Targeting of Deif: Symbolic Blow to Al-Qassam Brigades Deepens Leadership Crisis

Palestinians stand near covered bodies after an Israeli air strike in the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis, southern Gaza Strip, 13 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
Palestinians stand near covered bodies after an Israeli air strike in the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis, southern Gaza Strip, 13 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
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Targeting of Deif: Symbolic Blow to Al-Qassam Brigades Deepens Leadership Crisis

Palestinians stand near covered bodies after an Israeli air strike in the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis, southern Gaza Strip, 13 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
Palestinians stand near covered bodies after an Israeli air strike in the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis, southern Gaza Strip, 13 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER

Israel killed dozens of Palestinians on Saturday in an attempt to assassinate Mohammed Deif, leader of Hamas’ military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, alongside his deputy, the head of the Khan Younis brigade, Rafa Salama.

This is at least the seventh attempt in 30 years to eliminate Deif.

Israel awaits confirmation of Deif’s death, which, if confirmed, would be a significant propaganda victory during the current Gaza conflict. Hamas denies Israel’s claims, calling the incident another civilian massacre.

The potential success of this operation raises questions about its impact on the Al-Qassam Brigades, whose leaders have been targeted since Israel’s recent conflict escalation following the Oct.7 attacks.

Understanding Deif’s role is crucial—he is the second leader of the Al-Qassam Brigades, assuming his position after the assassination by the Israeli army of its former commander, Salah Shahada, on July 23, 2002.

However, he is widely regarded as the architect of the group’s significant military strength.

Sources informed Asharq Al-Awsat that shortly after assuming leadership of Al-Qassam Brigades, specifically in 2003, Deif swiftly obtained authorization from Hamas’ political leadership to establish a large military force, effectively an army, and immediately began implementation.

Despite numerous assassination attempts and the loss of many of his aides and family members, Deif has never ceased in his efforts, persisting in building this “large army” which has over the years become the foremost Palestinian force and to some extent, a deterrent against Israel.

Since the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel’s repeated attempts to assassinate Deif have intensified, following six previous failed efforts.

Deif’s ability to evade capture elevated him beyond his role in Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades to a symbol of Palestinian resilience.

Israel claims Deif was the driving force behind Hamas’ military strength and the mastermind behind their tunnel network.

His potential absence could impact morale within Al-Qassam Brigades.

Nevertheless, Al-Qassam Brigades have a history of displaying flexibility in their military structure.

For example, when Israel assassinated Ahmed Jabari, known as Hamas’ “Chief of Staff,” in 2012, Marwan Issa was immediately appointed as his successor. In the aftermath of the Oct.7 attacks, Israel killed Issa.

Al-Qassam Brigades have a comprehensive military structure encompassing military justice, manufacturing, oversight, support and combat weapons, operations, intelligence, internal front, human resources, and institutes and colleges.

If Israel succeeds in assassinating Deif and Salama, it would have eliminated nearly all members of the military council.

The exceptions include Mohammed Shabana, leader of the Rafah Brigade, Azzedine al-Haddad, commander of the Gaza Brigade, and the uncertain fate of Raed Saad, previously claimed to be assassinated by Israel without confirmation, along with Mohammed al-Sinwar, brother of Gaza’s Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar.

The Sinwar brothers are known to be close associates of Deif and are believed to be alive.

Despite the ongoing assassinations that have targeted 14 brigade commanders and other leaders across Gaza, Hamas sources suggest that if Deif is killed and the Sinwar brothers survive, Mohammed al-Sinwar is likely to take over leadership of the Al-Qassam Brigades.

According to Hamas sources, the brigades’ future leadership will be decided by the political bureau, adapting to the operational situation.

Operations will continue under a structure established since the fourth month of the ongoing conflict, with each brigade following a hierarchical command from the brigade commander down to unit leaders, factions, and other military groups.

Despite losing many political and military leaders over the years, including its founders, Hamas remains strong in Gaza.



Egypt... An ‘Alternative Sudan’ for those Fleeing War

A café in Giza popular with displaced Sudanese (Asharq Al-Awsat)
A café in Giza popular with displaced Sudanese (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Egypt... An ‘Alternative Sudan’ for those Fleeing War

A café in Giza popular with displaced Sudanese (Asharq Al-Awsat)
A café in Giza popular with displaced Sudanese (Asharq Al-Awsat)

With the influx of hundreds of thousands of displaced Sudanese into Egypt over the past months due to the ongoing war in their country, Egypt has turned into an “alternative Sudan” that embraces more than 5.5 million regular and irregular refugees.

“We live in an integrated Sudanese society in Egypt,” Musaab Hamdan, 33, told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Hamdan, a cleaning worker at a private company in the Mohandiseen neighborhood, said that the country was a haven for thousands of displaced people fleeing the war.

The Egyptian government estimates the number of Sudanese at about 5 million out of 9 million refugees on its territory, while President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi describes them as “guests of Egypt.”

The large inflow of Sudanese since the outbreak of the war in their country in 2023 has put pressure on the International Commission for Refugees in Cairo and Alexandria, where about 3,000 refugee applications are received daily. This has increased the number of Sudanese registered with the Commission to 300,000 persons, which represents 52 percent of the total number of refugees registered in Egypt with UNHCR until April.

The Sudanese features and traditional attire are distinctive on the streets of Cairo and Giza, where Sudanese vendors and citizens are now seen practicing business activities that were limited to Egyptians for decades, including driving taxis and small buses in popular neighborhoods. Hamdan said that this reflects the rapid integration of newcomers into everyday life in Egypt.

Mohamed Abdel Majeed, a taxi driver in Giza, speaks the Egyptian dialect so fluently that many locals do not realize he is from Sudan.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that he has adapted to driving on Cairo’s streets and now knows the names and locations of stations by heart.

Alternative haven

Social networking sites are monitoring this heavy Sudanese presence in Egypt, as some videos have focused on the idea of an “alternative Sudan in the country.”

Among them was a comment made by a Sudanese influencer who joked about the heavy presence of his countrymen in the Faisal neighborhood in Giza, saying: “If you are Sudanese living abroad and want to see your family and your country. All you have to do is go to Giza, Egypt.”

Tens of thousands of Sudanese fleeing the war in Sudan consider Egypt the “best haven.” Fatima Hassan feared that her daughters would be “raped by armed militias in Sudan,” and decided to enter Egypt irregularly, she told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Extreme heat and thirst exhausted Fatima and her three daughters during a long trip, before she succeeded in reaching Giza to join her sister who had preceded her there several months ago.

Last month, the authorities announced that they have prevented the illegal entry of buses carrying displaced Sudanese. However, Abdullah Qouni - who has lived in the Maadi neighborhood in Cairo for 15 years and helps many newly displaced to find housing or a job opportunity - told Asharq Al-Awsat that around 11 buses from Aswan enter Egypt daily. He added that each irregular migrant pays about $500 to smugglers in exchange for the trip.

Education

One of the most important features of “Alternative Sudan” is the sight of dark-skinned students on their way to dedicated schools. Their number has increased steadily in recent months, forcing the Egyptian authorities to close some of them in order to “legalize the situation.”

Sami Al-Baqir, spokesman for the Sudanese Teachers Syndicate, estimates the number of Sudanese schools in Egypt at about 300 basic and intermediate schools.

The Sudanese embassy in Cairo, which moved its headquarters years ago from Garden City to the Dokki neighborhood, thanked the Egyptian government for its cooperation in making the Sudanese primary certificate exams a success in June, through six educational centers affiliated with the embassy. ​​

On the academic level, Ayman Ashour, the Egyptian Minister of Higher Education, estimated the number of Sudanese students who enrolled in Egyptian universities last year at more than 10,000.

Egyptian sensitivities

With the Sudanese “jilbab” dominating Egyptian streets and neighborhoods, and videos of large Sudanese gatherings in Cairo being circulated on social media, in addition to reports about the expulsion of Egyptian tenants to house displaced Sudanese, concerns have mounted over their presence in the country.

Moreover, news have emerged about some Sudanese families performing circumcision on their daughters in Egypt, prompting activists to call on Egyptian authorities to enforce the law that criminalizes female circumcision.

Egyptian media professionals joined in criticizing the Sudanese presence. Qaswa Al-Khalali expressed “concern” about the presence of refugee clusters in popular areas, considering this matter “extremely dangerous.” Meanwhile, journalist Azza Mostafa warned of “some refugees taking control of entire areas in Cairo,” pointing to bad consequences on Egypt.

Egyptian parliamentarians responded to calls to legalize the status of refugees, including Siham Mostafa, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee in the House of Representatives. In television statements, she said: “Egypt hosts millions of foreigners and provides them with services at the same prices provided to citizens without any increase, despite the current economic crisis.”

Reducing burdens

Due to the economic crisis, Egypt has called on the international community to support it in “bearing the burdens of refugees.”

Former Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry said, after his meeting with the Director-General of the International Organization for Migration, Amy Pope, that the support Egypt receives from the international community was not commensurate with the burdens it bears, especially as the Egyptian economy suffers from the consequences of global crises.

The Egyptian government recently launched a process to count the numbers of refugees residing on its territory, with the aim of calculating the cost of hosting them and determining the financial burdens.

In a statement issued in April, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Egypt requested $175.1 million to meet the most urgent needs of Sudanese refugees who have fled to Egypt since mid-April 2023.