US President Donald Trump’s announcement to lift sanctions on Syria came with five conditions, chief among them the demand that “all foreign fighters” leave Syrian territory, a requirement that poses a significant challenge to the new administration of President Ahmed al-Sharaa.
The presence of these fighters, many of whom have been allied for years with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), underscores the complexity of Trump’s demand. These militants played a key role in the conflict against former President Bashar al-Assad, and many in HTS view them as having earned their place on the battlefield through loyalty and sacrifice.
The influx of foreign fighters into Syria began with the formation of the Free Syrian Army in the early days of the uprising. Türkiye’s border soon became a dual gateway, a route of escape for Syrians fleeing war, either settling in Türkiye or continuing toward Europe, and a corridor for hundreds of non-Syrian fighters arriving to join the battle.
Initially, many of these fighters aligned themselves with non-ideological armed groups. But over time, especially between 2012 and 2014, as the regime intensified its use of barrel bombs and heavy weaponry on opposition-held neighborhoods, the foreign fighters gained prominence in what became known as the “revolutionary strongholds,” particularly in Syria’s north.
‘The Migrants’ of the Revolution
Their combat skills and commitment earned them both fear and admiration. In this period, foreign fighters often led the charge in so-called “inghimasi” (commando-style) and suicide operations, which won them significant support among local communities. They were dubbed “al-Muhajireen” - the migrants - a reference both to their origins and their perceived dedication to the Syrian cause.
Following the collapse of the former Syrian regime on December 8, foreign fighter factions such as the Turkistan Islamic Party, Ajnad al-Sham and Ajnad al-Kavkaz (Chechens) emerged as key players within the operations command room led by the HTS.
In his first public remarks on the presence of foreign fighters, Syria’s new president described them as instrumental in toppling Bashar al-Assad’s regime and said they “deserve to be rewarded.”
Speaking to journalists in mid-January, al-Sharaa said the atrocities committed by the former government had necessitated foreign support, and hinted at the possibility of granting these fighters Syrian citizenship, a suggestion that sparked widespread debate.
Soon after, the new administration took steps that signaled both gratitude and political calculation: several foreign fighters were appointed to senior military posts in the newly restructured Syrian army, with ranks ranging from colonel to brigadier general.
Among the most prominent were Jordanian Abdulrahman Hussein al-Khatib, promoted to brigadier general; Egyptian Alaa Mohamed Abdel Baki; Uyghur militant Abdulaziz Dawood Khodabardi; Tajik national Moulana Tursun Abdulsamad; Turkish fighter Omar Mohamed Jeftchi Mukhtar; Albanian Abdul Bashari Khattab; and Dagestani native Zanor al-Basri Abdelhamid Abdullah, the commander of the “Army of Emigrants and Supporters.”
A Dilemma at the Heart of Syria’s Future
A former HTS commander, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, said the al-Sharaa administration is unlikely to oppose the US demand.
“The muhajireen brothers themselves are not clinging to their positions if they stand in the way of the country’s interests,” he said.
Indeed, less than 24 hours after Trump and al-Sharaa met in the Saudi capital, local Syrian outlets began reporting that General Security forces had raided foreign fighter strongholds in rural Idlib.
Asharq Al-Awsat was unable to independently verify the reports, but whether the raids were genuine or simply political theater, analysts say the message was unmistakable: Damascus may be willing to act decisively to secure international recognition and economic relief.
Kareem Mohammed, a current Syrian army commander and former battalion leader in the HTS with direct ties to foreign fighters, told Asharq Al-Awsat from Damascus that these combatants still hold significant sway within the country’s military and security apparatus, as well as among the revolution’s grassroots base.
“There is no interest for the government in taking negative action against them,” Mohammed said. “They remain popular within the ranks of the new army and the revolutionary heartland.”
Mohammed added that several countries have recently begun raising the issue of foreign fighters as a bargaining chip in their engagement with Syria’s new leadership. But he emphasized the crucial role these militants - referred to by rebels as al-Muhajireen (the migrants) - played from the outset of the uprising.
“These fighters had a decisive impact from the early days of the revolution. Their military expertise stood out in key battles,” he said.
According to Mohammed, the al-Sharaa government is actively working to distance the muhajireen from internal political conflicts and reassign them to their former positions in Idlib. There are also promises of eventual integration into Syrian society and possibly even the granting of citizenship down the line.
The ongoing debate over the presence of foreign fighters in Syria may be based on a misunderstanding, according to extremist group researcher Hossam Jazmati, who says Western powers are not explicitly calling for their expulsion.
“The American and Western demands are not about deporting foreign fighters,” Jazmati told Asharq Al-Awsat.
“Rather, they focus on two main conditions: that these individuals do not hold prominent positions in the emerging Syrian state, particularly in the army, security, or government , and that Syrian territory is not used by any of them to launch, prepare for, or train for military operations abroad.”
Jazmati noted that even during Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s control over Idlib in recent years, the group maintained a policy of preventing factions from using Syrian territory as a base for cross-border attacks.
“HTS managed to keep the jihadist movements in check, discouraging any ambitions of launching operations beyond Syria’s borders,” he said.
As the future of foreign fighters in Syria hangs in the balance, allies and commanders aligned with the so-called muhajireen are rejecting any calls for their expulsion or forced repatriation.
“What their brothers and allies refuse is the idea of throwing them out of a country they fought to defend against a brutal regime, or handing them over to their home countries, where prison, or even execution, likely awaits,” said Jazmati.
“Generally speaking, I don’t believe that leaders and fighters in the HTS, or other factions, or even the religious and revolutionary base that admires the muhajireen model, insist on these fighters taking part in building the new state,” he added. “Nor do I think the foreign fighters themselves want that.”
That sentiment is echoed by Abu Hafs al-Turkistani, a former leader in the Turkistan Islamic Party who now heads a battalion within the Syrian army under the Ministry of Defense. His unit, composed mainly of Uyghur fighters, is stationed between Idlib and the Latakia countryside.
“We didn’t come to Syria to kill Syrians,” Turkistani told Asharq Al-Awsat. “We didn’t come here for money or positions. We came to support them, to share their suffering and help them as best we could, and thanks to God, victory was achieved, and we are honored to have taken part in it.”
Turkistani dismissed accusations linking foreign fighters to recent violence in coastal areas or in Sweida as part of a broader media campaign to vilify them. “These are baseless allegations,” he said.
Turkistani insisted that foreign fighters have largely kept to themselves and respected Syrian customs and traditions.
“We never interfered in the lives of Syrians. We’ve lived among them for years and stayed out of their personal affairs. Every nation has its differences, and while we may not agree on everything, we never tried to impose ourselves on their society,” he said.
As for past incidents in Idlib involving foreign fighters, Turkistani acknowledged isolated cases but said they were not repeated and did not reflect a broader pattern of misconduct. “The Syrians know that well,” he added.
Jazmati says Syria’s new leadership could resolve the foreign fighters dilemma by allowing them to stay under clear legal terms, provided they step away from power and military involvement.
“The muhajireen can remain in Syria under officially agreed legal arrangements, as civilians only,” Jazmati told Asharq Al-Awsat.
“They were never here to govern, and should not be placed at the forefront of a state they have no intention of ruling. But they must also pledge not to use Syrian territory to plan or launch jihadist operations in their home countries or elsewhere, as that could cause serious harm. If they refuse, they can leave for a destination of their choice.”
Appointments Stir Controversy
A foreign fighter of Arab nationality, known as Abu Mohammed, told Asharq Al-Awsat that he and others remain committed to the state led by al-Sharaa.
“We will not turn against Sharaa. We never did,” he said. “We avoided factional infighting and always prioritized Syria’s interests, which never clashed with our own. We were ready to die for the lives of Syrians, and now we know how to live under a state we respect and value.”
However, Jazmati warned that the real challenge lies in undoing the senior military appointments made shortly after the fall of the Assad regime, including three generals and three colonels, all foreign nationals.
“Reversing those promotions and assignments is a political and institutional dilemma,” Jazmati said. “It’s only been three weeks since the regime’s collapse, and these titles carry weight.”
According to confidential information seen by Jazmati, Syrian officials have pledged to halt the appointment of non-Syrians going forward.
But resolving the status of those already promoted remains a sensitive issue, one that may require a compromise that preserves their dignity, rank, and possibly even their current roles.
Efforts to limit the influence of foreign fighters in Syria’s post-Assad era are unlikely to trigger a resurgence of al-Qaeda or ISIS, according Jazmati.
“I don’t see al-Qaeda seeking a revival in Syria after its affiliate, Hurras al-Din, was dismantled,” Jazmati told Asharq Al-Awsat.
“As for ISIS, while its Syrian strategy remains unclear, it could attempt to recruit disaffected individuals, both Syrian and foreign, who are frustrated by the new government’s policies. Other smaller groups may also emerge, especially those that believe the current leadership is straying from their interpretation of Islamic law.”
Fragmented Landscape of Foreign Fighters
Not all foreign fighters in Syria fall along a single ideological spectrum. Divisions among them have existed since the early days of their arrival, influenced by how they were recruited and the routes they took to join the war.
Some were brought in through structured recruitment networks. These fighters were often contacted online, vetted, and then smuggled into Syria through well-organized channels. Others arrived independently, relying on human smugglers and covering their own travel costs, usually via Türkiye on tourist visas.
By mid-2013, as the rebel scene in Syria splintered, foreign fighters mostly gravitated toward jihadist factions, especially Jabhat al-Nusra. A smaller number joined so-called “moderate” groups such as Liwa al-Tawhid in Aleppo.
Ideological Rifts and Realignment
As rivalries over ideology and influence deepened, most foreign fighters shifted between groups, particularly after Jabhat al-Nusra’s break from ISIS. The split followed its former leader Ahmad al-Sharaa’s refusal to pledge allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, instead aligning with former al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri.
That move sparked further defections, with some foreign fighters rejecting al-Zawahiri’s authority and joining ISIS.
Clashes between the factions ensued, eventually leading to the rise of independent groups like Jund al-Aqsa, founded by Abu Abdul Aziz al-Qatari, a jihadist of Palestinian origin born in Iraq.
Other units formed along national lines, including Uyghur, Uzbek, and Chechen battalions.
By mid-2014, the rise of ISIS across western Iraq and into Syria’s Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, parts of Hasakah, and the Aleppo and Idlib countryside intensified rivalries among jihadist factions.
ISIS declared other foreign-led groups apostates, even as many maintained ties with Jabhat al-Nusra and adopted a position of neutrality in the escalating infighting.
Factions like the Turkistan Islamic Party, Ajnad al-Sham, Ajnad al-Kavkaz, and Ansar al-Tawhid, as well as remnants of Jund al-Aqsa, survived through Assad’s fall, opting for autonomy or quiet alliance with the HTS.
The Syrianization of the Fight
Between 2014 and 2018, HTS, under the leadership of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (al-Sharaa), systematically sidelined foreign fighters, removing them from leadership roles and the media spotlight.
Many were arrested or expelled, especially those affiliated with hardline factions such as Hurras al-Din, or those resistant to HTS’s pivot toward local governance.
The shift was both strategic and ideological.
Syrians increasingly resented the dominance of foreign leaders within the group, while international actors, particularly Türkiye, raised concerns about HTS’s associations with transnational jihadism.
Foreign fighters were often seen preaching al-Qaeda-style rhetoric and resisting cooperation with the Turkish military,which they denounced due to its NATO membership.
Al-Sharaa responded by launching a sweeping reform within HTS, marginalizing extremists regardless of nationality.
He rebranded the movement’s mission from global jihad to Syrian nationalism, using phrases like “Thawrat Ahl al-Sham” (“the revolution of the people of the Levant”) to underscore local priorities.
Many foreign fighters aligned with this vision, describing themselves as “supporters” rather than leaders of Syria’s future, as HTS moved to integrate them into the new nationalist framework.
Al-Sharaa’s project of “Syrianizing” the battle and its fighters aimed to distance the group from its jihadist roots and bring it closer to the political mainstream.
Now as president, al-Sharaa faces a new test: can he extend this project of ideological reform and integration under a national flag, while appeasing international stakeholders demanding limits on foreign fighters?
Observers say success will depend on his ability to restructure without alienating the fighters who once formed the backbone of the armed opposition.
The challenge lies in balancing their role in Syria’s recent history with the imperatives of diplomacy, reconstruction, and future security.
Whether Sharaa’s past efforts at moderation and localization can evolve into a credible state policy remains to be seen but with pressure mounting from both allies and adversaries, the answer may define the country’s next chapter.
