Sudan's Burhan, Hemedti… a Violent End to an Old Friendship

Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohammad "Hemedti" Dagalo and army commander Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. (AFP)
Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohammad "Hemedti" Dagalo and army commander Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. (AFP)
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Sudan's Burhan, Hemedti… a Violent End to an Old Friendship

Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohammad "Hemedti" Dagalo and army commander Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. (AFP)
Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohammad "Hemedti" Dagalo and army commander Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. (AFP)

The armed conflict that erupted on Saturday between the Sudanese army, led by Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) headed by Lt. Gen. Mohammad "Hemedti" Dagalo, ended an old friendship and cooperation between the two men, which had started with the beginning of the conflict in the Darfur region in 2003 during the rule of ousted President Omar al-Bashir.

At that time, Hemedti formed a small army to confront armed movements in the region that were resisting the Bashir regime. Thus, he gained the president’s support. Burhan, for his part, was coordinating the army’s operations in Darfur, and started to work closely with Hemedti.

The size of Hemedti’s forces grew over time and became affiliated with the army, while maintaining a kind of independence in their leadership and operations.

This relationship strengthened in April 2019, under the pressure of the massive popular revolution that demanded the fall of Bashir’s regime. The two men agreed to overthrow the president, who was supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, and to form a military council to rule the country.

The third stage in their relationship began shortly after the coup that they orchestrated against the civilian government in October 2021, when Burhan assigned figures of the Bashir regime to key positions. Hemedti objected to the move, sparking resentment among the Islamists, who always considered him a “traitor” because he “stabbed Bashir in the back.”

The disagreement in political positions gradually developed between them, sometimes emerging in the media through indirect statements or sharp accusations.

However, the failure to form a government and the deterioration of the economic and security situation in the country, prompted the various military and civilian parties to sign a framework agreement in December 2022, which was widely accepted by civilians and important and influential parties from the international and regional communities.

Although Burhan and Hemedti signed the agreement, which provides for the transfer of power to civilians and the return of the military to their barracks, a new and stronger conflict emerged between the army and the RSF over the implementation of one of the provisions related to military reform and the integration of the Rapid Support Forces into the army.

A war of words escalated between the two sides, with the deputy head of the Rapid Support Forces, Abdel-Rahim Dagalo (Hemedti’s brother), directly addressing the army commanders who control power in the country and saying: “Our message to our brothers in the ruling authority is to hand over power to the people without further stalling.”

He added: "From now on, we will not allow the killing of young demonstrators or the arrest of politicians. We have been silent for a long time, and we don’t want to become a reason for what is happening, but we will not abandon or go back on the basic principles that unite the Sudanese people."

In response, Burhan reiterated that the integration of the RSF into the army was a necessary condition for implementing the framework agreement.

The dispute over the agreement escalated and turned into an exchange of accusations, culminating in the withdrawal of the Sudanese army and military forces from a security and military reform workshop.

Hemedti considered that the army was attempting to disrupt the implementation of the agreement and to prevent the formation of a civilian government, in order to stay in power.

The crisis reached its climax at the airport in the northern city of Merowe, near the air base of the Sudanese army, when the RSF deployed a large number of vehicles and soldiers near the base, claiming to defend their troops against any potential aircraft strikes.

Sources had told Asharq Al-Awsat that a meeting that included Burhan, Hemedti, the international forces supporting the civil transition, and the signatories to the framework agreement, decided to defuse the crisis by providing assurances to the RSF, and removing the aircraft from the air base. But the army did not abide by the agreement, prompting Hemedti to order his forces coming from the west to continue the march to both Merowe and Khartoum and deploy there.

The situation remained severely tense throughout the past week. Mediation led by multiple parties ended with an announcement that a meeting between the two men would take place over the weekend. But instead, the fighting erupted, confirming the Sudanese people’s fear of an imminent outbreak of violence.



What to Know about the Tensions between Iran and the US before Their Third Round of Talks

The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)
The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)
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What to Know about the Tensions between Iran and the US before Their Third Round of Talks

The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)
The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)

Iran and the United States will hold talks Saturday in Oman, their third round of negotiations over Tehran’s rapidly advancing nuclear program.

The talks follow a first round held in Muscat, Oman, where the two sides spoke face to face. They then met again in Rome last weekend before this scheduled meeting again in Muscat.

Trump has imposed new sanctions on Iran as part of his “maximum pressure” campaign targeting the country. He has repeatedly suggested military action against Iran remained a possibility, while emphasizing he still believed a new deal could be reached by writing a letter to Iran’s 85-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to jumpstart these talks.

Khamenei has warned Iran would respond to any attack with an attack of its own.

Here’s what to know about the letter, Iran’s nuclear program and the tensions that have stalked relations between Tehran and Washington since the 1979 revolution.

Why did Trump write the letter? Trump dispatched the letter to Khamenei on March 5, then gave a television interview the next day in which he acknowledged sending it. He said: “I’ve written them a letter saying, ‘I hope you’re going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it’s going to be a terrible thing.’”

Since returning to the White House, the president has been pushing for talks while ratcheting up sanctions and suggesting a military strike by Israel or the US could target Iranian nuclear sites.

A previous letter from Trump during his first term drew an angry retort from the supreme leader.

But Trump’s letters to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in his first term led to face-to-face meetings, though no deals to limit Pyongyang’s atomic bombs and a missile program capable of reaching the continental US.

How did the first round go? Oman, a sultanate on the eastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, hosted the first round of talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff. The two men met face to face after indirect talks and immediately agreed to this second round in Rome.

Witkoff later made a television appearance in which he suggested 3.67% enrichment for Iran could be something the countries could agree on. But that’s exactly the terms set by the 2015 nuclear deal struck under US President Barack Obama, from which Trump unilaterally withdrew America.

Witkoff hours later issued a statement underlining something: “A deal with Iran will only be completed if it is a Trump deal.” Araghchi and Iranian officials have latched onto Witkoff’s comments in recent days as a sign that America was sending it mixed signals about the negotiations.

Yet the Rome talks ended up with the two sides agreeing to starting expert-level talks this Saturday. Analysts described that as a positive sign, though much likely remains to be agreed before reaching a tentative deal.

Why does Iran’s nuclear program worry the West? Iran has insisted for decades that its nuclear program is peaceful. However, its officials increasingly threaten to pursue a nuclear weapon. Iran now enriches uranium to near weapons-grade levels of 60%, the only country in the world without a nuclear weapons program to do so.

Under the original 2015 nuclear deal, Iran was allowed to enrich uranium up to 3.67% purity and to maintain a uranium stockpile of 300 kilograms (661 pounds). The last report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran’s program put its stockpile at 8,294.4 kilograms (18,286 pounds) as it enriches a fraction of it to 60% purity.

US intelligence agencies assess that Iran has yet to begin a weapons program, but has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.”

Ali Larijani, an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, has warned in a televised interview that his country has the capability to build nuclear weapons, but it is not pursuing it and has no problem with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspections. However, he said if the US or Israel were to attack Iran over the issue, the country would have no choice but to move toward nuclear weapon development.

“If you make a mistake regarding Iran’s nuclear issue, you will force Iran to take that path, because it must defend itself,” he said.

Why are relations so bad between Iran and the US? Iran was once one of the US’s top allies in the Middle East under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who purchased American military weapons and allowed CIA technicians to run secret listening posts monitoring the neighboring Soviet Union. The CIA had fomented a 1953 coup that cemented the shah’s rule.

But in January 1979, the shah, fatally ill with cancer, fled Iran as mass demonstrations swelled against his rule. The revolution followed, led by Khomeini, and created Iran’s theocratic government.

Later that year, university students overran the US Embassy in Tehran, seeking the shah’s extradition and sparking the 444-day hostage crisis that saw diplomatic relations between Iran and the US severed. The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s saw the US back Saddam Hussein. The “Tanker War” during that conflict saw the US launch a one-day assault that crippled Iran at sea, while the US later shot down an Iranian commercial airliner that the American military said it mistook for a warplane.

Iran and the US have see-sawed between enmity and grudging diplomacy in the years since, with relations peaking when Tehran made the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. But Trump unilaterally withdrew America from the accord in 2018, sparking tensions in the Middle East that persist today.