NATO and the War in Ukraine

A general view of a session at the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Bucharest, Romania, on November 30, 2022. Reuters
A general view of a session at the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Bucharest, Romania, on November 30, 2022. Reuters
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NATO and the War in Ukraine

A general view of a session at the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Bucharest, Romania, on November 30, 2022. Reuters
A general view of a session at the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Bucharest, Romania, on November 30, 2022. Reuters

The end of the cold war in 1991 brought along questions as regards NATO’s future. It has been more than 30 years and NATO’s ability to adopt itself to “the most complex security environment since the end of the Cold War” has preserved it as the strongest military alliance able to maintain its relevance and more.

After the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO and Russia were able to establish a structural relationship. But throughout the years, relations have been far from stable.

Russia has been concerned with NATO’s eastward expansion and NATO has been troubled by Russia’s assertive and aggressive policies in particular in former Soviet geography, the so-called near abroad.

At the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008, it was declared that Ukraine and Georgia will (eventually) become members.

Russia responded by military intervention in Georgia, leading to the break up of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

A few years later in 2014 Russia intervened in Ukraine and annexed Crimea.

NATO’s response was strongly worded, coupled with certain sanctions and suspension of cooperation (even then, political and military channels of communication remained open) but Russia was unaffected and even further emboldened with the soft reaction of the West.

This time around, when Russia invaded, NATO sided with Ukraine actively. In March 2022 Heads of State and Government of NATO countries held an extraordinary summit in Brussels and declared Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as the “gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades”. All ties between NATO and Russia were severed.

From a military point of view, there are two things which took almost everyone by surprise in Ukraine. One is the poor performance of the Russian military and the other is the performance of the Ukrainian army beyond expectations.

The Ukrainians have been able to inflict heavy damage on the Russians and NATO now has a battered Russia on its eastern flank.

Ukraine owes a lot to NATO and the Allies. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO engaged in strengthening and transforming Ukraine’s security and defence. At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, the Alliance efforts were structured under what is called the Comprehensive Assistance Package.

Russia has long sighted NATO’s eastward expansion as a threat. Its invasion of Ukraine has brought Russia’s worst dreams to life. In the heat of the war, Ukraine has formally applied for NATO membership and so have Sweden and Finland.

NATO rejects Russia’s objections as an unacceptable interference in its affairs and has reiterated its policy of “open door”. That means, every European nation has the right to apply for membership and whether or when it is accepted is NATO’s business and nobody else’s.

But having made the principle clear, NATO would not be in a rush to do that. NATO was not very pleased when Ukraine handed in its formal application for membership. To admit Ukraine as a member would carry things to another level, where Ukraine would come under the umbrella of article 5 of the Washington Treaty and bring NATO in direct confrontation with Russia.

As to Sweden and Finland, in May 2022, they submitted their official letter of application to become a NATO member. Once all Allies have ratified the Accession Protocol according to their national procedures, they will accede to the Washington Treaty.

The alliance has welcomed the two countries with open arms. There is a problem stemming from Türkiye but it is not an objection to the actual membership and the problem is expected to be solved. With Finland and Sweden as formal NATO members, the Alliance’s military capacity will be further strengthened and NATO will have a 1,340-km-long common border with Russia.

At its 2022 Summit in Madrid, NATO leaders agreed to the Alliance’s eight Strategic Concept. This is the core reference document of the Alliance and it is revised/updated about every ten years. The Concept outlines the Alliance’s purpose and nature, lays out challenges it faces and provides guidelines. The last concept was adopted in 2010 when Russia was a partner and the global strategic environment was different.

The Strategic Concept of 2022 has been prepared at a time of war and has reflected the sentiments, concerns and reactions surrounding it.

Russia has been declared the culprit as article 8 of the document states that “The Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”. It is also emphasized that “Russia seeks to establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation.”

In recent years, ups and downs in transatlantic ties, the idea of “Europe taking the lead in European security” and a sort of fatigue of involvement in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and Sahel were visible within NATO.

Relations with Russia and how to react to Russian policies have always been an issue where there have been different approaches. Allies from eastern and central Europe and the Baltics have traditionally taken a tougher position, whereas, western and southern European allies including Germany, France and Italy have preferred a more cooperative approach, with doors and communication channels open.

It has never been an easy process, but Allies have always been able to reach consensus and move forward.

The war in Ukraine had implications on NATO-China relations as well. China made it into NATO Strategic Concept in 2022 for the first time in history where its stated ambitions and coercive policies are said to challenge NATO’s interests, security and values. The war in Ukraine has changed focus of attention away from China.

On the defense side, NATO military planners have reviewed plans in light of the war in Ukraine. At the Madrid Summit in June 2022, Allies agreed the biggest revision of collective defense and deterrence since the Cold War.

NATO has increased the number of its forces on its eastern flank. Eight battlegroups at the level of brigade in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland. Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are in place along NATO’s eastern flank, from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south. High readiness forces are structured to deter and protect alliance territory and populations.

Defense spending had become a major issue in the Alliance. President Trump argued that the US bears the burden in a most unfair way and threatened to reexamine its NATO policies unless steps were taken. The agreed solution was a pledge by each ally to increase its defense spending to at least two percent of its gross domestic product by 2024.

The process was slow. Before the war, only a few NATO members had fulfilled their pledge. The war in Ukraine had an accelerating effect and as of today, 20 NATO countries are above the threshold.

In this context, Germany came in as a major booster. The European industrial giant committed 100 billion Euros for its defense spending. It also began sending weapons and supplies to Ukraine to fight off Russians. These are all a first since the second world war.

In face of the war in Ukraine and the new geopolitical environment, NATO seems to be united against the common threat in this new generation cold war. But there is room for concern that the war may have a backlash as it is costly in many ways also for NATO members.



Mazen Al-Sudairi Brings Financial Expertise as Saudi Market Expands Globally

Mazen bin Turki Al-Sudairi (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Mazen bin Turki Al-Sudairi (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Mazen Al-Sudairi Brings Financial Expertise as Saudi Market Expands Globally

Mazen bin Turki Al-Sudairi (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Mazen bin Turki Al-Sudairi (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Mazen bin Turki Al-Sudairi will lead the board of Saudi Arabia’s Capital Market Authority after a royal order appointed him chairman with the rank of minister, as the kingdom’s capital market rapidly expands, deepens its offerings, strengthens ties with global markets and seeks to attract more foreign investment.

Al-Sudairi brings a career rooted in financial markets and investment before moving into government and policymaking, combining technical expertise in market analysis with institutional experience inside government.

His appointment comes as Saudi Arabia’s capital market enters a new phase of growth focused on greater depth and openness, a broader investor base and a stronger presence in global markets, alongside the economic and investment transformation under Saudi Vision 2030.

The royal order appointed Al-Sudairi chairman of the Capital Market Authority’s board with the rank of minister, succeeding Mohammed El-Kuwaiz. He takes charge of the market regulator as the financial sector assumes an increasingly important role in financing economic growth and attracting domestic and international capital.

Since 2024, Al-Sudairi has served as an adviser at the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers at an excellent grade, adding a government dimension to his background in finance and investment. The role broadened his experience from analyzing markets and investments to working in an environment closely connected to policymaking and decision-making.

He holds a master’s degree in finance from HEC Paris in France and a bachelor’s degree in industrial engineering from King Saud University, an academic background combining financial knowledge with the analytical and quantitative training associated with engineering.

Al-Sudairi has extensive experience in financial services and capital markets. He served as head of research at Al Rajhi Capital, where he monitored company and sector performance and analyzed economic and financial developments and their impact on investor decisions.

He also headed sell-side research at Al-Istithmar Capital, adding experience in managing investment research and responding to market developments and investor needs during a period of rapid regulatory and investment change in the Saudi market.

Earlier, Al-Sudairi worked as an analyst covering the energy and petrochemicals sectors at Samba Capital, two of the most influential sectors in the Saudi economy and capital market. The role gave him direct experience analyzing companies and industries exposed to energy markets, global developments, commodity prices and economic cycles.

His career also took him outside Saudi Arabia, where he worked in equity research at Bank Degroof in Belgium. The experience added an international dimension to his background and gave him practical exposure to market and company analysis in a European financial environment.

Al-Sudairi is a recognized name in financial research and market analysis, having built experience across Saudi and international financial and investment institutions. His roles have been closely tied to assessing markets, analyzing companies and sectors, and evaluating investment opportunities.

His career spans financial and economic analysis, investment research and government work. After years of leading research functions at Saudi financial institutions and analyzing equities and sectors, his move into government added experience in institutional work and policymaking.

Al-Sudairi takes the helm of the Capital Market Authority’s board as the market becomes increasingly important as a channel for financing companies and projects, supporting private-sector growth, expanding savings and investment options, and connecting the Saudi economy more closely with global capital flows.


From War Amnesty to Prison Amnesty... What Has Changed in Lebanon in 35 Years?

A general view of parliament building in Beirut, Lebanon, March 24, 2026. (Reuters)
A general view of parliament building in Beirut, Lebanon, March 24, 2026. (Reuters)
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From War Amnesty to Prison Amnesty... What Has Changed in Lebanon in 35 Years?

A general view of parliament building in Beirut, Lebanon, March 24, 2026. (Reuters)
A general view of parliament building in Beirut, Lebanon, March 24, 2026. (Reuters)

The Lebanese parliament's landmark approval of an amnesty law on Wednesday, 35 years after the 1991 amnesty, has revived debate on the different circumstances that prompted Lebanon to resort to amnesty twice.

While the first was enacted to turn the page on the 1975-90 civil war and kick off a new political chapter in the country, the 2026 law came to address the conditions of detainees and convicts, prolonged detentions, and the prison crisis, amid political considerations that led to parliament to ratify it.

‘Public oblivion’

Former Minister of Social Affairs Rashid Derbas brought the discussion back to the philosophy of amnesty itself, telling Asharq Al-Awsat that "the general amnesty issued in 1991 came following the civil war, in hopes of closing a chapter and entering a new era."

He explained that "the philosophy of general amnesty is fundamentally based on establishing public oblivion, meaning closing a page of the past and opening a new one."

Commenting on the current amnesty law, Derbas wondered: "Is it reasonable for a person to remain all this long time without a trial? Is it reasonable for certain accusations and cases to drag on to this extent? It was necessary to address this issue,” but unfortunately, it fell victim to political wrangling for years.

Former Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar drew a legal and political distinction between the two experiences, telling Asharq Al-Awsat that "there is a very big difference between the law of August 26, 1991, and the law of August 12, 2026."

He explained that "from a political standpoint, the 1991 general amnesty law aimed to turn the page on the war and conclude all prosecutions associated with it. This is evidenced by the fact that it broadly covered crimes committed before March 28, 1991, specifically war-related crimes of a political nature, with some specific exceptions."

Najjar added that "the 1991 law therefore had a political, reconciliatory character, meaning it aimed to restore the smooth functioning of coexistence, which was its primary political goal."

As for the new legislation, he placed it in a different framework, stating that "the 2026 law has specific political dimensions in Lebanon and Syria, in addition to being related to prison conditions and the high number of detainees and convicts."

Najjar stressed that "the law issued on Wednesday is not a general amnesty for crimes committed before a specific date, because it targets specific categories and cases. It is closer to a socio-penal law concerned with addressing the conditions of detainees and convicts through an exceptional reduction of certain sentences."

He pointed out that "the 2026 law excluded many crimes and felonies, including the killing of military personnel, crimes referred to the Judicial Council, premeditated murder, money laundering, financial crimes, and drug felonies."

"This Lebanese law has clear Syrian dimensions, and it has also benefited some Lebanese who had sought refuge in Israel," he added.

Lebanese lawmakers attend a parliamentary session to discuss a proposed general amnesty law, the abolition of the death penalty and the salaries of retired members of Lebanon's security forces in Beirut, Lebanon, 11 August 2026. (EPA)

Political settlement

Former MP and Minister Butros Harb interpreted the current law from an angle that combines politics and humanitarian considerations.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Harb stated: "In part, the current amnesty is a political settlement more than a purely judicial move, even though it includes a humanitarian aspect that cannot be ignored."

At the same time, he stressed that addressing the conditions of prisoners should not lead to "overlooking the rights of the Lebanese Army and its victims, particularly in cases related to those who engaged in clashes with it."

He explained that "there is a humanitarian aspect that must be taken into account, because the Lebanese judiciary was influenced at certain stages and did not exercise its powers with the required speed, whether in terms of settling cases or issuing verdicts."

He noted that "there are individuals who spent long periods in prison that, in some cases, exceeded the sentence that could have been issued against them had they been tried within normal timeframes."

This "demands a humanitarian and legal solution to the problem," he remarked.

However, he noted that the amnesty file "has also unfortunately turned into a subject of sectarian debates, especially regarding the cases of Islamists who fought the army."

Harb criticized the double standards related to the army in the ongoing debate. "Some of those who today declare their concern for the army were, unfortunately, among the forces that helped inflict major losses on it, whether during the Lebanese civil war or in the clashes the country witnessed in later years."

The issue must not turn into fodder for political debates at the expense of the army or the rights of its victims, he urged.

‘Fundamentally different’

He said the 1991 and current amnesty are "fundamentally different."

He explained that the 1991 amnesty happened during "exceptional political circumstances that followed the Taif Agreement" and the end of the civil war.

"At that time, Lebanon was emerging from a long war, and it was necessary to turn the page on that chapter and enter a new era allowing the rebuilding of the state. Therefore, the amnesty was part of a broader national political settlement."

"Today, however, the problem is different even if it has a political aspect because it is primarily linked to a judicial and humanitarian failure that must be addressed," Harb stressed.

"The issue required a solution because it is unacceptable for individuals to remain in prison for years due to delayed trials or the failure to settle their cases," he said.


Gaza Cancer Patients Face Rising Death Rate Amid Israeli Curbs, Doctors Say

Palestinian cancer patient Elham Al-Sakafi, 38, speaks to a doctor after receiving nutritional intravenous fluids at Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, August 6, 2026, according to medics. (Reuters)
Palestinian cancer patient Elham Al-Sakafi, 38, speaks to a doctor after receiving nutritional intravenous fluids at Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, August 6, 2026, according to medics. (Reuters)
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Gaza Cancer Patients Face Rising Death Rate Amid Israeli Curbs, Doctors Say

Palestinian cancer patient Elham Al-Sakafi, 38, speaks to a doctor after receiving nutritional intravenous fluids at Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, August 6, 2026, according to medics. (Reuters)
Palestinian cancer patient Elham Al-Sakafi, 38, speaks to a doctor after receiving nutritional intravenous fluids at Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, August 6, 2026, according to medics. (Reuters)

Gaza cancer patients are dying at two to three times the pace they did before the start of the war in the territory, as Israel blocks many from travelling for treatment after destroying the only local specialized facility, Gaza doctors said.

Israel blew up Gaza's specialized cancer hospital last year after saying troops found a tunnel used by Hamas running beneath it. That means that an estimated 17,000 Gazans with cancer have no local option for chemotherapy or other advanced therapy.

Few Palestinians can afford to travel for treatment, and those who can face Israeli restrictions. The military imposes strict caps on daily crossings to Egypt, despite a 2025 Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal that requires free movement in and out.

Asked for comment, COGAT, the Israeli military agency that controls access to Gaza, said it coordinates medical evacuations with the World Health Organization. To depart, Gazans must have a ‌valid request from a ‌receiving country and pass "required security screening," COGAT said.

The WHO did not immediately respond to a ‌request ⁠for comment.

RACE AGAINST TIME

For ⁠Khuloud Abu Sahmoud, a Palestinian mother-of-two with advanced ovarian cancer, the wait for treatment abroad has become a race against time as her cancer spreads.

"Every day my disease progresses, and my condition is tragic. My fingernails have all fallen out – I have none left. I am just waiting to die."

Abu Sahmoud, 33, said she has been waiting to exit Gaza for treatment in Egypt or further afield since the ceasefire was struck last October. In that time, the cancer has spread to her lungs and bones, she says.

COGAT said around 5,800 Gazans needing medical treatment have exited to Egypt since Israel agreed in February to a limited reopening of the Rafah border crossing, largely shut during the ⁠war that began in 2023.

"Medical evacuations are in no sense restricted by the State of Israel ‌but are wholly dependent on the receiving country's request; without the official request, ‌COGAT cannot coordinate a patient's leave," COGAT said.

Palestinian health officials said 11,000 people, including patients, had gone through Rafah since it reopened, fewer than half ‌the number that had been expected under the ceasefire deal.

A further 20,000 patients, including 5,000 with cancer, are registered for treatment ‌abroad but not yet permitted to leave, the officials said.

TOXIC CHEMICAL EXPOSURE

The ceasefire ended major fighting but left Israeli forces in control of more than half of Gaza, since expanded to around two-thirds. Nearly all of Gaza's more than 2 million people live in a Hamas-controlled strip along the coast, mostly in makeshift tents or shelters in damaged buildings.

Before the war, local health services had made advances thanks to investment from abroad and persistence ‌from local doctors, a Reuters investigation found.

But most Gaza hospitals were destroyed or damaged in the war, and those that remain operational have been stripped of up to 70% of essential ⁠medical supplies, including those needed ⁠for cancer treatment and diagnostic services, doctors said.

Among those killed by Israel during the war were dozens of highly qualified specialists, including cancer experts operating in the Turkish-Palestinian Friendship Hospital, demolished in an Israeli controlled demolition in March 2025.

"We have been recording a significant number of deaths, ranging from three to five daily, because patients are not receiving the chemotherapy needed to save their lives," said Mohamed Abu Selmia, head of Gaza's biggest hospital, Al-Shifa.

Sobhi Skaik, a Palestinian surgeon who was head of the Turkish-Palestinian Friendship Hospital, said the death rate before the war was about one to two per day. Some pre-war statistics put the figure at around 1.7 per day, he said.

He said the rising deaths were due mostly to an absence of local treatment and to border restrictions. But he also said that cancer itself may be spreading at a faster rate due to the presence of toxic materials from Israeli explosives dropped on Gaza.

There were some 11,000 registered cancer patients in Gaza before the war started following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on southern Israel, after which registrations largely stopped, Skaik said.

He estimated that another 6,000 Gazans had likely developed cancer since.

"Some people can be treated if diagnosed in early stages, but they are wandering around the tents sick, unaware, and with no help," Skaik said.