplete victory.

Iran would be weaker but not politically defeated. The war would fade, but its deeper causes would remain.

The coming days will determine not only when the war ends, but also what its ending means: a settlement imposing new realities on Iran, or merely a pause from which the regime emerges wounded yet convinced that oil leverage saved it.

That is the real test facing Trump, not in the number of targets destroyed, but in the kind of ending he ultimately delivers.