Leila Khaled: The Soviets Supplied us with Parts to Develop Advanced Bombs

Plane hijacker recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat her storied operations in the 1970s

One of three planes that were hijacked and forced to land outside the Jordanian capital, Amman, and that was later blown up by Palestinian militias in September 1970. (Getty Images)
One of three planes that were hijacked and forced to land outside the Jordanian capital, Amman, and that was later blown up by Palestinian militias in September 1970. (Getty Images)
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Leila Khaled: The Soviets Supplied us with Parts to Develop Advanced Bombs

One of three planes that were hijacked and forced to land outside the Jordanian capital, Amman, and that was later blown up by Palestinian militias in September 1970. (Getty Images)
One of three planes that were hijacked and forced to land outside the Jordanian capital, Amman, and that was later blown up by Palestinian militias in September 1970. (Getty Images)

Final episode

Leila Khaled is approaching 80. She has spent her life chasing a dream that has not been achieved. She has not abandoned it and feels no regret or remorse. She joined the Arab Nationalist Movement while she was still in high school and later joined the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

She rose up the ranks to become a member of its leading body. Danger would become her daily companion when she joined the PFLP’s External Operations headed by Wadie Haddad.

Throughout the years, I had always wondered whether there was any connection between the External Operations and the intelligence empire of the Soviets’ KGB that was long headed by Yuri Andropov before he became master of the Kremlin.

Khaled had the answer. She said: “Wadie opened the channel of communication with the Soviets through a military attaché in Beirut. At one point, we were building bombs that could breach the entrance of airport gates, no matter how high advanced they were.”

“We tested some of them, leaving the British with quite a surprise,” she recalled in an interview to Asharq Al-Awsat in Amman. “One day we realized that we needed a specific spring to develop the bomb. We didn’t trust any embassy and we used to resolve our problems through Wadie’s doctor friends at the American University of Beirut hospital. This time, they couldn’t find a solution to our problem.”

“It was difficult for us to approach the Soviet embassy or arrange a meeting elsewhere. Western security agencies were tracking us. The best way to meet the Soviet military attaché was at the seaside promenade where we could appear as casual pedestrians.”

“We explained our case to the official, who relayed our request to his command. Afterwards, we headed to Moscow and received what we had asked for. I did not take part in the meetings, but did go with Wadie to Moscow,” Khaled said.

I asked her about a meeting that had allegedly taken place between Haddad and Andropov in a forest outside of Moscow. She replied that she had not taken part in that meeting.


PLO member Leila Khaled and a group of Palestinian women attend the 16th Palestinian National Council meeting in Algiers. (Getty)

Forest meeting

The forest meeting did indeed happen. Haddad was hosted at a palace in the middle of a forest. He held a series of meetings with Soviet officials that tackled military, political and technical issues. The talks were capped with a meeting with KGB leader Andropov.

The topic at hand was not easy. At the time it was called “terrorism”. The discussions quickly revealed evident differences over the two-state solution. Haddad stressed that “our country is one and indivisible. We have never thought about the rise of two states. If the whole of Palestine, including Jerusalem, but excluding Haifa, were to be offered to us, we would turn it down.”

He was then asked if he had any specific demands. Haddad replied: “I had made a list before my arrival. I am not greedy, but in need. We need the list to be met in full or not at all.” He handed over his list and indeed, the Soviets fulfilled all of his demands. Some weapons, machineguns, rifles, ammunition, timers, and certain devices.

Khaled recalled: “After some time, we were contacted in Aden. Some six kilometers off the shore, we received all the weapons that Wadie had asked for. There would be no follow up to the meeting in the forest. The relations would remain as they were. Later, at Wadie’s funeral, a Soviet diplomat asked us who would be his successor and we told him that now was not the time for such discussions. Actual relations were never established after that.”


 Leila Khaled smiles after returning to Jordan following the hijacking of after American T.W.A. jetliner in Damascus (Getty)

Plane hijacker

I was a student in the southern Lebanese city of Sidon when news broke out that a young Palestinian woman, who called herself Shadia Abou Ghazaleh, had hijacked an Israeli plane and flown it over Haifa before landing in Damascus airport. Abou Ghazaleh was the name of the PFLP’s first female operative to be killed.

The news of the hijacking was exceptionally exciting. It was uncommon in the Middle East and even the world for a woman to hijack a plane. Her family had been displaced to Lebanon in 1948. She graduated from a school in Sidon before joining the PFLP and later the External Operations.

I had never imagined back then that decades later, I would one day be in an apartment in Amman to listen to Khaled recount to Asharq Al-Awsat what happened at that time.

Haddad was studying medicine at the American University of Beirut. His colleague, George Habash, dreamed of returning to Palestine. He was horrified at the thought of a world that would get used to seeing Palestinians living under occupation or displaced in camps in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. He was aware of Israel’s power and strength of its ties with the West. He feared that Palestine would be forgotten by the world.

He thought of different ways to again draw the world’s attention to the plight of the Palestinian people. And so, the idea of hijacking planes was born. It would serve as a reminder to the world and to prompt the release of prisoners held in Israeli jails.

Khaled stressed that Haddad was aware of how sensitive this issue was to international public opinion. That is why he stressed that the hijackers should never harm passengers or fire back at any shooter.

Two incidents would precede Khaled’s first hijacking. The first was the hijacking of the Algeria-bound Israeli El Al flight by Youssef Rajab and Abou Hassan Ghosh. “Since negotiations only took place between nations, their operation ended in pledges,” recalled Khaled. The second was an attack on an Israeli plane before takeoff from Zurich airport. The operation was carried out by four people, including Amina Dahbour. The attackers turned themselves over the police, but one guard on the plane managed to exit the aircraft and shoot dead one of the perpetrators, Abdul Mohsen Hassan.

Plane hijacking and the ‘hefty catch’

It was the summer of 1969. Khaled was happy and excited. She was chosen to carry out a shocking and unprecedented operation – evidence of the faith she enjoyed from the leadership that recognized her loyalty and abilities. She received training at the hands of PFLP member Salim Issawi in Jordan. He would also be her partner during the hijacking.

Haddad briefed them on the plan: Hijack a TWA flight flying from Los Angeles to Tel Aviv. The purpose was to exchange Palestinian prisoners with the Israeli passengers. Reportedly, a major Israeli figure was supposed to be on board the flight, which would have forced Israel to agree to negotiate. Khaled tried to find out who that important person was from Haddad, but he said that it was a “need to know” situation. She would later find out that it was General Yitzhak Rabin, who would later become prime minister. He would ultimately change his itinerary and deprive the hijackers of a “hefty catch”.

Khaled would undergo intense training for four months. She would learn about how planes work and about maps and coordinates and what to do if the aircraft encountered turbulence. The American flight had two stops in Europe, Rome and Athens, before arriving in Tel Aviv. Khaled and Issawi departed Beirut to Rome and booked a flight to Athens.

August 29, 1969, was the day it happened. Khaled sat in first class with Issawi. The plan would go into action a half hour into the flight when the plane was at 35,000 feet. They took out their weapons and asked the first class passengers to head to the tourist class. Issawi and Khaled then stormed the cockpit.

She told the pilot: “I am Captain Shadia Abou Ghazaleh of the Che Guevara unit in the PFLP.” She informed him that she would take command. She took his headset and microphone. He noticed that she had taken off the pin of a hand grenade she was carrying and asked that she rest her hand so that the explosive would not go off.

“I explained to the pilot and the copilot that we were not here to kill or blow up anyone. We only want our rightful demands,” she added. “I asked that the plane’s code be changed to Popular Front Liberated Arab Palestine. I told them that we will not respond to any call that does not use that code. I asked the pilot to head directly to Tel Aviv without stopping in Athens.”

She added: “We didn’t want to land in Tel Aviv. We only wanted to fly over the Palestinian territories to remind the world of our cause.” She told the pilot that they wanted to fly to Syria. “I heard an exchange between the Damascus and Beirut watch towers. The Syrians asked: ‘Where is this plane going?’ The Lebanese replied: ‘Not to us. It’s headed to you.’”

Damascus airport was still new and not operating at full capacity. This was the first American flight to land there. Haddad had not informed the Syrian authorities of his plan ahead of time because he did not trust them.

“The plane landed in Damascus according to plan. We turned ourselves over to the authorities and explained to them why we did what we did,” said Khaled.

The passengers, some 122 of them, ran towards the airport building. Only a small group ran towards the fence. “I told the police that they may be Israelis and indeed, they were,” recalled Khaled.

“A Syrian officer asked us: ‘Why did you come to us?’ Shocked, I replied: ‘I came to Syria, not to Israel.’ He was angered by this, but the operation had still gone according to plan,” she said. The ensuing negotiations led to the release of 23 Palestinian and Arab prisoners and two Syrian pilots, who were detained during the 1867 war.


Leila Khaled is seen holding up a map of Palestine after addressing the crowd at the DOCC Hall in Orlando East, Soweto, South Africa in 2015 (Getty)

‘Salem’, ‘Mariam’ and ‘Mujahed’

The popularity of the PFLP and Haddad would skyrocket after the first hijackings. Anti-West groups and individuals seeking an opportunity to tangle with their perceived enemy soon poured into the Middle East. The PFLP’s External Operations would later become tied to a group of people from diverse nationalities. Jordan was their preferred destination because the Palestinian factions had set up base there while the Jordanian army did little to stop them because it wanted to avert a clash that would eventually happen later.

The relations between these groups would start off with reaching common political ground. Once firmly established, they would begin to cooperate according to a specific agenda. They would exchange information, documents and weapons. They would also provide facilitations and trainings and sometimes take part in direct operations.

The West named the network that was established by Haddad the “empire of terrorism” because of the many foreigners who were involved. The External Operations would become a hub and training and planning ground that would produce figures that shocked the world with their violence: Venezuela’s “Salem”, who was none other than the infamous Carlos, “Mariam”, who was Fusako Shigenobu, head of the Japanese Red Army, and “Mujahid”, who was Hagop Hagopian, head of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.

After his death, Haddad’s “students” would eventually be tracked down. Some would be shot dead and others would land in jail. Perhaps their downfall could be blamed on their poor organization and lack of uniting leadership. Perhaps they committed the error of forming ties with countries and agencies. Of course, infamy could be lethal in a world that must be shrouded in secrecy.

In 1970, Jordan was at boiling point. Coexistence between the army and Palestinian factions had grown fragile and strained. Coexistence between two authorities in the same country is unwieldly at best. Ceasefires acted more as sedatives in the buildup to zero hour when one party had to give.

In July 1970, the Israeli Mossad tried to assassinate Haddad in Beirut. They attacked his bedroom, but he was in another room where he was deep in conversation with Khaled. Both came out alive. These discussions would move to the American University of Beirut hospital where Haddad’s wife was treating their son, Hani.

At the hospital, Khaled would study a book on flight movements all over the world. She searched for El Al and noted the pattern of flights to and from Tel Aviv. She said she proposed to Haddad carrying out a new hijacking in retaliation to the attempt on his life. He agreed and asked her to follow up on it and bring in female comrades to train.

The day of plane hijackings

Haddad would send Khaled to a dinner with people she did not know. One of the guests told her he had just returned from a hunting trip in Jordan where he came across a facility, similar to an airport, that the British had used for their trainings. She eagerly listened and asked more about the location to determine if it was suitable for her plan.

Khaled said she vividly remembers that night. “I was eager for the dinner to be over so I could go back to Haddad and tell him all about what I had learned. It was decided that I would go scout the location. I was accompanied by a comrade from the Arab Nationalist Movement. At the facility, I ran around to test the firmness of the ground. My comrade asked me why I was so interested and I replied that I was looking for an appropriate training ground.”

The plan called for hijacking three planes at once and flying them to what was called the “revolutionary airport” - the Jordanian site. “Negotiations would then be held over the liberation of prisoners held in enemy and European jails,” Khaled said.

September 6, 1970, would become known as the day of plane hijackings in the world. All eyes turned to the “revolutionary airport”. The attempt to hijack an El Al flight was thwarted while it was in the air. Two planes, one Swiss and one American, were blown up at the airport. Another American plane was blown up at Cairo airport.

Luck was not on Khaled’s side this time. Four of her accomplices were supposed to board the El Al flight in Amsterdam, but two failed to secure a reservation. She boarded the plane with her accomplice, Patrick Argüello. The hijacking failed and the plane landed in London. Argüello was killed by a marshal that was on the plane and Khaled threw a hand grenade that did not explode. She was arrested in Britain. After an investigation and weeks of detention, authorities were forced to release her as part of an exchange.

Mossad under the bed

I asked her if the Mossad had ever managed to reach her. She replied: “Yes, in Beirut. They planted an explosive under my bed. Security measures at the time demanded that we change our apartments constantly. I was training women in the South and the Bekaa. I would return exhausted to my temporary furnished apartment in the capital. I would immediately collapse in bed and get as much rest as possible because Wadie would often send for me and he believed that we had no right to feel tired.”

That day, Khaled returned to her apartment in Beirut’s Caracas neighborhood and by chance, she noticed a black box under her bed. “I wasn’t sure if that box was mine. I had my doubts. I immediately went to the PFLP office. A explosives expert head to the apartment and discovered that the box held ten kilograms of explosives.”



From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
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From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)

Libya depends on oil for nearly 98% of its income. Yet a central question persists: How are those revenues collected and spent in a country divided between rival governments? And why do Libyans complain of poverty when their country holds Africa’s largest oil reserves and produces and exports about 1.4 million barrels a day?

The process starts with the National Oil Corporation, which collects proceeds from crude oil and gas sales in US dollars and deposits them in accounts at the Libyan Foreign Bank. The money is then transferred to the Central Bank of Libya's accounts in Tripoli, recorded as state budget sovereign revenue, and converted into Libyan dinars.

The dollar trades at 6.36 dinars at the official rate, compared with 9.12 on the parallel market.

The Finance Ministry in Tripoli then issues spending authorizations under approved financial arrangements, after which the central bank releases funds to ministries and other state bodies through the main budget chapters.

Libya’s oil export revenues have swung sharply in recent years, ranging between $18 billion and $22 billion. They rose to about $18 billion in the first half of this year, nearly double the level in the same period last year, according to the Economy Ministry in the interim Government of National Unity.

Libyan oil expert Mohamed al-Shahati attributed the increase during that period to the war involving Iran.

Where is the breakdown?

Economists say Libya’s dependence on oil as its near-exclusive source of income lies at the heart of the crisis.

Ayoub al-Farsi, an economics professor at the University of Benghazi, said Libya showed how excessive reliance on natural resources could turn into a complex financial crisis when combined with political fragmentation and a lack of economic diversification.

“The Libyan economy is a clear example of how excessive dependence on natural resources can become a complex financial crisis,” he said, adding that political fragmentation and the absence of diversification had created conditions that directly affected people’s lives.

Al-Farsi, a member of the Central Bank of Libya’s Monetary Policy Committee, said the economy was built around a rentier-state model that depended almost entirely on oil exports to fund the treasury and provide foreign currency.

That dependence, he told Asharq Al-Awsat, had created deep structural distortions.

Agriculture and industry had been marginalized, the state bureaucracy had expanded to absorb workers into unproductive public-sector jobs, and the country had grown heavily dependent on imports for most consumer goods, he said.

Industrial activity remains limited, largely confined to the private sector and small-scale production. Critics also point to a market dominated by a small number of traders and importers, helping imported goods crowd out local production.

At protests across Libyan cities, the question is often the same: Where is the oil money going? Why are people struggling in an energy-producing country?

Al-Shahati said part of the answer lies in the difference between the value of the oil Libya produces and the amount that actually reaches the state treasury.

“Not every barrel produced in Libya is converted directly into a dollar entering the public treasury, because foreign partners have a share,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Foreign companies have become production partners under various contractual arrangements, he said.

He also pointed to a stark contradiction: Libya produces oil, yet depends heavily on imports of gasoline, diesel, and other petroleum products to meet domestic demand.

That means a growing share of the country’s resources is converted into foreign currency to pay for fuel imports.

Al-Shahati said another problem was the lack of a regularly published, unified, and easy-to-read account that answers basic questions, such as: What was the total value of the oil produced? How much went to foreign partners? How much was exported for the state? How much went to the domestic market? And how much net revenue was actually available for public spending?

“The figures in circulation provide parts of the picture,” he said, “but they do not always show the full flow of revenues from the wellhead to the state’s public accounts.”

Libya’s oil fields are concentrated mainly in the eastern Sirte Basin, which holds about 82% of its oil reserves, as well as in the Murzuq Basin in the southwest and offshore areas along the coast.

Fuel and power crises

Those weaknesses in the oil revenue chain are unfolding as Libya grapples with a severe electricity crisis.

The country has suffered several “blackouts” in recent days, with some areas going without electricity for more than 17 hours a day.

Researcher Ezzedine Mokhtar sees the power cuts as one part of a wider pattern of recurring financial failures, including fuel shortages.

He blamed the hardship facing many Libyans on “corruption” and “unlimited spending” by two rival governments competing for power in the country’s east and west.

He also cited “oil smuggling through Arkenu, whose revenues go to specific individuals rather than the state treasury.”

Mokhtar said Libya’s subsidy system was another core problem, with more than 60% of the country’s budget going to fuel subsidies.

He called on the Tripoli government to phase out those subsidies gradually and to draw up a national plan to develop the workforce.

“We have no industrial skills in anything,” he said. “We import everything — yogurt, dairy products, fruit, vegetables, frozen fish, and even underwear. Everything comes from abroad.”

Libya ranks 10th globally in proven oil reserves, with about 48.3 billion barrels, according to Worldometer.

The UN Panel of Experts said in its latest report on Libya, covering October 2024 to February 2026, that Arkenu had moved at least $3 billion in oil revenues to bank accounts outside Libya between January 2024 and November 2025.

According to the report, Arkenu was established in 2023 as a private company and is indirectly controlled by Saddam Haftar, deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army. It faces accusations of “oil smuggling.”

Reuters previously investigated the company and concluded, based on shipping documents, London Stock Exchange Group data, and information from Kpler, that some oil revenues were being diverted away from the Central Bank of Libya.

How are revenues distributed?

Oil revenues are distributed across the four main chapters of the state budget, according to experts and economists.

Chapter One, salaries and wages, takes the largest share. It covers public-sector employees across eastern, western, and southern Libya through the unified national identification number system.

Chapter Two covers operating expenses for ministries and public institutions.

Chapter Three covers subsidies, including fuel, water, and electricity.

Chapter Four covers development and projects, including infrastructure, as well as allocations to the National Oil Corporation to sustain and increase production.

Al-Shahati said 26% of oil revenues went toward importing fuel products, equivalent to about $7 billion if crude traded at $70 a barrel.

This year, he said, the figure could rise to between $8 billion and $9 billion because oil prices had climbed above $85 a barrel and the gap between crude prices and diesel and gasoline prices had widened amid shortages.

He also pointed to higher domestic consumption driven by economic growth and a rise in smuggling.

A second problem, al-Shahati said, is the absence of an approved national budget, which would make it possible to determine how spending should be allocated among population groups and regions.

“What is clear is that the main cities control most spending,” he said.

He also pointed to “a large and obvious imbalance” in salaries across Libya’s three regions, job grades, and types of employment.

Those gaps, he said, risk widening financial divisions between social groups.

Even an agreement to unify development spending did not appear to be properly implemented because there were no clear standards and no comprehensive budget.

“There are no criteria for distributing oil revenues,” al-Shahati said. “The distribution process is random and unsustainable.”

Libya fell to 177th out of 182 countries in the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, from 173rd out of 180 countries in 2024, reflecting worsening corruption and no tangible improvement over the past two years.

Pressure on the local economy

A report by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Libya highlighted deep structural strains in the economy, driven by high public spending, near-total dependence on oil and gas revenues, and mounting pressure from food, fuel, and electricity prices.

The report, submitted to the UN Security Council on Aug. 17, covers the period from April 1 to July 28.

Citing the International Monetary Fund, it said Libya’s fiscal deficit reached 30% of gross domestic product last year, while public debt climbed to 146% of GDP.

Inflation also rose into double digits, eroding purchasing power.

The UN report noted unjustified increases in fuel consumption by military and security agencies and the energy sector, as well as repeated double purchasing.

The cost of institutional division

Libya’s political and institutional split and the presence of multiple authorities have made the economic crisis worse, al-Farsi said.

The distortions, he said, were no longer merely structural.

They had created parallel public finances and pushed consumer spending higher to meet the demands of rival authorities, sending salaries and subsidies to unprecedented levels.

Repeated shutdowns of oil fields in previous years, combined with lower actual revenues, pushed financial authorities toward deficit financing and higher public debt, al-Farsi said.

That flooded the market with money without a corresponding rise in domestic production.

Oil revenues reached $21.9 billion in 2025, according to the National Oil Corporation, up from $18.6 billion in 2024, an increase of 15%.

Al-Farsi said the deterioration in public finances had left monetary authorities in a difficult position and forced them into emergency measures to protect reserves and contain the deficit.

The result, he said, was a weaker national currency, liquidity shortages and a collapse in confidence.

Development tools had also been paralyzed.

“Monetary policy shifted from an instrument for stimulating growth and investment into a tool for managing daily crises,” he said.

Why has the crisis not been solved?

Economists point to several reasons.

Al-Shahati put “corruption spreading on an unprecedented scale” near the top of the list.

“Corruption is no longer confined to the margins,” he said. “It has come to dominate the core of public finances in key sectors, obstructing any attempt at reform.”

He also blamed the absence of an institutional vision following the breakdown of middle management, which had once linked fiscal and monetary policy to economic realities and provided unified political backing.

Policies, he said, had become detached from the economy and lost their ability to restore balance.

Conventional reforms that had worked elsewhere would not work in Libya, al-Shahati said, because the country lacked a central political authority capable of building an institutional vision and curbing corruption that had spread through both the state and private sector.

Al-Farsi said Libya could not escape its fiscal and monetary crisis without addressing the roots of the problem.

That meant unifying the management of public finances, curbing government spending, and launching genuine structural reforms that would gradually shift Libya from consuming oil rents to building a diversified economy.

Mokhtar also called on the Tripoli government to develop a strategic plan to make better use of human resources and support small and medium-sized industries.

For him, breaking Libya’s dependence on oil revenues is part of the way out.

Masoud Suleiman, chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation, said in media remarks last week that the country needed between $30 billion and $40 billion in investment to develop untapped oil and gas resources.

The corporation, he said, aims to raise production to 2 million barrels a day by 2030.


Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
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Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)

With a long shoreline on the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's southern trade hub of Bandar Abbas has found itself at the frontlines of the war with the United States, with residents struggling to revive livelihoods battered by months of fighting.

Like elsewhere in Iran, economic strain has squeezed households since US-Israeli strikes triggered the Middle East war on February 28. But unlike much of the country, the port city of around half a million people has remained exposed to fighting even after an April 8 ceasefire brought relief elsewhere.

But despite a lull in hostilities in July, residents still feel squeezed. Saeed Tajik, 42, used to work at a shipyard before losing his job and turning to driving a taxi.

"The prices of housing and food have become extremely high. Almost all the basics -- rice, yoghurt, and oil -- have doubled," said Tajik.

Fuel shortages have long been common in southern Iran, where authorities restrict supplies in an effort to curb widespread fuel smuggling.

But now, "the queues have become longer ... it happens that we wait in the long line for fuel only to get told 'there is none' upon arriving," Tajik said as he drove past a station where motorists waited under the punishing summer heat.

Hormuz has emerged as a central flashpoint after an April ceasefire and June framework deal failed to resolve disagreements between Washington and Tehran over the future management of the strait.

During the war, US strikes hit bridges, highways and railway infrastructure around Bandar Abbas until mid-July, in what analysts saw as attempts to cut off the city and disrupt Iranian military logistics in the south.

- 'Nothing left' -

Inside the city, under a towering concrete statue of two armed men with their arms trained towards Hormuz waters, economic strains play out in long queues snaking outside petrol stations and soaring prices squeezing shoppers in local markets.

The city's repeatedly hit airport remained largely closed until August 15, leaving travelers facing arduous road journeys, sometimes combined with flights and boat crossings.

Outside the city, construction crews still toil under the sweltering summer sun to repair the Gachin bridge, split by a US strike, as cars rumble along a dusty detour below.

Along the waterfront, traditional wooden vessels known as lenjes sit moored alongside fishing and commercial boats, part of a centuries-old trading network linking southern Iran with Arab states across the Gulf.

Arash Tondro, 45, used his lenj to carry Iranian fresh and dried fruit to the United Arab Emirates and return with household goods and other imports.

"My income dropped to zero at the beginning of the war," said Tondro, who later rerouted some trade through Oman's Khasab port as regional seaways were disrupted and "many of the lenjes were hit by drones".

After the UAE suspended trade with Iran on Tuesday following a missile attack on a ship that Tehran denied carrying out, Tondro said he was again unsure how his work would be impacted.

"People in the south mostly rely on trade or fishing. If you take the sea and trade away from them, there is practically nothing left. We don't have agriculture here; whatever there is comes from the sea," he said.

- 'No sales' -

As night falls and August's oppressive heat begins to ease, fish vendors set up along a busy street, laying out shark, tuna and shrimp as the smell of the day's catch hangs in the humid air.

Among them is 22-year-old Anoush Mallah, who recently moved onto the street after soaring rents forced him to close his shop in one of the city's bazaars.

"Business has been terrible since the war started. There are no sales, it's very weak," he told AFP.

"People are short of money. The fishermen aren't going fishing either."

Many fishermen around Bandar Abbas only began returning to sea in recent weeks, after months ashore for fear of being caught in the crossfire of US-Iran fighting.

Diplomatic efforts have so far failed to end the war. For Mallah, the uncertainty only adds to the strain.

"Let it (the war) start and get some result; right now, we're just left in limbo," he said.


The Ethiopian Dam Dispute and Egypt’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
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The Ethiopian Dam Dispute and Egypt’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry

Over the past two weeks, Egypt has repeatedly stressed its right to prevent any actions by Addis Ababa on the Nile River that could harm its water interests, stressing that it possesses the “right to self-defense” over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

According to experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, Egypt’s signaling means that it “will not hesitate to use all legitimate means to safeguard its water security.”

They explained that the message is a stern warning to Ethiopia and suggests that Cairo is seeking to shift from a policy of protesting Ethiopian measures to preventive deterrence, aimed at stopping the establishment of a new status quo on the Nile.

New Egyptian Warning

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said that “Egypt will not allow the construction of additional dams ... that affect its water interests,” stressing Cairo’s commitment to a legally binding agreement that guarantees its water rights.

In a television interview on Wednesday evening, Abdelatty said that Egypt does not oppose African countries’ right to development, noting Cairo’s participation in dam and infrastructure projects in several Nile Basin states. However, he stressed the need to balance the right to development with the rights of downstream countries.

He also underscored Egypt’s commitment to protecting its water interests. “We have the right to self-defense to protect our interests and water security,” said the minister. “We will not accept any agreement regarding the Nile River unless it is legally binding,” he reiterated.

Mohamed Hegazy, a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs and a former assistant foreign minister, says the right of self-defense is protected under international law after all peaceful means have been exhausted.

According to Hegazy, the core message is that Cairo still prefers agreement and negotiation, but it no longer accepts using negotiations to impose a fait accompli.

He argued that the most significant aspect of Abdelatty’s statements is that they send three simultaneous messages - Rejection of unilateral measures, rejection of additional dams, and insistence on the right of self-defense to protect water security.

Hussein El-Behairy, an African affairs expert at the National Center for Middle East Studies, said the minister’s recent statements reaffirm Egypt’s right to defend its historical and water rights in the Nile by whatever means the Egyptian state deems appropriate to preserve what Egyptians view as a matter of life and death.

Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Reuters

Escalating Egyptian Position

This is the third time Egypt has signaled the possibility of using its “right to self-defense” and preventing dam construction on the Nile.

On August 16, Egypt’s state news agency quoted an unnamed Egyptian official as saying that Cairo “will neither accept nor allow any party to control the flow of Nile waters to downstream countries,” stressing that the Egyptian state possesses multiple tools capable of protecting its people’s interests in the Nile.

The statement came in response to remarks attributed to Ethiopian Minister of Water and Energy Habtamu Itefa concerning the construction of additional dams on the Nile and control over water flows to downstream states, namely Egypt and Sudan.

Earlier, on August 4, Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hani Sewilam stated during a press conference that Egypt “will not allow the construction of new Ethiopian dams on the Nile River.”

He said: “It is well known that Ethiopia has plans to build additional dams, but will the Egyptian state allow this? No.”

According to Hegazy, the ball is now in Ethiopia’s court. If Addis Ababa agrees to resume serious negotiations leading to a legally binding agreement on GERD, the crisis can be contained.

However, if Ethiopia continues to create new realities on the Nile, the scope for a diplomatic solution will narrow, making risk management and deterrence a more prominent part of Egypt’s strategy.

El-Behairy does not expect the escalation to pave the way for new negotiations on GERD unless the Ethiopian government is willing to make concessions in response to Cairo’s demands. These demands include reaching a legally binding agreement that guarantees Egypt’s water rights during periods of drought and severe drought, and providing Egypt with information regarding the operation of the dam in a manner that does not harm its water interests.