Syria’s al-Sharaa Under Trump’s Spotlight, Admiring ‘Strong’ Leaders

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
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Syria’s al-Sharaa Under Trump’s Spotlight, Admiring ‘Strong’ Leaders

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)

A hundred days after Ahmed al-Sharaa was sworn in as Syria’s president, US officials are still proceeding with caution regarding his administration. There are concerns about the potential for chaos, which could create fertile ground for extremist groups and allow Iran to maintain its foothold in the country.

Additionally, there are growing anxieties over Türkiye’s expanding influence across Syria and its implications for Israel.

These points were highlighted in discussions with Robert Wood, a former US ambassador who held various positions at the State Department and served at the US Mission to the United Nations; Robert Ford, former US ambassador to Syria; Henri Barkey, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and former government official; and Ayman Abdel Nour, a Syrian-American political analyst and journalist.

While caution is urged in evaluating al-Sharaa’s leadership, it remains unclear whether his actions will translate into meaningful governance.

According to Wood, the current situation in Syria can be described as highly complex, especially considering recent violence, and experts are watching closely to see how al-Sharaa navigates these challenges. While his hosting of a national unity conference has drawn some positive attention, concerns remain about the broader implications of his leadership.

Ford shares a similar perspective, acknowledging that Shara's actions often align with what one would expect from a head of state. Notably, his agreement with Mazloum Abdi, leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is seen as a potential step toward greater internal stability, provided it is properly implemented.

However, Barkey emphasizes that Abdi controls a much larger force than other groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which likely made it necessary for al-Sharaa to strike a deal with him. If Abdi forms alliances with other minority groups, such as the Druze, he could become a key figure of opposition to al-Sharaa’s rule. Additionally, al-Sharaa faces the challenge of reducing his reliance on Turkish support, while also proving his ability to act independently on the international stage.

US diplomats, however, remained cautious about al-Sharaa's leadership, with some expressing skepticism about his ability to lead effectively. While he appears to be acting presidentially, concerns persist regarding his control over extremist factions within his government, as well as recent security violations in Latakia and Tartus. Experts note that despite his ascent to power, Sharaa has yet to unite the country, with some pointing to the collapse of the regime’s military as a key factor in his rise.

A significant point of criticism from Barkey is al-Sharaa’s appointment of former jihadists as governors in key areas, including Latakia and Tartus, as well as his reliance on family members and loyalists within his government.

While some US officials argue that Sharaa’s government may not be directly involved in recent incidents, uncertainty remains about who in his administration might be complicit.

For his part, Abdel Nour highlights a shift in public perception of al-Sharaa since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024.

Initially, Syrians—including Alawites—were relieved by Assad's ousting, but nearly 100 days into Sharaa's presidency, tensions have risen due to discrepancies between al-Sharaa’s rhetoric and the reality on the ground, particularly in relation to key figures like Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani and mid-level officials.

Key Questions Raised on Accountability and Rule of Law

Ford echoed concerns about al-Sharaa’s ability to address critical issues, including accountability and the rule of law, especially following the unrest in Latakia and Tartus.

Despite al-Sharaa’s formation of a committee to investigate the incidents, Ford questions whether those responsible for violations will be held publicly accountable, stressing that such actions are crucial for maintaining trust within security forces and the broader public.

Wood acknowledged the significance of al-Sharaa’s national unity conference yet remains deeply concerned about the potential agreements Sharaa may strike with the SDF. While he sees positive signs, he underscores the importance of thorough investigations into recent killings, as the identities of those responsible remain unclear.

US Perspectives on al-Sharaa’s Leadership

Abdel Nour describes two prevalent perspectives in Washington regarding al-Sharaa’s leadership. One, held by military and security figures with experience in Iraq, doubts that the new Syrian leadership will bring significant change, regardless of its outward appearance. The other viewpoint suggests giving al-Sharaa several months to adjust to the new reality.

Fears Over ISIS Prisoners and Regional Stability

A significant concern raised by Wood is the potential release of approximately 9,500 ISIS fighters currently held in over 20 prisons across Syria, should Sharaa reach a deal with the SDF. These fighters could pose a serious security threat not only to Syria but to Iraq and the broader region.

Ford added that al-Sharaa’s past, particularly his involvement with jihadist factions like Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, raises questions about his true political motivations. Ford wonders whether al-Sharaa used these groups for political leverage.

Iran’s Influence and Regional Dynamics

Both Wood and Ford emphasize the importance of monitoring Iran’s role in Syria. Ford warns that further instability could provide Iran with opportunities to rebuild its influence in certain Syrian communities, which he believes would not align with US national security interests.

Wood stresses that neighboring countries, including Israel and Türkiye, have a strong interest in a unified Syria to avoid further regional instability.

Professor Barkey cautions that while Iran's influence in Syria has not been eliminated, Tehran will likely continue to pursue ways to reassert its presence.

Türkiye-Israel Tensions and the Future of Syria

Concerns over a potential Turkish-Israeli confrontation in Syria are growing. Ford points out that Türkiye, a key player with growing ties to al-Sharaa’s government, could play a significant role in Syria’s future. He worries that a direct conflict between Turkish and Israeli forces, potentially involving airstrikes or proxy engagements, could escalate tensions in the region.

However, Barkey believes that such a scenario is unlikely to escalate into direct military confrontation. Instead, he suggests that the Turkish-Israeli rivalry will remain largely political, with both countries focusing on strategic interests in the region, particularly in Syria’s south where Israel is concerned about the resurgence of Hezbollah or other new actors.

In discussions surrounding Syria’s new constitution, Ford sees little value in UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and the Constitutional Committee led by UN Special Envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen. Similarly, Barkey shares Ford’s skepticism, noting that he sees limited potential for the UN to bring about meaningful change unless Arab countries step in with support.

Barkey also echoes the view held by many that US President Donald Trump was unpredictable in his decision-making. He added that Trump had a deep admiration, though not fascination, for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, viewing him as one of the “strongmen” capable of shaping the future of their countries as they see fit.

Looking ahead, Barkey remains uncertain about Syria’s future, acknowledging that the situation is highly unpredictable. He suggests that if Syria were to experience another war or a severe collapse of law and order, it is highly probable that ISIS could resurge.

The US government, Barkey speculates, is likely deeply concerned that without American forces acting as a buffer or deterrent, the stability of the region could be further jeopardized in the event of a breakdown in Syria.



UN Agency Begins Clearing Huge Gaza City Waste Dump as Health Risks Mount

Palestinians walk near a landfill, in Gaza City, February 11, 2026. (Reuters)
Palestinians walk near a landfill, in Gaza City, February 11, 2026. (Reuters)
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UN Agency Begins Clearing Huge Gaza City Waste Dump as Health Risks Mount

Palestinians walk near a landfill, in Gaza City, February 11, 2026. (Reuters)
Palestinians walk near a landfill, in Gaza City, February 11, 2026. (Reuters)

The United Nations Development Program began clearing a huge wartime garbage dump on Wednesday that has swallowed one of Gaza City’s oldest commercial districts and is an environmental and health risk.

Alessandro Mrakic, head of the UNDP Gaza Office, said work had started to remove the solid-waste mound that has overtaken the once busy Fras Market in the Palestinian enclave's main city.

He put the volume of the dump at more than 300,000 cubic meters (390,000 cubic yards) and 13 meters (14 yards) high.

It formed after municipal crews were blocked from reaching Gaza’s main landfill in the Juhr al-Dik area - adjacent to the border with Israel - when the Gaza war began in October 2023.

The area in Juhr ‌al-Dik is now ‌under full Israeli control.

Over the next six months, UNDP plans ‌to ⁠transfer the waste to ⁠a new temporary site prepared in the Abu Jarad area south of Gaza City and built to meet environmental standards.

The site covers 75,000 square meters and will also accommodate daily collection, Mrakic said in a statement sent to Reuters. The project is funded by the Humanitarian Fund and the European Union's Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations.

Some Palestinians sifted through the garbage, looking for things to take away, but there was relief that the market space would eventually be cleared.

"It needs to be moved to a ⁠site with a complex of old waste, far away from people. There's ‌no other solution. What will this cause? It will cause ‌us gases, it will cause us diseases, it will cause us germs," elderly Gazan Abu Issa said ‌near the site.

The Gaza Municipality confirmed the start of the relocation effort in collaboration with the ‌UNDP, calling it an urgent step to contain a worsening solid-waste crisis after about 350,000 cubic meters of rubbish accumulated in the heart of the city.

'A SYMBOL OF THE WAR'

Fras Market, an historic quarter that before the war served nearly 600,000 residents with items ranging from food to clothes and household tools, has been ‌buried under garbage for more than a year.

Amjad al-Shawa, head of the Palestinian NGOs Network and a liaison with UN and international agencies, ⁠said the dump had fueled “serious ⁠health and environmental problems and the spread of insects and illnesses.”

“It is a symbol of the war that continued for two years,” he told Reuters. “Its removal may give people a sense of hope that the ceasefire (agreed last October) is moving forward.”

Shawa said the waste would be transported to a transitional site near the former Netzarim settlement in central Gaza until Israeli forces withdraw from eastern areas and municipal access to the permanent landfills can be restored.

UNDP said it had collected more than 570,000 tons of solid waste across Gaza since the war began as part of its emergency response to avert a further deterioration in public health conditions.

The number of temporary dumpsites has decreased from 141 to 56 as part of efforts in 2024-25 to remove smaller dumping sites, a UNDP report last December said.

"However, only 10 to 12 of these temporary dumping sites are accessible and operational, and Gaza’s two main sanitary landfills remain inaccessible. The environmental and public health risks remain critical," it added.


Israel Says Killed Hamas Operative Responsible for 2004 Bus Bombings

Destroyed buildings are pictured in the Jabalia camp for Palestinian refugees in the northern Gaza Strip on February 8, 2026. (AFP)
Destroyed buildings are pictured in the Jabalia camp for Palestinian refugees in the northern Gaza Strip on February 8, 2026. (AFP)
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Israel Says Killed Hamas Operative Responsible for 2004 Bus Bombings

Destroyed buildings are pictured in the Jabalia camp for Palestinian refugees in the northern Gaza Strip on February 8, 2026. (AFP)
Destroyed buildings are pictured in the Jabalia camp for Palestinian refugees in the northern Gaza Strip on February 8, 2026. (AFP)

The Israeli military said on Wednesday it killed a senior Hamas operative who had been convicted of orchestrating two bus bombings in 2004 that left 16 civilians dead and dozens more wounded.

The bombings were among the deadliest attacks during the second intifada, the Palestinian uprising of the early 2000s.

In a joint statement, the military and the Shin Bet domestic security agency said their forces killed Bassem Hashem Al-Haymouni in a strike in the Gaza Strip last week.

They described him as "a senior operative" for Hamas who "had been active since 2004" as part of a cell responsible for carrying out deadly attacks in Israel.

They identified him as the mastermind of an August 2004 attack in the southern Israeli city of Beer Sheva, in which suicide bombers blew up two buses.

He "dispatched several suicide bombers to carry out a coordinated attack on two buses in Beer Sheva, in which 16 Israeli civilians were murdered and approximately 100 others were injured", the statement said.

Haymouni was apprehended and sentenced, but was released in 2011 as part of the so-called "Shalit deal", in which Israel freed more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the release of soldier Gilad Shalit.

Palestinian fighters had seized Shalit in 2006 during a cross-border raid near the Kerem Shalom crossing and held him hostage for five years.

His case became a major national issue in Israel.

The military and Shin Bet statement said that after Haymouni was released, he "resumed recruiting attackers and directing terrorist activity".

It added that the strike on Haymouni was also in response to violations of the ongoing ceasefire in Gaza.

"During the war he was involved in the production and placement of explosive devices intended to harm Israeli troops," it said, referring to the war in Gaza sparked by Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack on Israel.

The US-brokered Gaza ceasefire entered its second phase last month, and foresees a demilitarization of the territory -- including the disarmament of Hamas -- along with a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Hamas has said that disarmament is a red line, although it has indicated it could consider handing over its weapons to a future Palestinian governing authority.

A Palestinian technocratic committee has been set up with a goal of taking over day-to-day governance in the Strip, but it remains unclear whether, or how, it will address the issue of demilitarization.


Somali President to Asharq Al-Awsat: Working with Saudi-led Partners to Void Israel’s Somaliland Recognition

Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince and Prime Minister meets with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud Makkah. (SPA file)
Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince and Prime Minister meets with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud Makkah. (SPA file)
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Somali President to Asharq Al-Awsat: Working with Saudi-led Partners to Void Israel’s Somaliland Recognition

Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince and Prime Minister meets with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud Makkah. (SPA file)
Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince and Prime Minister meets with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud Makkah. (SPA file)

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud unveiled a three-pronged political and legal strategy to nullify what he described as Israeli recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland, warning that such a move threatens Somalia’s sovereignty and regional stability.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mohamud said his government is acting in close coordination with partners led by Saudi Arabia to safeguard stability and shield the Horn of Africa from what he called “reckless escalation.”

Without naming specific countries, the Somali leader said some regional states may see the Israeli recognition as an opportunity to pursue “narrow, short-term interests at the expense of Somalia’s unity and regional stability.”

“I do not wish to name any particular country or countries,” he said. “But it is clear that some may view this recognition as a chance to achieve limited gains.”

He stressed that Somalia’s unity is a “red line,” adding that Mogadishu has taken firm positions to protect national sovereignty. “We warn against being misled by reckless Israeli adventurism,” he said.

Three parallel steps

Mohamud was referring to recognition announced by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland as an independent state.

“I affirm with the utmost clarity and firmness that any recognition of Somaliland as an independent state constitutes a blatant violation of the sovereignty and unity of the Federal Republic of Somalia,” he said.

He described the move as a grave breach of international law, the UN Charter, and African Union resolutions that uphold respect for inherited African borders.

On that basis, Somalia has adopted and will continue to pursue three parallel measures, he revealed.

The first involves immediate diplomatic action through the UN, African Union, and Organization of Islamic Cooperation to reject and legally and politically invalidate the recognition.

Mohamud said Somalia called for and secured a formal session at the UN Security Council to address what he termed a “flagrant Israeli violation” of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The session, he said, marked a significant diplomatic victory for Mogadishu, particularly given Somalia’s current membership on the council.

He expressed “deep appreciation” for statements of solidarity and condemnation issued by the African Union, Arab League, OIC, Gulf Cooperation Council, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the EU, among others.

The second step centers on coordinating a unified Arab, Islamic, and African position. Mohamud praised Saudi Arabia for being among the first to issue a clear statement rejecting any infringement on Somalia’s unity.

He said the Saudi position reflects the Kingdom’s longstanding commitment to state sovereignty and territorial integrity, reinforced by the Saudi cabinet’s “firm and principled” support for Somalia during what he described as a delicate moment.

The third step focuses on strengthening internal national dialogue to address political issues within the framework of a single Somali state, free from external interference or dictates.

Regional security

Mohamud warned that if left unchecked, the recognition could set a “dangerous precedent and undermine regional and international peace and security.”

He said it could embolden separatist movements not only in the Horn of Africa but across Africa and the Arab world, citing developments in countries such as Sudan and Yemen as evidence of the high cost of state fragmentation.

“This concerns a vital global shipping artery and core Arab national security,” he said, referring to the Red Sea.

“Any political or security tension along Somalia’s coast will directly affect international trade and energy security.”

He added that instability would impact Red Sea littoral states, particularly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Yemen, and Jordan. “Preserving Somalia’s unity is a cornerstone of collective Red Sea security,” he said.

Strategic foothold

Mohamud argued that Israel’s objective goes beyond political recognition.

“We believe the goal extends beyond a political gesture,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. “It includes seeking a strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa near the Red Sea, enabling influence over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and threatening the national security of Red Sea states.”

He described the move as a test of Somali, Arab, and African resolve on issues of sovereignty and territorial unity, emphasizing that Somalia’s opposition to secession is a principled and enduring national stance supported widely in the Arab and African worlds, “foremost by Saudi Arabia.”

He rejected any attempt to turn Somalia into a battleground for regional or international rivalries. “We will not allow Somalia to become an arena for settling conflicts that do not serve our people’s interests or our region’s security,” he declared.

Saudi ties

Regarding Saudi-Somali relations, Mohamud described the partnership as “deep-rooted and strategic, rooted in shared history, religion, and a common destiny.” Saudi Arabia, he said, “remains a central partner in supporting Somalia’s stability, reconstruction, development, and Red Sea security.”

He voiced admiration for Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and the economic and development gains achieved under the leadership of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz and Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince and Prime Minister.

Asked about the recent Saudi Cabinet decision rejecting any attempt to divide Somalia, Mohamud said the federal government received it with “great appreciation and relief.”

He said the position extends the Kingdom’s historic support for Somalia’s territorial unity and sovereignty, reinforces regional stability, and sends an important message to the international community on the need to respect state sovereignty and refrain from interference in internal affairs.