Rafik Hariri to Blair: 11 Meetings with Israel… It Requested Hezbollah’s Dissolution

Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
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Rafik Hariri to Blair: 11 Meetings with Israel… It Requested Hezbollah’s Dissolution

Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)

Asharq Al-Awsat Publishes Details of the Late Premier’s Meetings in London

A series of recently declassified British documents reveal details of meetings held by the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri with British officials in 1997 and 1999.

According to the documents, Hariri informed his British counterpart Tony Blair that Lebanon and Israel held 11 rounds of negotiations in Washington, but the Hebrew state put forward a series of conditions, including “dissolving Hezbollah.”

The accounts, which are published by Asharq Al-Awsat in two episodes, quoted an official in the French presidency as saying that Paris was upset with Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and accused him of reneging on previous promises to deploy the Lebanese army in the south after Israel’s withdrawal in May 2000. This prompted Paris to freeze steps to increase the number of its troops in the UNIFIL.

The documents confirm that the United Kingdom tried to play a role in the negotiations on the Lebanese and Syrian tracks with Israel, and believed that there was a great possibility of achieving progress in light of the promises made by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (1999-2001) to withdraw from South Lebanon, and the “courtesy” between him and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

They also show that a special envoy of Blair met with Assad in this regard, and carried a message to Lahoud on the negotiations with Israel. However, the latter refused to receive him due to pressure exerted on him.

The documents, which were declassified in the British National Archives, show that Blair’s reception of Hariri came at the “insistence” of French President Jacques Chirac.
While the first meeting in 1997 was normal, because it took place between two prime ministers, the second meeting in 1999 was problematic “protocol”. Once again, Chirac insisted on Blair to meet Hariri, who was then a former prime minister after he resigned in 1998, following Lahoud’s election as president to succeed President Elias Hrawi.

On July 17, 1997, Blair received his Lebanese counterpart, Rafik Hariri, at 10 Downing Street. He was then the new prime minister after he led his party, the Labor Party, that year to a landslide victory over the Conservatives. Hariri had been prime minister for years under President Elias Hrawi and was focusing his efforts on rebuilding Lebanon after the long years of civil war.

Hariri visited the prime minister for 35 minutes on July 17. He was accompanied by the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministers of Finance, Information and Trade, Secretary General of the Council of Ministers and Lebanon’s Ambassador in London. The meeting was also attended by Derek Fatchett (Foreign Secretary of State for the Middle East), and other UK officials.

The minutes of the meeting show that Hariri clearly held then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responsible for obstructing progress in the peace talks, and argued that this policy would only lead to the growth of the influence of Hamas and the fundamentalists.

Blair asked about the situation in Lebanon. Hariri said that there was now a monitoring group looking into the April understandings in South Lebanon. The group included Americans, French, Syrians, Israelis and Lebanese. He said that nobody wanted the situation to escalate, adding that the Lebanese were trying to build infrastructure throughout the country and achieve financial stability. There have been dramatic developments over the past five years, he noted.

Hariri invited the British Prime Minister to visit Beirut to see for himself. Fatchett said he visited the Lebanese capital, pointing to significant progress compared to its previous visits the year before. Hariri said that they were now hosting the Arab Games, and that a British company had built a wonderful stadium to host it.

Blair-Hariri... A second meeting in different circumstances

Two years after Blair’s meeting with Hariri, a second meeting took place between the two men, but under different circumstances. Hariri had been outside the Lebanese government after his resignation during the term of Lahoud.
An important change also took place in Israel, with the arrival of Ehud Barak to the premiership, succeeding Benjamin Netanyahu.

On July 5, 1999, Philip Barton wrote to the British prime minister, saying that Hariri, the former premier, would visit him the following day because of Chirac's repeated insistence.

He added that Hariri would be accompanied by some people from his office.

A list attached to Barton’s letter comprised the proposed topics for discussion. Those included the possibility of achieving progress in the Middle East peace process in the wake of Barak’s election; the necessity to reach progress on the Syrian and Lebanese track to achieve a comprehensive peace; the negotiations with the European Union; concern over the recent escalation in southern Lebanon that caused the bombing of Beirut on June 25; and progress in the negotiations of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Lebanon.

The brief explanation provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated the following:

South Lebanon

A recent escalation of violence in southern Lebanon culminated in the June 25 Israeli Air Force attacks on Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon, which killed 10 civilians, and a Hezbollah attack in northern Israel that killed two. The Israeli Air Force attacks were ordered by the Netanyahu government. Barak was informed of it, but not consulted. The situation is calm, but tense, according to the explanation. Contacts resumed in the Israeli-Lebanese monitoring group set up to monitor the April 1996 understandings.
Some saw the Hezbollah attack as a reminder to both Syria and Barak that they could not be ignored in any peace negotiations…

The Middle East peace process

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it expected that Barak would implement the Wye River memorandum whenever he forms a government. The second redeployment of Israeli forces under Wye will be the starting point for renewed negotiations on all tracks in the peace process. It added that the greatest progress was likely to be made on the Syrian-Lebanese tracks (with Israel). Barak may focus his attention here, according to the explanation.

It also noted that a unilateral withdrawal of the Israelis from South Lebanon would deprive the Syrians of one of their main cards in the negotiations over the Golan Heights, specifically their (implicit) influence regarding Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

The Lebanese will not walk alone without their dominant partner. Nevertheless, we understand that Barak knows the need for Syrian cooperation to ensure a successful withdrawal from Lebanon, the British ministry reported in the documents.

The internal Lebanese situation

The British Foreign Affairs’ Ministry said that Emile Lahoud was inaugurated on November 24, 1998, to succeed Elias Hrawi. In order to enable Lahoud, the former commander of the Lebanese army, to become president, the Lebanese parliament voted to amend Article 49 of the constitution that bars senior civil servants from running for president as long as they are in office or within two years of leaving office. It added that 118 of the 128 Lebanese deputies voted for Lahoud. The ten MPs who boycotted were members of Walid Jumblatt’s party.

The documents added that Hariri was offered the opportunity to continue his work as prime minister under the new president’s rule, but he declined on constitutional grounds, as he put it.

Speculation continued in Lebanon about the reason for Hariri’s “resignation”, but it seemed likely that he did not consider that he could work with Lahoud without playing the minor role in the administration.

Dr. Salim al-Hoss was nominated prime minister on December 2. Lahoud and Hoss appointed a mini-government of 16 ministers (half of the previous government). The government included reform-minded technocrats, in an effort to tackle corruption.

The British Foreign Ministry pointed to disappointment in Lebanon with the limited performance of the Hoss government. It added that a sharp economic slowdown was remarked, noting that an anti-corruption campaign appeared to be directed specifically against political opponents of Lahoud and Hoss and away from friends of the Syrian government.



Xi-Putin-Trump Summit: What Comes Next?

19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)
19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)
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Xi-Putin-Trump Summit: What Comes Next?

19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)
19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)

An unprecedented summit between Chinese, US and Russian leaders this week in Shenzhen was light on substance but immensely symbolic, analysts say.

From nuclear weapons to reforming the United Nations and cancelling international arrest warrants, AFP looks at what was announced, its significance and what might come next:

- Substance or hot air? -

The three leaders jointly declared lofty goals to "reduce nuclear risks" and reform the United Nations, as well as commitments to immunity for state officials.

Their "Declaration toward Peace" also said the countries plan to boost oil supply and reaffirmed the importance of "stable energy flows".

The promise of dialogue on nuclear risks and non-proliferation "creates an opening for cooperation despite disagreements over arsenal reductions", said Sun Chenghao, senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University.

"Implementation is now the main test," he told AFP.

Progress could be signaled by dates for nuclear talks or the appointment of designated officials.

Beijing previously rebuffed Trump's invitations to nuclear arms talks, arguing the US and Russia should first cut their giant arsenals before it agreed to discuss its smaller stockpiles.

The four-point declaration contains few details on future actions, with Germany's Chancellor Friedrich Merz calling the meeting a "photo op".

The "fairly sparse" points were "least common denominators" among the leaders, said Ryan Hass at the Brookings Institution.

Trump told reporters he would give a press conference on Friday, where he may provide more details.

- A new Yalta? -

The symbolism of three powerful leaders gathering to discuss global security issues -- including Putin's invasion of Ukraine and Trump's war with Iran -- had raised comparisons to the 1945 Yalta Conference.

Then-leaders of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union met to hash out the post-World War II settlement and re-draw European borders.

Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky and European powers worried Thursday's summit would push for a peace settlement favorable to Moscow without them at the table.

The format "suggests the creation of conditions where Beijing, Moscow, and Washington call the shots for the rest of the world", said Chong Ja Ian, an associate professor at the National University of Singapore.

But "a functioning 'G3' would require much greater agreement among the three countries and cooperation from many other governments," Tsinghua University's Sun told AFP.

"The Yalta analogy also overlooks today's economic interdependence and the influence of regional actors," he said.

- Should Europe, others worry? -

Other US allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan -- which unlike China and Russia are vibrant democracies -- will also have eyed the summit with unease.

"From South Korea's perspective, this inevitably raises questions about whether it can continue to rely on its alliance with the United States," said Lee Jae-mook, a political science professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

"The pillars of South Korea's foreign and security policy that it has long taken for granted are being shaken," Lee told AFP.

Japan, too, may reconsider its relationships with China and the US.

"If China and Russia really draw the United States together, I think Japan will have a huge pressure to... make a better relationship with China," said Tzeng Wei-feng, an associate research fellow at Taiwan's National Chengchi University.

However, Tokyo and Washington maintain a bilateral defense pact, so there will likely be "no substantial change" in their ties, he added.

The US has roughly 54,000 military personnel stationed in Japan -- whose relations with China are poor -- and 28,500 in South Korea.

Despite the bonhomie between Xi, Trump and Putin displayed in Shenzhen, major strategic differences remain between their countries.

Washington has curbed Beijing's access to US technologies, while Moscow is fighting a Ukraine that still relies in large part on American intelligence.

Diverging national interests between China, the US and Russia means the rest of Asia won't be "overly concerned" yet, according to Dylan Loh of Singapore's Nanyang Technological University.

The format may not stick, especially after Trump leaves office in two years, he said.

- What next? -

"Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect is the absence of any commitment to reconvene or continue meeting at the leader-level," said Brookings' Hass.

With no follow-up announced, eyes will turn to next month's G20 summit in Miami, where Xi and Trump are due to hold their fourth meeting of the year, and Putin could make his first appearance at the grouping since his war in Ukraine began.

He has been shunned by most Western leaders since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.

Still, "there is little chance that such a meeting will be held again", said Shen Dingli, a Shanghai-based scholar of international relations.

International Criminal Court (ICC) members -- which exclude the US -- are obliged to detain Putin if he travels to their territory after the court issued a warrant for him for war crimes associated with the Ukraine invasion.

"Putin has been ruled an international criminal by the ICC, and most APEC and G20 members are signatories to the Rome Statute. So, there are few opportunities for the three countries' leaders to convene," said Shen.


Turkish Investments in Egypt Strengthen Ties Despite Political Differences

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)
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Turkish Investments in Egypt Strengthen Ties Despite Political Differences

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)

Growing Turkish investment in Egypt is strengthening economic ties between Cairo and Ankara despite ongoing disagreements over a maritime deal between Türkiye and Libya, according to analysts.

The Egyptian government highlighted the expanding Turkish business presence in the country on Wednesday, releasing figures that analysts interpreted as a sign of both sides’ determination to deepen economic cooperation while managing political disputes.

According to the Egyptian Cabinet’s Media Center, Turkish investment has expanded across manufacturing, trade, services and other economic activities in recent years. Turkish companies have contributed around $921.5 million in investment through 1,869 businesses established in Egypt, creating around 43,900 jobs.

Annual Turkish investment inflows surged 393.2% over eight years, reaching $175.1 million in the 2024-2025 fiscal year, compared with $35.5 million in 2016-2017.

The increase came despite a period of strained relations before Cairo and Ankara restored ambassador-level diplomatic ties in 2023.

Bilateral trade rose 44.7%, reaching $6.8 billion in 2025, up from $4.7 billion in 2016, according to the government figures, which highlighted major Turkish projects in the garment and food-processing industries.

Economic interests

Bashir Abdel Fattah, a Türkiye affairs specialist at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, said the growth in Turkish investment reflects Ankara’s determination to strengthen its strategic partnership with Cairo.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Fattah described economic cooperation as a key component of the rapprochement, adding that Türkiye is seeking to capitalize on investment opportunities in Egypt while broadening the partnership across multiple sectors.

Egypt also provides Turkish companies with access to Arab and African markets through trade arrangements, including the free trade agreement with members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), enabling businesses to manufacture goods in Egypt for export across the continent.

Hani al-Gamal, deputy director of the Tafkir Center for Political Affairs, said that the government figures demonstrate how closely Turkish capital has become integrated into Egypt’s economy, particularly in manufacturing, employment and exports, generating benefits for both countries.

While acknowledging the importance of investment in strengthening bilateral cooperation, al-Gamal cautioned that economic ties alone could not resolve geopolitical disputes.

He attributed the broader improvement in relations to political and regional circumstances that have also facilitated closer military cooperation and notable progress in defense industries.

Military cooperation

Egyptian and Turkish naval forces participated in the Sea of Friendship exercises this month. The Egyptian military described the drills as part of growing cooperation between the two countries’ armed forces, aimed at sharing expertise and strengthening naval coordination.

The exercises took place despite Cairo’s repeated rejection of the Libyan parliament’s ratification in October of a maritime boundary agreement with Ankara.

Egypt and Türkiye have nevertheless continued consultations aimed at reducing regional tensions.

Abdel Fattah identified the separation of contentious political issues from areas of cooperation as a key factor behind the recent improvement in relations.

Disagreements over maritime boundaries and the Libyan crisis have not prevented Cairo and Ankara from developing ties in other sectors, he explained.

He viewed this approach as evidence of political maturity and a shared determination to avoid a return to tensions.

He said that rapprochement and cooperation could build confidence, narrow disagreements and create more favorable conditions for resolving outstanding issues.

Al-Gamal similarly emphasized that translating political rapprochement into tangible economic interests could deepen mutual trust and broaden the foundations of cooperation.


Al-Mirghani: A Statesman of Peace

Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.
Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.
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Al-Mirghani: A Statesman of Peace

Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.
Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.

November 16 was no ordinary date in Sudan’s collective memory. It was the day Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani was laid to rest in Khartoum North. It was also the anniversary of the Sudanese Peace Initiative he signed 38 years earlier with Dr. John Garang in Addis Ababa, an accord known as the Mirghani-Garang Agreement.

It was as though history had chosen the day of his farewell to remind Sudan of the defining conviction he carried throughout his life: that the country could not be saved through war, but through dialogue.

This is not to place al-Mirghani, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, beyond criticism or to dismiss the disputes and disagreements that marked his political career. But fairness demands recognition of his unwavering commitment, at decisive moments, to peace, consensus and national unity. That is why he deserves to be called a man of peace.

On November 16, 1988, al-Mirghani and Garang made political history with a remarkably brief document: barely a page long and fewer than 400 words. But its significance was immense.

The agreement called for a ceasefire, the suspension of the provisions on hudud punishments and related articles of the September 1983 laws pending a national constitutional conference, the lifting of the state of emergency, cancellation of military agreements affecting national sovereignty, and formation of a national committee to prepare for the constitutional conference.

Its central premise was fundamental: the war was not an isolated southern problem, but a manifestation of a broader Sudanese crisis that could be resolved only through dialogue on equal terms among all political and social forces.

The agreement faced open opposition from the National Islamic Front before the Constituent Assembly approved it on April 3, 1989. Then came the June 30 coup, cutting short the process before it could be completed.

It would be wrong to attribute the coup solely to the Mirghani-Garang Agreement, just as it would be impossible to assert that peace was guaranteed had democracy been allowed to run its course. But it is entirely reasonable to say that Sudan lost a genuine opportunity for peace, one that would not be forgotten.

Instead of the swift peace envisioned in a single-page document, the war continued for roughly another 16 years after the coup. It claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, forced millions from their homes and into exile, and saw the proliferation of armed groups and militias.

Ultimately, Sudan needed years of negotiations and volumes of protocols and agreements to reach the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. That accord, in turn, opened the way to self-determination, the 2011 referendum and the secession of South Sudan.

This contrast is what makes the Mirghani-Garang initiative a living document to this day. One page had outlined a broad political vision for a united country. Years later, Sudan required seemingly endless documents to reach an outcome in which it lost a cherished part of its territory and people.

Jaafar Hassan, a leading figure in the Unionist Alliance and spokesman for the Sumoud coalition, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the late al-Mirghani was “one of Sudan’s pillars and one of the few men of sound judgment.”

Hassan said al-Mirghani had pursued peace early on, drawing on his position as head of the Democratic Unionist Party and leader of the Khatmiyya Sufi order.

Al-Mirghani had put his considerable popularity among his followers at the service of peace, recognizing early the dangers of allowing the war in South Sudan to continue. He was behind the landmark agreement between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement led by John Garang.

“Had it not been for the National Islamic Front’s coup in 1989, Sudan would still be united today,” Hassan said.

He stressed that al-Mirghani’s commitment to peace and national unity was not a fleeting political position, but of principles on which he refused to compromise.

Milestones in the pursuit of peace

The 1988 initiative was not the only landmark in al-Mirghani’s record. At least six major milestones can be identified in his pursuit of peace.

The first was his agreement with Garang. The second was his leadership of the National Democratic Alliance after the coup, bringing together political parties, trade unions and armed movements of differing orientations under one umbrella.

The third was the 1995 Asmara Conference on Fundamental Issues, which placed war, democracy, identity and the relationship between religion and the state at the heart of the national dialogue.

The fourth came at the alliance’s second conference in Massawa in 2000, when it affirmed that Sudan’s problems could be resolved only through “serious and sustained dialogue among all Sudanese political forces” in a democratic environment.

The fifth milestone came through negotiations in Jeddah and Cairo, culminating in the 2005 Cairo Agreement between the government and the National Democratic Alliance under al-Mirghani’s leadership. The agreement opened the door to ending a prolonged political confrontation and allowing opposition forces to return to political life.

In Darfur, al-Mirghani sought to narrow differences between the government and armed movements that had not signed peace agreements. He encouraged those movements to unify their positions so they could join negotiations from a stronger position.

In 2022, he again proposed an initiative for comprehensive national dialogue and returned to Khartoum after a long absence, making another attempt to bring Sudanese factions together before the country descended into its current war.

Not everyone agreed with all his political choices. But at the time of his passing, there was broad agreement that his name had been closely associated with national unity and dialogue.

Political analyst Mohamed Latif told Asharq Al-Awsat that al-Mirghani’s political record might be a subject of disagreement for some, “but it is difficult to dispute that he was one of the leaders of Sudan’s two largest religious communities.”

“He succeeded in preserving the cohesion of the Khatmiyya order inside and outside Sudan, as well as its peaceful religious mission, far removed from violence and extremism,” he added.

The Mirghani-Garang Agreement was among the most significant moments not only in al-Mirghani’s life but also in Sudan’s modern history, he went on to say.

The agreement came after more than five years of fierce war between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the Sudanese army, despite repeated attempts to bring the fighting to an end.

Latif said Sudanese collective memory preserves two contrasting images from that period: the enormous crowds that welcomed al-Mirghani upon his return to Khartoum after signing the agreement in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, and the subsequent attempt to assassinate him at his home in the Khartoum 2 neighborhood.

The two episodes seemed to offer early signs of the struggle between the desire for peace and the path of violence that would later come to define Sudan.

The most meaningful tribute to al-Mirghani lies not in words of mourning alone, but in drawing lessons from his life and Sudan’s recent history.

Whenever the door to dialogue has been closed, the doors to war have opened wider. Whenever the illusion of a military solution has prevailed, the Sudanese people have paid the price in bloodshed, displacement and division.

Sudan once squandered the opportunity presented by a brief agreement that might have opened a different path. It must not squander today’s opportunity to end this devastating war.

Peace is not weakness. Negotiation is not betrayal. Ending the war is not merely one political option among many, but a national and moral duty to save what remains of Sudan.