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Farouk al-Qaddoumi: We Visited Assad and He Ordered Arafat’s Release from Mezzeh Prison

Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
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Farouk al-Qaddoumi: We Visited Assad and He Ordered Arafat’s Release from Mezzeh Prison

Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)

No history of the Arab world in the past seven decades could be written without stopping at length at the Palestinian Fatah movement. The history of the movement itself cannot be written without stopping at one of its founders, Farouk al-Qaddoumi (Abu al-Lutf), who passed away on Thursday at the age of 94.

Qaddoumi was one of the original founders of the movement in 1965, alongside Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf, and Khalil al-Wazir. He had moved away from the spotlight in the past 30 years over his opposition to the Oslo Accord and concern that Israel would use it against the Palestinian leadership and its people.

Before that, Qaddoumi was a prominent Palestinian figure who championed the cause as foreign minister of the Palestine Liberation Organization at international meetings. He was clear and firm in his speeches before the United Nations, Arab and Islamic summits and others.

A member of the Baath party, I asked him one day of his thoughts about Arafat (Abu Ammar) and his sole leadership of the Palestinians. He replied: “Abu Ammar is the leader of the Fatah tribe. According to our norms, the tribe leader enjoys privileges that others don't.” Whatever reservations he had about Arafat never led him to question his position as the top Palestinian leader.

I met Qaddoumi in Tunis in 1998 and will share some moments of that meeting in Asharq Al-Awsat in wake of his passing:

Early years

*How was the Fatah movement born?

Acts of resistance emerged after the occupation of Gaza in 1956. The Arab world was also being swept up in revolts from Algeria to Iraq and others. This left an impact on us. In fact, the success of the revolution in Algeria helped spur freedom fighter, “fidai”, work in our region.

Palestine’s Grand Mufti Amin al-Husseini had, during his stay in Egypt and then Lebanon, advocated for Palestinian resistance and struggle. The Higher Arab Commission existed at the time, paving the way eventually for the fidai movement. The armed struggle was also prompted by the lack of political achievements at the time.

With the dour political mood, Algeria’s independence was a beacon of hope that inspired the formation of fidai movements, and so Fatah began to take shape in Kuwait and later Qatar in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The formation of Fatah would pave the way for the formation of the PLO in 1964.

*When did you meet Arafat for the first time?

I was in Cairo in 1954. Along with Arafat, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), and I were members of the General Union of Palestine Students. Arafat was its president. I was a student at the American university, Arafat was a student at Cairo University and Abu Iyad went to al-Azhar University.

I was a member of the Baath part, Abu Iyad of the enlightened Muslim Brotherhood and Arafat was religious but independent. We spent three years in Cairo. Arafat graduated and then headed to Kuwait where he worked as an engineer. He was followed by Abu Iyad and I worked in the health ministry. I took up positions in Libya, then Saudi Arabia and later Kuwait in 1960.

We didn’t hold meetings together. Rather, we limited our talks to bilateral contacts to maintain secrecy. I used to get in touch with Arafat, and he with Abu Iyad. Adel Abdel Karim used to coordinate our meetings. Among the Fatah founders were Abu al-Adeeb and Khaled al-Hassan.

The central committee was formed later and it began to meet as a group in 1965. For years, we made contacts with brothers throughout the region, especially Arab and Palestinian national figures, including figures in Algeria, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

Farouk al-Qaddoumi at an Organization of Islamic Cooperation conference in Malaysia in 2003. (Getty Images)

*How was the official launch of Fatah decided in 1965?

We debated whether to announce the formation of Fatah before the establishment of the PLO in 1964 or after. In the end, we decided to reinforce resistance movements and to garner Arab support for the Palestinian national identity embodied in the PLO. This facilitated the way for armed struggle and fidai operations.

The national congress was held in Jerusalem in 1964. It brought together Arafat, Khaled al-Hassan and others. It was followed by a resistance operation that called for striking water pipelines in northern Palestine. The fighters came in from the Syrian border. The operation resulted in our first prisoner Mahmoud Hijazi and first martyr Ahmed Moussa.

We later formed a “revolutionary council”, regional committees and a central committee.

*What was Arafat’s position during that time?

He was first appointed deputy to the general commander, Abu Youssef al-Najjar. He rose to general commander in 1966 and named official spokesman. I chaired the inaugural meeting of the central committee and was named its secretary.

*Where there any disputes between members during the early days of the central committee?

Fatah embodied work, ideology and organization. Meaning we enrich our thought and organization, and improve our work through operations and experiences on the ground. We used to say that carrying arms was the foundation of our work and that the purpose of carrying arms was not financial or material, but rather, it had national, moral and noble goals.

We were initially accused to roping in Egypt and Gamal Abdul Nasser in our operations. We were also accused of poorly timing our operations. We were accused of being an Arab nationalist movement. Soon, however, our armed struggle began to bear fruit and raise the morale of the people.

The Karameh battle of 1968 gave Fatah an accomplishment. With the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967, the people yearned for the formation of a revolutionary movement. People turned to Fatah and we built foundations along the River Jordan. Eventually our work became more organized and we reached out to various Palestinian groups to unite under a single banner and so, the PLO was formed with Arafat at the helm.

*How were relations with Abdel Nasser?

We always sought to establish ties with him. We tried to meet him once in late 1965 or early 1966. I was accompanied by Arafat and Mahmoud Sawda. We couldn’t manage an audience with him and instead were met with the head of intelligence. At the time, the Palestinian revolution had not yet rose to prominence and swept headlines. It was not the focus of attention in Egypt or by its president.

That changed after the 1967 defeat of Arab armies. We met with Mohammed Hassanein Haykal, who facilitated a meeting with Abdel Nasser.

Abdel Nasser loved Arafat and saw in him the spirit of Arab youths who had hope in the future. In 1969, Abdel Nasser invited Arafat to join him on a trip to the Soviet Union and so, relations between Moscow and the PLO were forged.

Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. (Getty Images)

Ties with Syria

*When did you meet Syrian President Hafez al-Assad?

We’ve known each other since the 1960s when he was defense minister. In 1966, two Fatah officers were killed during an argument in Syria. Soon after, Syrian authorities imprisoned the Fatah leadership of Arafat, Mamdouh Saidam, Walid Ahmad Nimr, al-Wazir and others. Eleven leading members were sent to jail.

Along with a colleague, I traveled to Syria to tackle the situation. We contacted Salah Jadid, Hafez al-Assad and Ahmed Sweidan. The meeting with Assad was good. The truth was that Arafat and his comrades were suspected of being members of the Muslim Brotherhood. They were surprised to learn that I was part of the Palestinian revolution and knew that I was not a member of the Brotherhood, but of the Baath party.

Arafat was jailed for some 51 days in Mezzeh prison where he came under investigation. We sought out Assad, who was defense minister. We told him that we had heard rumors that the Syrian leadership wanted to execute the detainees. “Who told you this?” he asked. We told him that they were rumors we heard in Damascus. He replied: “Please, come and receive them.” And so, we secured the release of Arafat and the others.

Later, Arafat took part in an operation from Lebanese territories and was arrested by the Lebanese army. It also arrested the Palestinian group that carried out the operation. Through Syrian mediation, we succeeded in securing Arafat’s release.

*The Syrian and Palestinian leaderships had thorny relations. What was the toughest moment that you experienced with it?

The 1976 period when the Syrian army was deployed to Lebanon was the most difficult. The “national movement” in Lebanon was opposed to the deployment. We believed that the deployment would lead to a clash with the Palestinian revolution.

*Some Palestinians accused Syria of trying to seize Palestinian decision-making.

It wasn’t about seizing this power. The Palestinian cause was the top issue for Syria and the focus of its concern, otherwise it would never have offered us what it did. Assad and Syrian officials had repeatedly said that the Palestinians control Syrian decision-making, not the other way around.

Our relations with Assad were strong and coordination was always ongoing. Assad long underscored the strategic alliance between Syria and the Palestinian revolution. He is a member of the Baath and perhaps this background allows me to understand him since we are both members of the party. At the time, more than 60 percent of Syria’s budget went to supporting the Palestinian cause.

*Did Assad have reservations about the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon?

Not until the clash happened with the Syrian army. That prompted the question: Why did the Palestinian resistance oppose the deployment of the Syrian military? Assad is a calm, patient and persevering person. He listens to everyone and can discuss several issues at length. He has the patience that is lacking in several leaders and heads of state.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein receives Farouk al-Qaddoumi in Baghdad in 2002. (Getty Images)

Ties with Iraq

*What about your relations with Saddam Hussein?

We met Saddam in Cairo and used to travel to Baghdad, which had opened its doors to us after the Karameh battle. We even opened offices in Baghdad. Sabri al-Banna's (Abu Nidal) defection from Fatah though, created tensions between Iraq and the PLO.

*It was believed that the Iraqi leadership was influencing Banna.

Yes, we also sensed that. But Iraq acted out of a clear political vision. Iraq never hides its stances.

*What about Saddam?

He tried to understand who he was speaking with him. He was calm and focused on the person talking to him. He was never severe in dealing with us. Our requests were quickly met. He was generous with us and even more so after he became president. Iraq gave us so much. Iraq offered the PLO greater support after it was forced out of Beirut. The tensions between the PLO and Syria also helped bring us closer to Baghdad.

*Was Iraq a main backer of the PLO?

The truth is Saudi Arabia was. It provided us with so much. We must be fair in saying that Gulf countries helped the Palestinian people a lot.

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Four Iranian Narratives on the Collapse of the ‘Resistance’ in Syria  

Iran's General Qassem Soleimani makes a phone call near the historic Citadel of Aleppo, winter 2016. (Fars)
Iran's General Qassem Soleimani makes a phone call near the historic Citadel of Aleppo, winter 2016. (Fars)
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Four Iranian Narratives on the Collapse of the ‘Resistance’ in Syria  

Iran's General Qassem Soleimani makes a phone call near the historic Citadel of Aleppo, winter 2016. (Fars)
Iran's General Qassem Soleimani makes a phone call near the historic Citadel of Aleppo, winter 2016. (Fars)

One hundred and ninety-two days separated the last meeting between Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Syria’s ousted President Bashar al-Assad in Tehran from the moment the Syrian regime fell to the opposition in December 2024.

That interval was no footnote in the Syrian war. It became a sharp mirror inside Tehran, reflecting the magnitude of the wager Iran’s leadership had placed on Assad, and the limits of its ability to anticipate the trajectory of the conflict and shifts in the regional balance of power.

At that meeting, Khamenei laid out the essence of his “Syrian doctrine” amid changing realities across the “Axis of Resistance.” Syria, he argued, was no ordinary state but one with a “special place” because its identity, in his view, stemmed from its role in this axis.

Since “resistance is Syria’s defining identity and must be preserved,” he addressed Assad not as a political ally but as a partner in that identity. He praised Assad for once saying that “the cost of resistance is lower than the cost of compromise” and that “whenever we retreat, the other side advances.” Thus, Khamenei reaffirmed his full - if belated – gamble on the regime’s survival, even as signs of collapse were unmistakable on the ground.

Less than seven months later, the regime would fall. Assad’s collapse would yield several Iranian narratives: the Supreme Leader’s, the Revolutionary Guard’s, the diplomatic narrative, and a fourth voiced from within the system itself, one that raised blunt questions about the price of Iran’s Syrian gamble.

Khamenei’s narrative

In his first speech after Assad’s fall, Khamenei offered a hard-edged explanation: the event, he said, was the product of a “joint American-Zionist plot,” aided by neighboring states. He spoke of factors that he claimed prevented Iran from providing the necessary support, including Israeli and US strikes inside Syria and the closure of air and land corridors to Iranian supplies.

He concluded that the decisive flaw lay within Syria itself, where the “spirit of resistance” had eroded in state institutions.

He stressed that the regime’s fall did not mean the fall of the idea of “resistance,” predicting that “patriotic Syrian youth” would one day revive it in a new form.

This narrative rejects the notion of strategic defeat: for Khamenei, what happened is not the end of the struggle, but a harsh phase in a longer one.

Revolutionary Guard’s narrative

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) adopted a language closer to national security logic than pure ideology, though it drew from the same lexicon. In 2013, cleric Mehdi Taeb, head of the IRGC’s Ammar Headquarters think tank, framed the equation starkly: “Syria is our 35th province... If the enemy attacks Syria or Khuzestan, our priority is to keep Syria.”

With that shocking sentence, Syria was elevated to the level of Iranian strategic geography, sometimes above parts of Iran itself.

Late General Qassem Soleimani, then commander of the Quds Force, became the chief architect of this approach: confronting threats abroad by building multinational militia networks and using the “protection of shrines” as a mobilizing slogan that fused ideology with national security calculations.

A month after Assad’s fall, at a memorial for Soleimani, Khamenei reaffirmed this school of thought, linking the defense of shrines in Damascus and Iraq to the defense of “Iran as a sanctuary,” aiming to bind various fronts into a single cross-border security-sectarian struggle.

After the Syrian regime’s collapse, this narrative preserved its core: success or failure is not defined by who sits in Damascus, but by whether the IRGC’s influence networks remain intact and whether Iran still has access to Syrian depth.

Full withdrawal would amount, in this logic, to admitting that the “35th province” had slipped from the map, so the IRGC will continue to search for any possible foothold.

Diplomatic narrative

Iran’s diplomatic apparatus sought to tell a softer story. Weeks before the fall, Khamenei dispatched his adviser Ali Larijani to Damascus and Beirut with reassuring messages for Assad and other allies, publicly asserting that events in Syria and Lebanon “directly concern Iran’s national security.”

Days later, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Damascus just six days before the collapse, even posing with shawarma in a downtown restaurant to signal “normalcy” and dismiss talk of impending downfall as “psychological warfare.”

It was the peak of the gap between diplomatic messaging and a disintegrating reality.

Afterward, the Foreign Ministry adopted a defensive formula: Iran had “responded to the request of an allied government”, but “cannot decide on behalf of peoples.” Thus, responsibility was shifted toward Syrian internal failures and the external “conspiracy” often invoked by Khamenei.

This narrative treats Syria as one file among many, not an existential arena as seen by the IRGC and the Leader.

‘Open account’ narrative

The fourth narrative emerged, unexpectedly, from within the establishment itself. For the first time, semi-public acknowledgments surfaced that the economic return on Iran’s Syrian adventure was nearly nil and that the political-security “investment” had resulted in something resembling a net loss.

In 2020, former member of the Iranian parliamentary national security and foreign policy committee, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh revealed that Tehran had spent “$20-30 billion” in Syria, insisting: “This is the people’s money and must be recovered.”

Five years later, he returned with a more bitter charge: Syria’s debts to Iran were effectively settled through “land without oil, cow farms without cows, and empty promises.”

This view is no outlier. Over a decade, Iranian protest slogans increasingly linked “Gaza, Lebanon, Syria” with bread, fuel, and economic hardship at home.

With Assad gone, critics more easily argue that Iran spent tens of billions and paid a human cost among its fighters and proxies, only to end up with almost no influence in Damascus.

For decision-makers, this narrative becomes domestic pressure against any large-scale return to Syria.

Four scenarios for Tehran

Taken together, these narratives reveal a deep contradiction: the IRGC and Khamenei refuse to concede that Iran “lost Syria,” treating the episode as one phase in a longer struggle. Meanwhile, the diplomatic and economic narratives acknowledge, implicitly, that the previous intervention model is no longer sustainable.

Four broad scenarios emerge. The first is a return through proxies, closest to the IRGC’s logic: Iran would rebuild influence from the ground up through militias - old or newly recruited - to pressure any future authority in Damascus.

The second is regional repositioning without Syria, in which Iran shifts resources to arenas where it still holds leverage, including Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Gaza, while limiting its role in Syria to preventing hostile entrenchment.

The third is a “gray” re-entry: a gradual, negotiated, non-confrontational return through localized deals or modest economic and security projects, allowing Tehran to claim continued presence without the cost of backing a single ruler.

The fourth is institutionalizing the loss: Iran accepts Syria’s departure from its strategic depth, but repackages the outcome within a narrative of “conspiracy and steadfastness,” using it to tighten internal control while maintaining symbolic presence through shrine rhetoric and minimal diplomacy.

Across all scenarios, one fact remains. Syria, which was once described as more vital than Khuzestan and the “distinct identity of resistance”, is no longer what it was before December 8, 2024 when the regime collapsed.

Tehran can invoke time, the IRGC can search for openings, diplomats can polish their statements, and critics can lament “land without oil.” But one question looms over every debate in Iran: Can Tehran afford a second Syrian-sized gamble after emerging from the first still trying to convince itself that the “resistance factor” remains standing, even as its Syrian pillar has broken?

Features

A Year After Assad’s Fall, Families of Missing Detainees Languish without Answers 

Amina Beqai holds a photo of her husband, who went missing after he was arrested by security forces under the rule of ousted President Bashar al-Assad, in Damascus, Syria, November 23, 2025. (Reuters)
Amina Beqai holds a photo of her husband, who went missing after he was arrested by security forces under the rule of ousted President Bashar al-Assad, in Damascus, Syria, November 23, 2025. (Reuters)
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A Year After Assad’s Fall, Families of Missing Detainees Languish without Answers 

Amina Beqai holds a photo of her husband, who went missing after he was arrested by security forces under the rule of ousted President Bashar al-Assad, in Damascus, Syria, November 23, 2025. (Reuters)
Amina Beqai holds a photo of her husband, who went missing after he was arrested by security forces under the rule of ousted President Bashar al-Assad, in Damascus, Syria, November 23, 2025. (Reuters)

A year after dictator Bashar al-Assad's ouster in Syria, little has changed in Amina Beqai's desperate quest. She types her missing husband's name yet again into an internet search box, hoping for answers to a 13-year-old question. In vain.

Beqai has nowhere else to turn.

A National Commission for Missing Persons established in May has been gathering evidence of enforced disappearances under Assad, but has yet to offer families any clues on the estimated 150,000 people who vanished in his notorious prisons.

They include Beqai's husband Mahmoud, arrested by Syria's security forces at their home near Damascus on April 17, 2012, and her brother Ahmed, detained in August that year.

Assad's overthrow initially stirred hope that prison records could tell families if, when and how their loved ones died. Mass graves dug by Assad's forces across Syria could be exhumed. Victims could be properly buried.

None of that has transpired.

"It's been a year. They didn't do anything ... Is it thinkable that they didn't even get the documents for these men? Showing us the truth is what we want," Beqai told Reuters.

FADING HOPES

As opposition fighters swept through Syrian towns last year on the way to capturing Damascus, they rushed first to the jails, flinging doors open to free thousands of bewildered prisoners.

On December 8, 2024, hours after Assad fled to Russia, the fighters freed dozens of prisoners from Sednaya, dubbed "the human slaughterhouse" by Amnesty International for the industrial-scale torture and executions undertaken there.

The emerging detainees did not include Beqai's loved ones.

"When the prisons were open, and they didn't come back – that was the shock. That was when the hope ended, it really died," Beqai said. But she demands to know how, when and where her husband and brother may have died.

With no updates from the national commission, Beqai said she had become "obsessed" with her online hunt, scouring pictures of dead detainees and scans of prison documents published by Syrian news outlets who entered jails and security branches after Assad's fall.

"All there is left to do is sit and search," she said.

Such documents have revealed crucial information.

Sarah al-Khattab last saw her husband heading into a police station in Syria's south on February 9, 2019 to reconcile with Assad's government after years holed up with insurgents.

She has had no news of him since.

A spreadsheet of dead Sednaya prisoners seen by Reuters after Assad's fall included his name, Ali Mohsen al-Baridi, dating his death as October 22, 2019 from "stopped pulse and breathing" with orders that the body not be given to his family.

Reuters passed its finding to the Syrian Justice and Accountability Center, an advocacy group working with families of the missing, who informed Khattab.

COMMISSION SEEKS HELP, OVERSIGHT

The national commission was established by new President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The commission's media adviser, Zeina Shahla, told Reuters its mandate includes any missing Syrian, no matter the circumstances.

"When it comes to the pain of the families, maybe we really are being slow. But this file needs progress to come carefully, in a way that is scientific and systemic and not rushed," she said.

Next year, the commission hopes to launch a database of all the missing using documents from prisons and other locations. Exhuming mass graves requires more technical expertise and probably won't happen until 2027, Shahla said.

The commission has met with Syrian advocacy groups and some families. In November, it signed a cooperation agreement with the Geneva-based International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Commission on Missing Persons, which have global expertise on the issue.

Syria's commission hopes that will lead to more training for its personnel and access to equipment in short supply in Syria, including DNA testing labs for exhumed remains.

"We welcome any kind of cooperation and support we can receive, as long as the issue remains under (our commission's) authority,” Shahla said.

RELATIVES, ACTIVISTS DEMAND BETTER

The government's approach has upset organizations who developed expertise on enforced disappearances while in exile during the Assad era, six rights groups told Reuters.

Many were excited to apply that knowledge on the ground with Assad gone, but say the government's centralized approach has excluded them, slowed progress and left families in limbo.

"When you have as many as a quarter of a million people missing, you can't do that. You break up the work," said Ahmad Helmi, a Syrian activist who leads Ta'afi, an initiative focused on missing detainees and prison survivors.

Activists also accuse the commission of "monopolizing" detention-related documents.

In September, Syrian authorities briefly detained Amer Matar, an activist who founded a virtual museum to preserve detainees' experiences, accusing him of illegally accessing official documents for personal purposes.

In November, the commission urged families not to believe any detention-related documents shared on unofficial online platforms, like the ones Beqai has been searching, and threatened legal action against those outlets.

"The commission wants to monopolize the file, but it lacks the tools, the competence and the transparency. It demands the trust of families but delivers no results," Matar said.

Shahla said the commission is "the central, official body authorized to reveal the fate" of missing people and that families needed one place to go to for accurate answers.

Agnes Callamard, head of Amnesty International, said the commission should issue regular updates about its progress and consider granting financial aid to relatives of missing people.

"The most important thing ... the national commission can do at the moment is ensuring that families feel they are being heard and being supported," she told Reuters.

As Syria marks a year since Assad's downfall, many people remain exhausted by the same burden that plagued them under his rule: the lack of closure.

Alia Darraji last saw her son Yazan on November 1, 2014, as he left home to meet friends near Damascus. He never returned.

In the last year, the elderly woman has spent time in "truth tents" - sit-ins demanding information on disappeared Syrians that were unthinkable under Assad. While solidarity has helped, it hasn't given her what her heart aches for.

"We were hoping to find their bodies, to bury them, or to find out where they are," Darraji said.

Features

‘It’s All Over’: How Iran Abandoned Assad to His Fate Days Before Fall

Iran was a staunch backer of Bashar al-Assad but quickly withdrew its forces once as opposition forces took over Syria. (AFP)
Iran was a staunch backer of Bashar al-Assad but quickly withdrew its forces once as opposition forces took over Syria. (AFP)
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‘It’s All Over’: How Iran Abandoned Assad to His Fate Days Before Fall

Iran was a staunch backer of Bashar al-Assad but quickly withdrew its forces once as opposition forces took over Syria. (AFP)
Iran was a staunch backer of Bashar al-Assad but quickly withdrew its forces once as opposition forces took over Syria. (AFP)

As city after city fell to a lightning opposition offensive in Syria last December, Iranian forces and diplomats supporting Bashar al-Assad saw the writing on the wall, abandoning the longtime ruler days before his ousting, sources told AFP.

During Syria's civil war, which erupted in 2011 following the government's brutal repression of pro-democracy protests, Iran was one of Damascus's biggest backers, sending Assad military advisers and forces from its Revolutionary Guards.

Iranian and allied regional fighters -- mainly from Lebanon's Hezbollah, but also from Iraq and Afghanistan -- had held key locations and helped prop up Assad, only to melt away in the face of opposition forces' headlong rush towards the capital.

Syrian officers and soldiers served under the Iranian Guards, whose influence grew during the conflict as Assad's power waned.

A former Syrian officer assigned to one of the Guards' security headquarters in Damascus said that on December 5 last year, his Iranian superior summoned him to an operations center in the Mazzeh district the following day to discuss an "important matter".

The former officer, requesting anonymity due to fears for his safety, said his superior, known as Hajj Abu Ibrahim, made a bombshell announcement to around 20 Syrian officers and soldiers gathered for the meeting.

"From today, there will be no more Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Syria. We're leaving," they were told.

"It's all over. From today, we are no longer responsible for you."

He said they were ordered to burn or otherwise destroy sensitive documents and remove hard drives from computers.

- Border bottleneck -

The announcement came as the opposition forces were making huge gains, but it still took the Syrian soldiers by surprise, he said.

"We knew things hadn't been going well, but not to that extent."

They received one month's salary in advance and went home.

Two days later the opposition forces captured Damascus without a fight after Assad fled to Russia.

Two Syrian employees of Iran's consulate in Damascus, requesting anonymity for security reasons, also described a hasty Iranian exit.

The consulate was empty by the evening of December 5 as Iranian diplomats scarpered across the border to Beirut, they told AFP.

Several Syrian employees "who held Iranian nationality left with them, accompanied by senior Revolutionary Guards officers", according to one of the former employees.

At Jdeidet Yabus, Syria's main border crossing with Lebanon, taxi drivers and former staff reported a massive bottleneck on December 5 and 6, with an eight-hour wait to clear the frontier.

Both of the former consulate employees said the Iranians told their Syrian personnel to stay home and paid them three months' salary.

The embassy, consulate and all Iranian security positions were deserted by the morning of December 6, they said.

- Russian base -

During the war, forces under Iranian command were concentrated in sensitive areas inside Damascus and its suburbs, particularly the Sayyida Zeinab area, home to an important Shiite shrine, and around Damascus airport, as well as near the Lebanese and Iraqi borders.

Parts of the northern city of Aleppo and locations elsewhere in the province were also major staging areas for personnel and fighters.

At a site that used to be a key military base for Iranian forces south of Aleppo, Colonel Mohammad Dibo said that when the city fell early in the opposition campaign, "Iran stopped fighting".

Iranian forces "had to withdraw suddenly after the quick collapse" of Assad's military, said Dibo, who took part in the opposition offensive and now serves in Syria's new army.

On the heavily damaged walls of the abandoned base, an AFP journalist saw Iranian and Hezbollah slogans, and a painting of a sword tearing through an Israeli flag.

Tehran's foe Israel had launched hundreds of strikes on Syria over the course of the war, mainly saying it was targeting Assad's army and Iran-backed groups.

The former Syrian army officer who requested anonymity said that on December 5, a senior Iranian military official known as Hajj Jawad and several Iranian soldiers and officers were evacuated to Russia's Hmeimim base on the Mediterranean coast, then flown back to Tehran.

At the abandoned site near Aleppo, Dibo said that after the city's fall, "some 4,000 Iranian military personnel were evacuated via Russia's Hmeimim base" where they had taken refuge.

Others fled overland through Iraq or Lebanon, he said.

Their exit was so rushed that "when we entered their bases" in Aleppo province, "we found passports and identity documents belonging to Iranian officers who didn't even have time to retrieve them."