Lahoud Angered France by ‘Backtracking’ on Pledge to Deploy Army in S. Lebanon

British declassified documents cite Tony Blair as telling then Lebanese President Lahoud that he was convinced of Ehud Barak’s sincerity in prioritizing the peace process.

Israeli soldiers pull out of southern Lebanon, May 24, 2000. (Reuters)
Israeli soldiers pull out of southern Lebanon, May 24, 2000. (Reuters)
TT

Lahoud Angered France by ‘Backtracking’ on Pledge to Deploy Army in S. Lebanon

Israeli soldiers pull out of southern Lebanon, May 24, 2000. (Reuters)
Israeli soldiers pull out of southern Lebanon, May 24, 2000. (Reuters)

A series of recently declassified British documents reveal details of meetings held by late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri with British officials in 1997 and 1999, as well as letters exchanged between then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Lebanese presidency.

In the first episode published by Asharq Al-Awsat on Sunday, Hariri informed Blair that Lebanon and Israel held 11 rounds of negotiations in Washington, but Tel Aviv had put forward several conditions, including “dismantling Hezbollah.”

The accounts, which were published by Asharq Al-Awsat in two episodes, quoted an official in the French presidency as saying that Paris was upset with then Lebanese President Emile Lahoud for reneging on previous promises to deploy the Lebanese army in the South after Israel’s withdrawal in May 2000.

The second episode focuses on London’s efforts to join negotiations between Beirut and Tel Aviv. The British documents, which were declassified in the National Archives, show that Blair’s government believed that it was possible to achieve progress in the peace process after Ehud Barak assumed the Israeli premiership, succeeding Benjamin Netanyahu.

They also recount that a special envoy of Blair met with Hafez al-Assad in this regard, and carried a message to Lahoud on the negotiations with Israel. However, the latter refused to receive him due to “stressful circumstances.”

The documents explain how Israel withdrew its forces from South Lebanon in 2000, as promised by Barak. However, Lahoud angered the French, who saw that he was reneging on his pledges to deploy the Lebanese army. This prompted Paris to freeze steps to increase the number of its troops in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

In June, the UN confirmed that Israel had indeed completed its unilateral withdrawal from the South on May 24, 2000, weeks before the scheduled date in July. The step led to the collapse of the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army. Many of its members and supporters fled to Israel for fear of reprisals by Hezbollah.

Lebanon later said that Israel did not complete its full withdrawal from the South, referring to its presence in the disputed Shebaa Farms.

In a letter addressed by Paris to the British Foreign Office, a copy of which was sent to Blair, detailed the French policy towards the developments in Lebanon.

South Lebanon: The French approach

The letter explained that no decision was taken over the French reinforcements to the UNIFIL. It said the UN Affairs office at the Quai d'Orsay noted that the French conditions were not met, accusing Lahoud of going back on his previous commitments to deploy the Lebanese army.

According to the letter, the director of UN Affairs said no decision had been reached in the government’s discussions regarding a possible increase in the French contribution to UNIFIL.

He continued that the prospects for Lebanon’s cooperation with the French demands were now seen as less encouraging than they were at the end of the previous week.

The letter underlined that contacts would continue between Beirut, Washington, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and other regional players.

Britain offers to mediate between Lebanon and Israel

The Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon came at a time when Britain was trying to mediate a negotiation track between Lebanon and Israel. However, these efforts did not bear fruit, in light of the hardening position of the Lebanese presidency, which accused the Israelis of carrying out “adventures” and violating “understandings” reached in 1996.

On March 10, 2000, Tim Barrow, the foreign minister’s private secretary, sent a letter to Philip Barton at 10 Downing Street, enclosing the text of a letter from Lahoud to Blair. Barrow said that Lahoud’s message “explains itself... There is no need to respond to it.”

The letter, dated February 16, 2000, stated: “I would like to thank you for your heartfelt message conveyed by your Special Envoy and friend Mr. (Michael) Levy. Unfortunately, due to stressful circumstances, I was unable to meet him.”

The president added: “The recent Israeli aggression clearly violated the April 1996 Understandings, the mechanism aimed at protecting against the unjustified killing of civilians and the destruction of countries’ infrastructure… As we work diligently to clear the rubble, in wake of a new and lamentable chapter in Israeli adventurism, allow me to share with you the hope for the imminent resumption of ‘peace talks’ that will eventually bring a comprehensive and just peace to the region.”

He added that while Lebanon has always paid a price for war in the Middle East, it remained hopeful and looked forward to reaping the benefits of peace, while reclaiming its unique role in the region.

“Your invaluable efforts, dear Prime Minister, for a just and lasting settlement of age-old disputes remain the cornerstone of your leadership,” he concluded.

Lahoud’s message to Blair came in response to a letter addressed by the UK Prime Minister through his personal envoy, dated February 1, 2000, over the resumption of the Lebanese-Israeli track.

Blair started his letter by thanking the Lebanese president and his government for “the kind reception you have extended to the bearer of this letter, Michael Levy”, whom he described as a trusted close friend.

He added that Levy was traveling directly from Damascus, where he was able to discuss the peace process in detail with President Hafez al-Assad.

He also expressed optimism over the imminent resumption of negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, as well as the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 425.

Blair underlined his confidence in Barak’s “sincerity and determination” to fulfill his commitment to withdraw from southern Lebanon by July.

Wishing Lahoud success in the upcoming negotiations, Blair stressed that he, along with Robin Cook (Foreign Secretary) and Levy, were ready to help wherever they could.

The UK Prime Minister’s offer to Lahoud to help in the course of negotiations with Israel did not come out of nowhere. Blair himself had told the Lebanese president in a letter a year earlier that Barak wanted to resume negotiations with Lebanon and Syria and sought to withdraw his forces from the South.

In a letter dated July 26, 1999, Blair told Lahoud that he had the opportunity to talk at length on July 21 with Ehud Barak on his way back to Israel from Washington.

He recounted that Barak voiced his commitment to ending the century-old Arab-Israeli conflict.

Blair said he was convinced of the premier’s sincerity in prioritizing the peace process as the primary task of his new government.

He also quoted Barak as saying that peace in the region would remain fragile until a final settlement was reached with Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians, adding that he was determined to move on all tracks and advance each one wherever peace was possible.

According to Blair, Barak confirmed his intention to withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon. He also acknowledged the complexities of the Lebanese problem while searching for a settlement with Syria.

The British premier told Lahoud that he expressed to Barak his political support for a just and secure peace. He stressed that the UK would not be lecturing the parties directly involved on how they should get there but would play whatever constructive and supportive role, “both bilaterally and with our EU partners, to help achieve this.”



Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
TT

Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)

The sound of gunfire, barrel bombs, and stray bullets is nothing new in Sudan. What’s new is that the violence has moved from the outskirts to the capital, Khartoum. This shift forced the government and military to relocate to a temporary capital in Port Sudan, nearly 1,000 kilometers away on the Red Sea coast.
Past conflicts were seen as rebellions against the state, but they stemmed from a deeper struggle: the “center” holds all the power and resources, while the “margins” are left with nothing.
These wars have always been about demands for rights and equality.
Under Islamist President Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s wars shifted from demands for rights to a “religious war” between the Muslim north and the Christian or secular south. This led to South Sudan’s secession and the creation of a new state that joined the United Nations. But what drives the conflicts that continue to devastate Sudan?
Analysts say the root cause is the lack of a national vision and the failure to recognize Sudan’s ethnic and cultural diversity. Without a unified political and economic framework, this diversity has been ignored.
The current war, though fought between two formal armies, stems from the same issues of marginalization and exclusion. These problems sparked Sudan’s first rebellion in 1955, led by the Anya-Nya 1 forces, named after the cobra snake.
The Naivasha Agreement
Sudan’s first civil war ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement but reignited in 1983 after former President Jaafar Nimeiri imposed Islamic Sharia law. This sparked a rebellion led by John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
The conflict escalated into a “jihadist” war as Islamist forces framed it as a battle against “enemies of the faith.” The fighting lasted for years, killing more than two million people.
Unable to secure a military victory, the government signed the Naivasha Agreement in Kenya. The deal granted South Sudan the right to self-determination, with a five-year transitional period to decide between unity or independence.
John Garang briefly became Sudan’s First Vice President during this period but died in a mysterious helicopter crash. His deputy, Salva Kiir, succeeded him and led South Sudan to a 2011 referendum, where the region voted for independence. South Sudan became a new nation, taking a third of Sudan’s land, a quarter of its people, and most of its resources.
Meanwhile, conflict spread to Darfur in 2003, with rebels accusing the government of marginalization. The war turned ethnic when the government armed Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, to fight African-origin rebel groups. One Janjaweed leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or Hemedti, later became the head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The Darfur war claimed 300,000 lives. Al-Bashir’s government was accused of war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, leading to International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Bashir and three senior officials that remain in effect.
Chasing Peace Across Capitals
In May 2006, Sudan’s government signed a peace deal in Abuja with a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Minni Arko Minnawi. However, the movement split, and another faction, led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, rejected the deal and continued fighting from Jebel Marra in central Darfur.
Minnawi briefly joined the government as an assistant to President Omar al-Bashir but later rebelled again, claiming he was treated as a "kitchen helper" rather than a serious political partner.
Efforts to negotiate peace moved between capitals. In 2011, some groups signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in Qatar, which promised power and wealth-sharing, but fighting continued.
In 2020, Sudan’s transitional government signed a new peace agreement in Juba with key armed groups, including Minnawi’s faction and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Gibril Ibrahim.
The deal gave Minnawi the role of Darfur governor and Ibrahim the post of finance minister. Despite these accords, true peace remains out of reach.
A New Southern Conflict
War broke out in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, two regions given a right to “popular consultation” under the Naivasha Agreement to decide their future. The SPLM-North, an offshoot of the southern SPLM, took up arms again.
The SPLM-N split into two factions: one led by Malik Agar, now a deputy in Sudan’s Sovereign Council, who signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement; the other, led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, controls Kauda in South Kordofan and continues sporadic fighting.
Eastern Sudan also saw conflict in the 1990s, with groups like the Beja Congress and Free Lions opposing Bashir’s regime. These groups later signed the Asmara Peace Agreement, gaining shares of power and wealth.
In April 2019, months of protests forced the military to oust President Omar al-Bashir. But sit-ins continued, and a violent crackdown killed hundreds, drawing condemnation as a horrific crime against civilians.
Under public pressure, the military signed a constitutional declaration in August 2019, agreeing to share power with civilians. This led to a transitional government with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and a Sovereign Council headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his deputy, Hemedti.
War of the Generals
On October 25, 2021, Sudan's army leader overthrew Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s civilian government in a coup. Under pressure from peaceful protests, the general later agreed to a framework agreement with civilian leaders, promising a return to civilian rule and preventing the return of the Islamist regime.
However, supporters of the former regime undermined the deal, causing tensions between the army and the RSF, leading to war.
On April 15, 2023, gunfire broke out in southern Khartoum, marking the start of the ongoing conflict. The RSF accused the army of attacking its camps, while some claim Islamist cells within the army targeted the RSF, forcing it to choose between surrender or war.
Miscalculations
The war was expected to end quickly due to the army’s stronger military. However, the RSF surprised the army by using urban warfare tactics to take control of key military bases and government buildings, including the presidential palace.
The government moved to Port Sudan, while Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan was trapped for over three months before escaping.
The RSF expanded its control over Darfur, western Sudan, and the central Gezira region, holding about 70% of the country. After nearly two years of fighting, the army regained some areas, but the RSF still controls large parts of Sudan and continues fierce fighting, with the war still ongoing.
The Worst Humanitarian Crisis
The war in Sudan has killed tens of thousands and triggered what the UN calls "the worst humanitarian crisis in history." More than 11 million people are displaced within Sudan, while around 3 million have fled to neighboring countries. Over half of Sudan’s population, about 25 million people, face severe food insecurity.
Negotiations have failed, with both sides refusing to return to talks after the Jeddah Humanitarian Declaration collapsed, largely due to the army’s and its supporters' refusal to engage.
Root Causes
Former Sovereign Council member and deputy head of the Democratic Civil Forces Coordination “Tagadum,” Al-Hadi Idris blames the war on Sudan’s failure to agree on a “national development plan” since independence.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, he says the main reasons for the conflict are the failure to implement fair development, achieve justice, and the lack of resolution on key issues like the role of religion in politics, national identity, and military involvement in government.
Idris argues that addressing these issues is crucial to ending the war for good.
Mohamed Abdel-Hakim, a leader in the Unionist Gathering, believes the wars stem from unequal development and citizenship.
He says resolving issues like marginalization, protecting people’s rights, and replacing oppressive regimes with democratic governance is key to stopping Sudan’s long-running conflicts.
Abdel-Hakim also calls for reforming the military to create a professional, national army focused on protecting the constitution and civilian leadership, with strict oversight to prevent the army from becoming politicized.