Wiretapping Scandal Continues to Rock Iraq

Two prominent members of the Coordination Framework were targeted by the wiretapping network. (Government media)
Two prominent members of the Coordination Framework were targeted by the wiretapping network. (Government media)
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Wiretapping Scandal Continues to Rock Iraq

Two prominent members of the Coordination Framework were targeted by the wiretapping network. (Government media)
Two prominent members of the Coordination Framework were targeted by the wiretapping network. (Government media)

“Several politicians” were the victims of the wiretapping network that was busted at the Iraqi prime minister’s office, informed sources told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The investigations revealed that two prominent members of the ruling pro-Iran Coordination Framework are among the targets, while it seems that the wiretapping was aimed at politically extorting its victims.

News emerged last week over the arrest of a wiretapping network at PM Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's office. Detainees included employees and cyber security officers working at the office.

Local reports said the network had also spied on Faiq Zidan, head of the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council, but he denied the claims.

Investigations with the main suspect in the network appear to have led to other partners, revealed information obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat.

Confessions by the detainees revealed that the network, which began operating in late 2023, was charged with spying on senior state officials with the aim of political extortion, said sources.

Observers have described the case a “major breach of the government.”

Sudani issued on August 20 a statement saying that he ordered the formation of an investigation committee against an employee at his office for supporting a “position that is harmful to some officials and several lawmakers.”

Legal measures have been taken against that employee, but the government hasn’t issued a follow-up statement yet about its further proceedings.

Mohammed Juhi, aide to the PM’s media director, has been viewed as the main suspect in the wiretapping case. He has since been suspended until investigations are completed.

Reports have said he used to work at the Health Ministry before assuming his post at the PM’s office. His uncle, Judge Raed Juhi, used to work at former PM Mustafa al-Kadhimi's office.

Seven suspects, including Mohammed Juhi and an intelligence officer, have since been arrested in the wiretapping case.

The New Region website said Mohammed Juhi was only a “tool, not the real head” of the spy network.

“He (Juhi) was reached by following a link to one of the pages associated with him personally. Following the link led the National Security personnel directly to his home inside the Green Zone, where he was arrested,” it reported according to sources.

The report also said Zidan was among the targets of the network.

Zidan’s quick denial of the reports only fueled speculation among Iraqis that he was indeed a victim of the network.

Informed sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that while the network did target politicians and officials, it did not reach Zidan.

They confirmed that two prominent members of the Coordination Framework were indeed targeted.

MP Mustafa Sanad said last week that the network had spied on the telephones of several lawmakers and politicians, including himself.

It was also controlling electronic armies, fabricating fake news, and assuming the identity of politicians and businessmen.

The network has confessed to its crimes, he added, while revealing that a lot of pressure was being exerted to release the suspects. The judge handling their case has not yielded to the pressure.

Sources close to the Coordination Framework told Asharq Al-Awsat that the wiretapping case has “angered the alliance and it is trying to keep its details from going public because it is a great embarrassment to the government.”

They did not rule out the possibility that senior officials at the PM’s office may be involved in the network over disputes with influential judges.



Sudan's Tasis Alliance Seizes Blue Nile’s Strategic Bau District

Members of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Blue Nile state (File photo: AP)
Members of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Blue Nile state (File photo: AP)
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Sudan's Tasis Alliance Seizes Blue Nile’s Strategic Bau District

Members of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Blue Nile state (File photo: AP)
Members of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Blue Nile state (File photo: AP)

Forces from Sudan's Tasis alliance, which includes the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), said they had captured the strategic Bau locality in southeastern Blue Nile state after hours of fighting with the army and its allies.

The alliance's forces pushed forward rapidly early Friday, seizing Khor Mak, Sinja Nabaq, Al-Taqa, Madina 10 and Madina 11, bringing the fighting closer to Damazin, the regional capital.

Bau lies about 70 kilometers southwest of Ed Damazin and is the birthplace of Malik Agar, deputy chairman of Sudan's Sovereignty Council and leader of an SPLM-N faction allied with the army.

Tasis said it had inflicted heavy losses on army troops and allied forces, capturing large quantities of weapons, ammunition and military equipment.

In a statement, the alliance said its fighters had seized 27 combat vehicles and six armored vehicles, destroyed or burned more than 70 others and killed hundreds of army personnel. It also claimed to have captured numerous soldiers, including a senior officer.

Bau's position along several strategic routes could allow the alliance to push further toward Damazin, Blue Nile's political, military and administrative hub.

Videos posted Friday by Tasis fighters showed RSF and SPLM-N personnel inside Bau town.

The Sudanese army has not officially commented on the fighting.

Last Sunday, the army sent combat units to its Fourth Infantry Division headquarters to reinforce frontline positions in Blue Nile and halt advances by the RSF and forces loyal to Joseph Tuka.

But Bau Commissioner Abdel Ghani Daqis Khalifa disputed the alliance's claim of full control, saying RSF fighters had entered the area but had not seized the entire locality.

Khalifa accused South Sudan and Ethiopia of direct involvement in destabilizing Blue Nile.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that army troops and allied forces had repelled a Tasis assault on Dairang, inflicting heavy losses on the attackers.

He said RSF fighters were positioned in Maqja, an area the army had withdrawn from for tactical military reasons.

Fighting shifted Friday morning to Madina 11, east of Bau town near Qeissan locality, he said.

More than 6,000 families had fled Bau and surrounding areas to Al-Shaheed Effendi, a town in the far south of Damazin, according to preliminary figures cited by Khalifa.

He said most administrative areas in Bau remained stable and that he was continuing to carry out his duties from within the locality.

In early August, the RSF and the SPLM-N faction led by Abdelaziz Adam al-Hilu seized the strategic towns of Kurmuk and Qeissan along the Ethiopian border, turning Blue Nile into one of Sudan's most active war fronts.

Calls to protect civilians

The Civil Society Initiative, a local group, voiced grave concern over the rapid military escalation and the advance of fighting toward Ed Damazin.

In a statement posted on Facebook, it urged the warring parties to protect civilians, open safe humanitarian corridors to evacuate people trapped in combat zones and allow aid to reach those in need without obstruction.

The group said the attacking RSF forces bore responsibility for protecting civilians and called on them to take precautions to shield residents from military operations and avoid actions that could endanger lives or property.

Blue Nile borders Ethiopia and South Sudan.

Tasis forces had earlier seized the strategic Sali area in Kurmuk locality, widening their presence across the region.


From Coexistence to Reclaiming Sovereignty: How Has Lebanon’s Approach to Hezbollah Changed?

 Hezbollah supporters wave the group's flags in Beirut's southern suburbs (AFP)
Hezbollah supporters wave the group's flags in Beirut's southern suburbs (AFP)
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From Coexistence to Reclaiming Sovereignty: How Has Lebanon’s Approach to Hezbollah Changed?

 Hezbollah supporters wave the group's flags in Beirut's southern suburbs (AFP)
Hezbollah supporters wave the group's flags in Beirut's southern suburbs (AFP)

Lebanon is shifting its approach to Hezbollah after decades of political and institutional coexistence with the group's influence and weapons, as military and regional upheaval brings the question of exclusive state authority back to the fore.

From the 1989 Taif Agreement to recent government decisions, the shift marks a move away from political compromises toward tighter oversight, greater accountability and attempts to restore the authority of state institutions.

What has changed?

Hezbollah's alleged influence once reached deep into sensitive areas of the Lebanese state, from cargo shipments and customs inspections to the judiciary and security agencies.

Beirut airport was a major flashpoint. In May 2008, a government decision to dismiss its security chief, coupled with a move against Hezbollah's telecommunications network, triggered armed clashes that exposed the limits of the government's ability to enforce its decisions.

At Beirut port and land border crossings, repeated allegations pointed to shipments moving through channels exempt from routine inspections. Former officials described containers marked in red as belonging to the "resistance" and therefore off-limits to customs inspectors.

The judiciary faced similar pressure. In 2021, alleged threats by Hezbollah liaison official Wafiq Safa against judicial investigator Tarek Bitar renewed concerns over interference in judicial investigations.

The picture is different today.

Authorities say they have tightened inspections at the airport, port and border crossings and pursued weapons and explosives cases, including the 2026 Dahr al-Baidar case and the Bsharri cell.

A more assertive presidency and government decisions to place weapons under exclusive state control have accompanied the measures.

The change is also evident in official rhetoric. Where the debate once focused on special cargo routes and exemptions, officials now increasingly demand inspections, accountability and equal enforcement of the law.

Along the Syrian border, the change in power in Damascus has disrupted communication and supply routes Hezbollah once relied on.

But tighter controls do not mean Hezbollah's former influence has disappeared or that the state has regained full authority. The real test remains whether Lebanon can enforce its rules equally and consistently.

From Taif to the erosion of political coexistence

Former lawmaker Fares Souaid traces the roots of the arrangement to the 1989 Taif Agreement, which called for the Lebanese state to extend its sovereignty through its own forces and for militias to disband.

Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon and the influence of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, who was entrusted with implementing the agreement with US approval, effectively "upgraded Hezbollah from a militia to a resistance movement," Souaid said.

Other militias surrendered their weapons. Hezbollah kept its arsenal.

"Coexistence began under Syrian influence and continued under Iranian influence," he said.

After Israel withdrew from most of southern Lebanon in 2000, Souaid recalled Walid Jumblatt's choice between "Hanoi or Hong Kong" as a defining question about Lebanon's future.

The Syrian army's withdrawal in 2005 did not end foreign influence, he argued. Hezbollah stepped into the vacuum with Iranian backing, benefiting from Tehran's expanding regional reach after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.

Souaid links that period to the death of Yasser Arafat, the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the execution of Saddam Hussein, as well as Iran's influence across Syria, Iraq and Lebanon through Hezbollah and its alliance with the political movement represented by former Lebanese President Michel Aoun.

The balance began to shift with the confrontations that erupted in October 2023, followed by the 2024 pager explosions and the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, and then the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government, Souaid said.

Together, those developments weakened the regional alliance that had sustained Hezbollah's position and protected the previous political arrangement.

Souaid sees Arab support for Joseph Aoun's election as president and Nawaf Salam's appointment as prime minister in 2025 as carrying a clear message: aid would depend on the Lebanese state restoring its sovereignty.

The change, he says, goes beyond the country's political leadership. State institutions are increasingly willing to exercise their powers over the judiciary, security agencies and public facilities.

Arab and international demands for Lebanese sovereignty have also grown more explicit, replacing earlier compromises that repeatedly deferred confrontation over Hezbollah's weapons, he said.

Souaid points to cabinet decisions on Aug. 5 and 7, 2025, aimed at establishing exclusive state control over weapons, and a March 2, 2026, decision banning Hezbollah's military and security activities and requiring it to surrender its arsenal.

He also cites a shift in presidential rhetoric, with the Lebanese president now naming Hezbollah directly.

In the judiciary, Souaid praises "the courage of Judge Claude Ghanem at the Military Court." Recalling the 2008 killing of pilot Samer Hanna, he alleges that Hezbollah handed over a person who was not the perpetrator.

Souaid also acknowledges improved controls at the airport, port and borders, despite sporadic security incidents.

"Contrary to the prevailing public mood, we must be patient with the army," he said.

He argues that restoring state authority requires "Shiite political and social support" for the constitution and the Taif Agreement, rather than "putting an entire sect, its mothers and fathers, on trial for the conduct of one party."

Disarming Hezbollah, he insists, is "a purely Lebanese national demand rooted in the country's political covenant," not a matter tied to the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb, Israeli elections or the calculations of Trump and China.

It is a demand Lebanon failed to fulfill in both 1989 and 2005, he said.

Souaid advocates a sustained campaign fought through "smart judicial, political, security, military and media" efforts.

"This is a necessary and unavoidable battle, but it cannot be won by a knockout. It must be won on points."

A stronger state, but authority remains incomplete

Former lawmaker Wehbe Katisha says Hezbollah's influence was once rooted in its political strength inside state institutions.

"In the past, the state was on Hezbollah's side. Most ministers and lawmakers supported it. Hezbollah was therefore not weak within state institutions. It had a political majority that provided influence and protection," he said.

"That reality has changed. Most ministers and lawmakers are now against Hezbollah, shifting the balance of power within the state," he added, describing his assessment of the political landscape.

Katisha says the confrontations destroyed much of Hezbollah's military and political leadership and devastated large parts of southern Lebanon.

He estimates the group's losses at "around 10,000 dead and 30,000 wounded."

Funding and logistical support routes have also narrowed, he says, pointing to the closure of the Syrian supply route and Iran's declining strength.

"Together, these factors have weakened Hezbollah inside Lebanon, while the state has grown stronger at its expense," he said.

The judiciary offers another measure of that shift, Katisha argues.

"Lebanese people used to watch Wafiq Safa threatening a public prosecutor," he said, recalling what he describes as earlier pressure on judicial officials.

He cites the Lebanese Forces party's demand to refer the Dahr al-Baidar explosives case to the Judicial Council after Judge Claude Ghanem brought charges against 13 people in October 2026.

"In the past, who would have dared to discuss such cases and demand their referral to the Judicial Council?" he asked.

Katisha says Hezbollah's former sources of influence at the airport, port, judiciary, land border crossings and public administration have weakened as military and political conditions have shifted.

Security and judicial cases are now handled differently, he argues.

"Hezbollah had what amounted to a military fast-track lane at the airport and port, and officials running those facilities were largely under its sway," he said.

Katisha recalled testimony given by a customs director-general while he was serving in parliament.

"The customs director-general told us plainly that there were containers no one was allowed to approach or inspect because they belonged to the resistance. Other containers were subject to inspection," he said.

"Containers marked in red were classified as belonging to the resistance and therefore could not be inspected."

According to the account Katisha cites, those containers were linked to weapons, ammunition, money and goods.

"That situation no longer exists today as it once did," he said.

Katisha points to Hezbollah's diminished influence across government departments, land border crossings and the judiciary. But he cautions that the state cannot fully reclaim its authority through political declarations alone.

Those declarations must be translated into action.


Yemen Govt: Houthis Fully Responsible for Turning Hodeidah Ports into Arms Smuggling Platforms

Traffic moves along a street in the southern port city of Aden, Yemen November 16, 2026. (Reuters)
Traffic moves along a street in the southern port city of Aden, Yemen November 16, 2026. (Reuters)
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Yemen Govt: Houthis Fully Responsible for Turning Hodeidah Ports into Arms Smuggling Platforms

Traffic moves along a street in the southern port city of Aden, Yemen November 16, 2026. (Reuters)
Traffic moves along a street in the southern port city of Aden, Yemen November 16, 2026. (Reuters)

The Yemeni government stressed on Friday that the strikes carried out by the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy against some facilities at the port of Hodeidah, conducted in accordance with international law, hit legitimate targets used by terrorist Houthi militia to receive smuggled Iranian weapons and turn the port into a launchpad threatening international peace and security.

The Coalition announced on Friday that it carried out an operation to neutralize sources of threat used by the Houthis to support their military efforts to attack civilians in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Official Coalition Spokesperson Major General Turki Al-Malki operational capabilities at the Yemeni port of Hodeidah, which facilitated the smuggling and transport of weapons and ballistic missiles, were targeted.

In a statement, the Yemeni government said that “turning ports and civilian infrastructure into arms smuggling routes and hubs for directing military operations is a crime against the interests of the Yemeni people and poses a threat to regional and international security and stability.”

“These actions expose the practices of the terrorist Houthi militia in exploiting vital state facilities to serve its military agenda linked to the Iranian regime, at the expense of citizens' lives, needs, and national interests,” it added.

“Protecting civilians remains an absolute priority, and that the advance evacuation warning reflects full commitment to the rules of international law,” it continued.

“The responsibility to protect civilian facilities is inseparable from the need to prevent their exploitation in military activities and arms smuggling operations that threaten the security of Yemen, the region, and international navigation in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb,” it went on to say.

It added the government has previously revealed the presence of members from the Iranian General Staff in Hodeidah, operating out of certain port facilities and overseeing the smuggling of weapons and raw materials used in manufacturing missiles and drones.

“This is an extension of Iran's destructive role in arming the militia, developing its military capabilities, and expanding its threats to regional security and international maritime lanes,” it warned.

The government stressed that these activities and their networks “will not be immune from accountability and prosecution.”

Countering attempts to exploit these developments to mislead the public or fuel fears over living conditions, the government reassured citizens that the flow of basic commodities, humanitarian aid, and commercial activity will continue under approved arrangements.

It confirmed that ports and land, sea, and air crossings in liberated areas are operating regularly and at sufficient capacity to maintain the movement of commercial and humanitarian supplies and meet citizens' needs, underlining that safeguarding the interests and livelihoods of the Yemeni people remains at the forefront of the government's responsibilities.

The government, together with the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy, renewed its commitment to the principles of international humanitarian law, calling on the international community to shoulder its responsibilities regarding Houthi practices that exploit civilian facilities and vital infrastructure for military activities and arms smuggling.

The government held the Houthi militia “fully accountable for militarizing the port of Hodeidah, embroiling its civilian facilities in arms smuggling and military operations, and the resulting risks and repercussions.”

“Yemeni ports belong to the Yemeni people and exist to serve their interests, not as tools for a military agenda or launchpads threatening the security of Yemen and the wider region,” it said.