Mazloum Abdi: US Barred Türkiye from Carrying Out Military Operation in Syria 

SDF Commander tells Asharq Al-Awsat he won’t visit Damascus before conditions for political solution are available. 

SDF commander Mazloum Abdi. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
SDF commander Mazloum Abdi. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Mazloum Abdi: US Barred Türkiye from Carrying Out Military Operation in Syria 

SDF commander Mazloum Abdi. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
SDF commander Mazloum Abdi. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi said the American administration of former President Donald Trump “betrayed” its allies in the SDF when it did not oppose the Turkish infiltration in Syria in late 2019. In an interview to Asharq Al-Awsat, he revealed that the current administration has prevented Türkiye from carrying out a new operation in Syria. 

Asked if he was concerned that his forces would be “betrayed” again, he replied that “we are always worried but hope that the new American administration would fulfill its pledges and commitments and prevent Türkiye from carrying out any operation.” 

He noted that Turkish fighter jets had targeted the al-Hol camp for the displaced 80 kilometers deep into Syrian territory. “All Syrian skies were open to them and the US did nothing but make statements,” he stressed. 

Abdi spoke of the discussions he held with commander of the Russian forces in Syria Aleksandr Chaiko, who visited him at his headquarters east of the Euphrates River. They addressed Chaiko’s mediation with Ankara. “We can say that Russia is now standing in a neutral position between us and Türkiye,” said Abdi. 

Russia is trying to ensure that the 2019 Sochi agreement is being implemented and it is tackling violations when they happen. 

“On our end, we have many reservations over Türkiye and the many violations it is committing,” Abdi added. 

On the SDF’s role in Syria’s future, he stated that the force is generally part of the military’s defense organization. “But we have our conditions,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat over Zoom on Monday. “We have dispatched delegations to hold negotiations in Damascus. I want to go to Damascus when the conditions for a solution are right.” 

The SDF officially announced that it has stopped cooperation with the international anti-ISIS coalition. At the same time, we noticed that coalition and American forces deployed patrols in cooperation with the SDF. Can you explain this? 

Just so matters can be understood accurately, we had stated that the Turkish attacks were ongoing. The targeting of forces that were deploying these patrols led to the halt of these operations. The patrols were reduced to a minimum when the strikes were happening. Now, joint work has resumed. 

The issue was related to the security situation. Now that it has improved somewhat, the joint cooperation resumed. 

So cooperation between the SDF and coalition has returned to the way it was, whether related to fighting ISIS or in deploying patrols. 

Exactly. It has returned to the way it was 20 months ago. 

We noticed in recent days that the intense Turkish strikes had eased. Why? Was American pressure on Ankara truly behind this? 

I believe the American pressure on Ankara played a hand to an extent. With time, international pressure also mounted on Ankara. Ankara violated understandings that it had reached with Russia and the US alike. This prompted the major pressure that in turn led to a drop in strikes. 

The second factor, frankly, is that we, as a military force, had been well prepared. For example, the Kobani (Ain al-Arab) region, Manbij and Tal Rifaat were heavily attacked by Turkish jets and artillery, and yet, the SDF did not lose a single member. The Turks did not achieve their desired result.  

There is a belief that the US had granted Türkiye an undeclared green light to carry out its attacks over ten days. We have seen massive destruction of gas and oil infrastructure and attacks close to American military bases. Do you have any information about these claims? 

We can’t speak of a green light or coordination between the forces on the ground. But we have been very critical of the coalition forces because they are on the ground and had they fulfilled their pledges properly, the attacks would not have been this destructive. They had a very weak position towards the attacks. The Turks, just as the US Defense Department said, put the lives of American troops at risk. 

Did Turkish jets really fly over Syrian territory? 

They entered through Deir Ezzor. They struck the al-Hol camp, some 80 kilometers deep in Syrian territories. All Syrian skies were open to them. 

And the US did nothing to stop them? 

Nothing, but make statements to the media. 

The US or the West betrayed the Kurds seven times in the past 100 years Are you worried that another betrayal will happen or that Washington would abandon the Kurds in spite of the great sacrifices made in fighting ISIS? 

The last Turkish operation took place in 2019. At the time, coordination was ongoing between the Trump administration and the Turks, which led to the operation that we deemed a betrayal at the time. to take place. And to be honest, the American administration has since 2019 been exerting the greatest pressure to prevent Türkiye from carrying out a new ground operation. They have not allowed it 

Now, they have stated that the Biden administration will not allow a destructive ground operation to happen. 

We are always worried, but we hope the new American administration would fulfill its pledges and past commitments with Türkiye. We hope it would keep its word and prevent Türkiye from carrying out any operation. 

Days ago, you said that the Turkish escalation was a test to the Biden administration. Are you satisfied with the result of this test? Have you been reassured that the US is not plotting a betrayal? 

So far, we have seen that the Americans have been in direct contact with the Turks. We have asked them to keep up the pressure so that the Turks, specifically [President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan, would realize that they cannot launch any operation if they wanted to remain in power and continue to rule after the upcoming elections. 

So you are not worried about the betrayal? 
Let us be clear, that hasn’t happened yet. We are worried, and frankly, we believe the American position is not enough, but we will let things unfold over time. 

Agreements were reached between Russia, Türkiye and the US in 2019. Türkiye says that the SDF did not fulfill its pledges by withdrawing 30 or 32 kms from the border. Is it true that the SDF did not meet its pledges? 

Everyone knows that we fulfilled all agreements in full. The Russian guarantors have been around since 2019 and they are responsible for the agreement. As for the Americans, they have a deal with the Turks. 

What measures have you taken on the ground to carry out the agreement? 

First and foremost, the Turks’ main excuse was that there was a threat to their national security. Setting aside some extraordinary issues, we, as the SDF have repeatedly said that we have never carried out an operation that threatens Türkiye’s national security. No military operation directly aimed at Türkiye have been carried out from these regions. 

They have demanded the withdrawal of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the removal of all heavy weapons. Is this true? 

These forces are not deployed in these regions. Officially, the forces deployed on the border are the Syrian military. They are fully deployed along the border. 

You have said that you have not threatened Türkiye’s security. Of course, Türkiye says that the Istanbul bombing was carried out by people affiliated with the SDF and YPG and that it has evidence to back this claim. 

But the US, Britain, and European countries say that they don’t have such evidence and Türkiye never presented it. Has Türkiye presented its evidence to you? 

The main problem is that the Turks don’t cooperate with anyone. They haven’t provided the Americans with information. They only provide information through the media. They want the world to believe their information. We have stated that we view the attack as terrorist but we had nothing to do with it. 

I’ll give you new information: We are relying on the information that Türkiye is providing to the media and not officially. Today, we completed the first part of the probe in all the information that Türkiye has provided and we have submitted the findings to the relevant parties, including the Americans. 

We have proven that we have nothing to do with the operation. We concluded that some of the people who were identified by Türkiye were living in cities that were controlled by ISIS. We gave them our detailed information. The woman who carried out the attack had previously carried out several visits to Afrin where her relatives live. 

Afrin is controlled by Türkiye? 

Yes. Leaders of the so-called Syrian National Army and others were stationed there before we drove them out of the region before 2018. 

The names Türkiye presented were affiliated with armed factions in Jarablus and other regions. We presented the names of the people from Jarablus and Afrin along with the evidence. We will complete the second phase of the probe in the coming days. 

Who do you think is behind the attack? 

We don’t want to accuse anyone, but we know that it has something to do with the regions that are occupied by Türkiye. We have evidence that some of the explosives were obtained from those regions. The suspects came from those areas as well. They are present in Afrin and Jarablus. The probe must prove that the SDF had nothing to do with the operation. 

What about the talks with Russia? Turkish media has leaked a lot of information. The commander of the Russian forces was in Qamishli. What have the Russians offered you after the Turkish escalation? 

Let us correct this information first. They said he came from Qamishli airport. When they visit us, they come to our bases. 

Do they pass through American checkpoints to visit you? 

They come to our bases. 

The Russian command came to us. We completed meetings with the Russian forces commander Chaiko not too long ago. Türkiye accuses Russia of not forcing us to commit to the 2019 Sochi agreement. For its part, Russia is trying to make the Turks commit to the agreement.  

We can say that Russia is now standing in a neutral position between us and Türkiye. It is trying to apply the agreement and tackle violations when they happen. For our part, we have several reservations against Türkiye and the many violations it is committing. 

For instance, they speak of a 30km buffer zone, while they recently infiltrated it 70 – 80 kms deep. They have established infrastructure and boast a military force. These are all violations. 

On our end, we have been asking them to play their role and make Türkiye commit to the agreement. Of course, Türkiye has reservations against us, including claims that we are threatening its national security. 

We are committed to the agreement, in spite of individual violations that are acts of retaliation. We will commit to the 2019 agreements. 

Officially, we are not present on the border, so their demand that we pull out 30kms deep is not valid. The security forces (Asayish) are there, but they are not part of the deal. The Asayish will be present in all areas. They were not part of the withdrawal deal. The SDF is committed to the agreements. 

Our meetings with the Russians were primarily aimed at addressing the violations.  

It was said that Russia offered the withdrawal of the SDF from Kobani and Manbij in return for the deployment of the regime forces. 

Let me tell you something, the regime has more forces there than we do, nearly double ours. The regime is deployed in Kobani, Manbij and Tal Rifaat. The regime has enough forces in these regions. 

An attack on Kobani and Manbij will be more of a problem for the regime than us. The regime is present on the border and they will be targeted. The regime may then take the decision to withdraw and refrain from fighting. It may choose to leave the area to the Turkish army or to fight. 

Is it true that Iran mobilized its forces in the Aleppo countryside and is now presenting itself as a partner on the ground? 

The Iranians are present in Tal Rifaat and al-Shahba, and Nobl and al-Zahraa in the Aleppo countryside. East of the Euphrates and al-Jazira, they are not deployed in an official capacity, but stationed there with the regime. 

What about the talks with Damascus? We know that you signed a document with Syria’s national security chief Ali Mamlouk in 2019. An agreement was reached on the deployment of forces in specific regions. Was this deal carried out in full? 

We consider that it was carried out fully, whether with the regime or Russia, which in turn had reached deals with Türkiye and others. We did not agree to the return of regime institutions. We only agreed on the border guard and the presence of the regime on the border. We committed to this and assisted in the army’s deployment in full on the border. Currently, we have no need for more agreements. 

We are in agreement with the regime over main issues related to maintaining Syria’s territorial integrity. Problems lie in other areas, such as administrative affairs and issues related to education, for example. 

There are, however, disagreements over the Kurdish language, the future of the SDF and the autonomous Kurdish administration. 

Overall, for example, we are not opposed to the SDF becoming part of the defense organization of the Syrian army. We have conditions, however. We boast over 100,000 fighters, who have spent the past ten years in combat. They need a constitutional and legal resolution. The SDF must have a role and specific distinction in the military. We are in agreement over general issues, but the problems lie in the details. 

It appears that Damascus is demanding that you send a greater amount of oil. You are sending greater amounts to al-Sheikh Masoud in Aleppo, while government-held regions are suffering from a major fuel and energy crisis. 

Let me tell you something, Türkiye is threatening Tal Rifaat and al-Sheikh Masoud. Moreover, the regime has imposed a stifling siege on these regions. It is blocking diesel fuel, flour and food shipments. The people are hungry and suffering in the cold and are living without electricity. This has been going on since the Turks began making their threats. This is unacceptable. We may be forced to reply in kind if the situation persists. 

What was the extent of the destruction to the gas and oil infrastructure by Türkiye’s attacks? 

The attacks were aimed at taking institutions out of service, including the lone home gas company. It was taken out of service after being directly targeted. Several refineries were also hit. Over 50 percent of the sectors were damaged. Repairs and reconstruction are underway. 

Mamlouk and Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan met in Moscow in July. Syrian and Turkish security officers met in Kasab later. Are you worried about the Syrian-Turkish security cooperation? Do you believe Ankara and Damascus have set up security coordination, especially on how to confront the SDF? 

Let us be more accurate. We know that the Syrian state opposes the Turkish occupation of more Syrian territories. This is a general national stance. But we have our concerns. 

When Türkiye carries out its threats, our priority should lie in resisting the occupation and standing together against the attempted occupation. 

In the end, Türkiye is trying to occupy Syrian territories, such as Kobani, Tal Rifaat and others. We believe that Damascus has voiced a weak position against this threat. It is trying to benefit from it rather than stand with us against the Turkish occupation. 

They want to exploit the situation to pressure the regions that we may hold dialogue about in the future, such as Manbij, Deir Ezzor, Raqqa and others. I wanted to bring this up because a national stance has not been taken over it. 

Generally, we know that several meetings have been held and they aren’t denying it. 

We have heard claims that Türkiye sometimes asks to coordinate attacks with the regime against certain targets and that Damascus had turned it down. We hope this is true and that they would not coordinate to attack us in these regions. 

Moreover, we have heard through the media that Syrian President Bashar Assad is refusing to meet with Erdogan until after elections are held in Türkiye. We believe this is the right position and will help resolve the Syrian problem.  

Erdogan wants to be victorious in the elections and eliminate the Kurds. He has two options: Either carry out a military operation and later declare victory that he will invest for electoral gain, or reach an agreement with Damascus at the expense of the Kurds. He will also invest this in the elections. 

I have learned that you refuse to visit Damascus. Why so? What are your conditions for negotiations? 

We dispatch delegations to Damascus. I want to go when the conditions for the solution are available. I want my trip to Damascus to help in reaching a peaceful solution to the current crisis. 



Iraq on Verge of Restructuring Popular Mobilization Forces

Members of Saraya al-Salam attend a ceremony in Samarra on June 4, 2026, marking their integration into Iraq’s security forces. (AFP)
Members of Saraya al-Salam attend a ceremony in Samarra on June 4, 2026, marking their integration into Iraq’s security forces. (AFP)
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Iraq on Verge of Restructuring Popular Mobilization Forces

Members of Saraya al-Salam attend a ceremony in Samarra on June 4, 2026, marking their integration into Iraq’s security forces. (AFP)
Members of Saraya al-Salam attend a ceremony in Samarra on June 4, 2026, marking their integration into Iraq’s security forces. (AFP)

The military wing loyal to Sadrist movement leader Moqtada al-Sadr handed over responsibility for security in Samarra to the Iraqi army on Thursday, in a symbolic ceremony that included lowering the faction’s flag at its operations headquarters.

The move, seen by observers as a “qualitative shift,” coincided with an announcement by the spokesman for Iraq’s armed forces that work had begun to restructure formations of the Popular Mobilization Forces and guarantee the rights of their members.

Saad Maan, head of the Security Media Cell, said all Saraya al-Salam fighters affiliated with Sadr were now under the command of the prime minister, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Footage aired by state television showed Saraya al-Salam members lowering their faction’s flag outside the operations headquarters, in the presence of a military committee sent by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaydi.

Saraya al-Salam is part of the Popular Mobilization Forces through brigades 313, 314, and 315. It carries out security duties in several areas, most notably Samarra.

Sadr announced on May 27 that he was merging his military wing, Saraya al-Salam, into the state, and called on Popular Mobilization Forces factions to hand over their weapons.

Within a week, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib al-Imam Ali also announced their separation from the Popular Mobilization Forces. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, however, have continued to reject demands to disarm and dismantle the factions.

Saraya under the commander’s authority

After the handover ceremony, Deputy Commander of Joint Operations Qais al-Mohammedawi said at a news conference that merging Saraya al-Salam meant placing it under the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

He said, “A committee had been formed by government order to relink and redistribute armed formations so they move away from any other political title or formation.”

Saraya al-Salam brigades have been stationed in Samarra since the bombing of the Imam al-Askari shrine in June 2007. It remains unclear whether its members will leave the city for the first time in 19 years. But a military source told Asharq Al-Awsat the faction had handed over all its headquarters to the army, while its fighters now answer to the commander in chief of the armed forces.

Still, observers say the details of dismantling and disarmament remain unclear. Questions persist about the types and quantities of weapons held by the factions, whether they will hand them over to government authorities, and whether they will give them up entirely.

An Iraqi security official said the mechanism for placing all weapons under state control “remains unclear,” according to AFP. Local media, however, circulated claims that the Coordination Framework had put forward an initiative for discussion.

The proposal reportedly includes “securing tens of thousands of government jobs in official security institutions for individuals whose armed factions agreed to disengage.”

Restructuring the Popular Mobilization Forces

In a notable development, Sabah al-Numan, the spokesman for the commander in chief of the armed forces, said the committee formed at the commander in chief's direction had begun work to place all weapons under state control.

He said disengagement from the Popular Mobilization Forces included restructuring its formations and guaranteeing the rights of its members.

It is the first official reference to “restructuring the formations of the Popular Mobilization Forces” since the force was established in 2014 to fight ISIS.

Numan said the term “disengagement” involved administrative frameworks and restructuring these formations within the security services, while guaranteeing fighters’ rights and integrating them into military formations.

“The committee has been formed and has begun its work,” he said. “It will set the mechanisms for merging and incorporating the relevant formations, and for handing over weapons, equipment and camps to the Iraqi security authorities.”

Numan said “all weapons and all equipment” would be handed over to the central committee and Iraqi security authorities. A full inventory, he added, would be submitted within two days to the central committee, which is under the direct supervision, direction and follow-up of the commander in chief of the armed forces.

The committee includes several bodies, including the Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry, the Joint Operations Command and the Popular Mobilization Forces Commission.

The Coordination Framework authorized Prime Minister and Commander in Chief Ali al-Zaydi to take the decisions and measures needed to protect the country’s higher interests.

It also backed “restricting weapons to the state and disengaging the Popular Mobilization Forces Commission from political, partisan and social frameworks.”

What comes next?

Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, is expected to take a step similar to that of the Sadrist movement after agreeing with the prime minister to form a committee to separate from the Popular Mobilization Forces.

Khazali is under US sanctions and is one of the leaders of the Coordination Framework, which holds the largest parliamentary bloc. His political influence grew after his group won 27 seats in the latest parliamentary elections.

A source close to Asaib said the group “currently considers political work and presence in government more important than fighting. Therefore, it wants to give assurances to the United States.”

Kataib al-Imam Ali also said it would form a committee to “follow up the inventory, handover and transfer process under Zaydi’s supervision,” and another to “follow up the affairs of individuals and members and reintegrate them into state institutions.”

In practice, that means “all decisions related to their brigades within the Popular Mobilization Forces” will come under Zaydi’s authority “administratively,” according to a source close to the factions.

US special envoy to Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack welcomed a step that “will contribute to building order” and praised the initiative of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaydi, who, after taking office last month, pledged to restrict weapons to the state.

The move comes as Washington gains political and economic ground in Iraq, while Tehran’s regional influence has declined since the outbreak of the war in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, which is backed by Tehran, in 2023, followed by Israel’s first war against Iran in 2025, and then the second war launched by the United States and Israel in February, whose repercussions reached Iraq.

Disarmament plan

Asharq Al-Awsat revealed on May 9, 2026, that an Iraqi committee, including Prime Minister-designate Ali al-Zaydi, was working to complete an “executive project” to disarm armed factions before presenting it to Washington, amid mounting US pressure to keep militias away from the new government and key state institutions.

The committee had presented militia leaders with “ideas on how to disarm,” but some meetings “did not pass calmly,” according to informed sources.

The plan includes removing heavy and medium weapons and restructuring the Popular Mobilization Forces, alongside expected changes in sensitive security agencies, possibly including the intelligence service.

Political sources, however, questioned the government’s ability to implement the project, saying it may be aimed at “buying time.”


Israel, Hezbollah Dash Hopes for ‘Last-Chance’ Ceasefire Deal

The Lebanese and Israeli delegations, along with US State Department representatives, attend the latest round of negotiations in Washington.(AFP)
The Lebanese and Israeli delegations, along with US State Department representatives, attend the latest round of negotiations in Washington.(AFP)
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Israel, Hezbollah Dash Hopes for ‘Last-Chance’ Ceasefire Deal

The Lebanese and Israeli delegations, along with US State Department representatives, attend the latest round of negotiations in Washington.(AFP)
The Lebanese and Israeli delegations, along with US State Department representatives, attend the latest round of negotiations in Washington.(AFP)

Israel and Hezbollah have dashed hopes for a “last chance” ceasefire agreement in Lebanon, with Tel Aviv insisting it will continue military operations until a demilitarized zone is established, and Hezbollah vowing to fight on, calling the deal “a road map to exterminate part of the Lebanese people and enslave the rest.”

Lebanese contacts with domestic and international players are continuing in a bid to rescue the agreement.

The effort to salvage the deal, reached between the Lebanese state and Israel during direct talks in Washington on Wednesday, appeared to show that the crisis is tied to regional developments.

Lebanese ministerial sources said Lebanon had received Hezbollah’s rejection of the agreement from its secretary-general, Naim Qassem, “pending clarity on the Iranian position.” Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who supports a comprehensive ceasefire, remained silent.

Two obstacles appeared to be undercutting the agreement. The first was the failure to secure a comprehensive ceasefire across Lebanon. The second was Israel’s demand for “freedom of movement.”

A third hurdle, Hezbollah’s demand for a clause requiring Israel to withdraw from occupied territory, was eased after the Shiite duo accepted a timetable for withdrawal, starting after the ceasefire takes effect, with the next steps to proceed “step for step.”

A “last chance” agreement

Official Lebanon sees the deal as “the last chance” for a final and comprehensive ceasefire.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said in remarks to reporters that “each party must bear responsibility if it does not respond” to the statement and its provisions, which he described as highly important for Lebanon.

Aoun said that once replies are received from the concerned domestic parties, especially Hezbollah, Lebanon’s position will be relayed to the American side so the next steps can be determined.

Aoun praised the resolve of the Lebanese negotiating team, led by Ambassador Simon Karam, saying Wednesday’s talks were extremely difficult.

Karam, he said, suspended one round of negotiations and refused to move to any other issue before a comprehensive ceasefire was settled.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio then intervened to resume the talks, which ended with Lebanon’s demand for a comprehensive ceasefire being accepted.

Aoun said he remained in contact with international and domestic parties throughout Wednesday and into the early hours of Thursday to secure the comprehensive ceasefire.

He said brotherly and friendly states had helped put pressure on Lebanon’s side, and that US President Donald Trump would be the direct guarantor of the agreement’s implementation.

The deal could take effect 24 hours after Trump is notified of approval and the necessary guarantees are provided.

Israel and Hezbollah respond

The response came quickly. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said the army would not stop firing and would remain in the occupied areas “until Hezbollah elements are first removed from the entire area south of the Litani and a demilitarized zone is established.”

He also insisted on freedom of movement, including the right to strike targets in Beirut.

Qassem, for his part, called the agreement “a road map to exterminate part of the Lebanese people and enslave the rest.”

“We are concerned only with stopping the comprehensive aggression, with a ceasefire and Israel’s withdrawal,” he said.

“The ceasefire must be comprehensive. There can be no partition between the south and the rest of Lebanon, and no freedom for the Israeli enemy to kill in Lebanon. As long as the occupation exists, the resistance continues.”

Qassem said Hezbollah had given no one a pledge not to resist or respond to aggression.

“As long as the aggression continues, we will confront it with all the power we have, and we will reach it wherever we decide and are able,” he said.

“As long as our villages are not safe, are bombed and destroyed, and our people are killed, the settlements will not be safe, and they will see our force and severity.”

He said Hezbollah rejected any link between the presence of the resistance, stopping the aggression, and Israel’s withdrawal.

“No one has the right to interfere in Lebanon’s internal affairs among the Lebanese, in organizing their political, economic, and social life, and the decisions they agree on regarding the sovereignty and protection of their country within the national security strategy they agree on,” he said.

Prime minister

Prime Minister Nawaf Salam supports the official negotiating track. Opening a cabinet session, Salam said: “The negotiating path we chose is the fastest and least costly route for Lebanon and the Lebanese, and for the south and its people.”

He said negotiation “was not the only available option, but it was the best option.”

Referring to Aoun’s statement that “the negotiations were not easy, and our delegation faced Israeli intransigence,” Salam said Lebanon’s demands were unchanged.

“What we are demanding in these negotiations is not new,” he said.

“It is what we said from day one, a full Israeli withdrawal from our land, the return of our people to their homes and villages with dignity and safety, armed with our right to our land, the support of our Arab brothers, international support, and American understanding.”

On clearing the area south of the Litani of gunmen and weapons, Salam said, “This is not a condition imposed on us by anyone. This is what Lebanon pledged to the world when it agreed to Resolution 1701 in 2006.”

On the state’s exclusive control of arms across Lebanon, he said, “We have been very late in implementing what was stipulated in the Taif Agreement, which the Lebanese signed, and what was also included in our ministerial statement. We missed the opportunity in 2000 after the Israeli withdrawal, and then after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005. We must not miss this opportunity as well, because missing it this time will have grave consequences.”

Salam urged “all parties to place the interest of Lebanon and its people above any other interest, whether foreign or factional, and to bear their responsibilities.”

“Whoever rejects or stalls will alone bear the burden of what may result from that, before history, and more importantly before the Lebanese people, who have suffered greatly and made the greatest sacrifices,” he said.


Why Lebanon, Israel Chose Beaufort Castle as Pilot Zone

Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjayoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer
Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjayoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer
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Why Lebanon, Israel Chose Beaufort Castle as Pilot Zone

Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjayoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer
Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjayoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer

The ceasefire agreement between Lebanon and Israel provides for the creation of “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon, where the Lebanese army would assume exclusive control and ensure Hezbollah fighters are not present, in return for an Israeli military withdrawal from those areas.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said Beirut had proposed that the plan begin in the towns of Zawtar al-Sharqiya and Zawtar al-Gharbiya, along with Yohmor and Beaufort Castle, “given the symbolism of this area and its proximity to the city of Nabatieh.”

The zone carries strategic weight for both sides, security sources in southern Lebanon told Asharq Al-Awsat.

For Israel, it would be a test of security for northern towns and settlements. For Lebanon, it would push the Israeli army away from the surrounding areas of Nabatieh.

Israeli forces advanced last week in the area north of the Litani River, taking control of large parts of Zawtar al-Sharqiya and Yohmor.

By Sunday, they had reached the strategic historic site of Beaufort Castle before coming under Hezbollah fire from rockets and explosive drones, according to successive statements by the group. The security sources said Israeli forces carried out demolitions in parts of Yohmor and Zawtar, but did not establish a military position in the area.

The heights are among the most important military and geopolitical points in southern Lebanon. They overlook the Litani River, towns along its eastern bank, the Nabatieh to Marjayoun road to the east, Nabatieh and its suburbs to the west, and towns on both sides of Wadi al-Hujeir to the south.

For Israel, the elevated area forms a key security depth because it overlooks occupied areas in southern Lebanon and northern towns. It lies just 4 kilometers from the settlement of Metula.

Beaufort Castle has long been a focal point of fighting since the 1982 invasion. From the west, it overlooks the area between the Litani and Zahrani rivers and is the highest hill in that sector.

That position gives its holder a major military advantage. From Beaufort Castle and Yohmor, it is possible to overlook Taybeh, Deir Seryan, and Qantara, where the Israeli army is now deployed.

For that reason, “it cannot leave it outside its control, or without security arrangements, if it wants to remain in the area where it is stationed.”

For Lebanon, an Israeli withdrawal from the high ground is a priority for allowing residents to return to Nabatieh and its surroundings. The area overlooks territory to its west as far as the sea, meaning that an Israeli military presence there would leave nearby towns, as well as Nabatieh, exposed to strikes.

The city lies between 3 and 5 kilometers from Beaufort Castle, Yohmor, and Zawtar.

Sources in southern Lebanon say an agreement on the pilot zone would mean the area is demilitarized and falls under the control of the Lebanese army alone.

If the plan succeeds, it could gradually expand to other areas, including zones north of the yellow line in Majdal Zoun and Zebqine in the western sector, towns overlooking Wadi al-Slouqi in the central sector, or those overlooking Wadi al-Hujeir in the eastern sector.