Hamas’ Management of the Hostage Crisis: Time Works Against the Deal

A blimp-shaped balloon launched by families and supporters of Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, flies over the prime minister's office, in Jerusalem, 02 December 2024. EPA/ABIR SULTAN
A blimp-shaped balloon launched by families and supporters of Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, flies over the prime minister's office, in Jerusalem, 02 December 2024. EPA/ABIR SULTAN
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Hamas’ Management of the Hostage Crisis: Time Works Against the Deal

A blimp-shaped balloon launched by families and supporters of Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, flies over the prime minister's office, in Jerusalem, 02 December 2024. EPA/ABIR SULTAN
A blimp-shaped balloon launched by families and supporters of Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, flies over the prime minister's office, in Jerusalem, 02 December 2024. EPA/ABIR SULTAN

After more than 420 days of the most devastating war in Palestinian history, the people of Gaza, who have lost their land, lives, homes, and loved ones, still struggle to understand what exactly happened. What did Hamas aim to achieve with its surprise attack on Israel on October 7, 2023? The offensive reshaped the region and opened the gates to war and sweeping changes.

The only clear outcome so far is that Gaza has become unlivable. The survivors, who have lost nearly 50,000 people in the ongoing war and seen over 100,000 wounded, are left with indescribable pain.

If the residents of Gaza—and perhaps those in the West Bank, Lebanon, and other areas—are uncertain about Hamas’ intentions, they at least hope that the results, no matter how delayed, will be proportional to the losses. The only compensation for such sacrifices, they believe, would be the establishment of a state. But did Hamas genuinely seek statehood?

Hamas claims the attack marked the start of a liberation campaign. However, it focused on certain key issues: addressing the “stagnation” in the Israeli prisoner file, protesting repeated Israeli security force violations against Palestinian detainees, and countering increased aggression in Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque, as well as escalating settlement activity.

Hamas has also stated it aimed to preemptively strike to deny Israel the chance to surprise Gaza and to bring the Palestinian cause back to global attention.

A Hamas source told Asharq Al-Awsat: “These were valid and sufficient reasons for the movement to launch the attack, but the plan spiraled out of control.”

“The primary goal was to capture Israeli soldiers and broker a historic prisoner exchange deal. The other reasons were secondary. Even the main planners did not expect the Israeli forces to collapse so quickly, which allowed more resistance fighters to push into other areas within a short period. This expanded the scope of the operation beyond what was originally planned,” the source added.

Since its establishment in the late 1980s, Hamas has been fixated on liberating Palestinian prisoners through force.

In the early 1990s, shortly after its founding, Hamas managed to kidnap soldiers in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem, killing them without negotiation. In 1994, Hamas operatives abducted a soldier in Ramallah, broadcasted images and messages, and demanded a prisoner swap before Israeli forces raided the location, killing everyone inside.

Over the past few decades, Hamas has persistently pursued this goal, culminating in the 2006 abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit near Gaza. Shalit was held until 2011 when a major exchange deal freed him in return for 1,000 Palestinian prisoners, including Yahya Sinwar, who later spearheaded the October 7 attack to secure the release of remaining prisoners.

Hamas remains the only group to have successfully kidnapped Israelis inside Palestinian territories, unlike others who managed such operations abroad.

A Hamas source stated: “The movement’s leadership, particularly its political bureau chief Yahya Sinwar, has always prioritized the prisoner issue, seizing every opportunity to release as many as possible.”

“Sinwar had promised his comrades upon his release in the Shalit deal to secure their freedom,” the source added.

Indeed, Sinwar had sought a deal for four captives held by Hamas: soldiers Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul, captured in 2014, along with Avraham Mengistu, who crossed the Gaza border that same year, and Hisham al-Sayed, who also infiltrated from the border.

Hamas’ Tactics Before and After

Between 2014 and 2023, Hamas tried every strategy, proposing comprehensive deals and humanitarian exchanges and pressuring Israel by releasing videos of captives. Before the war, Hamas released a video of Mengistu, in which he said: “I am Avera Mengistu, the prisoner. How long will I remain in captivity with my friends? Where are the state of Israel and its people regarding our fate?”

Hamas has consistently used video releases to pressure Israel into prisoner swaps, a tactic it amplified during the current war. Over the past year, the group released multiple videos of Israeli captives to exert pressure on both the Israeli government and the families of detainees.

Most recently, Hamas released footage of dual US-Israeli citizen Aidan Alexander, who appealed to President-elect Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to negotiate his release and that of others in a prisoner exchange deal. Alexander warned that his Hamas captors had received new instructions if Israeli forces reached them, implying the possibility of his execution. He urged Israelis to protest daily to pressure their government to agree to a deal and end the war in Gaza.

Hamas’ latest video claims that 33 captives were killed and others went missing due to decisions made by Netanyahu and the Israeli army. It warned that continuing the war might lead to the permanent loss of captives.

A movement insider remarked: “When efforts for a deal failed, Hamas resorted to military action on October 7 to revive the issue.” However, the results were far from what Hamas had hoped for.

Most observers believe Hamas initially planned to capture a limited number of Israelis, forcing Israel into a short conflict that would result in a prisoner exchange, similar to the Shalit operation.

But the flood Hamas unleashed instead brought catastrophe upon Gaza, which has been devastated and paid an exorbitant price far exceeding its intended objectives.

A Growing Debate

Voices in Gaza are increasingly questioning whether the release of prisoners justifies the immense destruction. Many argue that the number of casualties now far exceeds the number of prisoners—around 6,000 before the war.

Fared Abu Habl, a displaced Palestinian from Jabalia now in Khan Yunis, said: “All we want is for this war to stop. Nothing can compensate for the enormous price we’ve paid—not even the release of all prisoners can restore our dignity as we languish in tents with nothing to feed our children.”

He added: “Who is responsible for this? If the prisoners themselves were asked, they might sacrifice their freedom to end this bloodshed.”

However, Manal Yassin argues that Israel and Netanyahu are primarily to blame for prolonging the war, rejecting every solution Hamas has offered. She believes Hamas has shown considerable flexibility but that Israel remains unwilling to negotiate.

This debate has spilled over to social media, with many voicing frustration. Writer Mahmoud Judeh lamented on Facebook: “The situation defies logic—hunger, fear, and rain-drenched misery in Gaza. This relentless suffering for nothing but humiliation.”

Dr. Fadel Ashour noted: “Hamas’ futile persistence is costing us dearly—our blood and the flesh of our children.”

Such public debates have extended to politicians and religious figures. Sheikh Suleiman Al-Dayeh, a prominent Islamic scholar aligned with Hamas, sparked controversy by criticizing the war’s toll. While defending the October 7 attack, he acknowledged its devastating impact on Gaza and called for reflection.

His comments drew mixed reactions, with some branding him a “defeatist.”

Hamas insiders admitted that the scale of the October 7 operation exceeded expectations, particularly regarding the extent of Israel’s retaliation. They conceded that if the planners had foreseen the consequences, they might have reconsidered the operation.

Negotiating a prisoner swap with Israel now appears more complicated than Hamas anticipated. Meanwhile, Netanyahu seems intent on prolonging the war to secure his political survival. Observers suggest this strategy helps him delay his corruption trials and maintain his coalition.

Many agree that a deal becomes less likely as time drags on, leaving Gaza in ruins and its people in despair.



The Fragile Israel-Hezbollah Truce is Holding so Far, Despite Violations

Mariam Kourani removes a toy car from the rubble of her destroyed house after returning with her family to the Hanouiyeh village in southern Lebanon, on Nov. 28, 2024, following a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (AP Photo/Hussein Malla, File)
Mariam Kourani removes a toy car from the rubble of her destroyed house after returning with her family to the Hanouiyeh village in southern Lebanon, on Nov. 28, 2024, following a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (AP Photo/Hussein Malla, File)
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The Fragile Israel-Hezbollah Truce is Holding so Far, Despite Violations

Mariam Kourani removes a toy car from the rubble of her destroyed house after returning with her family to the Hanouiyeh village in southern Lebanon, on Nov. 28, 2024, following a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (AP Photo/Hussein Malla, File)
Mariam Kourani removes a toy car from the rubble of her destroyed house after returning with her family to the Hanouiyeh village in southern Lebanon, on Nov. 28, 2024, following a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (AP Photo/Hussein Malla, File)

A fragile ceasefire between Israel and the Lebanon's Hezbollah has held up for over a month, even as its terms seem unlikely to be met by the agreed-upon deadline.

The deal struck on Nov. 27 to halt the war required Hezbollah to immediately lay down its arms in southern Lebanon and gave Israel 60 days to withdraw its forces there and hand over control to the Lebanese army and UN peacekeepers.

So far, Israel has withdrawn from just two of the dozens of towns it holds in southern Lebanon. And it has continued striking what it says are bases belonging to Hezbollah, which it accuses of attempting to launch rockets and move weapons before they can be confiscated and destroyed, The AP reported.

Hezbollah, which was severely diminished during nearly 14 months of war, has threatened to resume fighting if Israel does not fully withdraw its forces by the 60-day deadline.

Yet despite accusations from both sides about hundreds of ceasefire violations, the truce is likely to hold, analysts say. That is good news for thousands of Israeli and Lebanese families displaced by the war still waiting to return home.

“The ceasefire agreement is rather opaque and open to interpretation,” said Firas Maksad, a senior fellow with the Middle East Institute in Washington. That flexibility, he said, may give it a better chance of holding in the face of changing circumstances, including the ouster of Syria's longtime leader, Bashar Assad, just days after the ceasefire took effect.

With Assad gone, Hezbollah lost a vital route for smuggling weapons from Iran. While that further weakened Hezbollah’s hand, Israel had already agreed to the US-brokered ceasefire.

Hezbollah began firing rockets into Israel on Oct. 8, 2023 — the day after Hamas launched a deadly attack into Israel that ignited the ongoing war in Gaza. Since then, Israeli air and ground assaults have killed more than 4,000 people in Lebanon, including hundreds of civilians. At the height of the war, more than 1 million Lebanese people were displaced.

Hezbollah rockets forced some 60,000 from their homes in northern Israel, and killed 76 people in Israel, including 31 soldiers. Almost 50 Israeli soldiers were killed during operations inside Lebanon.

Here’s a look at the terms of the ceasefire and its prospects for ending hostilities over the long-term.

What does the ceasefire agreement say? The agreement says that both Hezbollah and Israel will halt “offensive” military actions, but that they can act in self-defense, although it is not entirely clear how that term may be interpreted.

The Lebanese army is tasked with preventing Hezbollah and other militant groups from launching attacks into Israel. It is also required to dismantle Hezbollah facilities and weapons in southern Lebanon — activities that might eventually be expanded to the rest of Lebanon, although it is not explicit in the ceasefire agreement.

The United States, France, Israel, Lebanon and the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon, known as UNIFIL, are responsible for overseeing implementation of the agreement.

“The key question is not whether the deal will hold, but what version of it will be implemented,” Maksad, the analyst, said.

Is the ceasefire being implemented? Hezbollah has for the most part halted its rocket and drone fire into Israel, and Israel has stopped attacking Hezbollah in most areas of Lebanon. But Israel has launched regular airstrikes on what it says are militant sites in southern Lebanon and in the Bekaa Valley.

Israeli forces have so far withdrawn from two towns in southern Lebanon - Khiam and Shamaa. They remain in some 60 others, according to the International Organization for Migration, and around 160,000 Lebanese remain displaced.

Lebanon has accused Israel of repeatedly violating the ceasefire agreement and last week submitted a complaint to the UN Security Council that says Israel launched some 816 “ground and air attacks” between the start of the ceasefire and Dec. 22, 2024.

The complaint said the attacks have hindered the Lebanese army's efforts to deploy in the south and uphold its end of the ceasefire agreement.

Until Israel hands over control of more towns to the Lebanese army, Israeli troops have been destroying Hezbollah infrastructure, including weapons warehouses and underground tunnels. Lebanese authorities say Israel has also destroyed civilian houses and infrastructure.

What happens after the ceasefire has been in place for 60 days? Israel's withdrawal from Lebanese towns has been slower than anticipated because of a lack of Lebanese army troops ready to take over, according to Lt. Col. Nadav Shoshani, a military spokesman. Lebanon disputes this, and says it is waiting for Israel to withdraw before entering the towns.

Shoshani said Israel is satisfied with the Lebanese army's control of the areas it has already withdrawn from, and that while it would prefer a faster transfer of power, security is its most important objective.

Israel does not consider the 60-day timetable for withdrawal to be “sacred,” said Harel Chorev, an expert on Israel-Lebanon relations at Tel Aviv University who estimates that Lebanon will need to recruit and deploy thousands more troops before Israel will be ready to hand over control.

Hezbollah officials have said that if Israeli forces remain in Lebanon 60 days past the start of the ceasefire, the militant group might return to attacking them. But Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Kassem said Wednesday that, for now, the group is holding off to give the Lebanese state a chance to "take responsibility” for enforcing the agreement.

Over the final two months of the war, Hezbollah suffered major blows to its leadership, weapons and forces from a barrage of Israeli airstrikes, and a ground invasion that led to fierce battles in southern Lebanon. The fall of Assad was another big setback.

“The power imbalance suggests Israel may want to ensure greater freedom of action after the 60-day period,” Maksad, the analyst, said. And Hezbollah, in its weakened position, now has a “strong interest” in making sure the deal doesn't fall apart altogether “despite Israeli violations,” he said.

While Hezbollah may not be in a position to return to open war with Israel, it or other groups could mount guerilla attacks using light weaponry if Israeli troops remain in southern Lebanon, said former Lebanese army Gen. Hassan Jouni. And even if Israel does withdraw all of its ground forces, Jouni said, the Israeli military could could continue to carry out sporadic airstrikes in Lebanon, much as it has done in Syria for years.