Lebanese former Foreign Minister Farez Boueiz recalled to Asharq Al-Awsat the hectic period towards the end of the 1975-90 Lebanese civil war over Elias Hrawi’s election as president and the ouster of Michel Aoun from the presidential palace and Syria’s role in both affairs.
Hrawi, like most Maronite politicians in Lebanon, dreamed of becoming president. Boueiz, Hrawi’s son-in-law, detailed to Asharq Al-Awsat the events that led up to his election.
During the civil war, Syria was entrusted by the whole world, including the United States, Vatican and Europe, to tackle the situation in Lebanon, said Boueiz. They had all acknowledged their inability to tackle the file. No one was willing to become involved militarily, so Syria was brought in to manage the situation, he explained.
Syria was still sore from the time when it was tasked in 1976 to rein in the Palestinian Liberation Organization, he went on to say. It chose Elias Sarkis to become president at the time and waged a real war in order to ensure his election.
“I believe that several Syrian soldiers were killed by Palestinian fighters during the ensuing battles,” Boueiz said.
Sarkis’ term was overshadowed by the rise of Bashir Gemayel in Lebanon and ended with Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. Gemayel was elected as his successor. Syria was also sore about this and didn’t want a repeat of that scenario, Boueiz added.
“So, it sought a Maronite president from beyond the Mount Lebanon region so that he wouldn’t be influenced by Maronites in that region,” he remarked. Damascus believed that the Maronites there were opposed to Syria.
Moreover, it sought a president who had no ties to the Lebanese Forces and would have preferred the election of a head of state who would confront it head-on if the need arose. Syria wanted a president who would not have yielded to the LF the way Sarkis did to Gemayel.
Boueiz believed that Syria had considered the election of Mikhael al-Daher, Rene Mouawad, Hrawi and Jean Obeid.
President or minister?
Ahead of the presidential elections, then minister Hrawi approached Boueiz for advice on how to handle an interview with LBC television that was then affiliated with the LF. Boueiz told him that if he harbored presidential ambitions, then he should make the message clear during the interview and add that an understanding with Syria was necessary to resolve the Lebanese crisis, which Hrawi did.
“I warned him that I would not be responsible for his security once he made such a declaration,” Boueiz recalled. “We were at war after all.” Hrawi, who had voted for Gemayel’s election as president and who had friends among the LF, believed that they would protect him from any harm.
When he finished his interview and returned home, he encountered some LF members, who told him that they wouldn’t be able to protect him. They advised him to take his family away to their house in the city of Zahle.
Hrawi had left his Zahle home eight years earlier, around the time Gemayel was elected president. Now, he was supposed to head to it without advance planning. His home had long since been occupied by local forces.
“It seemed that Syrian checkpoints had monitored his journey to Zahle. As soon as he arrived, he was greeted by [head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon] Ghazi Kanaan. Hrawi was uncertain that he would be allowed into his house, but Kanaan delivered a presidential salute to him with a greeting: ‘Welcome, Mr. President,’” revealed Boueiz.
“Hrawi replied: ‘What president? A president who doesn’t know where he will sleep the night?’ Kanaan responded: ‘Welcome to your house. If there is even an ashtray that is out of place, I will know what to do.’” Indeed, the Hrawis entered the house and found that everything appeared untouched.
It seemed that Kanaan was made aware of Hrawi’s journey to Zahle. He sent orders to the occupiers to clean the house immediately even as the Hrawis returned late at night.
Moreover, he informed Hrawi that Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was waiting for him at the late hour. Kanaan and Hrawi headed to Syria, and he was informed by Assad that he had Damascus’ support in his bid for the presidency.
Soon after his return to Lebanon, Hrawi telephoned Boueiz to inform him, without giving away too much information over line, that his visit to Damascus was “very positive”. Hrawi’s presidency was decided at that moment, but hit a setback after the emergence of a Saudi-Syrian settlement over the election of Mouawad as president.
Mouawad enjoyed strong ties with Lebanese businessmen in Saudi Arabia, which had favored his election. The Kingdom believed that the next president must be entrusted with Lebanon’s reconstruction and garnering aid and Mouawad had the necessary connections to do that.
So, he was elected president even though Assad had favored Hrawi. Mouawad’s tenure was short-lived. He was assassinated on November 22, 1989, days after his election. Hrawi was again the frontrunner in the race.
Election
Assad favored Hrawi’s election even though some powers in Syria were opposed to his choice, but in the end, he was elected president at the Park Hotel Chtaura. He then lived in a small modest apartment in a military barracks in Ablah in the eastern Bekaa region. The presidential palace at the time was controlled by army commander Michel Aoun, who was leading a mutiny.
Boueiz recalled that Hrawi felt ineffectual and weak as president during his time at the apartment because he was disconnected from the capital, telephone lines were not operational, and it was a four-hour journey for officials to visit him. At one point, Hrawi threatened to quit, declaring: “I am not a puppet.” He grew even more defeated when he saw footage on television of throngs of Aoun supporters at the presidential palace.
Deciding to assume control of the situation, Hrawi tasked Boueiz to visit Syria to find out what will happen in Lebanon. After much resistance, Boueiz, who had never been to Syria, relented. Effectively, he became Hrawi’s unofficial advisor. He assumed the role of responding to correspondence from the Pope and the French and American presidents.
“Lebanon was without a state. Hrawi had no one to help him. The presidential guard were made up of Jamil al-Sayyed's relatives. (...) Due to the circumstances, I was forced to do everything, especially when it came to diplomacy and foreign communication,” Boueiz revealed.
Meeting Assad
Boueiz informed Hrawi that he would agree to becoming his envoy to Syria on condition that he communicate directly with Assad, not his officers or any other official. So, he was tasked in an official capacity to visit Assad. Boueiz also demanded that his visits be made public, refusing to head to Damascus in secret.
Hrawi agreed and soon after, Boueiz was invited to visit Damascus to meet with Assad.
Boueiz described the meeting as “pivotal”. He explained that the Syrian leader was expecting to meet a traditional Maronite politician, who are normally opposed to or fearful of Arabism. Boueiz surprised Assad by embracing Arabism and highlighting Christian figures who championed that way of thought. He also surprised him with his criticism of the United States, whom he described as opportunistic.
Effectively, Boueiz passed Assad’s test and their relationship was formed from that point. He later confided in him that Hrawi was on the verge of resigning if the situation with Aoun was not resolved.
“Assad informed me that it was important to avert a military operation,” Boueiz said. He then returned to Beirut for consultations with French Ambassador Rene Ala and the Vatican’s Ambassador Pablo Puente. “I met with them regularly and they would meet with Aoun for negotiations,” he added.
At the same time, Syria feared the emergence of Samir Geagea as the most powerful Christian figure after Aoun’s ouster. They feared that he would hold sway over the president the same way Gemayel did over Sarkis. So, Assad sought guarantees from Geagea over this issue. He wanted Geagea to approve of the Taif Accord, which would help end the war. Geagea had yet to declare his support because he was worried it would impact his support among Christians. Assad also wanted Geagea to recognize Hrawi’s authority as president, take a clear stance from the dismantling of militias and the deployment of the army throughout Lebanon.
Boueiz recalled his shuttle diplomacy during that time between Paris, Washington and the Vatican. He also revealed how he would move by boat under cover of darkness from Beirut’s Saint Georges Bay to Jounieh Bay and from there to visit Geagea in Keserwan to avoid Aoun’s artillery fire. His visits to Geagea would stretch long into the night.
“Geagea would dispatch a boat to transport me from the Saint Georges area. This happened over a period of six or seven months, until the West finally informed Assad that it was time to put an end to Aoun’s munity, meaning it approved of Syria’s military operation,” Boueiz said.
Aoun's ouster
Aoun rejected all proposals for him to abandon his mutiny, even from the US and France.
France, said Boueiz, was invested in the issue because of Aoun’s ties with French intelligence. French Ambassador Ala tried to defend Aoun through all possible means and was genuinely concerned over his fate.
Boueiz met with the envoy prior to the military operation. He told Asharq Al-Awsat that he criticized Ala for allowing his emotions to influence his actions. He also believed that he was not sincere in the negotiations to persuade Aoun to end his mutiny, rather, he actually encouraged him to stay at the presidential palace.
“We began to discuss how Aoun would be removed safely from the palace and moved to the French embassy, where he would have immunity,” Boueiz said. He pledged that the army would escort him to a French vessel that would sail him to France.
After much concern over his safety, Aoun managed to leave the palace swiftly and without incident and headed to embassy. “I was shocked to learn that he had arrived alone without his family,” Boueiz revealed. In the midst of the battle, “we had to find a way to bring his family to safety,” he went on to say.
Elie Hobeika, a senior LF official with connections to Syria and a debt to Aoun, who had saved his life during a past battle, agreed to transport the family from the palace to the house of the French ambassador.
