Lebanese Ex-MP Recalls Shocking Meeting between Rafik Hariri, Bashar Assad on Lahoud Term Extension

One article on the agenda: Insulting Rafik Hariri

President Bashar al-Assad receives PM Hariri for a meeting. (Getty Images)
President Bashar al-Assad receives PM Hariri for a meeting. (Getty Images)
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Lebanese Ex-MP Recalls Shocking Meeting between Rafik Hariri, Bashar Assad on Lahoud Term Extension

President Bashar al-Assad receives PM Hariri for a meeting. (Getty Images)
President Bashar al-Assad receives PM Hariri for a meeting. (Getty Images)

Asharq Al-Awsat is publishing a series of excerpts from a new book by former Lebanese MP Bassem al-Sabeh in which he recalls the thorny relationship between slain former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and members of the ruling elite in Syria. “Lebanon in the Shadows of Hell: from the Taif Accord to Hariri’s Assassination” is published by All Prints Distributors & Publishers.

Sabeh worked as an aide to Hariri until his killing in February 2005. He served as lawmaker from 1992 to 2009. He was also appointed information minister in Hariri’s government between 1996 and 1998. Sabeh is a member of Hariri’s Mustaqbal Movement and a pillar of the March 14 movement that opposed Syria’s political and security hegemony over Lebanon.

Anjar ... mandatory gate to Syria

Lebanese officials headed to Damascus must make a mandatory stop in the Lebanese Bekaa town of Anjar. For over 30 years, the town was the headquarters of the Syrian intelligence in Lebanon. Major General Mohammed Ghanem assumed that post from 1976 to 1982. He was succeeded by Major General Ghazi Kanaan from 1982 to 2001 and then Rustom Ghazaleh in 2001 until Syria’s military withdrawal from Lebanon following former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri's assassination in 2005.

Ghanem had also taken up Beirut as the headquarters of his command, allowing it to be closer to the Arab Deterrent Force that was formed in 1976 to help end the Lebanese civil war (1975-90). The force eventually withdrew from Lebanon shortly after, leaving behind the Syrian army in Lebanon. Syria initially deployed 25,000 soldiers, but that figure eventually grew to 40,000.

The deployment of the Syrian troops took place in March 1976 at the official request of President Suleiman Franjieh to President Hafez al-Assad. He asked for military intervention to stop Palestinian organizations and leftist militias from carrying out attacks against Christian regions.

Ghazi Kanaan acted as the Syrian “high commissioner” in Lebanon. He took up residence in Anjar and Beirut’s Ramlet al-Bayda area. I visited Anjar with Hariri and alone a handful of times. Throughout those visits, Kanaan was always courteous and never abused his position for political gain. I did notice, however, how he could be courteous to some visitors and deliberately offensive to others, including lawmakers, ministers, businessmen and clerics.

It was rare for any Lebanese official or public figure to head to Damascus without passing through Anjar or receiving its approval. I met several heads of political blocs, senior ministers, security officials, judicial officials, clerics, muftis, university professors, bank directors, businessmen and others in Anjar seeking favor with Damascus or “help” in passing a violation at a ministry or other public administration.

Ghazi Kanaan addresses an audience with Rafik Hariri seated the background in 2002. (EPA)

In 2001, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad decreed that Kanaan return to Damascus. He appointed Ghazaleh in his place with the direct support of Assef Shawkat, Assad’s brother-in-law and head of military intelligence – one the most important branches of Syrian intelligence. A rivalry would soon emerge between Kanaan and Ghazaleh.

The name Rustom Ghazaleh has haunted me in my personal and political life. One of my most shocking encounters with the official dates back to early 2001 when a Lebanese youth visited my home in Beirut’s Bir Hassan area. I usually received friends and citizens asking for services during morning hours. One such figure was a youth who asked to meet me alone.

After completing the morning meetings, I received him while my bodyguards remained by the door because they were suspicious of him. “I carry a political message. I am unarmed and I only want a one-on-one meeting,” he said in a Lebanese accent with a slightly southern lilt.

“It is unimportant for you to know my name, but it is important that you understand the purpose of my message,” he said, identifying himself Khaled. “I can humbly pave the way for PM Rafik Hariri to Assef Shawkat. My ties with Assef are greater than you can imagine.”

“I can play a positive role in PM Hariri’s favor. He is now the closest person to Bashar. I am the only one who can open the doors to Hariri. Try and you won’t lose. Khaddam’s role is finished. Shehabi has resigned and Kanaan will meet the same fate,” he said referring to Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam and army commander Hikmat al-Shehabi.

I quickly made my way to Hariri’s residence in Qoreitem in Beirut. I told him in detail everything that happened that morning. He picked up the phone, called Kanaan and informed him that he was heading to Anjar to inform him of “something important.” Kanaan replied that he would be out of the office and that I should meet with Ghazaleh.

I headed to the headquarters of Syrian intelligence in Ramlet al-Bayda to meet Ghazaleh. We sat alone in the office and I recounted the meeting with Khaled. He then got up and contacted Kanaan by phone. He held a military salute the entire time he was on the line, detailing to him what I had just told him. “As you wish, sir,” he kept on repeating.

At the end of the conversation, he turned to me and said: “Is this dog going to visit you again tomorrow?... Thank you for your cooperation. I hope that you will receive him and inform me of anything new.” Concerned, I returned to Qoreitem again and briefed Hariri on the meeting.

The next day, Khaled came to visit me. No sooner had he stepped foot into the house that I saw Ghazaleh storming in with two armed men. They beat Khaled up and Ghazaleh ordered them to “take the dog to the car. He will see what happens to those who undermine their masters.” He thanked me and hastily left. I was left in shock and quickly made my way to Qoreitem.

Hariri had not expected Ghazaleh’s reaction to be this severe. I expressed my concern that I may have inadvertently caused a dispute between Syrian intelligence branches. Hariri contacted Ghazaleh, who asked that I meet with him.

He stood behind his desk, holding the same club that he used to beat up Khaled. He showered me with thanks and praise, while I voiced my alarm over what happened. He replied: “There is no need to be afraid. He got what he deserved... He will rot away in prison. He is in the custody of the military police. He is a nobody and has no ties with anyone in the leadership.”

For months guilt ate away at me for what happened to Khaled. Was he killed or was he really imprisoned?

Bassem al-Sabeh and Rafik Hariri are seen at parliament in Beirut an hour before the bombing that killed the former PM in February 2005. (Courtesy of Bassem al-Sabeh)

Syrian ‘high commissioner’

My attention then shifted to news of Ghazaleh’s appointment as Syria’s “high commissioner” in Lebanon and Kanaan’s transfer to Damascus. Ghazaleh’s appointment forced Hariri to change his approach. The PM had enjoyed good ties with Kanaan, Shehabi and Khaddam.

Ghazaleh celebrated his appointment to the “Anjar throne” for three days during which he received well-wishers. Syrian intelligence intensified its activities in Beirut’s Hamra neighborhood, the southern Beirut suburbs, northern Metn region and northern city of Tripoli. Local Lebanese parties and economic, judicial, security and media figures were expected to queue up in Anjar to gain Ghazaleh’s blessing.

Kanaan, meanwhile, carried out a farewell tour throughout Lebanon, starting with the presidential palace where President Emile Lahoud awarded him with the National Order of the Cedar - the country’s highest order - “in appreciation of his work for Lebanon”. Hariri threw a reception in his honor that was also attended by Ghazaleh. He bestowed upon him the key to the city of Beirut in recognition of his services. At the Defense Ministry, Kanaan was also bestowed with a medal in recognition of his work.

Hariri was aware that Kanaan’s transfer was the result of a secret meeting held between Lahoud, Shawkat, Ghazaleh and Jamil al-Sayyed, the head of Lebanon’s General Security. Lahoud had expressed his irritation with Kanaan’s role in the parliamentary elections and how he had joined Hariri’s celebrations in the western Bekaa town of al-Khiyara. Lahoud went so far as to contact Assad himself to request Kanaan’s transfer.

Ultimately, Hariri’s Lebanese and Syrian rivals worked together to clip Kanaan’s wings. They succeeded in taking out an ally of sorts out of the picture, replacing him with Ghazaleh, who relished political, financial and security blackmail and in playing the dirtiest of roles.

Syrian intelligence chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazaleh. (AFP)

Days after his appointment, Ghazaleh sent Hariri a list of pressing demands related to furnishing his home in Chtaura, paving the road leading to it, and generally providing whatever the new Syrian high commissioner in Lebanon needed in his new house. It was from this home that Ghazaleh waged campaigns against Hariri, completely ungrateful to the man who had furnished it for him.

I visited that house in late 2004, when I was returning to Beirut from Damascus with Hariri. The visit took place weeks after the failed assassination attempt against minister Marwan Hamadeh. We were warmly greeted by Ghazaleh, who denied that he had anything to do with the extension of Lahoud’s term in office. He also stressed that Syria would never cover up the failed assassination attempt, amid accusations by the Lebanese opposition that Damascus was behind the attack.

As we got up to leave, Ghazaleh told me: “Brother Bassem, rest assured. Don’t be afraid of anything. We won’t let what they did to Marwan happen to you. Your brother is here whenever you want.” I was shocked. In the car, Hariri said: “Did you hear what he said? He is crazy. He is either dumb or threatening you.” I replied: “Those words were for you.”

Ghazaleh reaped the rewards of Syria’s intelligence operations in Lebanon. He gained a fortune that was not simply a product of whatever payments he received from Hariri, politicians, businessmen and people asking for favors. He used to receive 50,000 dollars a month from Hariri. He also took part in looting the Al-Madina Bank following its scandal in Lebanon.

Kanaan himself was affected by the scandal and soon after, his influence in Lebanon ended with Ghazaleh taking over completely. Hariri and I visited Kanaan in Damascus less than two months after his transfer. He appeared defeated, telling Hariri: “You have given so much to Lebanon and Syria. We wronged you at times, but you stood tall.” Out of respect, Hariri did not bring up Ghazaleh, who on the contrary, used to bring up Kanaan whenever he could to deride his work.

Extension of Lahoud’s term

Tensions over the extension of Lahoud’s term in office reached boiling point in early 2004. For once, Lebanese politicians were no longer afraid of speaking out against Syria’s role in Lebanon.

The Council of Maronite Bishops issued a strongly worded statement expressing their rejection of the extension and undermining of the constitution. “Syria is dealing with Lebanon as though it were a Syrian province. It has the final say in everything, appoints governors and organizes elections. It appoints whoever it wants and interferes in all state affairs,” it said. Hariri remarked at the time: “Lebanon is headed towards a dead end if the way in which it is governed does not change.”

President Emile Lahoud and PM Hariri. (AFP)

In late March 2004, Hariri was summoned for an urgent meeting with Assad. He believed the meeting would be an opportunity to reconsider the extension of Lahoud’s term given Lebanon’s opposition to it. He had high hopes, especially with international pressure on Syria and efforts to draft United Nations Security Council resolution 1559 that would be issued in September and call for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon.

The Syrian leadership had other things in mind completely. It received Hariri for an unprecedented meeting in the history of Lebanese-Syrian relations.

Hariri arrived at the meeting on time. He was met with Bashar and all senior officers who had overseen Syria’s operations in Lebanon: Kanaan, Ghazaleh, and Mohammed Khalouf. Assad had set only one article on the meeting agenda: Insulting Hariri.

He said: “Comrades Ghazi, Rustom and Mohammed had dedicated their work in service of Lebanon and they helped you in assuming your responsibility. While you, you dedicated all your relations to strike Syria. You will fail in preventing the extension of Lahoud’s term. Lahoud is me and I am Lahoud. What you are doing with your French and American friends will backfire against you. The extension will happen and you will not stand in its way, neither will statements nor pressure from your friends.”

Assad then gave the way for Kanaan to launch his own attack. He deliberately tried to soften the blow by detailing the support Syria has offered Lebanon and the history of relations between them. He warned of the danger of using Lebanon and the position of its prime minister to attack Syria. He also hailed Hariri’s role during the rule of late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

It was then Ghazaleh’s turn. Like Bashar, he did not hold back. “Who are you without Syria and its president?” he told Hariri. “You are just a businessman. You would never have dreamed of becoming prime minister were it not for Syria’s approval. We helped you. We supported your policies. We opened doors for you here and in Lebanon. But you have been ungrateful for everything we have done for you. You stand with [French President Jacques] Chirac against us. You are inciting him to harm Syria. You, Chirac and the Americans will not have your way. Syria is your master. If the president wants the extension to happen, then you will make it happen. You have no choice in this.”

Bashar watched the blows rain down on Hariri in a state of nothing short of elation.

The meeting ended with Hariri not uttering a word in his defense.

Abdul Halim Khaddam. (Reuters)

Back in Beirut, he said: “Never in my life have I ever been hurt this way. I almost stormed out of there without permission and could have created a big problem. A problem with whom? The president of Syria. Should I have spoken back right in front of his officers?! I chose silence and patience ... and left afraid for Syria and Lebanon.”

Hariri did not speak of the meeting to Khaddam, who had telephoned to ask about it. Hariri told him: “Ask Abou Arab, he was there. I will stay at home. You won’t see me in Syria anymore.” Khaddam realized that the situation was dangerous, and I was summoned to meet him the next day.

What happened to Hariri is “unacceptable”, Khaddam told me. He said he had contacted Bashar to express his alarm at the meeting, bluntly telling him that it was not right for the president of Syria to insult the prime minister of Lebanon, whether in the presence of his officers or not. “Rafik Hariri is my friend and was your father’s friend, but he is also the prime minister of a brotherly country and debasing him is just not done by the president of Syria,” he added.

He also said that he had advised Assad to rectify the situation. Assad listened and “told me to tackle it with the best of my ability. You can apologize and do what you deem fit,” he remarked.



From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
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From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)

Libya depends on oil for nearly 98% of its income. Yet a central question persists: How are those revenues collected and spent in a country divided between rival governments? And why do Libyans complain of poverty when their country holds Africa’s largest oil reserves and produces and exports about 1.4 million barrels a day?

The process starts with the National Oil Corporation, which collects proceeds from crude oil and gas sales in US dollars and deposits them in accounts at the Libyan Foreign Bank. The money is then transferred to the Central Bank of Libya's accounts in Tripoli, recorded as state budget sovereign revenue, and converted into Libyan dinars.

The dollar trades at 6.36 dinars at the official rate, compared with 9.12 on the parallel market.

The Finance Ministry in Tripoli then issues spending authorizations under approved financial arrangements, after which the central bank releases funds to ministries and other state bodies through the main budget chapters.

Libya’s oil export revenues have swung sharply in recent years, ranging between $18 billion and $22 billion. They rose to about $18 billion in the first half of this year, nearly double the level in the same period last year, according to the Economy Ministry in the interim Government of National Unity.

Libyan oil expert Mohamed al-Shahati attributed the increase during that period to the war involving Iran.

Where is the breakdown?

Economists say Libya’s dependence on oil as its near-exclusive source of income lies at the heart of the crisis.

Ayoub al-Farsi, an economics professor at the University of Benghazi, said Libya showed how excessive reliance on natural resources could turn into a complex financial crisis when combined with political fragmentation and a lack of economic diversification.

“The Libyan economy is a clear example of how excessive dependence on natural resources can become a complex financial crisis,” he said, adding that political fragmentation and the absence of diversification had created conditions that directly affected people’s lives.

Al-Farsi, a member of the Central Bank of Libya’s Monetary Policy Committee, said the economy was built around a rentier-state model that depended almost entirely on oil exports to fund the treasury and provide foreign currency.

That dependence, he told Asharq Al-Awsat, had created deep structural distortions.

Agriculture and industry had been marginalized, the state bureaucracy had expanded to absorb workers into unproductive public-sector jobs, and the country had grown heavily dependent on imports for most consumer goods, he said.

Industrial activity remains limited, largely confined to the private sector and small-scale production. Critics also point to a market dominated by a small number of traders and importers, helping imported goods crowd out local production.

At protests across Libyan cities, the question is often the same: Where is the oil money going? Why are people struggling in an energy-producing country?

Al-Shahati said part of the answer lies in the difference between the value of the oil Libya produces and the amount that actually reaches the state treasury.

“Not every barrel produced in Libya is converted directly into a dollar entering the public treasury, because foreign partners have a share,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Foreign companies have become production partners under various contractual arrangements, he said.

He also pointed to a stark contradiction: Libya produces oil, yet depends heavily on imports of gasoline, diesel, and other petroleum products to meet domestic demand.

That means a growing share of the country’s resources is converted into foreign currency to pay for fuel imports.

Al-Shahati said another problem was the lack of a regularly published, unified, and easy-to-read account that answers basic questions, such as: What was the total value of the oil produced? How much went to foreign partners? How much was exported for the state? How much went to the domestic market? And how much net revenue was actually available for public spending?

“The figures in circulation provide parts of the picture,” he said, “but they do not always show the full flow of revenues from the wellhead to the state’s public accounts.”

Libya’s oil fields are concentrated mainly in the eastern Sirte Basin, which holds about 82% of its oil reserves, as well as in the Murzuq Basin in the southwest and offshore areas along the coast.

Fuel and power crises

Those weaknesses in the oil revenue chain are unfolding as Libya grapples with a severe electricity crisis.

The country has suffered several “blackouts” in recent days, with some areas going without electricity for more than 17 hours a day.

Researcher Ezzedine Mokhtar sees the power cuts as one part of a wider pattern of recurring financial failures, including fuel shortages.

He blamed the hardship facing many Libyans on “corruption” and “unlimited spending” by two rival governments competing for power in the country’s east and west.

He also cited “oil smuggling through Arkenu, whose revenues go to specific individuals rather than the state treasury.”

Mokhtar said Libya’s subsidy system was another core problem, with more than 60% of the country’s budget going to fuel subsidies.

He called on the Tripoli government to phase out those subsidies gradually and to draw up a national plan to develop the workforce.

“We have no industrial skills in anything,” he said. “We import everything — yogurt, dairy products, fruit, vegetables, frozen fish, and even underwear. Everything comes from abroad.”

Libya ranks 10th globally in proven oil reserves, with about 48.3 billion barrels, according to Worldometer.

The UN Panel of Experts said in its latest report on Libya, covering October 2024 to February 2026, that Arkenu had moved at least $3 billion in oil revenues to bank accounts outside Libya between January 2024 and November 2025.

According to the report, Arkenu was established in 2023 as a private company and is indirectly controlled by Saddam Haftar, deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army. It faces accusations of “oil smuggling.”

Reuters previously investigated the company and concluded, based on shipping documents, London Stock Exchange Group data, and information from Kpler, that some oil revenues were being diverted away from the Central Bank of Libya.

How are revenues distributed?

Oil revenues are distributed across the four main chapters of the state budget, according to experts and economists.

Chapter One, salaries and wages, takes the largest share. It covers public-sector employees across eastern, western, and southern Libya through the unified national identification number system.

Chapter Two covers operating expenses for ministries and public institutions.

Chapter Three covers subsidies, including fuel, water, and electricity.

Chapter Four covers development and projects, including infrastructure, as well as allocations to the National Oil Corporation to sustain and increase production.

Al-Shahati said 26% of oil revenues went toward importing fuel products, equivalent to about $7 billion if crude traded at $70 a barrel.

This year, he said, the figure could rise to between $8 billion and $9 billion because oil prices had climbed above $85 a barrel and the gap between crude prices and diesel and gasoline prices had widened amid shortages.

He also pointed to higher domestic consumption driven by economic growth and a rise in smuggling.

A second problem, al-Shahati said, is the absence of an approved national budget, which would make it possible to determine how spending should be allocated among population groups and regions.

“What is clear is that the main cities control most spending,” he said.

He also pointed to “a large and obvious imbalance” in salaries across Libya’s three regions, job grades, and types of employment.

Those gaps, he said, risk widening financial divisions between social groups.

Even an agreement to unify development spending did not appear to be properly implemented because there were no clear standards and no comprehensive budget.

“There are no criteria for distributing oil revenues,” al-Shahati said. “The distribution process is random and unsustainable.”

Libya fell to 177th out of 182 countries in the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, from 173rd out of 180 countries in 2024, reflecting worsening corruption and no tangible improvement over the past two years.

Pressure on the local economy

A report by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Libya highlighted deep structural strains in the economy, driven by high public spending, near-total dependence on oil and gas revenues, and mounting pressure from food, fuel, and electricity prices.

The report, submitted to the UN Security Council on Aug. 17, covers the period from April 1 to July 28.

Citing the International Monetary Fund, it said Libya’s fiscal deficit reached 30% of gross domestic product last year, while public debt climbed to 146% of GDP.

Inflation also rose into double digits, eroding purchasing power.

The UN report noted unjustified increases in fuel consumption by military and security agencies and the energy sector, as well as repeated double purchasing.

The cost of institutional division

Libya’s political and institutional split and the presence of multiple authorities have made the economic crisis worse, al-Farsi said.

The distortions, he said, were no longer merely structural.

They had created parallel public finances and pushed consumer spending higher to meet the demands of rival authorities, sending salaries and subsidies to unprecedented levels.

Repeated shutdowns of oil fields in previous years, combined with lower actual revenues, pushed financial authorities toward deficit financing and higher public debt, al-Farsi said.

That flooded the market with money without a corresponding rise in domestic production.

Oil revenues reached $21.9 billion in 2025, according to the National Oil Corporation, up from $18.6 billion in 2024, an increase of 15%.

Al-Farsi said the deterioration in public finances had left monetary authorities in a difficult position and forced them into emergency measures to protect reserves and contain the deficit.

The result, he said, was a weaker national currency, liquidity shortages and a collapse in confidence.

Development tools had also been paralyzed.

“Monetary policy shifted from an instrument for stimulating growth and investment into a tool for managing daily crises,” he said.

Why has the crisis not been solved?

Economists point to several reasons.

Al-Shahati put “corruption spreading on an unprecedented scale” near the top of the list.

“Corruption is no longer confined to the margins,” he said. “It has come to dominate the core of public finances in key sectors, obstructing any attempt at reform.”

He also blamed the absence of an institutional vision following the breakdown of middle management, which had once linked fiscal and monetary policy to economic realities and provided unified political backing.

Policies, he said, had become detached from the economy and lost their ability to restore balance.

Conventional reforms that had worked elsewhere would not work in Libya, al-Shahati said, because the country lacked a central political authority capable of building an institutional vision and curbing corruption that had spread through both the state and private sector.

Al-Farsi said Libya could not escape its fiscal and monetary crisis without addressing the roots of the problem.

That meant unifying the management of public finances, curbing government spending, and launching genuine structural reforms that would gradually shift Libya from consuming oil rents to building a diversified economy.

Mokhtar also called on the Tripoli government to develop a strategic plan to make better use of human resources and support small and medium-sized industries.

For him, breaking Libya’s dependence on oil revenues is part of the way out.

Masoud Suleiman, chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation, said in media remarks last week that the country needed between $30 billion and $40 billion in investment to develop untapped oil and gas resources.

The corporation, he said, aims to raise production to 2 million barrels a day by 2030.


Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
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Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)

With a long shoreline on the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's southern trade hub of Bandar Abbas has found itself at the frontlines of the war with the United States, with residents struggling to revive livelihoods battered by months of fighting.

Like elsewhere in Iran, economic strain has squeezed households since US-Israeli strikes triggered the Middle East war on February 28. But unlike much of the country, the port city of around half a million people has remained exposed to fighting even after an April 8 ceasefire brought relief elsewhere.

But despite a lull in hostilities in July, residents still feel squeezed. Saeed Tajik, 42, used to work at a shipyard before losing his job and turning to driving a taxi.

"The prices of housing and food have become extremely high. Almost all the basics -- rice, yoghurt, and oil -- have doubled," said Tajik.

Fuel shortages have long been common in southern Iran, where authorities restrict supplies in an effort to curb widespread fuel smuggling.

But now, "the queues have become longer ... it happens that we wait in the long line for fuel only to get told 'there is none' upon arriving," Tajik said as he drove past a station where motorists waited under the punishing summer heat.

Hormuz has emerged as a central flashpoint after an April ceasefire and June framework deal failed to resolve disagreements between Washington and Tehran over the future management of the strait.

During the war, US strikes hit bridges, highways and railway infrastructure around Bandar Abbas until mid-July, in what analysts saw as attempts to cut off the city and disrupt Iranian military logistics in the south.

- 'Nothing left' -

Inside the city, under a towering concrete statue of two armed men with their arms trained towards Hormuz waters, economic strains play out in long queues snaking outside petrol stations and soaring prices squeezing shoppers in local markets.

The city's repeatedly hit airport remained largely closed until August 15, leaving travelers facing arduous road journeys, sometimes combined with flights and boat crossings.

Outside the city, construction crews still toil under the sweltering summer sun to repair the Gachin bridge, split by a US strike, as cars rumble along a dusty detour below.

Along the waterfront, traditional wooden vessels known as lenjes sit moored alongside fishing and commercial boats, part of a centuries-old trading network linking southern Iran with Arab states across the Gulf.

Arash Tondro, 45, used his lenj to carry Iranian fresh and dried fruit to the United Arab Emirates and return with household goods and other imports.

"My income dropped to zero at the beginning of the war," said Tondro, who later rerouted some trade through Oman's Khasab port as regional seaways were disrupted and "many of the lenjes were hit by drones".

After the UAE suspended trade with Iran on Tuesday following a missile attack on a ship that Tehran denied carrying out, Tondro said he was again unsure how his work would be impacted.

"People in the south mostly rely on trade or fishing. If you take the sea and trade away from them, there is practically nothing left. We don't have agriculture here; whatever there is comes from the sea," he said.

- 'No sales' -

As night falls and August's oppressive heat begins to ease, fish vendors set up along a busy street, laying out shark, tuna and shrimp as the smell of the day's catch hangs in the humid air.

Among them is 22-year-old Anoush Mallah, who recently moved onto the street after soaring rents forced him to close his shop in one of the city's bazaars.

"Business has been terrible since the war started. There are no sales, it's very weak," he told AFP.

"People are short of money. The fishermen aren't going fishing either."

Many fishermen around Bandar Abbas only began returning to sea in recent weeks, after months ashore for fear of being caught in the crossfire of US-Iran fighting.

Diplomatic efforts have so far failed to end the war. For Mallah, the uncertainty only adds to the strain.

"Let it (the war) start and get some result; right now, we're just left in limbo," he said.


The Ethiopian Dam Dispute and Egypt’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
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The Ethiopian Dam Dispute and Egypt’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry

Over the past two weeks, Egypt has repeatedly stressed its right to prevent any actions by Addis Ababa on the Nile River that could harm its water interests, stressing that it possesses the “right to self-defense” over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

According to experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, Egypt’s signaling means that it “will not hesitate to use all legitimate means to safeguard its water security.”

They explained that the message is a stern warning to Ethiopia and suggests that Cairo is seeking to shift from a policy of protesting Ethiopian measures to preventive deterrence, aimed at stopping the establishment of a new status quo on the Nile.

New Egyptian Warning

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said that “Egypt will not allow the construction of additional dams ... that affect its water interests,” stressing Cairo’s commitment to a legally binding agreement that guarantees its water rights.

In a television interview on Wednesday evening, Abdelatty said that Egypt does not oppose African countries’ right to development, noting Cairo’s participation in dam and infrastructure projects in several Nile Basin states. However, he stressed the need to balance the right to development with the rights of downstream countries.

He also underscored Egypt’s commitment to protecting its water interests. “We have the right to self-defense to protect our interests and water security,” said the minister. “We will not accept any agreement regarding the Nile River unless it is legally binding,” he reiterated.

Mohamed Hegazy, a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs and a former assistant foreign minister, says the right of self-defense is protected under international law after all peaceful means have been exhausted.

According to Hegazy, the core message is that Cairo still prefers agreement and negotiation, but it no longer accepts using negotiations to impose a fait accompli.

He argued that the most significant aspect of Abdelatty’s statements is that they send three simultaneous messages - Rejection of unilateral measures, rejection of additional dams, and insistence on the right of self-defense to protect water security.

Hussein El-Behairy, an African affairs expert at the National Center for Middle East Studies, said the minister’s recent statements reaffirm Egypt’s right to defend its historical and water rights in the Nile by whatever means the Egyptian state deems appropriate to preserve what Egyptians view as a matter of life and death.

Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Reuters

Escalating Egyptian Position

This is the third time Egypt has signaled the possibility of using its “right to self-defense” and preventing dam construction on the Nile.

On August 16, Egypt’s state news agency quoted an unnamed Egyptian official as saying that Cairo “will neither accept nor allow any party to control the flow of Nile waters to downstream countries,” stressing that the Egyptian state possesses multiple tools capable of protecting its people’s interests in the Nile.

The statement came in response to remarks attributed to Ethiopian Minister of Water and Energy Habtamu Itefa concerning the construction of additional dams on the Nile and control over water flows to downstream states, namely Egypt and Sudan.

Earlier, on August 4, Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hani Sewilam stated during a press conference that Egypt “will not allow the construction of new Ethiopian dams on the Nile River.”

He said: “It is well known that Ethiopia has plans to build additional dams, but will the Egyptian state allow this? No.”

According to Hegazy, the ball is now in Ethiopia’s court. If Addis Ababa agrees to resume serious negotiations leading to a legally binding agreement on GERD, the crisis can be contained.

However, if Ethiopia continues to create new realities on the Nile, the scope for a diplomatic solution will narrow, making risk management and deterrence a more prominent part of Egypt’s strategy.

El-Behairy does not expect the escalation to pave the way for new negotiations on GERD unless the Ethiopian government is willing to make concessions in response to Cairo’s demands. These demands include reaching a legally binding agreement that guarantees Egypt’s water rights during periods of drought and severe drought, and providing Egypt with information regarding the operation of the dam in a manner that does not harm its water interests.