Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
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Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday he would meet former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia after his regime fell in Damascus. But what will Putin say to his former ally? And how might their first exchange unfold, given Russia’s role in helping Assad escape on a chaotic night?

 

The Kremlin, known for staging Putin’s meetings with precision, might opt to limit media coverage this time. Putin could be seen sitting at a small table with Assad, now on asylum in Moscow, in a soundless scene—one that leaves little room for formal pleasantries.

 

Why has Putin announced plans to meet Assad? Is it to reprimand him? Many in Russia believe Assad’s stubbornness has hurt Moscow’s efforts, threatened its gains in Syria, and could eventually risk its key military presence there.

 

As details remain unclear, Russian experts are racing to analyze developments in Syria and outline scenarios for the next phase.

 

Some Russian experts have painted grim scenarios. A member of the prestigious Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy warned of potential risks, including a prolonged conflict with civil war elements, a humanitarian catastrophe with millions of refugees, escalating migration in Europe, and rising tensions among nations like Israel, the US, and Iran.

 

He also predicted a new wave of international terrorism that could reach far beyond the region.

 

Other experts echoed this pessimism. One posted an image of a Syrian dissident stepping on a statue of Assad’s father, warning that “this is just the beginning.” Another blamed the crisis on the “Obama curse,” citing the West’s interference, while a third shared a bleak analysis titled, “We Must Pray for Syria.”

 

So far, Russian media and think tanks have avoided any optimistic outlooks for Syria’s future.

 

Experts, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, believe Moscow may be preparing to handle one of three possible scenarios in Syria.

 

The first, most favorable for Russia’s interests, involves Moscow reaching an agreement with the new Syrian authorities to maintain its military presence for a limited period.

 

This could mean replacing the current 49-year agreements with a five-year deal to facilitate a gradual Russian withdrawal. Such an arrangement could help the new leadership in Syria manage Western pressure to cut ties with Moscow.

 

The second scenario envisions Russia giving up its airbase in Hmeimim while retaining a significant presence in Tartus. This would mirror agreements from 1972, which allowed Russian naval vessels to use the Tartus logistics center in the Mediterranean. This compromise would preserve Russia’s interests while reducing Western pressure on Damascus.

 

The third scenario involves a full Russian withdrawal from both bases, with Moscow later seeking agreements for shared use of air and sea ports. Such agreements, similar to those Russia has signed with other countries, are less likely to provoke Western opposition.

 

Regardless of the outcome, the Kremlin has yet to develop a clear strategy for dealing with the emerging situation in Syria.

 

Key questions remain, including how to curb Iran’s regional influence, manage Türkiye and Israel’s growing roles in Syria, and establish a new regional balance that secures Moscow’s minimum interests.



Israel’s Messages Behind Strikes on Beirut’s Southern Suburb

Men stand at the scene of an Israeli strike on a building in Beirut's southern suburbs on April 1, 2025. (AFP)
Men stand at the scene of an Israeli strike on a building in Beirut's southern suburbs on April 1, 2025. (AFP)
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Israel’s Messages Behind Strikes on Beirut’s Southern Suburb

Men stand at the scene of an Israeli strike on a building in Beirut's southern suburbs on April 1, 2025. (AFP)
Men stand at the scene of an Israeli strike on a building in Beirut's southern suburbs on April 1, 2025. (AFP)

Israel’s latest airstrikes on Beirut’s southern suburb, known as Dahiyeh, have moved beyond mere retaliation for rocket fire, signaling a shift in the rules of engagement. By targeting the area twice in less than a week, Tel Aviv has effectively abandoned the informal understanding that had kept the suburb off-limits since the ceasefire took effect in November.

The escalation raises questions about how Lebanon’s government and Hezbollah will respond and whether this marks the beginning of a more intense phase of conflict.

Pressure to normalize ties

Observers close to Hezbollah believe Israel’s strikes are aimed to increase pressure on Lebanon to engage in normalization talks.

Brig. Gen. Mounir Shehadeh, former Lebanese government coordinator with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), suggested that the rockets fired into Israel last Friday—which prompted the initial Israeli response—ultimately served Israeli interests.

“It was evident that these were crude, suspicious rockets, giving Israel the pretext it needed to strike deep into Lebanese territory, specifically Dahiyeh,” Shehadeh told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He pointed to Tuesday’s assassination of a Hezbollah member in the Dahiyeh strike, describing it as a significant escalation. “Unlike last week, there was no pretext for this attack,” he said. “This confirms that Israel’s objective is to pressure Lebanon into normalization.”

Shehadeh argued that the US and Israel are working to push Lebanon into political negotiations involving diplomats and politicians rather than military representatives.

“There are also growing efforts to force Hezbollah into making internal concessions, particularly to disarm in areas north of the Litani River,” he added.

He stressed that Israel is sending a clear message: no location in Lebanon is off-limits, and it will continue to act whenever and wherever it sees fit.

A different perspective

Retired Brig. Gen. George Nader offered a different interpretation of the escalation. He believes Israel does not need excuses to carry out its attacks, but argues that Lebanon should avoid giving it any justification.

“We have failed to implement international resolutions, particularly Resolution 1701, and we continue to insist that Hezbollah’s disarmament requires national dialogue,” Nader told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He questioned the relevance of such discussions, given that Lebanon’s previous government had already signed an agreement calling for the disarmament of armed groups and the dismantling of their military infrastructure, starting south of the Litani River.

“As long as the situation remains unchanged, we should expect Israeli violations and attacks to intensify,” he warned. He also cited explicit US warnings that Lebanon could face cuts in military aid and even sanctions if it fails to implement the agreement.

“We are at a crossroads,” Nader said. “Either Hezbollah acknowledges the shifting regional and international dynamics, helps the state assert full sovereignty over Lebanese territory, and surrenders its weapons—or Israel will continue the aggressive approach we are seeing today.”