Iraqi PM in Tehran to after Iran Border Attacks

A Kurdish flag is pictured amid the destruction caused by a reported Iranian rocket attack near town city of Altun Kupri (Perdi), north of Kirkuk, in Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region, on November 23, 2022. (AFP)
A Kurdish flag is pictured amid the destruction caused by a reported Iranian rocket attack near town city of Altun Kupri (Perdi), north of Kirkuk, in Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region, on November 23, 2022. (AFP)
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Iraqi PM in Tehran to after Iran Border Attacks

A Kurdish flag is pictured amid the destruction caused by a reported Iranian rocket attack near town city of Altun Kupri (Perdi), north of Kirkuk, in Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region, on November 23, 2022. (AFP)
A Kurdish flag is pictured amid the destruction caused by a reported Iranian rocket attack near town city of Altun Kupri (Perdi), north of Kirkuk, in Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region, on November 23, 2022. (AFP)

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani will kick off on Tuesday a visit to Tehran in an attempt to contain tensions in wake of Iran’s attacks on Kurdish opposition groups in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry said the PM is visiting at the invitation of President Ebrahim Raisi.

Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani said the visit aims to “follow up on the bilateral dialogue over economic, trade and political issues.”

The two parties will discuss issues related to water and the border and the Iranian strikes on northern Iraq, he went on to say.

“We hope the visit will help develop bilateral relations between the countries,” he added.

Iran launched cross-border strikes against Kurdish opposition groups in Iraq on November 21, killing at least one fighter, a week after similar attacks on the factions Tehran accuses of stoking protests back home.

Iran has been shaken by two months of protests sparked by the death of Kurdish-Iranian woman Mahsa Amini, 22, who died in custody days after her arrest by the morality police for allegedly breaching the country’s strict dress code for women.

Observers believe Sudani’s visit is being held at a time of mounting tensions between Baghdad and Tehran over the intense Iranian attacks.

A day before the PM’s trip, Baghdad and Erbil – the capital of the Kurdistan Region – had taken a joint approach in handling this sensitive file. Kurdish President Nechirvan Barzani had paid two visits to Baghdad over the past week to address the situation.

An agreement was reached for the federal government to oversee the border through joint cooperation between the Iraqi forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga - the first time they work together since 2003.

Sudani is expected to discuss with Iranian officials efforts to control the border between their countries and curb the movement of Iranian opposition groups that have taken up the mountainous regions in the Kurdistan Region as a safe haven.

Head of the Center for Political Thinking in Iraq Dr. Ihssan Shmary told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sudani’s visit is part of protocol in Iran after a new prime minister takes office in Baghdad.

The visit will also seek to consolidate the balance in Iraq’s foreign relations, which is an approach that has been adopted by previous governments, he added.

This time, however, the government is dominated by the pro-Iran Coordination Framework that is still seeking these balanced ties, he stated.

Sudani is visiting Iran after trips to Jordan and Kuwait.

The timing of the Tehran visit is significant given Iran’s attacks against the Kurdish groups, continued Shmary.

Sudani wants to achieve balance in relations and reassure decision-makers in Iran, especially in wake of the great openness shown by Washington towards Baghdad, he noted.

It appears as though the United States is completely open to Iraq and Sudani will seek to avoid provoking Tehran, meaning he will attempt to keep Baghdad at an equal distance between Washington and Tehran, explained Shmary.



Syria and Türkiye Move to Forge Strategic Partnership

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan meets US Ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy to Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack, a day after Turkish-Syrian talks in Ankara (Turkish Foreign Ministry)
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan meets US Ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy to Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack, a day after Turkish-Syrian talks in Ankara (Turkish Foreign Ministry)
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Syria and Türkiye Move to Forge Strategic Partnership

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan meets US Ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy to Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack, a day after Turkish-Syrian talks in Ankara (Turkish Foreign Ministry)
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan meets US Ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy to Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack, a day after Turkish-Syrian talks in Ankara (Turkish Foreign Ministry)

Syria and Türkiye are moving to forge a strategic partnership, deepening political and security coordination while expanding economic ties.

The two countries’ foreign and defense ministers held talks in Ankara on Tuesday on counterterrorism, defense cooperation and regional developments. They also reviewed final preparations for launching a joint high-level committee to oversee bilateral relations.

Strategic Coordination

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan outlined plans to strengthen cooperation against terrorism and organized crime based on shared interests.

Fidan and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, joined by Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler and his Syrian counterpart Murhaf Abu Qasra, also examined the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into Syrian state institutions.

Fidan reaffirmed Türkiye’s support for the process under the principle of “one state, one army,” arguing that it would strengthen Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

He emphasized the need to end terrorism in Türkiye, Syria and Iraq, put an end to the denial of identities and allow everyone to participate in political life in an atmosphere of peace and stability.

Ankara remains committed to working closely with Damascus to ensure the process succeeds while extending bilateral cooperation into new areas, he added.

Türkiye is pursuing a process aimed at dissolving and disarming the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), including organizations Ankara considers affiliated with it, particularly the SDF, and withdrawing PKK elements from areas of northern Iraq.

The initiative, which Ankara calls “Terror-Free Türkiye,” also envisions what it describes as a “terror-free region.”

Talks with Barrack

On Wednesday, Fidan met US Ambassador to Türkiye and President Donald Trump’s envoy to Syria and Iraq, Tom Barrack, at the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

Diplomatic sources indicated that the meeting covered SDF integration and developments in Syria, Iraq and the wider region.

Al-Shaibani had met Barrack in Ankara on Tuesday. According to the Syrian Foreign Ministry, both officials underscored the importance of coordination and consultation to strengthen regional security and stability.

At a press conference following Tuesday’s talks, Fidan expressed confidence in Syria’s future, citing the determination of its people and the country’s growing contribution to regional stability, development and counterterrorism.

He detailed plans for cooperation between the two countries’ defense and security institutions to counter threats facing Syria, including attempts to divide the country and terrorist activity.

Türkiye was also working to help restructure the Syrian army and strengthen its security institutions, he noted.

Fidan cautioned that threats from terrorist organizations, particularly ISIS, and continued security unrest could disrupt trade and regional connectivity.

Expanding Economic Cooperation

Fidan highlighted the deepening bilateral relationship, pointing to numerous healthcare and education projects completed in Syria and an agreement to establish a joint Turkish-Syrian university in Damascus.

He also reiterated Ankara’s position that regional countries should take responsibility for addressing challenges in their own strategic and geographic surroundings rather than relying on outside powers.

Fidan accused Israel of seeking to destabilize Syria and urged an end to Israeli attacks on Syrian territory and compliance with the 1974 Disengagement Agreement.

For his part, al-Shaibani described Syria as a cornerstone of Middle East stability and Türkiye as an indispensable partner in maintaining it.

He put bilateral trade at nearly $3.7 billion in 2025, an increase of more than 40%.

Efforts were underway to ease Syrian product entry into the Turkish market, establish a legal framework to protect them, accelerate the rehabilitation of border crossings and prepare for the Qamishli crossing to begin operating soon, he explained.

Al-Shaibani announced an agreement to accelerate a railway project linking Türkiye to the Gulf through Syria and Jordan.

The electricity interconnection between Aleppo and the Turkish city of Cicek had also been rehabilitated, with work underway to increase its capacity.

Turning to strategic cooperation, al-Shaibani outlined discussions on expanding training and capacity-building, improving coordination against terrorism and organized crime, and creating conditions for the voluntary and sustainable return of Syrian refugees.

He stressed that these efforts were based on the principle of Syrian sovereignty over the country’s entire territory.


Is Eastern Libya Moving Toward Full Autonomy?

Osama Hammad attends a conference on combating terrorism and curbing irregular migration in Benghazi on November 3 (Government of Stability media office)
Osama Hammad attends a conference on combating terrorism and curbing irregular migration in Benghazi on November 3 (Government of Stability media office)
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Is Eastern Libya Moving Toward Full Autonomy?

Osama Hammad attends a conference on combating terrorism and curbing irregular migration in Benghazi on November 3 (Government of Stability media office)
Osama Hammad attends a conference on combating terrorism and curbing irregular migration in Benghazi on November 3 (Government of Stability media office)

The prospect of autonomy in eastern Libya has returned to the political forefront after the government appointed by the House of Representatives threatened to assert financial and administrative independence.

The move has revived questions about whether such an arrangement is feasible and what it could mean for the unity of state institutions and the management of resources and powers in a country divided for years.

The debate has widened among Libyan politicians, tribal leaders and activists since Benghazi-based Prime Minister Osama Hammad raised the possibility on Monday of allowing his government to independently manage resources and public facilities within the territory under its authority.

Hammad’s warning came in response to the Government of National Unity, headed by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, preventing a House of Representatives session from taking place in the western city of Zintan.

The incident renewed disputes over the powers of Libya’s rival institutions and the geographic and administrative limits of their authority.

Supporters of autonomy argue that it would protect the interests of eastern and southern Libya and allow the regions to manage their resources without being held back by the dysfunction of central institutions.

Critics, however, warn that such a move could entrench the country’s divisions in the absence of national consensus and constitutional guarantees governing the distribution of power and wealth.

The Federal System

Political analyst Abdullah al-Dibani believes Hammad’s government has the legal and executive means to pursue financial and administrative independence, or autonomy, as a way to protect citizens’ interests and ensure continued development.

Al-Dibani told Asharq Al-Awsat that the move draws its legitimacy from the government’s appointment by the elected House of Representatives, as well as the security stability, reconstruction projects and infrastructure development achieved in eastern and southern Libya.

He described the proposed move as a response to political deadlock and the disruption of legislative activity, aimed at preventing political disputes from holding the country’s resources and citizens’ livelihoods hostage.

Independent management of resources, he argued, could help ensure a fairer distribution of wealth and the continued provision of public services.

The debate echoes longstanding calls by Libyan politicians for a federal or quasi-federal system that would grant the country’s three historic regions - Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan - greater powers to manage their own affairs.

Yet the proposal appears to lack consensus even among those who regard federalism as a possible solution to Libya’s current crisis.

Abu Bakr al-Qatrani, a leading figure in Libya’s federalist movement, argues that federalism already exists in practice because of the division between rival governments in the east and west, but that it has neither been enshrined in the constitution nor established democratically.

Libya abolished its federal system in 1963 under Constitutional Amendment Law No. 1 of that year, which established a unitary state.

In a Facebook post, al-Qatrani warned that adopting federalism would not address the roots of the crisis as long as disputes persisted over ministries and sovereign institutions, which he described as the real focus of the struggle among Libyan factions.

Complexities and Obstacles

Questions about Libya’s political future intensified after a video circulated showing young Libyans at a heritage festival organized by the Libyan Heritage and Wildlife Authority in Benghazi on Tuesday.

During a traditional dance, participants chanted slogans calling for Saddam Haftar, deputy commander-in-chief of the eastern-based Libyan National Army, to be installed as president of Libya.

They also displayed a banner featuring his photograph in civilian clothing alongside the word “President.”

Others, however, consider autonomy unlikely at present.

Among them is Dr. Aref Teer, a professor of political science at the Libyan Academy for Postgraduate Studies, who argues that threatening to assert financial and administrative independence does not necessarily mean it can be implemented at this stage.

He cited political, economic and social complexities, as well as the need for constitutional and institutional arrangements that could take decades to establish.

“Libyan public opinion does not appear receptive to the idea of dividing the country or undermining its unity,” he said, pointing to the historical symbolism of King Idris al-Senussi, whose legacy is associated with Libya’s declaration of independence and the unification of its regions in 1951.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Teer stressed that the interconnected nature of Libya’s sovereign financial and economic institutions, together with the overlap of resources and revenues among regions, posed obstacles to establishing an independent financial administration.

These factors also raised questions about the place of Fezzan and southern Libya in any future arrangements, he added.

On the international front, Teer considered it unlikely that neighboring countries or the broader international community, including the United States, Britain, Russia and China, would accept such a move at present.

He did not, however, rule out a change in circumstances over the longer term if divisions persisted and efforts to reach a comprehensive political settlement continued to falter, potentially prompting rival parties to explore alternative administrative arrangements.

Between these competing positions, Mohamed al-Mubasher, chairman of the Libyan Council of Elders for Reconciliation, advocates an approach centered on citizens’ rights and the fair distribution of wealth.

“Libya’s problem is not a problem of maps,” he said, arguing that people across the country’s cities and regions share similar needs, including salaries, medicine, education and employment opportunities.

Al-Mubasher acknowledged that demands for federalism had legitimate motivations, particularly feelings of marginalization and the accumulation of unfulfilled promises.

But he questioned the value of changing the structure of the state without fair institutions and effective mechanisms for oversight and accountability, warning that corruption and favoritism could simply be transferred to the regions.

Instead, he proposed empowering municipalities by granting them meaningful authority and independent budgets, alongside transparent rules for distributing revenues.

He pointed to the interconnected nature of Libya’s economy, banking system, currency, oil wealth and social ties across regions as foundations for preserving the country’s unity.


Who Will Succeed al-Mirghani? Eldest Son Has First Claim to Religious Leadership as Party Succession Remains Contested

Abdullah al-Mirghani with Prime Minister Kamil Idris during a condolence gathering in Khartoum (Sudan News Agency/SUNA)
Abdullah al-Mirghani with Prime Minister Kamil Idris during a condolence gathering in Khartoum (Sudan News Agency/SUNA)
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Who Will Succeed al-Mirghani? Eldest Son Has First Claim to Religious Leadership as Party Succession Remains Contested

Abdullah al-Mirghani with Prime Minister Kamil Idris during a condolence gathering in Khartoum (Sudan News Agency/SUNA)
Abdullah al-Mirghani with Prime Minister Kamil Idris during a condolence gathering in Khartoum (Sudan News Agency/SUNA)

The death of Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, who for decades led both Sudan’s Khatmiyya Sufi order and the Democratic Unionist Party, has opened the question of succession on two fronts.

Within the religious order, several senior representatives insist that his eldest son, Ali, has the first claim to its leadership. But the party presidency remains contested, with three of al-Mirghani’s sons competing for influence amid differences over the war and political alliances inside and outside Sudan.

Al-Mirghani succeeded his father, Ali al-Mirghani, as spiritual leader of the Khatmiyya order following his death in 1968, in a transition that proceeded smoothly and without major public dispute.

In 1982, following the death of party leader Sharif Hussein al-Hindi, he assumed the presidency of the Democratic Unionist Party, combining religious and political leadership until his death in Cairo on November 13.

A source told Asharq Al-Awsat that three of al-Mirghani’s sons — Abdullah al-Mahjoub, Mohamed al-Hassan and Jaafar al-Sadiq — were competing for leadership of the party and the religious order.

They draw support from different factions and groups inside Sudan and abroad, as well as from ties to regional actors that the source said were backing some of them.

According to the source, Abdullah al-Mahjoub enjoys the support of a regional state and Sovereignty Council Chairman Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Mohamed al-Hassan, meanwhile, is backed by another regional state and political forces opposed to the war, including parties that signed the Framework Agreement.

Jaafar al-Sadiq relies on forces within the Democratic Bloc alliance, which he chairs, despite having differed with some of the alliance’s positions in the past.

Eldest Son Has Priority

The source said Mohamed al-Hassan’s endorsement of his elder brother Ali as head of the Khatmiyya order had introduced a fourth name into the religious succession arrangements. Ali had remained outside the political disputes among his brothers.

Under longstanding traditions within the al-Mirghani family, the eldest son has priority in inheriting the sajjada, or spiritual leadership of the Khatmiyya order, unless he declines the position.

The party presidency, however, is governed by organizational and constitutional procedures whose interpretation has become a source of disagreement among party leaders.

The source said a group of senior representatives of the order was insisting that its leadership pass to Ali al-Mirghani as the late leader’s eldest son.

Following his father’s death, Mohamed al-Hassan publicly endorsed his elder brother’s succession as head of the Khatmiyya order.

He also signed a statement identifying himself as “President of the Democratic Unionist Party (Original),” having served as deputy party president during his father’s lifetime.

A source in the party’s organizational secretariat said Ali’s claim to the religious leadership rested on traditions dating back to the order’s founder, and that Mohamed al-Hassan’s endorsement amounted to recognition of that entitlement.

Under those traditions, family members, senior representatives of the order and its followers pledge allegiance to the eldest son, the source added.

Who Will Lead the Party?

Regarding the party presidency, the organizational secretariat source, in remarks carried by a Sudanese newspaper, said Mohamed al-Hassan was authorized to manage party affairs until its general congress convenes.

The source cited a decision issued by his father in 2013 dissolving the party’s organizational bodies and establishing an interim steering committee, chaired by Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani with Mohamed al-Hassan as his deputy, to prepare for the general congress.

Following the party president’s death, responsibility for continuing to manage party affairs and completing the establishment of its institutions and organizational structures falls to his deputy on the steering committee, the source explained.

In remarks made before al-Mirghani’s death and reported by Sudan Tribune, the party’s deputy organizational secretary, Osama Hassouna, said Mohamed al-Hassan derived his constitutional and organizational legitimacy from decisions issued by his father following the Reference Conference.

In contrast, Mohamed Syed Ahmed, an adviser to the party president known as “al-Jakoumi,” said the party presidency was not hereditary.

He argued that choosing al-Mirghani’s successor was a matter for consultation and the relevant party institutions.

Jaafar al-Sadiq al-Mirghani, deputy party president and chairman of the Democratic Bloc alliance, renewed his pledge to uphold his father’s approach and mission and preserve the family’s religious and national legacy in a farewell address.

He did not address arrangements for either the political or religious succession. Some analysts, however, interpreted his emphasis on preserving the family’s legacy as an indication of his position on the succession.

Unionist leader Moataz al-Fahl told Asharq Al-Awsat that the succession question had not yet been settled, as party and religious leaders and the late leader’s sons remained occupied with mourning ceremonies.

He said Jaafar al-Sadiq, Abdullah al-Mahjoub and Ahmed al-Mirghani had traveled to Sudan to attend the funeral and had not discussed succession arrangements.

“Sayyid Mohamed Osman was too important a figure for his succession to be settled so quickly,” he said.

Disputes Predate His Death

Organizational disputes between Mohamed al-Hassan and Jaafar al-Sadiq date back several years before their father’s death.

They became public in 2022, when the brothers adopted differing positions on party management and political alliances.

In November that year, al-Mirghani issued a video directive instructing Jaafar al-Sadiq to continue his duties as deputy party president and address what he described as organizational “breaches of discipline.”

Mohamed al-Hassan’s faction, however, maintained that the 2013 decisions establishing the steering committee remained the basis of its organizational legitimacy.

The disputes resurfaced in June 2025, when decisions issued in the party president’s name called for restructuring the executive bureau and appointing Ahmed Saad Omar as its head, replacing Jaafar al-Sadiq.

The decisions drew objections from some Unionist leaders, while others maintained that they were legitimate.

An Opportunity to Reunite the Unionists

Political analyst Mohamed Latif said separating the religious leadership of the Khatmiyya order from the political leadership of the party could open the way to reunifying Unionist factions.

Some factions had distanced themselves from the original party because of its association with religious authority.

Latif told Asharq Al-Awsat that Mohamed al-Hassan’s endorsement of his elder brother Ali as head of the Khatmiyya order, alongside his own declaration that he was assuming the party presidency, marked a shift in the historic relationship between the two leadership roles. Their father had held both positions for decades.

Latif argued that the development could give the Unionist movement an opportunity to restore its unity and political role in Sudan.

He also noted that the call for an end to the war, which featured prominently in Mohamed al-Hassan’s statement, could pave the way for closer ties with civilian forces supporting a democratic transition.

The source who described the rivalry among al-Mirghani’s sons, however, warned that an escalation of their disputes could cost the family its historic influence within the party and lead to its leadership passing outside the al-Mirghani family.
The source pointed out that the presidency of the Democratic Unionist Party had been separate from leadership of the Khatmiyya order before Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani combined the two positions.

Political figures from outside the family had previously led the party, notably Ismail al-Azhari and Sharif Hussein al-Hindi.

As succession arrangements unfold, the Unionist movement faces organizational divisions and disagreements over the war and political alliances.

The party’s various factions have yet to reach a consensus on a leadership arrangement following al-Mirghani’s death.