Arafat Refused to Credit Syria for Palestinian Resistance’s ‘Victory’ against 1982 Israeli Invasion of Beirut

Arafat is seen at the frontline in Beirut’s southern suburbs. (Getty Images)
Arafat is seen at the frontline in Beirut’s southern suburbs. (Getty Images)
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Arafat Refused to Credit Syria for Palestinian Resistance’s ‘Victory’ against 1982 Israeli Invasion of Beirut

Arafat is seen at the frontline in Beirut’s southern suburbs. (Getty Images)
Arafat is seen at the frontline in Beirut’s southern suburbs. (Getty Images)

The summer of 1982 was turbulent in Beirut and for the Palestinian resistance. Besieged by Israeli forces, the Palestinian resistance in the Lebanese capital realized that it had no other choice than to leave the city.

Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat realized that the time had come and he decided to leave by sea, refusing to take the Beirut-Damascus route. Four decades later, the Palestinians are still fighting for their cause to establish their own independent state. The Lebanese, meanwhile, have failed in forming their own state in spite of their success in liberating their territories from Israeli occupation.

Asharq Al-Awsat concludes on Friday a series of features highlighting the significant developments and recollections of influential players during that heated summer.

Shafik al-Wazzan

Lebanese former Prime Minister Shafik al-Wazzan believed that the Palestinian leadership knew that its time in Beirut was up from the very moment Israel besieged the city. The leadership sought to use the time it had left to make diplomatic and political gains.

The reality was that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) could not carry on the battle forever, recalled Wazzan.

Weeks after the invasion, it became apparent that the Soviet Union was not prepared to take any dramatic move. The United Nations Security Council’s hands were tied. Only the United States could pressure Israel to end the invasion.

Of course, Israel had its own conditions that needed to be met before making any move.

No one could take the decision to completely destroy Beirut and bringing an end to the Palestinian leadership would have dire consequences on the entire Palestinian cause, said Wazzan.

On July 3, Wazzan informed US envoy Philipe Habib that the PLO had agreed to pull out its forces. Habib asked him if the Palestinians had signed a document to confirm their withdrawal. Wazzan said it had not occurred to him to request a signed document. Habib stressed that the Israelis would want written proof of their vow.

Wazzan relayed the envoy’s message to the Palestinians, who “received quite the shock by it.” He explained that the Palestinian leadership was trying to avoid submitting any written vow.

He recalled an ensuing heated meeting that was held between him, former PMs Saeb Salam and Takieddin al-Solh and Arafat at Salam’s residence. Wazzan said Arafat addressed the Lebanese people, especially the residents of Beirut, as if they had abandoned the resistance.

Salam was outraged by his remarks, saying: “You’re saying this after everything Beirut has done for you? You’re saying this after everything Lebanon has offered? Haven’t you seen the destruction in the country? Do want Beirut to be completely destroyed and for its people to be displaced?”

During the meeting, Solh asked the Palestinian leadership: “Are there any weapons you haven’t yet used in this war? If so, then we will stand by you and make sacrifices for you. Have any countries pledged to join the war, fight by your side and secure your victory? If so, then we will stand by you.”

“If you don’t have these weapons and that vow, then have mercy on Beirut, which is being destroyed in spite of everything that it has given and continues to give,” he told Arafat.

In the end, the Palestinians agreed to quit the city. Wazzan said the decision pained him as “we had supported the Palestinian resistance and stood by its side to an extent that we sometimes ignored its mistakes and neglected the Lebanese.”

Saeb Salam

When Israel invaded Lebanon, the Lebanese cabinet decided to place all capabilities at the army’s disposal. There were concerns, however, that it would be crushed by the invading military and the country would be left divided as a result, especially with various rival militias on the ground.

Wazzan wanted to resign when the Israeli army surrounded Beirut, but Salam warned that the country would not be able to tolerate more division and paralysis in the state. He offered Wazzan his complete support and persuaded him against resigning.

Salam’s position was hailed by his rivals, including Secretary General of the Lebanese Communist Party Mohsen Ibrahim and Secretary General of the Communist Action Organization in Lebanon George Hawi.

Salam recalled those days when Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon wanted to destroy Beirut along with the Palestinians and Lebanese people. He said: “My sole concern was for the resistance to be safe and for our country to be safe.”

“Some have said that ‘he forced our withdrawal to save his country’,” he added. “This is not true. They left with their weapons, while raising the victory sign. I saw them off at the port and they went abroad to continue to fight for their cause. Sharon’s attack was destructive. Looking out from my house, I could see flames from all sides.”

“I clashed several times with Abou Ammar [Arafat]. And yet, when the time came for him to leave, he dropped by to bid me farewell and express his gratitude,” added Salam.

George Hawi

Hawi recalled three positions that were prevalent and shared by the Palestinians and Lebanese leadership when the Israeli army invaded Beirut and hammered it with shelling.

The first believed that there was no point in continuing the fight and everything should be done to rescue whatever could be salvaged.

The second was a more romanticized view that spoke of transforming Beirut into a new Stalingrad. Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) George Habash shared this view and so did Hawi during the first month of the invasion.

The third was more realistic and realized that the fighting should aim to improve the conditions of a political solution. This position was reinforced when it appeared that the international community had no hope in stopping the Israeli war machine, said Hawi.

He denied that he, along with Mohsen, led to the prolongation of the war because they were awaiting the Soviet position. “In the beginning, Mohsen adopted a hard line just as we did. He later adopted a more realistic approach,” Hawi added. “The truth is Arafat was the most pragmatic of us all.”

When asked who he believed opposed the withdrawal from Beirut, he replied: “No one really. Not the Palestinians or the Lebanese.”

Ahmed Jibril

Secretary General of the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC) Ahmed Jibril’s account of events doesn’t align with others. One time when I was in Damascus, I asked him about his version of events of that summer of 1982.

When he sensed that the Palestinians were in agreement over withdrawing from Beirut, Arafat called for a meeting of Lebanese leaders, including Walid Jumblatt, AMAL movement leader Nabih Berri, Ibrahim Koleilat, Mohsen Ibrahim, Abdulrahim Murad and Toufic Sultan.

Arafat revealed that he had received an offer to pull out from Beirut, but said he could not give an answer before first consulting with Palestinian and Lebanese officials. At the meeting, Ibrahim, Koleilat and Murad said: “We gave you the whole of Lebanon, so give us Beirut.” Jumblatt chose not to say anything negative or positive.

Berri appeared to support the withdrawal, while others noted that the Palestinians chose not fight Israel from southern Lebanon, so why were they opting to fight from Beirut? The meeting was very tense and like a stab in the back, said Jibril.

My questions rekindled the hatred between Arafat and Jibril. “Arafat chose to quit Beirut, but he was searching for an excuse to avoid leaving through Syria. (...) Along with George Habash and Nayef Hawatima, we sent a message to then Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam. After 24 hours, we received a reply through a cable,” recalled Jibril.

He explained that members of the Baath had met with President Hafez al-Assad and agreed to receive more Palestinians. “I read out the message to Arafat, who replied: ‘I do not work through cables. The Syrian government must release a formal statement about the matter.’”

“We clashed. I told Arafat: ‘It’s been three months, and you haven’t missed an opportunity to criticize Syria, directly or indirectly. Syria is waging a battle with us. It has dispatched 90 jets and thousands of tanks, armored vehicles and soldiers, while you make contact with various Arab countries. Do you want to clash with Syria?’ The meeting became strained and quickly came to an end.”

Jibril again contacted Damascus and hours later Syrian state radio announced its agreement to host the Palestinians. He met with Arafat to relay the message. The Palestinian leader said: “Do you think I will credit our resistance for three months and victory in Beirut to the Syrian leadership?”

A year later, Arafat would return to Tripoli to provoke Syria. “We surrounded him, but he eventually left. Then Syrian chief-of-staff Hikmat al-Shehabi would later tell me, I wish you had finished him off there and relieved everyone of him,” said Jibril.

The hatred went farther than that. Jibril later told me he hoped Arafat would have been assassinated by a Palestinian, the same way Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat was killed by Egyptian extremist Khalid Islambouli. I asked him if he had ever sent someone to kill Arafat, he replied: “I am certain a Palestinian Khalid Islambouli will eventually rear his head.”

George Habash

Meeting with Habash in Damascus, he told me how the majority of the Palestinian leaders, including himself, supported the withdrawal from Beirut. The decision became the best option after Israel tightened its siege and it became necessary to take into account the suffering of the Lebanese people.

“Of course, I chose to head to Damascus because I knew I could continue the armed struggle there, rebuild the military capabilities and take part in the armed resistance against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon,” he said.

“I was focused on the political compromise Arafat would have to make after leaving Beirut. He told us bluntly that we had no choice but to accept the American initiatives to resolve the Palestinian cause because the fight against Israel according to his [Arafat’s] rules was no longer possible after the loss of the Lebanese arena,” he added.

Salah Khalaf

I once met prominent Palestinian leader Salah Khalaf in Tunisia. He was forlorn and told me that the decision to leave Beirut was dictated by several military, political and humanitarian factors.

The Palestinian resistance was not fighting on its own land, he recalled. It had to take into account the needs of the locals and their fears. Moreover, no one truly believed that the Security Council and Soviet Union could deter Israel. “Given those circumstances, taking a suicidal decision was out of the question. So, we had no choice but to withdraw,” he revealed.

“We were unable to find a substitute to Beirut after we pulled out from it. There can be no substitute to this city that gave so much to the Palestinian revolution. Along with the Lebanese, we wronged the city, inadvertently at times. If only we had been better at understanding the fears of our rivals and circumstances of our allies,” he remarked.

“After Beirut, we had no choice but to look internally. I’m not exaggerating when I say that we criminally wronged Beirut. We wasted this glittering gem. I often wonder how the Lebanese people themselves allowed Beirut to deteriorate to such an extent. They took part in the crime as well, also inadvertently at times. There was an inevitable price to pay for the loss of Beirut,” he said.



Askari, Iran Revolutionary Guards’ Shadow Envoy in Baghdad

Iraqi security personnel stand beside the coffin of a Popular Mobilization Forces member killed in an attack in al-Qaim district (AFP)
Iraqi security personnel stand beside the coffin of a Popular Mobilization Forces member killed in an attack in al-Qaim district (AFP)
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Askari, Iran Revolutionary Guards’ Shadow Envoy in Baghdad

Iraqi security personnel stand beside the coffin of a Popular Mobilization Forces member killed in an attack in al-Qaim district (AFP)
Iraqi security personnel stand beside the coffin of a Popular Mobilization Forces member killed in an attack in al-Qaim district (AFP)

Abu Ali al-Askari, whose death was recently announced by Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah, may not have been a single man, but a full diplomatic apparatus representing Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in Baghdad.

Most likely, Askari, a covert account on X, functioned as a banner for a group rotating the role of a “shadow ambassador,” enforcing the policies of Iran’s Revolution in Baghdad, including setting a strict tempo for political decision-making.

Kataib Hezbollah, one of the Iran-aligned armed groups, said on March 16 that Askari had been killed, without giving details of time or place.

The announcement is believed to have followed a rocket strike on a house in Baghdad’s Karrada district, where influential figures from armed factions were holding an “operational” meeting. Security sources, however, said he may have been targeted in one of two attacks, one on a vehicle and another on a separate house east of the capital.

In a statement signed by Ahmad al-Hamidawi, who is the group’s leader, Askari was described as “the artery linking battlefields with media platforms.”

For about five years, this pseudonym issued a stream of hardline positions that helped entrench rigid policies in Iraq, often reflecting Iran’s unofficial stances, not those of its ambassador in Baghdad.

The account was repeatedly deleted or suspended and re-created, with its statements often circulating through media outlets or screenshots rather than directly from the source.

A lingering mystery

Askari remained an enduring enigma, the subject of constant speculation about his identity.

Iraqi researcher Hisham al-Hashimi, who was shot dead by a Kataib Hezbollah member in the summer of 2020, had said Askari was MP Hussein Moanes of the Huqooq Movement, the group’s political wing.

Many denied any link. Over time, a different narrative took hold, portraying Askari as a shadowy operative handling highly sensitive roles, while identifying himself online as “the security official of Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq.”

After the announcement of his death, conflicting accounts emerged. Initial reports said he was among those killed in the Karrada strike, naming him as Abu Ali al-Amiri, a special adviser and aide to the group’s leader.

Later, platforms close to armed factions said he was one of Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi's brothers. Other assessments suggested the group fabricated his death to cover up the killing of several faction leaders in precise strikes across Baghdad since the outbreak of the war with Iran.

In the end, Abu Ali al-Askari appears to be a collective identity. The multiplicity of personas fits a media strategy that mirrors the Revolutionary Guard’s use of ambiguity to project intimidation. It also raises the possibility that the reported death masks a significant internal development, since the death of a “virtual account” can be concealed.

Sources say the figure, or figures, behind the account likely included a security official within the group, a member of its shura council, and a military adviser trained by the Revolutionary Guard to shape both field and political strategies.

In all cases, Askari stands as one of the Guard’s most significant political investments in Baghdad.

An Iranian yardstick

Abu Ali al-Askari may not even be a pseudonym, but a functional title for one of Iran’s most sensitive roles in Iraq. By weight of influence, it acted as a tool steering political outcomes toward Tehran’s approach.

Days before his reported death, Askari wrote that “the appointment of the next prime minister will not take place without the fingerprint of the Islamic resistance.”

At a time when the Coordination Framework was deadlocked over the rejected nomination of Nouri al-Maliki, his position set the tone for Shiite political behavior and signaled a threshold aligned with Iran’s vision, including the selection of a premier approved by Tehran first.

He kept alive his drumbeat of criticism to the government of Mustafa al-Kadhimi, then softened rhetoric toward the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, which emerged after violent clashes between supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr and security forces in the Green Zone. He had endorsed the current government early.

Over the years, Askari commented on nearly every domestic decision, including opposing plans to extend an Iraqi oil pipeline to Jordan.

With similar force, he helped derail the “majority government” project that Muqtada al-Sadr sought after the 2021 elections, calling it “exclusionary toward the factions’ weapons and aligned with the American vision.”

In 2019, when protesters demanding an end to Iranian influence were killed in operations attributed to a “third party,” Askari described them as infiltrators pursuing suspicious foreign agendas, rhetoric widely seen as incitement against hundreds of young demonstrators.

In that sense, identifying his true identity may matter less than understanding the scale of influence Kataib Hezbollah has built.

Askari’s role extended to setting rules of engagement, defining the political weight of Sunni and Kurdish actors, and signaling red lines in Iraq’s external relations, including ties with Arab, Gulf, and international actors. At one stage, he warned against “reintegrating Syria and rehabilitating its new leadership within the international community.”

Iran’s shadow ambassador

After the 2017 independence referendum in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, Askari took a hardline stance against Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani, effectively giving an informal green light for punitive measures, calling the move a “division project backed by the United States and Israel.”

For Askari, the rise of Mohammed al-Halbousi to the speakership in 2018 reflected non-national balances in an externally backed deal. In his view, the Sunni leader of the Taqaddum party paid the price for what he described as an “intersection with a suspicious external project.”

In January 2020, after the killing of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Askari wrote that “US forces in Iraq have become legitimate targets.”

Five years on, these positions read as if issued by a “shadow embassy” for Iran, articulating hardline stances that are acted upon literally, without being voiced by official diplomats.


Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
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Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)

When Israeli and US strikes killed Ali Khamenei at the start of the Middle East war, Iran's security chief Ali Larijani became even more powerful than he had been for decades.

Israel's Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Tuesday that Larijani had been killed, though Iran's authorities have not confirmed his death.

Larijani had since the start of the war played a far more visible role than the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen in public since he was appointed to replace his slain father.

The security chief, on the other hand, was seen walking with crowds at a pro-government rally last week in Tehran, in a sign of defiance against Israel and the US.

His killing, if confirmed, would be a major blow against Iran, undermining a key figure seen as capable of navigating both ideology and diplomacy.

- Pragmatist -

Adept at balancing ideological loyalty with pragmatic statecraft, Larijani was central prior to the war to Iran's nuclear policy and strategic diplomacy.

Bespectacled and known for his measured tone, the 68-year-old was believed to enjoy the confidence of the late Khamenei, after a long career in the military, media and legislature.

In 2025, after Iran's last war with Israel and the US, he was appointed head of Iran's top security body, the Supreme National Security Council -- a position he had held nearly two decades earlier -- coordinating defense strategies and overseeing nuclear policy.

He later became increasingly visible in the diplomatic arena, travelling to Gulf states such as Oman and Qatar as Tehran cautiously engaged in nuclear negotiations that were ultimately scuppered by the war.

- 'Canny operator' -

"Larijani is a true insider, a canny operator, familiar with how the system operates," Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group's project director for Iran, said before the Middle East war began.

Born in Najaf, Iraq in 1957 to a prominent Shiite cleric who was close to the Islamic Republic's founder Khomeini, Larijani's family has been influential within Iran's political system for decades.

Some of his relatives have been the targets of corruption allegations over the years, which they denied.

He earned a PhD in Western Philosophy from the University of Tehran.

A veteran of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq war, Larijani later headed state broadcasting IRIB for a decade from 1994 before serving as parliamentary speaker from 2008 to 2020.

In 1996, he was appointed as Khamenei's representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). He later became secretary of the SNSC and chief nuclear negotiator, leading talks with Britain, France, Germany and Russia between 2005 and 2007.

He ran in the 2005 presidential elections, losing to populist candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with whom he later had disagreements over nuclear diplomacy.

Larijani was then disqualified from running for president in both 2021 and 2024.

Observers viewed his return as the head of the SNSC as signaling a turn reflecting his reputation as a conservative capable of combining ideological commitment with pragmatism.

Larijani supported the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with world powers which unraveled three years later after US President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement.

In March 2025, Larijani warned that sustained external pressure could alter Iran's nuclear posture.

"We are not moving towards (nuclear) weapons, but if you do something wrong in the Iranian nuclear issue, you will force Iran to move towards that because it has to defend itself," he told state television.

Larijani repeatedly insisted negotiations with Washington should remain confined to the nuclear file and defended uranium enrichment as Iran's sovereign right.

- Violent repression -

Larijani was among officials sanctioned by the US in January over what Washington described as "violently repressing the Iranian people", following nationwide protests which erupted weeks earlier due to the rising cost of living.

According to rights groups, thousands of people were killed in the government's brutal crackdown of the protests.

Larijani acknowledged that economic pressures had "led to the protests", but blamed the violence which ensued on foreign involvement by the United States and Israel.


Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
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Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)

Western diplomatic sources have outlined to Asharq Al-Awsat the tight inner circle surrounding Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, shedding light on the key figures shaping decision-making at a critical moment for the country.

According to these sources, any serious discussion of a comprehensive ceasefire in the ongoing war with Israel and the US is unlikely to begin until this inner circle concludes that the country has reached a point of military exhaustion and that prolonging the conflict would only deepen its strategic predicament.

The sources also dismissed claims over Khamenei’s lack of experience over decision-making. Khamenei has long been involved in the decision-making process within the office of his late father, former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, they stressed. He has also maintained extensive ties with Iran’s military leadership, particularly within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

A key figure in this circle is Mohsen Rezaei, appointed by Mojtaba Khamenei as a senior military adviser. Often described as a “man of war”, Rezaei is also believed to have been among those who advised Khomeini to accept the ceasefire with Iraq at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, when Iranian forces were reportedly exhausted.

The sources identified several influential figures in the Supreme Leader’s inner circle. The most prominent among them is parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former IRGC commander who is said to have played a leading role during last year’s 12-day conflict with Israel.

Other key figures include General Ahmad Vahidi, the commander of the IRGC, who previously served as minister under both presidents Ebrahim Raisi and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and was the first commander of the Quds Force, the foreign arm of the IRGC.

General Rahim Safavi, a senior adviser during the tenure of the slain Khamenei, General Ali Abdollahi, head of operations at the armed forces’ general staff, General Majid Mousavi, commander of the IRGC’s missile unit, and Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, head of its naval forces, are also part of the new supreme leader’s inner circle.

Despite the heavy blows, the Iranian regime has so far succeeded in preventing any fragmentation within its military and leaderships, the sources noted.

Developments indicate that Iran’s military leadership had preprepared a strategy aimed at making any war against it extremely costly for both the region and the global economy.

This strategy, they said, rests on two main pillars: first, “drawing Gulf states into the theater of war through missile and drone attacks under the pretext of targeting US presence”; and second, “causing widespread or total disruption to maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.”

The sources added that Tehran is betting on what it perceives as US President Donald Trump’s limited patience for prolonged conflict, especially amid rising oil prices, which Iran hopes could approach $200 per barrel, the proximity of US midterm elections, and the lack of broad public support for war.

On the other side, US and Israeli forces have escalated strikes in an effort to demonstrate the scale of destruction inflicted on Iran’s military arsenal and defense industries.

The objective of regime change appears to have receded in favor of a strategy of attrition, one that could compel Iran to scale back what the sources described as its “self-destructive behavior.”

The sources suggested that the new supreme leader may initially find it difficult to adopt a flexible or conciliatory stance in his first test of leadership. However, a growing sense that continued attrition could trigger internal unrest — or even raise questions about the regime’s survival — may ultimately lead senior military figures to conclude that preserving the system justifies accepting painful compromises.

They also warned that missile and drone attacks targeting Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries could prove counterproductive, particularly as they have largely struck civilian targets.

The sources stressed that the Gulf states’ significant regional and international standing could form the basis for mounting global pressure on Iran to agree to a ceasefire. When that moment comes, Tehran may find that the war has set it back by years.