Lahoud Angered France by ‘Backtracking’ on Pledge to Deploy Army in S. Lebanon

British declassified documents cite Tony Blair as telling then Lebanese President Lahoud that he was convinced of Ehud Barak’s sincerity in prioritizing the peace process.

Israeli soldiers pull out of southern Lebanon, May 24, 2000. (Reuters)
Israeli soldiers pull out of southern Lebanon, May 24, 2000. (Reuters)
TT
20

Lahoud Angered France by ‘Backtracking’ on Pledge to Deploy Army in S. Lebanon

Israeli soldiers pull out of southern Lebanon, May 24, 2000. (Reuters)
Israeli soldiers pull out of southern Lebanon, May 24, 2000. (Reuters)

A series of recently declassified British documents reveal details of meetings held by late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri with British officials in 1997 and 1999, as well as letters exchanged between then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Lebanese presidency.

In the first episode published by Asharq Al-Awsat on Sunday, Hariri informed Blair that Lebanon and Israel held 11 rounds of negotiations in Washington, but Tel Aviv had put forward several conditions, including “dismantling Hezbollah.”

The accounts, which were published by Asharq Al-Awsat in two episodes, quoted an official in the French presidency as saying that Paris was upset with then Lebanese President Emile Lahoud for reneging on previous promises to deploy the Lebanese army in the South after Israel’s withdrawal in May 2000.

The second episode focuses on London’s efforts to join negotiations between Beirut and Tel Aviv. The British documents, which were declassified in the National Archives, show that Blair’s government believed that it was possible to achieve progress in the peace process after Ehud Barak assumed the Israeli premiership, succeeding Benjamin Netanyahu.

They also recount that a special envoy of Blair met with Hafez al-Assad in this regard, and carried a message to Lahoud on the negotiations with Israel. However, the latter refused to receive him due to “stressful circumstances.”

The documents explain how Israel withdrew its forces from South Lebanon in 2000, as promised by Barak. However, Lahoud angered the French, who saw that he was reneging on his pledges to deploy the Lebanese army. This prompted Paris to freeze steps to increase the number of its troops in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

In June, the UN confirmed that Israel had indeed completed its unilateral withdrawal from the South on May 24, 2000, weeks before the scheduled date in July. The step led to the collapse of the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army. Many of its members and supporters fled to Israel for fear of reprisals by Hezbollah.

Lebanon later said that Israel did not complete its full withdrawal from the South, referring to its presence in the disputed Shebaa Farms.

In a letter addressed by Paris to the British Foreign Office, a copy of which was sent to Blair, detailed the French policy towards the developments in Lebanon.

South Lebanon: The French approach

The letter explained that no decision was taken over the French reinforcements to the UNIFIL. It said the UN Affairs office at the Quai d'Orsay noted that the French conditions were not met, accusing Lahoud of going back on his previous commitments to deploy the Lebanese army.

According to the letter, the director of UN Affairs said no decision had been reached in the government’s discussions regarding a possible increase in the French contribution to UNIFIL.

He continued that the prospects for Lebanon’s cooperation with the French demands were now seen as less encouraging than they were at the end of the previous week.

The letter underlined that contacts would continue between Beirut, Washington, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and other regional players.

Britain offers to mediate between Lebanon and Israel

The Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon came at a time when Britain was trying to mediate a negotiation track between Lebanon and Israel. However, these efforts did not bear fruit, in light of the hardening position of the Lebanese presidency, which accused the Israelis of carrying out “adventures” and violating “understandings” reached in 1996.

On March 10, 2000, Tim Barrow, the foreign minister’s private secretary, sent a letter to Philip Barton at 10 Downing Street, enclosing the text of a letter from Lahoud to Blair. Barrow said that Lahoud’s message “explains itself... There is no need to respond to it.”

The letter, dated February 16, 2000, stated: “I would like to thank you for your heartfelt message conveyed by your Special Envoy and friend Mr. (Michael) Levy. Unfortunately, due to stressful circumstances, I was unable to meet him.”

The president added: “The recent Israeli aggression clearly violated the April 1996 Understandings, the mechanism aimed at protecting against the unjustified killing of civilians and the destruction of countries’ infrastructure… As we work diligently to clear the rubble, in wake of a new and lamentable chapter in Israeli adventurism, allow me to share with you the hope for the imminent resumption of ‘peace talks’ that will eventually bring a comprehensive and just peace to the region.”

He added that while Lebanon has always paid a price for war in the Middle East, it remained hopeful and looked forward to reaping the benefits of peace, while reclaiming its unique role in the region.

“Your invaluable efforts, dear Prime Minister, for a just and lasting settlement of age-old disputes remain the cornerstone of your leadership,” he concluded.

Lahoud’s message to Blair came in response to a letter addressed by the UK Prime Minister through his personal envoy, dated February 1, 2000, over the resumption of the Lebanese-Israeli track.

Blair started his letter by thanking the Lebanese president and his government for “the kind reception you have extended to the bearer of this letter, Michael Levy”, whom he described as a trusted close friend.

He added that Levy was traveling directly from Damascus, where he was able to discuss the peace process in detail with President Hafez al-Assad.

He also expressed optimism over the imminent resumption of negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, as well as the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 425.

Blair underlined his confidence in Barak’s “sincerity and determination” to fulfill his commitment to withdraw from southern Lebanon by July.

Wishing Lahoud success in the upcoming negotiations, Blair stressed that he, along with Robin Cook (Foreign Secretary) and Levy, were ready to help wherever they could.

The UK Prime Minister’s offer to Lahoud to help in the course of negotiations with Israel did not come out of nowhere. Blair himself had told the Lebanese president in a letter a year earlier that Barak wanted to resume negotiations with Lebanon and Syria and sought to withdraw his forces from the South.

In a letter dated July 26, 1999, Blair told Lahoud that he had the opportunity to talk at length on July 21 with Ehud Barak on his way back to Israel from Washington.

He recounted that Barak voiced his commitment to ending the century-old Arab-Israeli conflict.

Blair said he was convinced of the premier’s sincerity in prioritizing the peace process as the primary task of his new government.

He also quoted Barak as saying that peace in the region would remain fragile until a final settlement was reached with Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians, adding that he was determined to move on all tracks and advance each one wherever peace was possible.

According to Blair, Barak confirmed his intention to withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon. He also acknowledged the complexities of the Lebanese problem while searching for a settlement with Syria.

The British premier told Lahoud that he expressed to Barak his political support for a just and secure peace. He stressed that the UK would not be lecturing the parties directly involved on how they should get there but would play whatever constructive and supportive role, “both bilaterally and with our EU partners, to help achieve this.”



What to Know about the Tensions between Iran and the US before Their Third Round of Talks

The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)
The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)
TT
20

What to Know about the Tensions between Iran and the US before Their Third Round of Talks

The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)
The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)

Iran and the United States will hold talks Saturday in Oman, their third round of negotiations over Tehran’s rapidly advancing nuclear program.

The talks follow a first round held in Muscat, Oman, where the two sides spoke face to face. They then met again in Rome last weekend before this scheduled meeting again in Muscat.

Trump has imposed new sanctions on Iran as part of his “maximum pressure” campaign targeting the country. He has repeatedly suggested military action against Iran remained a possibility, while emphasizing he still believed a new deal could be reached by writing a letter to Iran’s 85-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to jumpstart these talks.

Khamenei has warned Iran would respond to any attack with an attack of its own.

Here’s what to know about the letter, Iran’s nuclear program and the tensions that have stalked relations between Tehran and Washington since the 1979 revolution.

Why did Trump write the letter? Trump dispatched the letter to Khamenei on March 5, then gave a television interview the next day in which he acknowledged sending it. He said: “I’ve written them a letter saying, ‘I hope you’re going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it’s going to be a terrible thing.’”

Since returning to the White House, the president has been pushing for talks while ratcheting up sanctions and suggesting a military strike by Israel or the US could target Iranian nuclear sites.

A previous letter from Trump during his first term drew an angry retort from the supreme leader.

But Trump’s letters to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in his first term led to face-to-face meetings, though no deals to limit Pyongyang’s atomic bombs and a missile program capable of reaching the continental US.

How did the first round go? Oman, a sultanate on the eastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, hosted the first round of talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff. The two men met face to face after indirect talks and immediately agreed to this second round in Rome.

Witkoff later made a television appearance in which he suggested 3.67% enrichment for Iran could be something the countries could agree on. But that’s exactly the terms set by the 2015 nuclear deal struck under US President Barack Obama, from which Trump unilaterally withdrew America.

Witkoff hours later issued a statement underlining something: “A deal with Iran will only be completed if it is a Trump deal.” Araghchi and Iranian officials have latched onto Witkoff’s comments in recent days as a sign that America was sending it mixed signals about the negotiations.

Yet the Rome talks ended up with the two sides agreeing to starting expert-level talks this Saturday. Analysts described that as a positive sign, though much likely remains to be agreed before reaching a tentative deal.

Why does Iran’s nuclear program worry the West? Iran has insisted for decades that its nuclear program is peaceful. However, its officials increasingly threaten to pursue a nuclear weapon. Iran now enriches uranium to near weapons-grade levels of 60%, the only country in the world without a nuclear weapons program to do so.

Under the original 2015 nuclear deal, Iran was allowed to enrich uranium up to 3.67% purity and to maintain a uranium stockpile of 300 kilograms (661 pounds). The last report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran’s program put its stockpile at 8,294.4 kilograms (18,286 pounds) as it enriches a fraction of it to 60% purity.

US intelligence agencies assess that Iran has yet to begin a weapons program, but has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.”

Ali Larijani, an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, has warned in a televised interview that his country has the capability to build nuclear weapons, but it is not pursuing it and has no problem with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspections. However, he said if the US or Israel were to attack Iran over the issue, the country would have no choice but to move toward nuclear weapon development.

“If you make a mistake regarding Iran’s nuclear issue, you will force Iran to take that path, because it must defend itself,” he said.

Why are relations so bad between Iran and the US? Iran was once one of the US’s top allies in the Middle East under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who purchased American military weapons and allowed CIA technicians to run secret listening posts monitoring the neighboring Soviet Union. The CIA had fomented a 1953 coup that cemented the shah’s rule.

But in January 1979, the shah, fatally ill with cancer, fled Iran as mass demonstrations swelled against his rule. The revolution followed, led by Khomeini, and created Iran’s theocratic government.

Later that year, university students overran the US Embassy in Tehran, seeking the shah’s extradition and sparking the 444-day hostage crisis that saw diplomatic relations between Iran and the US severed. The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s saw the US back Saddam Hussein. The “Tanker War” during that conflict saw the US launch a one-day assault that crippled Iran at sea, while the US later shot down an Iranian commercial airliner that the American military said it mistook for a warplane.

Iran and the US have see-sawed between enmity and grudging diplomacy in the years since, with relations peaking when Tehran made the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. But Trump unilaterally withdrew America from the accord in 2018, sparking tensions in the Middle East that persist today.