‘Al-Aqsa Flood’ : Initiated by 70 Elite Fighters, Crafted by 5 Hamas Leaders

Palestinians in Khan Yunis atop an Israeli military vehicle seized during the Al-Aqsa Flood operation (DPA)
Palestinians in Khan Yunis atop an Israeli military vehicle seized during the Al-Aqsa Flood operation (DPA)
TT

‘Al-Aqsa Flood’ : Initiated by 70 Elite Fighters, Crafted by 5 Hamas Leaders

Palestinians in Khan Yunis atop an Israeli military vehicle seized during the Al-Aqsa Flood operation (DPA)
Palestinians in Khan Yunis atop an Israeli military vehicle seized during the Al-Aqsa Flood operation (DPA)

Palestinian sources closely associated with the leadership of the Al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas in Gaza, have disclosed new details about the Al-Aqsa Flood attack on Oct.7, 2023.
This assault, which altered the landscape of the region, unfolded a new era with endless possibilities.
The surprise attack launched by Hamas resulted in the death of over 1,200 Israelis and the abduction of more than 200 others in settlements, kibbutzim, and military sites in the Gaza envelope.
In response, Israel claims to have killed a significant number of perpetrators of Al-Aqsa Flood, totaling at least 1,500 members of Hamas.
Additionally, Israel has reported the killing of over 23,000 Palestinians in its ongoing retaliatory war in Gaza.
The Al-Aqsa Flood operation began with just 70 fighters, launching a surprise attack along the entire Gaza Strip border, from north to south, Palestinian sources told Asharq Al-Awsat.
They crossed the Israeli border by strategically exploding prepared explosives to breach the thick walls of the Gaza-Israel barrier.
Additionally, they used gliders and parachutes to position fighters behind, above, and around Israeli sites.
Sources reveal that those involved in the operation were selected from Hamas’ “Elite Unit” across various areas in Gaza, having undergone extensive training over the years.
The plan to infiltrate settlements in Gaza’s envelope is not new, originating before the 2014 war and revisited after the 2021 “Sword of Jerusalem” battle.
After receiving confidential training, elite members pledged secrecy and refrained from discussing plans, even though they were unaware of any clear attack plan.
Their training focused solely on infiltrating settlements.
Sources reveal that many brigade leaders in various Gaza areas were unaware of attack details or plans, while some had limited information about their tasks.
This secrecy was part of a security plan to prevent leaks to Israeli intelligence, which later admitted to failing to prevent the Oct. 7 attack.
The decision and timing of the attack were reportedly made by only five individuals: Yahya Sinwar, Hamas leader in Gaza; Mohammed al-Deif, leader of the Al-Qassam Brigades; Mohammed Sinwar (Yahya’s brother), wanted by Israel and a key assistant to al-Deif.
The other two individuals are Rouhi Mushtaha, a Hamas leader close to Sinwar, and Ayman Nofal, a close associate of al-Deif and former head of Al-Qassam Brigades’ intelligence, assassinated by Israel in the current war.
According to sources, the officials responsible for planning the operation informed Al-Qassam Brigades’ unit leaders about the preparations and the attack plan, excluding the exact timing.
They were notified three days before final readiness, meeting with regional brigade leaders who were assigned tasks without specifying the “point of no return.”
Brigade leaders then prepared their selected forces.
Ayman Siyam, the leader of the Gaza rocket unit (also assassinated during this war), received instructions to launch hundreds of rockets simultaneously with the attack.
The sources explained that Oct. 7 was chosen based on reports of complete calm on the borders.
The decision-makers concluded on Friday that Saturday morning would be the most suitable time (Israel’s day off).
They waited until midnight on the eve of Oct.7 and then gave the order to prepare.
Field commanders and elite forces received instructions and began moving in the early hours, marking the start of the operation.
The secrecy was also extended to the political leaders of Hamas.
According to sources, Hamas leaders received a briefing just hours before the operation, instructing them to go into hiding.
Senior leaders, including Ismail Haniyeh and Saleh al-Arouri, were informed of an impending attack but received no specific details or timing until a few hours before.
The primary plan aimed for a significant attack and capturing Israeli soldiers, but unexpected events made it more extensive.
Israeli defense lines collapsed easily, leading to the immediate capture and casualties of many soldiers.
After an hour and a half, remaining elite units in Al-Qassam Brigades were mobilized to support those inside the settlements.
Other armed factions were later informed about the possibility of participating, expanding the attack as hundreds entered the settlements.
After capturing dozens of Israelis, Al-Qassam Brigades’ leadership instructed fighters to engage Israeli forces, using the opportunity to focus on gathering and hiding the abductees amid significant chaos.
Hamas and Palestinian groups, along with others, managed to move about 240 abducted individuals, including Israelis and non-Israelis, into Gaza.
About 136 of them are still there after some were exchanged earlier.
The Israeli army also found some abductees’ bodies during ongoing ground operations and brought them into Israel.



Beirut Transfers 128 Syrian Convicts Home

Lebanese army soldiers secure the area at the entrance of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah village, southern Lebanon, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese army soldiers secure the area at the entrance of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah village, southern Lebanon, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
TT

Beirut Transfers 128 Syrian Convicts Home

Lebanese army soldiers secure the area at the entrance of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah village, southern Lebanon, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese army soldiers secure the area at the entrance of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah village, southern Lebanon, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH

Lebanon has transferred 128 Syrian convicts to their home country, a Lebanese security source told AFP on Wednesday, the second batch of handovers under an agreement the two sides signed earlier this year.

Overcrowded Lebanese prisons host around 2,000 Syrian nationals held on various charges.

Many are still awaiting trial, while hundreds have been brought before military courts on charges of "terrorism" or related offences, including attacks on Lebanese forces.

Others are in custody for alleged membership in militant or armed groups that were opposed to now-ousted Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, who was supported by Lebanon's Hezbollah during the Syrian civil war.

The security source, who requested anonymity, said that Beirut "handed over the second batch of Syrian convicts in Lebanon to Damascus, numbering 128 convicts" on Wednesday.

The transfer follows the handover of more than 130 Syrian detainees in March, under an agreement signed between the two countries the previous month, which will cover almost 300 convicts who have served 10 years or more in Lebanese prisons.

Under the agreement, they will be required to complete the remainder of their sentences in Syria.

At least 260 convicts have now been sent to Syria's Adra prison out of 356 in Lebanon's Roumieh, the source added.

The issue of the detainees had been a sticking point in Beirut-Damascus relations following Assad's overthrow in December 2024.

It was discussed by Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam during his visit to Damascus in May, where he met Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Over the past year, both sides have repeatedly expressed their determination to open a new chapter in their relations.


Syrian Troop Killings Expose Repeated Attacks, Security Lapses

Syrian army personnel on a military vehicle in Deir Hafer, rural Aleppo, in January 2026. (Reuters)
Syrian army personnel on a military vehicle in Deir Hafer, rural Aleppo, in January 2026. (Reuters)
TT

Syrian Troop Killings Expose Repeated Attacks, Security Lapses

Syrian army personnel on a military vehicle in Deir Hafer, rural Aleppo, in January 2026. (Reuters)
Syrian army personnel on a military vehicle in Deir Hafer, rural Aleppo, in January 2026. (Reuters)

The recent killing of two Syrian army members near Manbij, east of Aleppo, was not an isolated attack. It was part of a recurring pattern of strikes on government forces, exposing serious administrative and security gaps that groups opposed to Syria’s new administration are using to target its personnel.

Syria’s Ministry of Defense media and communications department said on June 20 that two soldiers from the 76th Division were killed after unknown gunmen attacked them near Manbij.

The soldiers were riding a motorcycle on a road near the city when they came under direct fire.

Since the fall of the Assad regime, Asharq Al-Awsat has tracked many similar attacks on Syrian security and army personnel. Most have occurred as members were heading to or leaving their posts, often on motorcycles or via irregular transport.

Many see the pattern as evidence of weak protection measures and poor organization of personnel rotations.

Rural Aleppo has witnessed several assassinations this year. Among the most prominent were the killing of two Syrian army members in March and another member of the Interior Ministry in April near the town of al-Rai.

Similar incidents have also been reported across most Syrian provinces, including Daraa, Latakia, rural Hama and Homs.

Embarrassing the Syrian state

Demands have grown for personnel to avoid moving alone, wearing military uniforms or using motorcycles in remote areas where the risk is high and support is hard to reach.

Major Khaled al-Abdullah, director of the Syrian interior minister’s office, said the defense and interior ministries had repeatedly issued circulars banning personnel from wearing official uniforms outside working hours and requiring them to follow safety measures suited to Syria’s current conditions.

He said the immediate aim of attacks by groups opposed to the new administration, including Islamic State and remnants of the ousted regime, was to “try to embarrass the Syrian state.”

Abdullah stressed that authorities were working hard to impose security, eliminate armed groups and organizations, and had made significant progress on what he called a difficult path.

But in remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, he also pointed to “continued internal and external challenges that the Syrian state is working to overcome and whose danger it seeks to end.”

Manbij, the most dangerous route

Abu Mohammed al-Hussein, who oversees a cluster of checkpoints in eastern rural Aleppo, said the movement of personnel had become a problem. He said he had repeatedly asked for buses to transport rotating shift members, especially in rural areas far from the city center.

Hussein said one member of his checkpoint group survived an assassination attempt on the Manbij-al-Bab road in eastern rural Aleppo at the end of March. The incident pushed him to issue special orders regulating how his personnel move.

“A civilian car offered to take one of my men to Aleppo city,” he said. “After they had driven several miles, they claimed there was an emergency and said they had to return. As soon as he got out, the driver’s companion fired several shots at him with a pistol. Two hit his magazine pouch and one pierced his foot. He survived by a miracle.”

He said shift rotations are “decided centrally by sector commanders” and are often carried out at night because service areas are far from where personnel live. He said a ban on carrying weapons and moving through residential areas had also made personnel easier targets.

“With repeated assassination attempts, I issued a decision banning nighttime shift rotations, prohibiting movement in civilian cars or on motorcycles, which have also become easy targets, and limiting transport to road security vehicles,” he added.

Hussein said they were still waiting for approval of a request to allocate a bus to transport security and military checkpoint personnel deployed along the Aleppo-Manbij road.

He described it as “one of the most dangerous land routes,” linking Aleppo to outlying areas and Raqqa province, and passing through an area that remained for years under the control of the ousted regime and the Syrian Democratic Forces.

Ban on keeping weapons

Haider al-Mohammed, a special tasks member, disagreed. He said “transport buses are, in practice, the easy target” and are often attacked, meaning the problem of securing personnel goes beyond transport.

He said decisions that stripped personnel of the means to protect their safety and identity were the direct reason behind the rise in assassinations, alongside the exceptional conditions in the country and the process of “clearing out groups that believe they can create chaos and fear.”

He said among the most important of these decisions were “the ban on wearing face coverings, the ban on keeping registered weapons, and the strict instruction not to carry personal weapons, along with leniency over wearing official uniforms.”

As a result, he said, personnel are exposed, easy targets for these groups, and left without weapons to defend themselves.

On this point, Major Khaled al-Abdullah said Syria’s security and military institutions were working to “implement solutions to facilitate and reduce regular movement in a way that helps end the threat and strengthen the safety of their personnel.”

He said the pattern of attacks “confirms their randomness.” The failure to select specific targets or have prior knowledge of the personnel being targeted, he said, was “an attempt to create chaos and confuse the Syrian state.”


Arab Parliament Speaker Stresses Need for Solidarity to Confront Regional Challenges

Arab Parliament Speaker Stresses Need for Solidarity to Confront Regional Challenges
TT

Arab Parliament Speaker Stresses Need for Solidarity to Confront Regional Challenges

Arab Parliament Speaker Stresses Need for Solidarity to Confront Regional Challenges

Speaker of the Arab Parliament Mohammed Al-Yamahi stressed the importance of solidarity, unity of ranks, positions, and voices, and strengthening consensus among Arab countries in addressing the growing challenges and risks facing the region, which require greater solidarity, cohesion, and joint Arab action now more than ever.

He made the remarks today during the preparatory committee meeting for the Eighth Conference of the Arab Parliament and Speakers of Arab Councils and Parliaments, which is being held in partnership with the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union, SPA reported.

Al-Yamahi explained that this year's conference is being convened at a critical and exceptional stage for the Arab nation, requiring the highest levels of coordination, consultation, and unified positions on issues and challenges affecting the Arab world's present and future.

He noted that the conference will address several strategic issues, foremost among them the serious developments surrounding the Palestinian cause, the Arab world's primary concern.

It will also discuss recent highly dangerous security developments in the region and Iranian attacks against Arab states, as well as the topic of enhancing Arab digital sovereignty, which has emerged as a strategic issue driven by rapid digital transformation.

He said the issue calls for the development of a unified Arab parliamentary vision that protects Arab interests, strengthens digital security, and supports sustainable development efforts.