Israel-Gaza: Navigating the Buffer Zone Dilemma

An Israeli Merkava tank near the separation barrier between southern Israel and Gaza (Reuters)
An Israeli Merkava tank near the separation barrier between southern Israel and Gaza (Reuters)
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Israel-Gaza: Navigating the Buffer Zone Dilemma

An Israeli Merkava tank near the separation barrier between southern Israel and Gaza (Reuters)
An Israeli Merkava tank near the separation barrier between southern Israel and Gaza (Reuters)

Inherently, humans are territorial. Throughout the agricultural revolution, spanning over 15 thousand years, land has been a focal point of conflict among peoples.

The possession of land equates to power and wealth, leading to wars of invasion and occupation, culminating in the era of colonization during the industrial revolution.

Even in today’s age, with the technological revolution, territorial wars and invasions persist, ranging from Ukraine to Gaza.

Land control remains a fundamental consideration in strategic and security calculations.

Geographic depth, in a way, is deemed essential for both individual and national security.

The spatial dimension can be translated into time, ensuring early warning of impending danger. The farther away the geographical threat, the more time is available to prepare for its deterrence.

The geographical buffer may be artificial or, more precisely, prearranged between certain countries.

It can serve as an alternative solution to military confrontation, particularly when the interests of these nations intersect.

In the Great Game between Russia and Britain in Central Asia, what is now known as Afghanistan was established.

This occurred after the English Lord Mortimer Durand drew a 2,670-kilometer line that did not define the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Consequently, Afghanistan can be seen as playing the role of a buffer state during that time.

Israel grapples with a geographical dilemma, lacking geographic depth in terms of its length and width.

For instance, Israel’s width in its narrowest region does not exceed 15 kilometers, situated between the West Bank and the sea.

From a purely security standpoint, this distance means that a single Katyusha rocket has the potential to disrupt life in Tel Aviv.

Israel is currently engaged in a campaign of eradication in Gaza, occasionally alluding to the establishment of buffer zones within the territory.

As for past experiences, Israel has experimented with buffer zones, notably through the use of smart fences, but these attempts have proven unsuccessful.

The limited size of the Gaza Strip (365 square kilometers) does not allow for the creation of buffer zones within it, particularly given its high population density.

Israel cannot maintain control within the buffer zones in the presence of fighters from Hamas and other organizations.

Therefore, the situation necessitates the complete elimination of all organizations in the sector. So far, the factor of time is working against Israeli forces.

If all organizations are eliminated, who will govern Gaza? Who will volunteer for such a task? Can the Security Council issue a resolution to manage the sector, considering the possibility of a Chinese or Russian veto?



Yemeni Platform Warns of Houthis Expanding Influence to Horn of Africa

Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)
Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)
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Yemeni Platform Warns of Houthis Expanding Influence to Horn of Africa

Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)
Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)

A Yemeni platform focused on organized crime and money-laundering, PTOC, has warned of the dangers of the Iran-backed Houthi militias expanding their activities and influence to the Horn of Africa.

In a report, it said the militias were actively seeking to expand their operations there with the direct supervision of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and in coordination with the Lebanese Hezbollah militia, which is also backed by Tehran.

This is the first time that a report is filed about the Houthi plans in the Horn of Africa.

Asharq Al-Awsat received a copy of the report that details the Houthis’ expansionist plans at Iran’s direction. It discusses the Houthis’ smuggling and armament operations, recruitment and training of Africans, and identifies the officials responsible for the militias’ project in the Horn of Africa.

Overseeing the foreign expansion are leading Houthi officials Abdulwahed Abu Ras, Al-Hassan al-Marrani and Abu Haidar al-Qahoum, as well as head of the so-called security and intelligence agency Abdulhakim al-Khiwani and foreign operations agency official Hassan al-Kahlani, or Abu Shaheed.

The report also highlighted the role played by deputy Houthi foreign minister Hussein al-Azzi through diplomatic sources and figures in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan and Kenya to forge intelligence, security, political and logistical ties.

Training

The report said the Houthis were keen on establishing “sensitive intelligence centers” throughout the Horn of Africa and countries surrounding Yemen. They are working on training cadres “as soon as possible” so that they can be “effectively activated at the right time to achieve the Quranic mission and common interests of all resistance countries, especially Iran, Gaza and Lebanon.”

The report obtained documents that reveal how the Houthis have established ties with African figures to “complete preparations and operations in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa to support the Houthis should they come under any international political or diplomatic pressure.”

Leading officials

The report identified several Houthi figures who are overseeing these operations, starting with IRGC official “Abu Mahdi” to the owner of the smallest boat that is used for smuggling weapons in the Red Sea.

It also spoke of the relations forged with the al-Shabaab al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia and the African mafia to smuggle Africans to Yemen in what the report described as one of the most dangerous human trafficking and organized crimes.

The PTOC report said the Houthis have recruited Africans from various countries, especially in wake of the militias’ coup in Sanaa in 2014. They have been subjected to cultural and military training and deployed at various fronts, such as Taiz, the west coast, Marib and the border.

Some of the recruits have returned to their home countries to expand the Houthi influence there.

Abu Ras and al-Kahlani

The report named Abdulwahed Naji Mohammed Abu Ras, or Abu Hussein, as the Houthis’ top official in expanding their influence in the Horn of Africa. A native of the Jawf province, he was tasked directly by top Iranian political officials and the IRGC in running this file.

Among his major tasks is coordinating with the IRGC and Houthis and directly overseeing the smuggling of IRGC and Hezbollah members from and to Yemen.

Abu Ras has avoided the spotlight for several years during which he has handled the Houthis’ most dangerous intelligence and political files.

He served as secretary of foreign affairs at the security and intelligence agency until Hassan al-Kahlani's appointment to that post. Abu Ras was then promoted to his current position at the recommendation of Houthi leader Abdulmalek al-Houthi and the IRGC leadership.

Al-Kahlani, also known as Abu Shaheed, was born in the Hajjah province in 1984. He is a known Houthi security operative as he grew up among the Houthis in Saada and Sanaa and joined the militias at a young age.

The report said al-Kahlani was part of the Sanaa terrorist cell that carried out several bombings and assassinations in wake of the killing of Houthi founder Hassan al-Houthi in 2004. He was also among the Houthi leaderships that took part in the coup in Sanaa.

Al-Kahlani now works directly under Abu Ras. He is known for his close ties to the IRGC and has been using this relationship to impose himself as the top official in the security and intelligence agency, exposing the struggle for power between him and the actual head of the agency Abdulhakim al-Khiwani.