Lebanese Ex-FM to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Differed with Hariri, But We Were United over Calamitous Emile Lahoud

Lebanese lawmakers are seen at parliament during a session to extend the term of then President Emile Lahoud in 2004. (Getty Images)
Lebanese lawmakers are seen at parliament during a session to extend the term of then President Emile Lahoud in 2004. (Getty Images)
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Lebanese Ex-FM to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Differed with Hariri, But We Were United over Calamitous Emile Lahoud

Lebanese lawmakers are seen at parliament during a session to extend the term of then President Emile Lahoud in 2004. (Getty Images)
Lebanese lawmakers are seen at parliament during a session to extend the term of then President Emile Lahoud in 2004. (Getty Images)

In 1998, then Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri turned to his Syrian and French allies to prevent the election of staunch Syria ally Emile Lahoud as president. He found out that the decision to elect him was taken and not up for discussion.

He tried coexisting with the new president, but realized that Lahoud had only one agenda: weakening Hariri and ensuring his failure.

Hariri refused to surrender. Parliamentary elections in 2000 were held according to a law that was tailored to defeat Hariri, but the PM came out victorious, turning the table on Lahoud. Hariri was again appointed prime minister and Lahoud had no choice but to “booby-trap” his governments with ministers who would obstruct his agenda.

Asharq Al-Awsat sat down with Lebanese former Foreign Minister Farez Boueiz to discuss Lahoud’s two tumultuous terms in 1998 and 2004 and the president’s strained relations with Hariri.

Boueiz said he differed with Hairiri on political affairs, but they were united over a “calamity called Emile Lahoud.” At the time, Syria had enjoyed political and security hegemony over its smaller neighbor, Lebanon.

In 1998, Lebanese and Syrian officials began to float Lahoud’s name to late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad as a successor to Elias Hrawi. They explained that Lahoud, then army commander, was not interested in politics, but was rather more invested in other pursuits, such as swimming and other sports, allowing Syrian intelligence free reign to assume the role of president should he be elected.

These factors favored Lahoud’s election and led to Boueiz’s opposition to him. He declared that he would not have allowed Syrian intelligence to play the role of president.

Ultimately, pro-Syrian Lebanese parties and Syria itself succeeded in securing Lahoud’s election in 1998, paving the way for Damascus to have complete control over Lebanon. Boueiz believed that someone in Lebanon actually headed to Damascus on a daily basis to received the “order of the day.” Lahoud was not opposed to this. He did not argue, ask questions or object to any of this.

Assad died in 2000 and was succeeded by his son, Bashar, with whom Lahoud saw eye-to-eye. “Lahoud was content to do what he was told by Syria, believing that it knew more than us what to do. He was a very disciplined officer,” Boueiz said.

Minister in Hariri’s government

Boueiz said he did not expect to be appointed as a minister during Lahoud’s term in office, saying he was part of the opposition. Days before the formation of a government headed by Hariri, he learned from the media that he would be named minister of environment, rather than foreign affairs.

“Truthfully, I didn’t want to become a minister. I believe that being named minister of environment was a step down from minister of foreign affairs,” he stated, adding, however, that he had no real objections to the environment portfolio. “I soon arranged for a press conference so that I would declare my resignation as soon as a government is formed,” he revealed.

Moreover, he said Hariri had not even consulted him about being named a minister.

“One night, Hariri telephoned me. At the point, with Lahoud in office, the strained relations I had with Hariri were no more. We were united in our calamity,” Boueiz continued. He said the PM telephoned him to persuade him to be a minister in his government.

He explained that he needed a minister who would be loyal to him, expressing his confidence in Boueiz, whom he described as bold figure who could stand against Lahoud.

“Without you, I would be alone in the confrontation. I need Maronites by my side,” Boueiz recalled Hariri as saying.

Boueiz told Asharq Al-Awsat that he initially refused to be a “hired” or “mercenary” minister who would “wage Hariri’s wars.” “Hariri told me that he was certain that if I were part of the government, I would confront Lahoud. ‘I appeal to you and hope that you would consider this as a permanent understanding between us,’ the PM told me,” Boueiz added.

After much insistence, Boueiz relented and agreed to become minister despite knowing that he would be at odds with Lahoud.

Tussles at cabinet

“And so it was, I became a minister and disputes erupted over the smallest details. As minister of environment, I believed in environment work and I wanted to work,” stressed Boueiz. He recalled that he had drafted a project on “national planning for crushers.” “The ministry had poured all its energies into the project, while Lahoud avoided addressing it whenever I brought it up at cabinet. He did not want to approve it. He did not want to acknowledge that Fares Boueiz had made an accomplishment,” he recalled, saying he had proposed the draft no less than five times at cabinet.

“One day I received a telephone call from [head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon] Rustom Ghazale,” said Boueiz. “I had served as foreign minister for nine years and not once did a Syrian security official telephone me. Now they were calling me even though I was just an environment minister with no real power.”

“For nine years no Syrian had contacted me and now Ghazale wanted to talk to me about crushers?! Syria only ever talked to you about politics,” remarked Boueiz.

“I told Ghazale that my project was ready, but I have no idea why Lahoud was not allowing it to be approved by the government. The next time the cabinet met, Lahoud told me, ‘We are still waiting on your crusher project.’ I smiled and knew that Ghazale had spoken to him. ‘It’s good that you have finally woken up to it. I have raised the issue at cabinet five times already and you have been avoiding it. I don’t know what happened to make you change your mind. Perhaps something unexpected has taken place,’” Boueiz added.

“Of course, the Syrians had their interests, and some political parties were perhaps benefitting from the crushers,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Liaison between Lahoud and Syrians

Asharq Al-Awsat asked Boueiz about Jamil al-Sayyed, Lebanon’s head of General Security during Lahoud’s term. “Al-Sayyed was the liaison between Lahoud and the Syrians. In effect, he was the one bringing the ‘order of the day’ to Lebanon. He was Lahoud’s godfather and the official responsible for his behavior. He was the figure who had initially promoted Lahoud to Bashar al-Assad.”

As Lahoud’s time in office drew to an end, heated discussions started to emerge over the contentious issue of extending his term. Boueiz expressed his objection to the extension at cabinet. “Of course, I was unsuccessful. I also expressed my objection at parliament and was unsuccessful there as well.”

“Hariri, who was on a visit to Damascus, came back to inform us that the decision to extend Lahoud’s term had been taken by Syria. I informed him that I would resign as a result,” continued Boueiz. The next day, instead of submitting his resignation to Lahoud, he made the announcement to the media.

Lahoud’s extension and Syria’s threat

Boueiz vividly remembers the infamous visit Hariri paid to Damascus, which had demanded that he support the extension.

The PM traveled to the Syrian capital a week before the extension came into effect in 2004. He recalled that it was a Saturday and that Hariri had headed to Damascus at around 2 pm and was back in Lebanon two hours later.

“I headed to his mountain residence. I noticed that there were no guards around,” he added. He recalled seeing a defeated Hariri seated alone at the home. “‘There is nothing we can do. They want the extension,’ he told me. I asked him if he had fought against it, and he replied: ‘Do you insult me? What do you think?’ With tears in his eyes, he added: ‘They said they would destroy Lebanon on my head and on the head of [former French President and Hariri’s personal friend] Jacques Chirac.’”

Hariri’s assassination

Boueiz recalled to Asharq Al-Awsat the fateful day when Hariri was assassinated on February 14, 2005. The minister and PM were at parliament in downtown Beirut. Boueiz revealed that Hariri had invited him to his house for lunch, but he had to turn down the offer because he was scheduled to attend a parliamentary committee meeting on the electoral law.

“He told me ‘Why are you wasting your time? The law has already been prepared,’ nodding his head in Damascus’ direction. I told him, ‘I know that, but I will simply express my objection to it.’ He told me: ‘Listen to me, let’s go have lunch together. It will be more useful than this and we will prepare for what is to come.’ I again respectfully declined because I had commitments at the committee. ‘I will speak for five minutes and then catch up with you,’ I told him.”

“Of course, if I had agreed to the lunch invitation, I would have joined him in his car and would have died with him,” Boueiz said. Hariri was killed in a massive explosion in Beirut minutes later.

The minister completed his work at parliament and was speaking to the media when the explosion happened. He headed outside and saw a plume of black smoke in the near distance.

“I immediately got into a car. I sensed that Hariri was the target. I contacted his residence at Qoreitem and asked about him. The employee on the line asked if I wanted the call to be transferred to him. His answer led me to believe that Hariri was at his residence, so I declined and ended the call. Soon after, MP Farid Makari approached me and asked me who I thought was targeted in the attack. He too had contacted Qoreitem and believed Hariri was safe,” Boueiz said.

Boueiz and his entourage headed to the scene of the blast and were astounded by the devastation. “We didn’t linger and couldn’t make out anything from the scene. We turned back and I wanted to go to Hariri’s residence, still assuming that he was expecting me for lunch.”

“On my way, I came across journalist Faisal Salman. I stopped to talk to him, and he said: ‘My condolences and may he rest in peace.’ I asked him who he was talking about, and he told me: ‘Hariri’. I replied: ‘How? I am on my way to have lunch with him’. He told me that he had just come back from the hospital where he had seen his corpse. I couldn't believe it. I made my way to Qoreitem and saw the angry and mournful crowd and found out the truth.”

Boueiz then headed to the nearby residence of MP Walid Jumblatt who said a meeting would be held at Hariri’s house in hours to declare a united front and revolt against Emile Lahoud. The movement would become known as March 14.



Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
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Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)

The fragile global legal framework for nuclear weapons control faces further setbacks in 2026, eroding guardrails to avoid a nuclear crisis.

The first half of the year will see two key events: the US-Russia bilateral treaty, New START, expires on February 5, and in April, New York hosts the Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) -- the cornerstone of global nuclear security frameworks.

The RevCon, held every four to five years, is meant to keep the NPT alive. But during the last two sessions, the 191 signatory states failed to agree on a final document, and experts expect the same outcome in April.

"I think this is going to be a difficult RevCon," said Alexandra Bell, head of US-based global security nonprofit the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, at a UN-hosted online conference in early December.

"In terms of the current state and near future prospects of nuclear arms control architecture, things are bleak," she added.

Anton Khlopkov, director of Russian think-tank the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), took an even starker point of view, saying at the same event that "we are at the point of almost complete dismantlement of arms control architecture".

"We should be realistic in the current circumstances. At best, I think we should try to preserve what we have," he said.

- 'Crumbling' safeguards -

From US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites to Russia's test of the new Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and US President Donald Trump's remarks about possibly resuming nuclear tests -- the international nuclear landscape darkened in 2025.

At the same time, "the arms control architecture is crumbling", Emmanuelle Maitre of France's Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) told AFP.

A key challenge hinges on a shift in global relations.

Nuclear control had been built over decades around a Moscow-Washington axis, but China's growing power and rapid technological advances have shifted the international playing field, which is simultaneously increasingly strained.

"The growing interlinkage between nuclear and conventional forces and the emergence of disruptive technologies (such as the US Golden Dome defense system and new hypersonic weapons) have transformed traditional nuclear deterrence into a multi-domain concept, especially in a multipolar world," said Peking University's Hua Han.

"This trilateral configuration introduces complexities far beyond the Cold War-era bilateral model. Increasing China-Russia cooperation further complicates deterrence calculations, particularly in the two main theaters of concern: Europe and the Asia-Pacific," she added, according to the minutes of an April event held by Pakistan's Center for International Strategic Studies.

A likely result of the changing landscape is the lapse of New START, which sets weapon limits and includes inspection systems.

"The entire inspection component is no longer functioning, the notifications when a missile is moved, etc, all of that has vanished. What remains is only the voluntary commitment to stay within the limits," said Maitre.

- 'Collective solutions' -

But allowing New START to lapse is "in American interest", according to Robert Peters of the influential Heritage Foundation, reflecting the stance of much of the US strategic community to avoid tying Washington's hands to Moscow alone.

Beijing, which currently has fewer weapons, has so far refused to engage in trilateral disarmament talks.

"China is the fastest growing nuclear power on the planet. It's building 100 new warheads a year and now has more ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) silos than the US has active Minuteman III silos," Peters said at a recent online International Institute for Strategic Studies event.

"New START does nothing to address" that issue, he added.

However, Maitre said, a New START lapse doesn't mean the world should expect serious consequences as early as February 6.

In both Washington and Moscow, "there is a small margin to bring some weapons back into service, but the numbers cannot be very significant. There are bottlenecks" that will slow any buildup, she said.

Nor will the lack of a final document from the RevCon cause "immediate or damaging consequences" to the NPT, she said.

But, she warned, fewer safeguards risks leaving the world without diplomatic tools to resolve tensions.

"The less functional the NPT becomes, the harder it is to forge collective solutions in the event of a crisis."


Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.


What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.