Iraqi Shiite factions and parties find themselves torn between two opposing forces — Tehran's call to preserve the “Wilayat al-Faqih” system at all costs, and Washington’s growing pressure to dismantle armed groups as a condition for engagement.
The competing agendas are tightening their grip as US and Iranian officials prepare for fresh negotiations in Oman on Saturday, amid a tense regional backdrop. Both sides are testing who will blink first.
Some Iraqi factions have reportedly received a religious ruling from Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, granting them leeway to ease US pressure without undermining Tehran’s loyalist political network in Iraq.
Iranian Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani has also left behind a small team in Baghdad to oversee political files, including a previously issued recommendation to halt attacks on US interests “for now.”
The ruling, which surfaced recently, was communicated late last year through Shiite politicians and is seen as a quiet nod toward de-escalation — or at least a tactical pause. Interviews conducted by Asharq Al-Awsat suggest the fatwa has enabled factions to avoid Israeli-American strikes and gain time to prepare a "Plan B" in case diplomacy with Washington breaks down.
Within Iraq’s powerful Coordination Framework — an umbrella group of Iran-aligned forces — discussions are intensifying.
But rather than focusing on disarmament, they aim to preserve the influence of pro-Khamenei groups in the political system. One insider likened the strategy to “sacrificing the fetus to save the mother,” while some influential Shiite figures in government are skeptical about “putting all the eggs in Tehran’s basket.”
Sources familiar with the talks say Washington remains unconvinced by Baghdad’s reassurances that Iran-aligned militias will be dismantled. A recent American message demanded disbanding armed groups and reintegrating their fighters through civilian rehabilitation programs.
A senior official from one of the Shiite factions told Asharq Al-Awsat, “It’s the factions themselves that will decide the fate of their weapons. That decision depends on regional calculations, not on unilateral demands.”
Khamenei’s “Harm Prevention” Fatwa
According to sources, in autumn 2024, representatives of a Shiite leader within the Coordination Framework — who also commands an armed wing — traveled to Iran to meet with Khamenei. They asked whether his earlier fatwa calling for participation in the “support front” remained in effect after the start of the Gaza war, even amid escalating threats from the US and Israel.
Khamenei reportedly responded verbally, saying: “Preventing harm comes first.” The Iraqi delegation interpreted this as a fatwa, and the leader passed it on to faction commanders and allies.
The meeting followed internal disputes among Iraqi factions over whether to continue attacks on US bases or Israeli targets. Some leaders had insisted the original fatwa supporting the "support front" remained in place.
A senior Iraqi official involved in the weapons negotiations said the fatwa has become a pivotal element in shaping discussions around disarmament.
These talks gained new momentum amid mounting US threats to strike Iranian assets and growing speculation in Baghdad that, with operations against Yemen’s Houthis winding down, Iraqi factions could become the last remaining operational node of the so-called “Axis of Resistance.”
Faction leaders now believe they can harness Iran’s two strongest traits — pragmatism and adaptability. As one official put it: “Baghdad has become a testing ground for political trial balloons.”
Qaani’s Team in Baghdad
A senior Shiite leader in Iraq says the priority for pro-Iran factions is to protect their political foothold within the Iraqi state, even if they are forced to disarm — a move they believe would be reversible if circumstances shift in Tehran’s favor.
Before concluding his March 2025 visit to Baghdad, Quds Force commander, Qaani, left behind a small Iranian team tasked with overseeing both political and field developments, according to Iraqi sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat.
The team’s initial objective was reportedly to help restructure Iraq’s Shiite political alliances, but sources say its main focus quickly turned to managing the behavior and positioning of armed factions under rising US pressure.
A trusted source told Asharq Al-Awsat the Qaani team was particularly committed to enforcing Tehran’s instruction of “zero operations” against US targets — a tactical pause aimed at avoiding escalation while high-stakes negotiations loom.
Despite conflicting accounts about the team’s mission, a senior figure in the Iran-aligned Coordination Framework said its dual purpose was to “curb the factions’ actions against the Americans while simultaneously mapping out political alliances ahead of elections.”
The source added that the factions are under strict orders to avoid provocative moves and refrain from unilateral action, but are also expected to be ready “to defend the Wilayat al-Faqih system if the outcome of the upcoming talks in Oman warrants it.”
The Iranian team has reportedly held a series of meetings with faction leaders and party officials to ensure that contingency plans — known as “Plan B” — are in place should nuclear negotiations collapse.
“If the nuclear talks result in a decision to disarm the factions, this team will be instrumental in managing the fallout,” the Shiite official said.
Fate of Arms?
Two senior officials from Shiite parties with brigades in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) say the fate of the paramilitary umbrella group and its weaponry are closely intertwined — and ultimately in the hands of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
But they admit that shifting regional dynamics have forced a recalibration of tactics.
“There’s something changing in Baghdad when it comes to the factions and their arms,” one of the officials told Asharq Al-Awsat. “Talks have intensified recently as US military deployments grow. Some are preparing to adapt to the risks and changing landscape — but the path ahead remains uncertain.”
The official noted that Iraq’s Shiite factions now find themselves caught between two conflicting tracks: one led by Iran, where their loyalty is political and security-based, and another dictated by the United States, where economic and security interests are at stake.
“It will end in one of two ways — either disarmament or a return to regional escalation,” the official said.
Reluctant Retreat Ahead of Elections
Within the Iran-aligned Coordination Framework, divisions are emerging over how to handle potential disarmament. While some factions remain wary of US intentions and the outcome of the nuclear negotiations, others are leaning toward a pragmatic retreat, favoring survival over resistance.
“After the Houthis, Iraqi factions will be Iran’s last remaining high-value asset — they won’t be given up easily or without concessions,” said a senior Shiite leader.
A former government official, speaking on condition of anonymity, ruled out any serious move to disarm. “Giving up weapons would mean losing their edge over political rivals,” the official said. “These groups won’t head into the next election in a wheelchair.”
In recent weeks, influential Shiite actors have begun floating trial balloons, including proposals for “negotiated disarmament,” aimed at crafting an Iraqi model that allows the Coordination Framework to navigate shifting US-Iran dynamics.
The Shiite clerical ruling known as the “harm prevention” fatwa has helped advance those discussions. One proposed model would see weapons handed over as a conditional trust — secured but retrievable — preserving the factions’ political leverage while keeping open the possibility of future resistance, should diplomacy falter.
Sources told Asharq Al-Awsat in February 2025 that ongoing talks over disarmament were largely symbolic and unlikely to produce meaningful results.
Maliki Holds Firm
Not all Shiite leaders support the pragmatic shift. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has rejected concessions, insisting on a hardline “Shiite strategy” regardless of how US-Iran negotiations unfold.
Multiple sources say Maliki has informed various parties — including Iranian circles — that he has no intention of weakening the PMF, even if Tehran distances itself. “We won’t trust anyone... We’re defending our own project,” he was quoted as saying.
People close to Maliki say his calculus is shaped by deep-rooted fears: changes in Syria’s power structure, Türkiye’s rising regional role, and growing competition within Iraq’s Shiite camp — particularly from current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who is seen as leveraging the US-Iran standoff to boost his political prospects.
A senior figure from Maliki’s Dawa Party said: “He will respond to these threats by reinforcing the most powerful Shiite military institution — the Popular Mobilization Forces — no matter what Tehran decides.”
