Lebanese Ex-FM to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Differed with Hariri, But We Were United over Calamitous Emile Lahoud

Lebanese lawmakers are seen at parliament during a session to extend the term of then President Emile Lahoud in 2004. (Getty Images)
Lebanese lawmakers are seen at parliament during a session to extend the term of then President Emile Lahoud in 2004. (Getty Images)
TT

Lebanese Ex-FM to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Differed with Hariri, But We Were United over Calamitous Emile Lahoud

Lebanese lawmakers are seen at parliament during a session to extend the term of then President Emile Lahoud in 2004. (Getty Images)
Lebanese lawmakers are seen at parliament during a session to extend the term of then President Emile Lahoud in 2004. (Getty Images)

In 1998, then Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri turned to his Syrian and French allies to prevent the election of staunch Syria ally Emile Lahoud as president. He found out that the decision to elect him was taken and not up for discussion.

He tried coexisting with the new president, but realized that Lahoud had only one agenda: weakening Hariri and ensuring his failure.

Hariri refused to surrender. Parliamentary elections in 2000 were held according to a law that was tailored to defeat Hariri, but the PM came out victorious, turning the table on Lahoud. Hariri was again appointed prime minister and Lahoud had no choice but to “booby-trap” his governments with ministers who would obstruct his agenda.

Asharq Al-Awsat sat down with Lebanese former Foreign Minister Farez Boueiz to discuss Lahoud’s two tumultuous terms in 1998 and 2004 and the president’s strained relations with Hariri.

Boueiz said he differed with Hairiri on political affairs, but they were united over a “calamity called Emile Lahoud.” At the time, Syria had enjoyed political and security hegemony over its smaller neighbor, Lebanon.

In 1998, Lebanese and Syrian officials began to float Lahoud’s name to late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad as a successor to Elias Hrawi. They explained that Lahoud, then army commander, was not interested in politics, but was rather more invested in other pursuits, such as swimming and other sports, allowing Syrian intelligence free reign to assume the role of president should he be elected.

These factors favored Lahoud’s election and led to Boueiz’s opposition to him. He declared that he would not have allowed Syrian intelligence to play the role of president.

Ultimately, pro-Syrian Lebanese parties and Syria itself succeeded in securing Lahoud’s election in 1998, paving the way for Damascus to have complete control over Lebanon. Boueiz believed that someone in Lebanon actually headed to Damascus on a daily basis to received the “order of the day.” Lahoud was not opposed to this. He did not argue, ask questions or object to any of this.

Assad died in 2000 and was succeeded by his son, Bashar, with whom Lahoud saw eye-to-eye. “Lahoud was content to do what he was told by Syria, believing that it knew more than us what to do. He was a very disciplined officer,” Boueiz said.

Minister in Hariri’s government

Boueiz said he did not expect to be appointed as a minister during Lahoud’s term in office, saying he was part of the opposition. Days before the formation of a government headed by Hariri, he learned from the media that he would be named minister of environment, rather than foreign affairs.

“Truthfully, I didn’t want to become a minister. I believe that being named minister of environment was a step down from minister of foreign affairs,” he stated, adding, however, that he had no real objections to the environment portfolio. “I soon arranged for a press conference so that I would declare my resignation as soon as a government is formed,” he revealed.

Moreover, he said Hariri had not even consulted him about being named a minister.

“One night, Hariri telephoned me. At the point, with Lahoud in office, the strained relations I had with Hariri were no more. We were united in our calamity,” Boueiz continued. He said the PM telephoned him to persuade him to be a minister in his government.

He explained that he needed a minister who would be loyal to him, expressing his confidence in Boueiz, whom he described as bold figure who could stand against Lahoud.

“Without you, I would be alone in the confrontation. I need Maronites by my side,” Boueiz recalled Hariri as saying.

Boueiz told Asharq Al-Awsat that he initially refused to be a “hired” or “mercenary” minister who would “wage Hariri’s wars.” “Hariri told me that he was certain that if I were part of the government, I would confront Lahoud. ‘I appeal to you and hope that you would consider this as a permanent understanding between us,’ the PM told me,” Boueiz added.

After much insistence, Boueiz relented and agreed to become minister despite knowing that he would be at odds with Lahoud.

Tussles at cabinet

“And so it was, I became a minister and disputes erupted over the smallest details. As minister of environment, I believed in environment work and I wanted to work,” stressed Boueiz. He recalled that he had drafted a project on “national planning for crushers.” “The ministry had poured all its energies into the project, while Lahoud avoided addressing it whenever I brought it up at cabinet. He did not want to approve it. He did not want to acknowledge that Fares Boueiz had made an accomplishment,” he recalled, saying he had proposed the draft no less than five times at cabinet.

“One day I received a telephone call from [head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon] Rustom Ghazale,” said Boueiz. “I had served as foreign minister for nine years and not once did a Syrian security official telephone me. Now they were calling me even though I was just an environment minister with no real power.”

“For nine years no Syrian had contacted me and now Ghazale wanted to talk to me about crushers?! Syria only ever talked to you about politics,” remarked Boueiz.

“I told Ghazale that my project was ready, but I have no idea why Lahoud was not allowing it to be approved by the government. The next time the cabinet met, Lahoud told me, ‘We are still waiting on your crusher project.’ I smiled and knew that Ghazale had spoken to him. ‘It’s good that you have finally woken up to it. I have raised the issue at cabinet five times already and you have been avoiding it. I don’t know what happened to make you change your mind. Perhaps something unexpected has taken place,’” Boueiz added.

“Of course, the Syrians had their interests, and some political parties were perhaps benefitting from the crushers,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Liaison between Lahoud and Syrians

Asharq Al-Awsat asked Boueiz about Jamil al-Sayyed, Lebanon’s head of General Security during Lahoud’s term. “Al-Sayyed was the liaison between Lahoud and the Syrians. In effect, he was the one bringing the ‘order of the day’ to Lebanon. He was Lahoud’s godfather and the official responsible for his behavior. He was the figure who had initially promoted Lahoud to Bashar al-Assad.”

As Lahoud’s time in office drew to an end, heated discussions started to emerge over the contentious issue of extending his term. Boueiz expressed his objection to the extension at cabinet. “Of course, I was unsuccessful. I also expressed my objection at parliament and was unsuccessful there as well.”

“Hariri, who was on a visit to Damascus, came back to inform us that the decision to extend Lahoud’s term had been taken by Syria. I informed him that I would resign as a result,” continued Boueiz. The next day, instead of submitting his resignation to Lahoud, he made the announcement to the media.

Lahoud’s extension and Syria’s threat

Boueiz vividly remembers the infamous visit Hariri paid to Damascus, which had demanded that he support the extension.

The PM traveled to the Syrian capital a week before the extension came into effect in 2004. He recalled that it was a Saturday and that Hariri had headed to Damascus at around 2 pm and was back in Lebanon two hours later.

“I headed to his mountain residence. I noticed that there were no guards around,” he added. He recalled seeing a defeated Hariri seated alone at the home. “‘There is nothing we can do. They want the extension,’ he told me. I asked him if he had fought against it, and he replied: ‘Do you insult me? What do you think?’ With tears in his eyes, he added: ‘They said they would destroy Lebanon on my head and on the head of [former French President and Hariri’s personal friend] Jacques Chirac.’”

Hariri’s assassination

Boueiz recalled to Asharq Al-Awsat the fateful day when Hariri was assassinated on February 14, 2005. The minister and PM were at parliament in downtown Beirut. Boueiz revealed that Hariri had invited him to his house for lunch, but he had to turn down the offer because he was scheduled to attend a parliamentary committee meeting on the electoral law.

“He told me ‘Why are you wasting your time? The law has already been prepared,’ nodding his head in Damascus’ direction. I told him, ‘I know that, but I will simply express my objection to it.’ He told me: ‘Listen to me, let’s go have lunch together. It will be more useful than this and we will prepare for what is to come.’ I again respectfully declined because I had commitments at the committee. ‘I will speak for five minutes and then catch up with you,’ I told him.”

“Of course, if I had agreed to the lunch invitation, I would have joined him in his car and would have died with him,” Boueiz said. Hariri was killed in a massive explosion in Beirut minutes later.

The minister completed his work at parliament and was speaking to the media when the explosion happened. He headed outside and saw a plume of black smoke in the near distance.

“I immediately got into a car. I sensed that Hariri was the target. I contacted his residence at Qoreitem and asked about him. The employee on the line asked if I wanted the call to be transferred to him. His answer led me to believe that Hariri was at his residence, so I declined and ended the call. Soon after, MP Farid Makari approached me and asked me who I thought was targeted in the attack. He too had contacted Qoreitem and believed Hariri was safe,” Boueiz said.

Boueiz and his entourage headed to the scene of the blast and were astounded by the devastation. “We didn’t linger and couldn’t make out anything from the scene. We turned back and I wanted to go to Hariri’s residence, still assuming that he was expecting me for lunch.”

“On my way, I came across journalist Faisal Salman. I stopped to talk to him, and he said: ‘My condolences and may he rest in peace.’ I asked him who he was talking about, and he told me: ‘Hariri’. I replied: ‘How? I am on my way to have lunch with him’. He told me that he had just come back from the hospital where he had seen his corpse. I couldn't believe it. I made my way to Qoreitem and saw the angry and mournful crowd and found out the truth.”

Boueiz then headed to the nearby residence of MP Walid Jumblatt who said a meeting would be held at Hariri’s house in hours to declare a united front and revolt against Emile Lahoud. The movement would become known as March 14.



From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
TT

From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)

Libya depends on oil for nearly 98% of its income. Yet a central question persists: How are those revenues collected and spent in a country divided between rival governments? And why do Libyans complain of poverty when their country holds Africa’s largest oil reserves and produces and exports about 1.4 million barrels a day?

The process starts with the National Oil Corporation, which collects proceeds from crude oil and gas sales in US dollars and deposits them in accounts at the Libyan Foreign Bank. The money is then transferred to the Central Bank of Libya's accounts in Tripoli, recorded as state budget sovereign revenue, and converted into Libyan dinars.

The dollar trades at 6.36 dinars at the official rate, compared with 9.12 on the parallel market.

The Finance Ministry in Tripoli then issues spending authorizations under approved financial arrangements, after which the central bank releases funds to ministries and other state bodies through the main budget chapters.

Libya’s oil export revenues have swung sharply in recent years, ranging between $18 billion and $22 billion. They rose to about $18 billion in the first half of this year, nearly double the level in the same period last year, according to the Economy Ministry in the interim Government of National Unity.

Libyan oil expert Mohamed al-Shahati attributed the increase during that period to the war involving Iran.

Where is the breakdown?

Economists say Libya’s dependence on oil as its near-exclusive source of income lies at the heart of the crisis.

Ayoub al-Farsi, an economics professor at the University of Benghazi, said Libya showed how excessive reliance on natural resources could turn into a complex financial crisis when combined with political fragmentation and a lack of economic diversification.

“The Libyan economy is a clear example of how excessive dependence on natural resources can become a complex financial crisis,” he said, adding that political fragmentation and the absence of diversification had created conditions that directly affected people’s lives.

Al-Farsi, a member of the Central Bank of Libya’s Monetary Policy Committee, said the economy was built around a rentier-state model that depended almost entirely on oil exports to fund the treasury and provide foreign currency.

That dependence, he told Asharq Al-Awsat, had created deep structural distortions.

Agriculture and industry had been marginalized, the state bureaucracy had expanded to absorb workers into unproductive public-sector jobs, and the country had grown heavily dependent on imports for most consumer goods, he said.

Industrial activity remains limited, largely confined to the private sector and small-scale production. Critics also point to a market dominated by a small number of traders and importers, helping imported goods crowd out local production.

At protests across Libyan cities, the question is often the same: Where is the oil money going? Why are people struggling in an energy-producing country?

Al-Shahati said part of the answer lies in the difference between the value of the oil Libya produces and the amount that actually reaches the state treasury.

“Not every barrel produced in Libya is converted directly into a dollar entering the public treasury, because foreign partners have a share,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Foreign companies have become production partners under various contractual arrangements, he said.

He also pointed to a stark contradiction: Libya produces oil, yet depends heavily on imports of gasoline, diesel, and other petroleum products to meet domestic demand.

That means a growing share of the country’s resources is converted into foreign currency to pay for fuel imports.

Al-Shahati said another problem was the lack of a regularly published, unified, and easy-to-read account that answers basic questions, such as: What was the total value of the oil produced? How much went to foreign partners? How much was exported for the state? How much went to the domestic market? And how much net revenue was actually available for public spending?

“The figures in circulation provide parts of the picture,” he said, “but they do not always show the full flow of revenues from the wellhead to the state’s public accounts.”

Libya’s oil fields are concentrated mainly in the eastern Sirte Basin, which holds about 82% of its oil reserves, as well as in the Murzuq Basin in the southwest and offshore areas along the coast.

Fuel and power crises

Those weaknesses in the oil revenue chain are unfolding as Libya grapples with a severe electricity crisis.

The country has suffered several “blackouts” in recent days, with some areas going without electricity for more than 17 hours a day.

Researcher Ezzedine Mokhtar sees the power cuts as one part of a wider pattern of recurring financial failures, including fuel shortages.

He blamed the hardship facing many Libyans on “corruption” and “unlimited spending” by two rival governments competing for power in the country’s east and west.

He also cited “oil smuggling through Arkenu, whose revenues go to specific individuals rather than the state treasury.”

Mokhtar said Libya’s subsidy system was another core problem, with more than 60% of the country’s budget going to fuel subsidies.

He called on the Tripoli government to phase out those subsidies gradually and to draw up a national plan to develop the workforce.

“We have no industrial skills in anything,” he said. “We import everything — yogurt, dairy products, fruit, vegetables, frozen fish, and even underwear. Everything comes from abroad.”

Libya ranks 10th globally in proven oil reserves, with about 48.3 billion barrels, according to Worldometer.

The UN Panel of Experts said in its latest report on Libya, covering October 2024 to February 2026, that Arkenu had moved at least $3 billion in oil revenues to bank accounts outside Libya between January 2024 and November 2025.

According to the report, Arkenu was established in 2023 as a private company and is indirectly controlled by Saddam Haftar, deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army. It faces accusations of “oil smuggling.”

Reuters previously investigated the company and concluded, based on shipping documents, London Stock Exchange Group data, and information from Kpler, that some oil revenues were being diverted away from the Central Bank of Libya.

How are revenues distributed?

Oil revenues are distributed across the four main chapters of the state budget, according to experts and economists.

Chapter One, salaries and wages, takes the largest share. It covers public-sector employees across eastern, western, and southern Libya through the unified national identification number system.

Chapter Two covers operating expenses for ministries and public institutions.

Chapter Three covers subsidies, including fuel, water, and electricity.

Chapter Four covers development and projects, including infrastructure, as well as allocations to the National Oil Corporation to sustain and increase production.

Al-Shahati said 26% of oil revenues went toward importing fuel products, equivalent to about $7 billion if crude traded at $70 a barrel.

This year, he said, the figure could rise to between $8 billion and $9 billion because oil prices had climbed above $85 a barrel and the gap between crude prices and diesel and gasoline prices had widened amid shortages.

He also pointed to higher domestic consumption driven by economic growth and a rise in smuggling.

A second problem, al-Shahati said, is the absence of an approved national budget, which would make it possible to determine how spending should be allocated among population groups and regions.

“What is clear is that the main cities control most spending,” he said.

He also pointed to “a large and obvious imbalance” in salaries across Libya’s three regions, job grades, and types of employment.

Those gaps, he said, risk widening financial divisions between social groups.

Even an agreement to unify development spending did not appear to be properly implemented because there were no clear standards and no comprehensive budget.

“There are no criteria for distributing oil revenues,” al-Shahati said. “The distribution process is random and unsustainable.”

Libya fell to 177th out of 182 countries in the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, from 173rd out of 180 countries in 2024, reflecting worsening corruption and no tangible improvement over the past two years.

Pressure on the local economy

A report by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Libya highlighted deep structural strains in the economy, driven by high public spending, near-total dependence on oil and gas revenues, and mounting pressure from food, fuel, and electricity prices.

The report, submitted to the UN Security Council on Aug. 17, covers the period from April 1 to July 28.

Citing the International Monetary Fund, it said Libya’s fiscal deficit reached 30% of gross domestic product last year, while public debt climbed to 146% of GDP.

Inflation also rose into double digits, eroding purchasing power.

The UN report noted unjustified increases in fuel consumption by military and security agencies and the energy sector, as well as repeated double purchasing.

The cost of institutional division

Libya’s political and institutional split and the presence of multiple authorities have made the economic crisis worse, al-Farsi said.

The distortions, he said, were no longer merely structural.

They had created parallel public finances and pushed consumer spending higher to meet the demands of rival authorities, sending salaries and subsidies to unprecedented levels.

Repeated shutdowns of oil fields in previous years, combined with lower actual revenues, pushed financial authorities toward deficit financing and higher public debt, al-Farsi said.

That flooded the market with money without a corresponding rise in domestic production.

Oil revenues reached $21.9 billion in 2025, according to the National Oil Corporation, up from $18.6 billion in 2024, an increase of 15%.

Al-Farsi said the deterioration in public finances had left monetary authorities in a difficult position and forced them into emergency measures to protect reserves and contain the deficit.

The result, he said, was a weaker national currency, liquidity shortages and a collapse in confidence.

Development tools had also been paralyzed.

“Monetary policy shifted from an instrument for stimulating growth and investment into a tool for managing daily crises,” he said.

Why has the crisis not been solved?

Economists point to several reasons.

Al-Shahati put “corruption spreading on an unprecedented scale” near the top of the list.

“Corruption is no longer confined to the margins,” he said. “It has come to dominate the core of public finances in key sectors, obstructing any attempt at reform.”

He also blamed the absence of an institutional vision following the breakdown of middle management, which had once linked fiscal and monetary policy to economic realities and provided unified political backing.

Policies, he said, had become detached from the economy and lost their ability to restore balance.

Conventional reforms that had worked elsewhere would not work in Libya, al-Shahati said, because the country lacked a central political authority capable of building an institutional vision and curbing corruption that had spread through both the state and private sector.

Al-Farsi said Libya could not escape its fiscal and monetary crisis without addressing the roots of the problem.

That meant unifying the management of public finances, curbing government spending, and launching genuine structural reforms that would gradually shift Libya from consuming oil rents to building a diversified economy.

Mokhtar also called on the Tripoli government to develop a strategic plan to make better use of human resources and support small and medium-sized industries.

For him, breaking Libya’s dependence on oil revenues is part of the way out.

Masoud Suleiman, chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation, said in media remarks last week that the country needed between $30 billion and $40 billion in investment to develop untapped oil and gas resources.

The corporation, he said, aims to raise production to 2 million barrels a day by 2030.


Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
TT

Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)

With a long shoreline on the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's southern trade hub of Bandar Abbas has found itself at the frontlines of the war with the United States, with residents struggling to revive livelihoods battered by months of fighting.

Like elsewhere in Iran, economic strain has squeezed households since US-Israeli strikes triggered the Middle East war on February 28. But unlike much of the country, the port city of around half a million people has remained exposed to fighting even after an April 8 ceasefire brought relief elsewhere.

But despite a lull in hostilities in July, residents still feel squeezed. Saeed Tajik, 42, used to work at a shipyard before losing his job and turning to driving a taxi.

"The prices of housing and food have become extremely high. Almost all the basics -- rice, yoghurt, and oil -- have doubled," said Tajik.

Fuel shortages have long been common in southern Iran, where authorities restrict supplies in an effort to curb widespread fuel smuggling.

But now, "the queues have become longer ... it happens that we wait in the long line for fuel only to get told 'there is none' upon arriving," Tajik said as he drove past a station where motorists waited under the punishing summer heat.

Hormuz has emerged as a central flashpoint after an April ceasefire and June framework deal failed to resolve disagreements between Washington and Tehran over the future management of the strait.

During the war, US strikes hit bridges, highways and railway infrastructure around Bandar Abbas until mid-July, in what analysts saw as attempts to cut off the city and disrupt Iranian military logistics in the south.

- 'Nothing left' -

Inside the city, under a towering concrete statue of two armed men with their arms trained towards Hormuz waters, economic strains play out in long queues snaking outside petrol stations and soaring prices squeezing shoppers in local markets.

The city's repeatedly hit airport remained largely closed until August 15, leaving travelers facing arduous road journeys, sometimes combined with flights and boat crossings.

Outside the city, construction crews still toil under the sweltering summer sun to repair the Gachin bridge, split by a US strike, as cars rumble along a dusty detour below.

Along the waterfront, traditional wooden vessels known as lenjes sit moored alongside fishing and commercial boats, part of a centuries-old trading network linking southern Iran with Arab states across the Gulf.

Arash Tondro, 45, used his lenj to carry Iranian fresh and dried fruit to the United Arab Emirates and return with household goods and other imports.

"My income dropped to zero at the beginning of the war," said Tondro, who later rerouted some trade through Oman's Khasab port as regional seaways were disrupted and "many of the lenjes were hit by drones".

After the UAE suspended trade with Iran on Tuesday following a missile attack on a ship that Tehran denied carrying out, Tondro said he was again unsure how his work would be impacted.

"People in the south mostly rely on trade or fishing. If you take the sea and trade away from them, there is practically nothing left. We don't have agriculture here; whatever there is comes from the sea," he said.

- 'No sales' -

As night falls and August's oppressive heat begins to ease, fish vendors set up along a busy street, laying out shark, tuna and shrimp as the smell of the day's catch hangs in the humid air.

Among them is 22-year-old Anoush Mallah, who recently moved onto the street after soaring rents forced him to close his shop in one of the city's bazaars.

"Business has been terrible since the war started. There are no sales, it's very weak," he told AFP.

"People are short of money. The fishermen aren't going fishing either."

Many fishermen around Bandar Abbas only began returning to sea in recent weeks, after months ashore for fear of being caught in the crossfire of US-Iran fighting.

Diplomatic efforts have so far failed to end the war. For Mallah, the uncertainty only adds to the strain.

"Let it (the war) start and get some result; right now, we're just left in limbo," he said.


The Ethiopian Dam Dispute and Egypt’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
TT

The Ethiopian Dam Dispute and Egypt’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry

Over the past two weeks, Egypt has repeatedly stressed its right to prevent any actions by Addis Ababa on the Nile River that could harm its water interests, stressing that it possesses the “right to self-defense” over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

According to experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, Egypt’s signaling means that it “will not hesitate to use all legitimate means to safeguard its water security.”

They explained that the message is a stern warning to Ethiopia and suggests that Cairo is seeking to shift from a policy of protesting Ethiopian measures to preventive deterrence, aimed at stopping the establishment of a new status quo on the Nile.

New Egyptian Warning

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said that “Egypt will not allow the construction of additional dams ... that affect its water interests,” stressing Cairo’s commitment to a legally binding agreement that guarantees its water rights.

In a television interview on Wednesday evening, Abdelatty said that Egypt does not oppose African countries’ right to development, noting Cairo’s participation in dam and infrastructure projects in several Nile Basin states. However, he stressed the need to balance the right to development with the rights of downstream countries.

He also underscored Egypt’s commitment to protecting its water interests. “We have the right to self-defense to protect our interests and water security,” said the minister. “We will not accept any agreement regarding the Nile River unless it is legally binding,” he reiterated.

Mohamed Hegazy, a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs and a former assistant foreign minister, says the right of self-defense is protected under international law after all peaceful means have been exhausted.

According to Hegazy, the core message is that Cairo still prefers agreement and negotiation, but it no longer accepts using negotiations to impose a fait accompli.

He argued that the most significant aspect of Abdelatty’s statements is that they send three simultaneous messages - Rejection of unilateral measures, rejection of additional dams, and insistence on the right of self-defense to protect water security.

Hussein El-Behairy, an African affairs expert at the National Center for Middle East Studies, said the minister’s recent statements reaffirm Egypt’s right to defend its historical and water rights in the Nile by whatever means the Egyptian state deems appropriate to preserve what Egyptians view as a matter of life and death.

Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Reuters

Escalating Egyptian Position

This is the third time Egypt has signaled the possibility of using its “right to self-defense” and preventing dam construction on the Nile.

On August 16, Egypt’s state news agency quoted an unnamed Egyptian official as saying that Cairo “will neither accept nor allow any party to control the flow of Nile waters to downstream countries,” stressing that the Egyptian state possesses multiple tools capable of protecting its people’s interests in the Nile.

The statement came in response to remarks attributed to Ethiopian Minister of Water and Energy Habtamu Itefa concerning the construction of additional dams on the Nile and control over water flows to downstream states, namely Egypt and Sudan.

Earlier, on August 4, Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hani Sewilam stated during a press conference that Egypt “will not allow the construction of new Ethiopian dams on the Nile River.”

He said: “It is well known that Ethiopia has plans to build additional dams, but will the Egyptian state allow this? No.”

According to Hegazy, the ball is now in Ethiopia’s court. If Addis Ababa agrees to resume serious negotiations leading to a legally binding agreement on GERD, the crisis can be contained.

However, if Ethiopia continues to create new realities on the Nile, the scope for a diplomatic solution will narrow, making risk management and deterrence a more prominent part of Egypt’s strategy.

El-Behairy does not expect the escalation to pave the way for new negotiations on GERD unless the Ethiopian government is willing to make concessions in response to Cairo’s demands. These demands include reaching a legally binding agreement that guarantees Egypt’s water rights during periods of drought and severe drought, and providing Egypt with information regarding the operation of the dam in a manner that does not harm its water interests.