Will a Weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon Disarm? 

Hezbollah fighters shout slogans during the funeral procession of their top commander Fouad Shukur, who was killed by an Israeli airstrike on July 30, in a southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, Aug. 1, 2024. (AP)
Hezbollah fighters shout slogans during the funeral procession of their top commander Fouad Shukur, who was killed by an Israeli airstrike on July 30, in a southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, Aug. 1, 2024. (AP)
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Will a Weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon Disarm? 

Hezbollah fighters shout slogans during the funeral procession of their top commander Fouad Shukur, who was killed by an Israeli airstrike on July 30, in a southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, Aug. 1, 2024. (AP)
Hezbollah fighters shout slogans during the funeral procession of their top commander Fouad Shukur, who was killed by an Israeli airstrike on July 30, in a southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, Aug. 1, 2024. (AP)

Israel's latest airstrike on what it called a Hezbollah missile storage facility in Beirut's southern suburbs came during increasing pressure for the Iran-backed Lebanese group to disarm.

The disarmament of what has been the region's most powerful non-state armed group has come to look increasingly inevitable. Hezbollah is severely weakened after a war with Israel in which much of its top leadership was killed, and after losing a key ally with the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a conduit for Iran to send arms.

Israel and the US are pushing for swift disarmament, but when and how it will happen - if it does - is contested.

Lebanon's President Joseph Aoun has said he is committed to bringing all arms in the country under state control, but that it will happen through discussions around a national security plan and not through force.

Many fear that an attempt to force the issue would lead to civil conflict, which Aoun has called a “red line.”

Hezbollah officials have said in principle that they are willing to discuss the group's arsenal, but leader Sheikh Naim Qassem said in a speech earlier this month that any serious discussions are contingent on Israel withdrawing its forces from territory they occupy in southern Lebanon and halting near-daily airstrikes.

“The Lebanese have to strike a delicate balance” on disarmament, said Aram Nerguizian, a senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“Go too slow ... and you will lose internal momentum and international legitimacy. Go too fast and you get accused by a still-hurting and battered Shiite community” — who make up most of Hezbollah's constituency — “of acting as a proxy for Israel, while risking Hezbollah remnants ... waging an insurgency against the Lebanese government.”

What would disarmament look like? After Lebanon’s 15-year civil war ended in 1990, the country went through a process of disarming most of the militias that had taken part. Hezbollah was the exception, given special status as a “resistance force” fighting against Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon at the time.

Aoun has outlined his vision of a similar disarmament process. Former Hezbollah fighters could apply to join the Lebanese army as individuals, the president said. Weapons deemed “usable” by the army would become part of its arsenal, while those deemed “unusable” would be destroyed.

Nerguizian said that more than 90% of Hezbollah's “sophisticated and heavy weapons” — which once included tens of thousands of missiles and drones — are believed to have been destroyed already, the vast majority of them by Israel.

What remains, he said, would not be compatible with the Lebanese army's arsenal, which is largely Western-supplied, while Hezbollah uses Iranian, Russian and Chinese-made weapons.

Nerguizian said it is unlikely that large numbers of Hezbollah's tens of thousands of fighters would be incorporated into the army because their ideology has not been compatible as a paramilitary force that has largely been “tied to the preferences of Iran.”

Retired Lebanese army Gen. Hassan Jouni agreed that much of Hezbollah's arsenal would not be easily integrated but said the post-civil war era provides a precedent for integrating fighters.

After going through training, “they become like any other soldier,” he said. While there might be a “religious and ideological obstacle” for some Hezbollah fighters, “I do not think this is the case for everyone.”

Ibrahim Mousawi, a member of Hezbollah's parliamentary bloc, told The Associated Press that “everything is open for discussion.”

“We don’t want to jump into discussing the details,” he said. “This is something that is being left in the hands of the president and the Hezbollah leadership to deal with.”

Mousawi said the destruction of Hezbollah’s arsenal “shouldn’t be acceptable to Lebanon.”

The cash-strapped Lebanese army has struggled to maintain its aging arsenal. In recent years, it has turned to the US and Qatar to help pay soldiers' salaries.

“We are part of the Lebanese strength,” Mousawi said. “If the Americans are really keen to show us that they really respect Lebanon and they care for the Lebanese, ... why don’t they equip the Lebanese army with defensive weapons?”

When might disarming occur? US envoy Morgan Ortagus said earlier this month in an interview broadcast on Lebanese channel LBCI that Hezbollah should be disarmed “as soon as possible."

A Lebanese diplomat said there is ongoing pressure from the Americans on that front. He spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly.

Hezbollah’s stance that it will not discuss giving up its armed wing before Israel withdraws from five key border points in southern Lebanon appears likely to drag out the process. Israeli officials have said that they plan to remain there indefinitely to secure their border and guard against any ceasefire violations by Hezbollah.

Israeli officials did not respond to a request for comment on the issue of Lebanon's army integrating former Hezbollah weapons and fighters.

Lebanese officials say that the Israeli presence violates the ceasefire agreement in November, under which Israel and Hezbollah were supposed to withdraw their forces from southern Lebanon, with the Lebanese army taking control alongside UN peacekeepers.

The Lebanese diplomat said that US officials had acknowledged that Israeli forces remaining in the five border points constituted an “occupation” but had not put strong pressure on Israel to withdraw quickly.

A “smart way to break the deadlock” and avoid further escalation is for Washington to increase its support for the Lebanese army and push Israel to withdraw, said Bilal Saab, a former Pentagon official and senior managing director of the Washington-based TRENDS US consulting firm.

Retired Lebanese army Gen. Elias Hanna said he believes that Hezbollah is “still in the phase of denial” regarding the diminution of its military and political clout.

He said disarmament needs to take place as part of broader discussions about Lebanon's military doctrine and strategy. The Lebanese army could benefit from the experience of Hezbollah, which for many years maintained deterrence with Israel before the latest war, he said.

Saab said he believes the outcome is not in doubt.

“Hezbollah has a choice,” he said. “Either lay down its arms or have them removed by Israeli force.”



China's Memories of Mao Fade to Nostalgia 50 Years after His Death

The Great Helmsman, who died September 9 1976, is still very much a fixture in central Henan province's Nanjie -- often dubbed "China's last Maoist village". Pedro PARDO / AFP
The Great Helmsman, who died September 9 1976, is still very much a fixture in central Henan province's Nanjie -- often dubbed "China's last Maoist village". Pedro PARDO / AFP
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China's Memories of Mao Fade to Nostalgia 50 Years after His Death

The Great Helmsman, who died September 9 1976, is still very much a fixture in central Henan province's Nanjie -- often dubbed "China's last Maoist village". Pedro PARDO / AFP
The Great Helmsman, who died September 9 1976, is still very much a fixture in central Henan province's Nanjie -- often dubbed "China's last Maoist village". Pedro PARDO / AFP

The crimson flags on Nanjie village's "East is Red" Square hang limp in the sweltering summer heat as a trickle of tourists take photos with a towering statue of Chairman Mao Zedong, still gleaming white almost 50 years after he died.

The Great Helmsman, who died September 9 1976, is still very much a fixture in central Henan province's Nanjie -- often dubbed "China's last Maoist village", said AFP.

Nostalgia for Mao's egalitarian ideals is growing in China as memories of his turbulent rule fade and the country grapples with a slowing economy and inequality.

Mao, who led the 1949 communist revolution against the ruling nationalists, ushered in an era of collectivized ownership he argued would drive industry and unite the country, but his drastic policies are also blamed by historians for mass starvation and millions of deaths.

While the ruling Chinese Communist Party maintains Mao was a revolutionary hero, it publicly acknowledged after his death that his devastating Cultural Revolution was a "grave mistake" -- a verdict upheld by subsequent leaders.

In Nanjie, countless murals of the former Chinese leader are plastered around the village.

Residents still live under Maoist principles of shared ownership, while the rest of the country moved on from that economic model.

"I still revere him very much," Xie Kaiyue, a 22-year-old local university student, said of Mao, who died almost three decades before she was born.

"I think young people in the village and, actually, myself, aren't as strong-spirited as in the past... People were purer," she said.

Nearby, electric carts whisked visitors past uniform apartment blocks plastered with socialist slogans as guides explained how cooperative ownership in local enterprises funds free housing for residents.

- Party line -

Around 500 kilometers (310 miles) north, in the mountain village of Dazhai in Shanxi province, once promoted by Mao as a national model after locals terraformed its arid hills into irrigated fields, tourists reminisce about an era when the Great Helmsman dominated political and social life.

"(People) didn't have enough to eat or to wear," Li, a 64-year-old tourist from Xi'an, said of his childhood.

"But... the whole country was full of vigor, and there was a spirit of struggling with heaven, earth, and people to change every aspect of China," the retiree said.

"Of course I miss it."

Now, Dazhai is overflowing with shops selling items that support Mao's personality cult -- posters, playing cards, and crockery emblazoned with his image, and the "Little Red Book" of his quotations.

Still, references to dark chapters of his decades in absolute power are tightly censored in public discourse.

The decade-long episode instigated by Mao in 1966 saw intellectuals brutally targeted as "class enemies" and schools shuttered, setting China back for years in education and development.

Private property and land were collectivized, while economic management pushed the country to the Great Famine, which the government says killed around 15 million people, while historians estimate around 20-43 million.

In one museum, text mentioning the Cultural Revolution had been crudely scraped off signage.

"Everything you see in the public domain... is the party line. No one is allowed to deviate from this," said scholar Xu Chenggang, who was targeted as a child in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution because his father was labelled a "rightist".

Mao's face is printed on banknotes, his portrait overlooks Tiananmen Square, and his body is preserved in a mausoleum.

Every year new movies and TV shows dramatizing Mao's life beam the message of his great deeds to public.

Public discussion has been squeezed further under current leader Xi Jinping, who warns against "historical nihilism", or narratives contradicting the party's own.

"The Communist Party told people there were mistakes, but what's the meaning of 'mistake'? No one knows," Xu said.

- 'Great figure' -

The sanitized history has left space for romanticized interpretations among youths frustrated by long working hours and intense competition in education and the job market.

In December, a viral video series on Bilibili -- a platform popular with those under 30 -- argued that the 2017 movie 'Youth', which follows young performers in a military dance troupe during the 1970s, was a subtle ode to the Cultural Revolution.

The videos, which praised Mao and blamed capitalist elites for crushing the movement, were removed after gaining over 35 million views in less than a week.

"Today, there is more of a sense that the Cultural Revolution was a period of idealism, where society was fired by ideals and not by the relentless pursuit of money and material goods," said to Kerry Brown, head of the Lau China Institute in London and author of a recent book on Mao.

"This is, of course, a total fabrication," he said.

Many also credit Mao with laying the foundation for China to become a modern, technologically advanced nation, said Mobo Gao, professor of Chinese studies at Adelaide University.

"They ask, where did (today's China) come from? It came from the establishment of the PRC," said Gao, who lived through the Mao era in rural Jiangxi province.

"Who was the one who really established the PRC? It must be Mao."

In Shijiazhuang, an industrial city of seven million northeast of Dazhai, 20-year-old Wang Zhihao and his classmates posed with a giant Mao statue opposite the municipal government.

"We admire and revere Chairman Mao very much. He is a great figure," Wang said, as the sound of elderly residents singing songs praising the Communist Party drifted over from the nearby square.

"He led the founding of New China."

 


Is US Military Cooperation with Ethiopia Driven by Anger over Egypt-China Rapprochement?

US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
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Is US Military Cooperation with Ethiopia Driven by Anger over Egypt-China Rapprochement?

US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)

A US defense agreement with Ethiopia was announced days before an important visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Cairo that saw agreements and memorandums of understanding signed in several fields and coincided with joint Egyptian-Chinese air exercises.

The timing raised questions over whether Washington’s military cooperation with Addis Ababa was driven by “US anger at Cairo” and what objectives it serves amid tensions in the Horn of Africa.

The United States and Ethiopia signed a defense agreement on Aug. 21 during an official visit by an Ethiopian military delegation to Washington. Both sides described it as a strategic framework aimed at strengthening military and security cooperation, protecting national interests and securing mutual benefits.

Raafat Mahmoud, head of the African Affairs Research Unit at the Egyptian Cabinet's Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC), told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington was seeking to rebuild ties with Addis Ababa after years of tension, particularly over the Tigray war and US criticism of Ethiopia’s human rights record.

He argued that the agreement showed Ethiopia had become part of broader US calculations involving Red Sea security, countering Chinese and Russian influence and combating armed groups in the Horn.

Ethiopian lawmaker Mohammed Al-Arusi noted that Washington views the Horn as directly linked to Red Sea security, international trade and maritime routes, while also facing terrorist threats.

“Ethiopia lies at the heart of this geography, with its demographic, political and military weight across a broad region, and it hosts the permanent headquarters of the African Union,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. Washington, he added, was not seeking a temporary stance but it is “rebuilding its position in a region where the balance of power is changing.”

US Republican and strategic affairs expert Adolfo Franco cautioned that the agreement lacks formally binding treaties and direct financial funding, adding that future defense exports remain subject to strict restrictions and case-by-case assessments, including human rights considerations.

Al-Arusi pointed to a US-Ethiopian dialogue launched in May covering economics, trade, investment, defense and security. The defense track advanced just three months later, a sequence he said showed Washington was approaching Ethiopia with long-term considerations.

Mahmoud said growing US support could strengthen Ethiopia’s negotiating position not only on water but also in its efforts to secure maritime access and expand its presence in the Red Sea region.

Recent media reports have portrayed the US-Ethiopian rapprochement as Washington’s response to Egypt’s growing ties with China, highlighted by Xi’s visit to Cairo this week.

Mahmoud countered that Egyptian-Chinese rapprochement was not new, although recent developments naturally raised sensitivities in Washington, particularly amid expanding economic and security cooperation.

In January 2026, Ethiopia and China elevated their relations to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” nearly two years after Egypt and China upgraded their ties to a “strategic partnership” in 2024.

Al-Arusi argued that Washington’s expanding partnership with Addis Ababa should not be viewed as replacing one partner with another, but rather as evidence of Ethiopia’s growing strategic value.

Former US diplomat Henry Ensher told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington wants a security partner in the Horn and that Ethiopia is the best option given its capabilities.

While China and the United States compete in Africa, Egypt is the more important partner, he said, making it unlikely that Washington would use this approach to confront or punish Cairo.


Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion

A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
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Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion

A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)

Ahmad al-Hilali, deputy governor of Hasakah, told Asharq Al-Awsat on Friday that the integration process stipulated in the “January 29, 2026 Agreement” has moved, following the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the former Kurdish Autonomous Administration, from “the stage of understandings and negotiations to actual implementation, whether in civilian institutions or in the security and military sectors.”

He described the security situation as “much better” and said “stability is gradually strengthening,” stressing that the process “is moving toward completion, and what we want is for it to take place calmly.”

Since SDF commander Mazloum Abdi announced from the presidential palace in Damascus on August 25 the dissolution of the SDF and the Autonomous Administration, Hasakah has witnessed a series of developments and changes signaling the emergence of a new phase in the governorate. Its defining features are the restoration of state authority across all sectors, stronger security and stability, the unification of institutions, and the end of administrative duplication, in accordance with the January 29 Agreement.

In his remarks, al-Hilali said that “the integration process is not simply a matter of transferring buildings or changing names. It is about reunifying institutional authority, administrative decision-making, and security and military command under the umbrella of the Syrian state.”

He said significant steps had already been completed in this direction, while work was underway to address the remaining files in an orderly manner that would prevent any institutional or security vacuum and preserve stability in the governorate.

Before the announcement of the SDF's dissolution, most cities and areas in Hasakah had experienced security disorder involving the Revolutionary Youth. Such incidents increased after the signing of the January 29 Agreement, when members of the group prevented the handover of institutions to the government. That situation, however, has now disappeared.

Al-Hilali attributed the disappearance of the previous unrest primarily to the fact that “the phase has changed.”

“Previously, there were attempts to obstruct the process of transferring state institutions, and some activities emerged aimed at disrupting this course. But as implementation of the agreement progressed and the direction toward ending institutional and security duplication became clear, these manifestations declined significantly,” he said.

According to al-Hilali, “There is now a growing conviction among everyone that state institutions should not be a subject of conflict or confrontation, and that the integration process is moving toward completion.”

“What we want is for this process to take place calmly, away from provocation and tension, and for all residents of the governorate to feel that the return of state institutions means the return of services, the rule of law and stability, and is not directed against any component of society,” he said.

Asked when the integration of military, security and civilian institutions would be fully completed, the deputy governor said: “I do not want to set an artificial date for a process of this scale and complexity, because some files require technical, administrative and security procedures before they can be formally closed.”

He added: “But I can say that we are at a very advanced stage and that the overall direction is clearly toward completing the integration as soon as possible.”

He noted that “the bulk of the work is now in the implementation phase, while what remains consists of detailed files requiring the completion of arrangements, verification and coordination among the ministries and relevant authorities.”

Women fighters from the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) take part in military traning in Hasakah, Syria, August 22, 2026. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman

Pending Files

Al-Hilali said: “What matters most to us is that the integration be complete, genuine and sustainable, rather than merely a political announcement whose impact fades after a short period.”

Asked about the main outstanding issues preventing the completion of the integration process, al-Hilali said the remaining files could be divided into three main tracks.

“First is the military and security file, involving the completion of the restructuring of personnel and cadres and the integration of those who meet the requirements into the Ministries of Defense and Interior in accordance with the established procedures,” he said.

“The second is the administrative and civilian file, particularly the status of employees and staff, the mechanisms for confirming their positions and paying their entitlements, and the integration of institutions and departments whose transfer to the state has not yet been completed.”

“The third involves a number of service-related, technical and administrative files linked to the transfer of powers and the reunification of operating systems, databases and resources.”

Al-Hilali said these issues “do not represent an obstacle to the integration process so much as they are implementation files that need to be completed.”

“The political decision is clear and the overall direction has been settled: state institutions will be unified, authority will rest with the Syrian state, and the rights of all citizens and components of the governorate will be preserved,” he said.

The rise of the Autonomous Administration

The first foundations of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, which sought to establish a “Kurdish project in Syria,” emerged through the formation of the Kurdish Supreme Committee. It was established by Syria's Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council following the signing of the Erbil Agreement on July 12, 2012.

A military wing was subsequently established for the committee, comprising the People's Protection Units (YPG), the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) and the Asayish security forces. The SDF was later formed in 2015, under predominantly Kurdish leadership.

The geographic footprint of the Autonomous Administration expanded from three cantons in 2014 to six in 2016 and seven by 2023. This territorial expansion was accompanied by the growth of its military and security apparatus and civilian institutions, which collectively included tens of thousands of personnel.

The SDF subsequently lost a significant portion of its territory during armed clashes that erupted between its fighters and the Syrian army in late 2025 and early 2026. The fighting lasted about two weeks and was followed by the signing of the January 29, 2026 Agreement.

The agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF called for a ceasefire and the gradual integration into Syrian state institutions of the military and civilian institutions established by the Kurds during the years of conflict. It also called for the handover of border crossings and oil and gas fields, as well as the withdrawal of foreign fighters from the region.