Farouk al-Qaddoumi: We Visited Assad and He Ordered Arafat’s Release from Mezzeh Prison

Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
TT

Farouk al-Qaddoumi: We Visited Assad and He Ordered Arafat’s Release from Mezzeh Prison

Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)

No history of the Arab world in the past seven decades could be written without stopping at length at the Palestinian Fatah movement. The history of the movement itself cannot be written without stopping at one of its founders, Farouk al-Qaddoumi (Abu al-Lutf), who passed away on Thursday at the age of 94.

Qaddoumi was one of the original founders of the movement in 1965, alongside Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf, and Khalil al-Wazir. He had moved away from the spotlight in the past 30 years over his opposition to the Oslo Accord and concern that Israel would use it against the Palestinian leadership and its people.

Before that, Qaddoumi was a prominent Palestinian figure who championed the cause as foreign minister of the Palestine Liberation Organization at international meetings. He was clear and firm in his speeches before the United Nations, Arab and Islamic summits and others.

A member of the Baath party, I asked him one day of his thoughts about Arafat (Abu Ammar) and his sole leadership of the Palestinians. He replied: “Abu Ammar is the leader of the Fatah tribe. According to our norms, the tribe leader enjoys privileges that others don't.” Whatever reservations he had about Arafat never led him to question his position as the top Palestinian leader.

I met Qaddoumi in Tunis in 1998 and will share some moments of that meeting in Asharq Al-Awsat in wake of his passing:

Early years

*How was the Fatah movement born?

Acts of resistance emerged after the occupation of Gaza in 1956. The Arab world was also being swept up in revolts from Algeria to Iraq and others. This left an impact on us. In fact, the success of the revolution in Algeria helped spur freedom fighter, “fidai”, work in our region.

Palestine’s Grand Mufti Amin al-Husseini had, during his stay in Egypt and then Lebanon, advocated for Palestinian resistance and struggle. The Higher Arab Commission existed at the time, paving the way eventually for the fidai movement. The armed struggle was also prompted by the lack of political achievements at the time.

With the dour political mood, Algeria’s independence was a beacon of hope that inspired the formation of fidai movements, and so Fatah began to take shape in Kuwait and later Qatar in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The formation of Fatah would pave the way for the formation of the PLO in 1964.

*When did you meet Arafat for the first time?

I was in Cairo in 1954. Along with Arafat, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), and I were members of the General Union of Palestine Students. Arafat was its president. I was a student at the American university, Arafat was a student at Cairo University and Abu Iyad went to al-Azhar University.

I was a member of the Baath part, Abu Iyad of the enlightened Muslim Brotherhood and Arafat was religious but independent. We spent three years in Cairo. Arafat graduated and then headed to Kuwait where he worked as an engineer. He was followed by Abu Iyad and I worked in the health ministry. I took up positions in Libya, then Saudi Arabia and later Kuwait in 1960.

We didn’t hold meetings together. Rather, we limited our talks to bilateral contacts to maintain secrecy. I used to get in touch with Arafat, and he with Abu Iyad. Adel Abdel Karim used to coordinate our meetings. Among the Fatah founders were Abu al-Adeeb and Khaled al-Hassan.

The central committee was formed later and it began to meet as a group in 1965. For years, we made contacts with brothers throughout the region, especially Arab and Palestinian national figures, including figures in Algeria, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

Farouk al-Qaddoumi at an Organization of Islamic Cooperation conference in Malaysia in 2003. (Getty Images)

*How was the official launch of Fatah decided in 1965?

We debated whether to announce the formation of Fatah before the establishment of the PLO in 1964 or after. In the end, we decided to reinforce resistance movements and to garner Arab support for the Palestinian national identity embodied in the PLO. This facilitated the way for armed struggle and fidai operations.

The national congress was held in Jerusalem in 1964. It brought together Arafat, Khaled al-Hassan and others. It was followed by a resistance operation that called for striking water pipelines in northern Palestine. The fighters came in from the Syrian border. The operation resulted in our first prisoner Mahmoud Hijazi and first martyr Ahmed Moussa.

We later formed a “revolutionary council”, regional committees and a central committee.

*What was Arafat’s position during that time?

He was first appointed deputy to the general commander, Abu Youssef al-Najjar. He rose to general commander in 1966 and named official spokesman. I chaired the inaugural meeting of the central committee and was named its secretary.

*Where there any disputes between members during the early days of the central committee?

Fatah embodied work, ideology and organization. Meaning we enrich our thought and organization, and improve our work through operations and experiences on the ground. We used to say that carrying arms was the foundation of our work and that the purpose of carrying arms was not financial or material, but rather, it had national, moral and noble goals.

We were initially accused to roping in Egypt and Gamal Abdul Nasser in our operations. We were also accused of poorly timing our operations. We were accused of being an Arab nationalist movement. Soon, however, our armed struggle began to bear fruit and raise the morale of the people.

The Karameh battle of 1968 gave Fatah an accomplishment. With the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967, the people yearned for the formation of a revolutionary movement. People turned to Fatah and we built foundations along the River Jordan. Eventually our work became more organized and we reached out to various Palestinian groups to unite under a single banner and so, the PLO was formed with Arafat at the helm.

*How were relations with Abdel Nasser?

We always sought to establish ties with him. We tried to meet him once in late 1965 or early 1966. I was accompanied by Arafat and Mahmoud Sawda. We couldn’t manage an audience with him and instead were met with the head of intelligence. At the time, the Palestinian revolution had not yet rose to prominence and swept headlines. It was not the focus of attention in Egypt or by its president.

That changed after the 1967 defeat of Arab armies. We met with Mohammed Hassanein Haykal, who facilitated a meeting with Abdel Nasser.

Abdel Nasser loved Arafat and saw in him the spirit of Arab youths who had hope in the future. In 1969, Abdel Nasser invited Arafat to join him on a trip to the Soviet Union and so, relations between Moscow and the PLO were forged.

Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. (Getty Images)

Ties with Syria

*When did you meet Syrian President Hafez al-Assad?

We’ve known each other since the 1960s when he was defense minister. In 1966, two Fatah officers were killed during an argument in Syria. Soon after, Syrian authorities imprisoned the Fatah leadership of Arafat, Mamdouh Saidam, Walid Ahmad Nimr, al-Wazir and others. Eleven leading members were sent to jail.

Along with a colleague, I traveled to Syria to tackle the situation. We contacted Salah Jadid, Hafez al-Assad and Ahmed Sweidan. The meeting with Assad was good. The truth was that Arafat and his comrades were suspected of being members of the Muslim Brotherhood. They were surprised to learn that I was part of the Palestinian revolution and knew that I was not a member of the Brotherhood, but of the Baath party.

Arafat was jailed for some 51 days in Mezzeh prison where he came under investigation. We sought out Assad, who was defense minister. We told him that we had heard rumors that the Syrian leadership wanted to execute the detainees. “Who told you this?” he asked. We told him that they were rumors we heard in Damascus. He replied: “Please, come and receive them.” And so, we secured the release of Arafat and the others.

Later, Arafat took part in an operation from Lebanese territories and was arrested by the Lebanese army. It also arrested the Palestinian group that carried out the operation. Through Syrian mediation, we succeeded in securing Arafat’s release.

*The Syrian and Palestinian leaderships had thorny relations. What was the toughest moment that you experienced with it?

The 1976 period when the Syrian army was deployed to Lebanon was the most difficult. The “national movement” in Lebanon was opposed to the deployment. We believed that the deployment would lead to a clash with the Palestinian revolution.

*Some Palestinians accused Syria of trying to seize Palestinian decision-making.

It wasn’t about seizing this power. The Palestinian cause was the top issue for Syria and the focus of its concern, otherwise it would never have offered us what it did. Assad and Syrian officials had repeatedly said that the Palestinians control Syrian decision-making, not the other way around.

Our relations with Assad were strong and coordination was always ongoing. Assad long underscored the strategic alliance between Syria and the Palestinian revolution. He is a member of the Baath and perhaps this background allows me to understand him since we are both members of the party. At the time, more than 60 percent of Syria’s budget went to supporting the Palestinian cause.

*Did Assad have reservations about the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon?

Not until the clash happened with the Syrian army. That prompted the question: Why did the Palestinian resistance oppose the deployment of the Syrian military? Assad is a calm, patient and persevering person. He listens to everyone and can discuss several issues at length. He has the patience that is lacking in several leaders and heads of state.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein receives Farouk al-Qaddoumi in Baghdad in 2002. (Getty Images)

Ties with Iraq

*What about your relations with Saddam Hussein?

We met Saddam in Cairo and used to travel to Baghdad, which had opened its doors to us after the Karameh battle. We even opened offices in Baghdad. Sabri al-Banna's (Abu Nidal) defection from Fatah though, created tensions between Iraq and the PLO.

*It was believed that the Iraqi leadership was influencing Banna.

Yes, we also sensed that. But Iraq acted out of a clear political vision. Iraq never hides its stances.

*What about Saddam?

He tried to understand who he was speaking with him. He was calm and focused on the person talking to him. He was never severe in dealing with us. Our requests were quickly met. He was generous with us and even more so after he became president. Iraq gave us so much. Iraq offered the PLO greater support after it was forced out of Beirut. The tensions between the PLO and Syria also helped bring us closer to Baghdad.

*Was Iraq a main backer of the PLO?

The truth is Saudi Arabia was. It provided us with so much. We must be fair in saying that Gulf countries helped the Palestinian people a lot.



What We Know and Don't Know about the Emerging Deal to End the Iran War

Government supporters hold Iranian flags and pictures of Iran's Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, during a ceremony honoring the armed forces and those killed in the war with Israel and the US in Tehran, Iran, Sunday, May 24, 2026. (AP)
Government supporters hold Iranian flags and pictures of Iran's Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, during a ceremony honoring the armed forces and those killed in the war with Israel and the US in Tehran, Iran, Sunday, May 24, 2026. (AP)
TT

What We Know and Don't Know about the Emerging Deal to End the Iran War

Government supporters hold Iranian flags and pictures of Iran's Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, during a ceremony honoring the armed forces and those killed in the war with Israel and the US in Tehran, Iran, Sunday, May 24, 2026. (AP)
Government supporters hold Iranian flags and pictures of Iran's Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, during a ceremony honoring the armed forces and those killed in the war with Israel and the US in Tehran, Iran, Sunday, May 24, 2026. (AP)

A deal appears to be emerging between the United States and Iran to end the war and open the Strait of Hormuz, and US President Donald Trump over the weekend said it had been “largely negotiated.”

It is not clear when or how the deal might be finalized and when its various parts will take effect. Trump spoke after calls with allies in the Middle East, including a separate call with Israel. Details come from two regional officials and a US official who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive negotiations.

Here’s what we know and don’t know:

The war would end

In the 12 weeks since the US and Israel launched the war with attacks on Iran that killed senior officials including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Tehran has insisted that any deal focus on ending the fighting on all fronts. That includes Lebanon, where the Iranian-backed Hezbollah militant group has been fighting Israel since two days into the war.

A fragile ceasefire has held since April 7. An end to the war would ease concerns throughout a region that saw Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates struck by Iranian missiles and drones. It would allow for global shipping, including an estimated 20% of the world's oil and natural gas, to begin flowing through the Strait of Hormuz again. It also would allow the rebuilding of energy and other infrastructure in the region.

Both regional officials said the draft deal includes an end to the war between Israel and Hezbollah, as well as a commitment to not interfere in the domestic affairs of countries in the region including Iran. That’s a critical reference to Iran’s support for proxies, which also include the Houthi militants in Yemen, Hamas militants in Gaza and Shiite armed groups in Iraq.

The US wants Israel to have a free hand to respond to what it views as threats in Lebanon while Iran rejects it, one regional official said. The US official said the deal would guarantee Israel’s right to act against imminent threats in self-defense.

The Strait of Hormuz would reopen gradually

Iran’s nuclear program, missile program and support for armed proxies were the stated reasons for the US and Israel attacking Iran. But Tehran’s retaliatory grip on the Strait of Hormuz quickly shot to the top of global concerns as hundreds of ships carrying oil, natural gas, fertilizer and other supplies were stranded.

Under the emerging agreement, the strait would gradually reopen in parallel with the US ending the blockade of Iran’s ports it launched on April 17, the regional officials said. The blockade has limited Iran’s ability to ship its oil and bring in badly needed cash for its long-suffering economy.

The US would allow Iran to sell its oil through sanctions waivers, said one of the officials, who has been briefed on the negotiations. Sanctions relief and the release of Iran’s billions of dollars in frozen funds would be negotiated during a 60-day period, the official said.

Iran would give up its stockpile of highly enriched uranium

Iran’s nuclear program and international concerns over its possible pursuit of a nuclear weapon underlie all tensions, and the US and Israel have considered highly complex military operations to go in and take out its highly enriched uranium.

Under the potential deal, Tehran would agree to give up that stockpile of highly enriched uranium, according to the regional officials. One official, with direct knowledge of the negotiations, said how Iran would give it up would be subject to further talks over the 60-day period. Some would likely be diluted and the rest transferred to a third country, potentially Russia, the official said. Russia has offered to take it.

A US official confirmed the 60-day period and said if Iran doesn’t give up its stockpile, there will be no sanctions relief.

Iran has 440.9 kilograms (972 pounds) of uranium that is enriched up to 60% purity, a short, technical step from weapons-grade levels of 90%, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Iran says it has an “inalienable” right to nuclear technology while insisting its program is peaceful. On Sunday, President Masoud Pezeshkian told state TV they were ready “to assure the world that we are not after a nuclear weapon.”

Trump on Sunday on social media said that “our relationship with Iran is becoming a much more professional and productive one. They must understand, however, that they cannot develop or procure a Nuclear Weapon or Bomb.”

What appears to be missing

Other issues have not been mentioned in descriptions of the emerging deal, including the status of Iran's uranium enrichment.

Another is Iran's missile program, which Israel in particular has sought to destroy.

And while the United States and Israel entered the war with stated ambitions of seeing Iranians rise up against their government after nationwide protests early in the year, any discussion of leadership change in Tehran appears to be out.

As for Iran's past stated aims during negotiations, there appears to be no mention of any withdrawal of US forces from the region, or for reparations for the damage the war has caused.


Attacks on Ebola Treatment Centers Are One of Several Problems Affecting Congo’s Outbreak Response

People wait to be attended at the Mongbwalu General Referral Hospital, as aid agencies intensify efforts to contain an Ebola outbreak caused by the Bundibugyo virus in Mongbwalu, Democratic Republic of Congo, May 23, 2026. (Reuters)
People wait to be attended at the Mongbwalu General Referral Hospital, as aid agencies intensify efforts to contain an Ebola outbreak caused by the Bundibugyo virus in Mongbwalu, Democratic Republic of Congo, May 23, 2026. (Reuters)
TT

Attacks on Ebola Treatment Centers Are One of Several Problems Affecting Congo’s Outbreak Response

People wait to be attended at the Mongbwalu General Referral Hospital, as aid agencies intensify efforts to contain an Ebola outbreak caused by the Bundibugyo virus in Mongbwalu, Democratic Republic of Congo, May 23, 2026. (Reuters)
People wait to be attended at the Mongbwalu General Referral Hospital, as aid agencies intensify efforts to contain an Ebola outbreak caused by the Bundibugyo virus in Mongbwalu, Democratic Republic of Congo, May 23, 2026. (Reuters)

Arson attacks on Ebola treatment centers in eastern Congo show how authorities are faced with a number of serious complications — including a backlash in local communities — as they try to stop an outbreak of an infectious disease that has been declared a global health emergency.

The burning of the centers in two towns at the heart of the outbreak shows the anger in a region beset by violence linked to armed rebel groups, the displacement of a large number of people, the failure of local government and international aid cuts that experts say have stripped health facilities in vulnerable communities.

"A devastating set of emergencies are converging," said the Physicians for Human Rights nonprofit.

Here's a look at the longstanding crises in eastern Congo that have made it home to one of the world's worst humanitarian disasters, and how they are now affecting the response to a rare type of Ebola:

The region has a constant threat of violence

Eastern Congo has seen violence by dozens of separate rebel groups for years, some of them with links to foreign countries or Islamic State.

The Rwanda-backed M23 rebels are in control of parts of the region. While the Congolese government still largely controls the northeastern Ituri Province, which is the epicenter of the Ebola outbreak, that control is tenuous. The Allied Democratic Forces, a Ugandan group linked to ISIS, is one of the dominant rebel groups there and responsible for violent attacks against civilian targets.

Before the outbreak, Doctors Without Borders said in an assessment of the situation in Ituri that the insecurity had worsened recently, causing doctors and nurses to flee and leaving overwhelmed health facilities and "catastrophic" conditions in some parts.

Nearly a million people are displaced in Ituri

Nearly 1 million people in Ituri have been displaced from their homes by conflict, according to the United Nations humanitarian office.

That means this Ebola outbreak is "unfolding in communities already facing insecurity, displacement and fragile health care systems," said Gabriela Arenas, Regional Operations Coordinator at the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

It's a significant concern that the disease might spread to the large displacement camps near the city of Bunia, where the first cases were reported.

Authorities have announced more than 700 suspected Ebola cases and more than 170 suspected deaths, mostly in Ituri. But cases have been reported in two other eastern provinces, North Kivu and South Kivu, where M23 are in control, and also in the neighboring country of Uganda.

That means that part of the outbreak in Congo is being managed by the government and part by rebel authorities, with an array of aid agencies also helping.

Aid cuts were devastating for eastern Congo

Health experts say international aid cuts last year by the United States and other rich nations were devastating for eastern Congo because it has so many problems.

The cuts "reduced the capacity to detect and respond to infectious disease outbreaks," said Thomas McHale, public health director at Physicians for Human Rights. Congo has had more than a dozen previous Ebola outbreaks.

Aid groups fighting this outbreak on the ground say they don't have the equipment they need, like face shields and suits to protect health workers from infection, testing kits, and body bags and other materials needed to safely bury the bodies of victims, which can be highly contagious.

"We have made requests to different partners, but we have not yet really received anything," said Julienne Lusenge, president of Women’s Solidarity for Inclusive Peace and Development, an aid group operating a small hospital near Bunia.

"We only have hand sanitizer and a few masks for the nurses."

The Bundibugyo type of Ebola virus responsible for the outbreak has no approved vaccine or treatment.

Health and aid workers also face anger from local communities

The burning of two treatment centers by people in the Rwampara and Mongbwalu areas — which have the highest case counts — show how a backlash in some communities is further complicating the response.

Colin Thomas-Jensen, director of impact at the Aurora Humanitarian Initiative, said the attacks may reflect the "built-in skepticism and anger" of people in eastern Congo over how the region has been treated, with years of violence from foreign-linked rebel groups and a failure of their government and international peacekeepers to protect them, he said.

Another source of anger has been the strict protocols around the burial of suspected victims of Ebola, which authorities are taking charge of wherever they can to prevent further spread of the disease when families prepare the bodies and people gather for a funeral.

The first burning of an Ebola center in Rwampara was by a group of local youths trying to retrieve the body of a friend who died, according to witnesses and police. The witnesses said the crowd accused the foreign aid group operating there of lying about Ebola.

Authorities in northeastern Congo have now banned funeral wakes and gatherings of more than 50 people in an effort to curb the spread, and armed soldiers and police are guarding some burials carried out by aid workers.


Report: Netanyahu Relegated from Partner to Passenger in Trump's War on Iran

 US President Donald Trump, right, meets with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office of the White House, in Washington, Feb. 4, 2025. (AFP)
US President Donald Trump, right, meets with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office of the White House, in Washington, Feb. 4, 2025. (AFP)
TT

Report: Netanyahu Relegated from Partner to Passenger in Trump's War on Iran

 US President Donald Trump, right, meets with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office of the White House, in Washington, Feb. 4, 2025. (AFP)
US President Donald Trump, right, meets with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office of the White House, in Washington, Feb. 4, 2025. (AFP)

In the run-up to the February 28 attack on Iran, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel was not only in the Situation Room with President Trump, he was leading the discussion, predicting that a joint US-Israeli strike could very well lead to the demise of the regime in Iran.

“Just a few weeks later, after those sanguine assurances proved inaccurate, the picture was starkly different. Israel was so thoroughly sidelined by the Trump administration, two Israeli defense officials said, that its leaders were cut almost entirely out of the loop on truce talks between the United States and Iran,” said a New York Times report on Saturday.

“Starved of information from their closest ally, the Israelis have been forced to pick up what they can about the back-and-forth between Washington and Tehran through their connections with leaders and diplomats in the region as well as their own surveillance from inside the Iranian regime,” said the two officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.

“The banishment from the cockpit to economy class has potentially significant consequences for Israel, and especially for the prime minister, who faces an uphill re-election battle this year.”

“Netanyahu has long sold himself to Israeli voters as a kind of Trump whisperer,” uniquely capable of enlisting and retaining the president’s support. In a televised speech early in the war, he portrayed himself as the president’s peer, assuring Israelis that he talked to Trump “almost every day,” exchanging ideas and advice, “and deciding together.”

“He had led Israel to war in February with grand visions of achieving a goal he has pursued for decades: stopping Iran’s push for nuclear weapons once and for all. As the war began with a stunning decapitation of much of the government in Tehran, it seemed as though an even more grandiose dream might come true: the toppling of the regime.”

“But many in Trump’s inner circle had always viewed the idea of regime change as absurd. And it wasn’t long before American and Israeli priorities began to diverge more, especially after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, sending oil prices soaring and pressuring Trump into agreeing to a ceasefire.”

Far from vanquished, Tehran has behaved as though it won the war, merely by surviving it. Israel, by contrast, has seen its biggest objectives for the war elude its grasp.

Netanyahu set three goals at the start of the war: toppling the regime, destroying Iran’s nuclear program and eliminating its missile program. None have been realized.

Instead of burying Iran’s nuclear ambitions, a recent American proposal called for a 20-year suspension of, or moratorium on, Iranian nuclear activity and that time frame may have gotten smaller in subsequent proposals. That raises the prospect that an eventual deal could resemble the Obama administration’s 2015 nuclear accord, which Netanyahu fought against at the time and Trump exited from three years later.

With the Trump administration excluding Israel from the negotiations, Iran’s arsenal of ballistic missiles may have been left off the table, as far as Israeli officials know. In that respect, any deal would fail to improve on the 2015 agreement, which Netanyahu assailed in part because it did not address Iran’s missiles.

It would also be a dismaying setback for the Israeli public, for whom life largely ground to a halt as the nation was bombarded by Iranian missiles in March and April.

There are other concerns for Israel about the possible contours of a US-Iran agreement, including a lifting of economic sanctions against Tehran. Doing so could amount to an economic lifeline, flooding Iran with billions of dollars that it could then use to rearm and to help its proxy forces, like Hezbollah, replenish their own arsenals with weapons to use against Israel.

While little is certain yet about the shape of an eventual deal — and any agreement could still be postponed by a renewal of fighting — what seems clear is that Israel’s partnership with the United States has come at a steep price. A country that for generations prided itself on “defending ourselves by ourselves,” and whose leaders exasperated a succession of American presidents with their hardheaded recalcitrance, is now making little secret of its need, and willingness, to submit to Trump’s demands.

As Defense Minister Israel Katz said on April 23, as Trump threatened to resume the war and bomb Iran back to the “Stone Age”: “We are only waiting for the green light from the US.”

“That admission was a humbling climbdown from the heady first days of the war, when the two countries achieved air supremacy and were so confident of success that they urged the Iranian people to topple the regime and secure their future,” said the NYT.

Within two weeks, it became clear that the war would not produce instant victory, as Trump had hoped. The White House, and some Israeli leaders, put aside their hopes for regime change, and Trump turned his attention toward ending the fighting.

“He had viewed Netanyahu as a war ally, but not as a close partner when it came to negotiating with the Iranians,” American officials familiar with his thinking said; in fact, he considered Netanyahu someone “who needed to be restrained when it comes to resolving conflicts.”

Israel soon found itself demoted from “equal partner” to something more akin to a “subcontractor” to the US military.

Israel would often clear plans with the United States, only to have the Trump administration throw it under the bus after those plans were executed, such as when Israel struck the South Pars natural gas field and oil facilities along the Gulf in southern Iran.

Trump even pressured Israel to bring a premature halt to its campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon within days after the ceasefire on April 8, forcing Israel to accept restraints on its fighting with a hostile adversary right on its border.

“The sidelining is particularly hard to take for some Israeli officials, who, speaking on condition of anonymity, noted that the country willingly shouldered some of the war’s more controversial assignments.”

For Netanyahu, it has meant repeatedly recalibrating his rhetoric, and even adjusting his description of Israel’s war objectives, in response to Trump’s frequent vacillations.

After initially telling his citizens that Israel’s goals were to “remove” the existential threats of an Iranian nuclear weapon and of its ballistic missile arsenal, by March 12 Netanyahu was articulating a new idea. This one downplayed the fact that those threats had not been removed, and instead exalted Israel’s close partnership with the United States.

“Threats come and threats go, but when we become a regional power, and in certain fields a global power, we have the strength to push dangers away from us and secure our future,” he said. What gave Israel such newfound strength in the eyes of its adversaries, Netanyahu asserted, was his alliance with Trump — “an alliance like no other.”

 

*David M. Halbfinger and Ronen Bergman for The New York Times