Angry Groups Emerge and Fade in Syria, Terror Cells or Shadows?

Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)
Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)
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Angry Groups Emerge and Fade in Syria, Terror Cells or Shadows?

Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)
Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)

When Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa met US President Donald Trump in Riyadh on May 14, the encounter marked a striking departure from Syria’s political norm, and one that sent ripples of surprise through both allies and adversaries.

While many Syrians expressed enthusiasm over the unexpected meeting, the reaction was far from unanimous.

For extremist circles, the image of al-Sharaa seated beside a US president, long portrayed in their rhetoric as the embodiment of a hostile international order, triggered deep unease and, in some cases, fury.

The backlash was swift and fragmented. Although not centrally coordinated, it was visible across encrypted Telegram channels - the platform of choice for many extremist groups - as well as in private gatherings and scattered posts on the social media platform X.

Reactions ranged from suspicion and ideological denunciation to outright accusations of apostasy. The criticism largely targeted al-Sharaa’s growing openness to the West, particularly Israel, and debated the legitimacy of such outreach under Islamic law.

Despite the noise, these objections appear to carry little political weight inside Syria’s emerging state institutions. Analysts and insiders say the dissent does not reflect the views of the security and military apparatus that has taken shape following the collapse of the former regime.

At the heart of this new order is a coalition of former factions, notably those once aligned with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which now forms the backbone of Syria’s restructured army and civil institutions. These groups have largely rallied around al-Sharaa, endorsing his foreign policy moves and viewing his leadership as best suited for steering the country through a fragile transition.

The new Syrian army, drawn from multiple factions that once formed the joint operations room which toppled the Assad government in Damascus, has since consolidated under state command.

Most of its components now back al-Sharaa, even as he pushes for diplomatic normalization, including tentative overtures to Israel - a shift they see as necessary for post-conflict stability.

While Syria’s new institutions rally around al-Sharaa’s push for reconciliation and international engagement, a defiant voice has emerged from outside the state structure - one that rejects his overtures and threatens to reignite instability.

The group calling itself Saraya Ansar al-Sunna has so far been the only actor to publicly oppose al-Sharaa’s trajectory. Shrouded in secrecy, the group is among the newest armed movements to surface following the collapse of the Assad regime.

Its presence remains confined to encrypted Telegram channels, where it has adopted a hardline tone steeped in religious denunciation and threats of violence. It has yet to establish a visible presence on the ground or disclose a clear organizational identity.

In a recent statement circulated online, the group vowed to escalate attacks across Syrian provinces and in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli - where it previously claimed activity.

The message marked a sharp warning from a faction that, despite its limited footprint, could stir trouble through lone-wolf operations, a method favored in such ideological circles.

Saraya Ansar al-Sunna first claimed responsibility for an attack in February in the village of Arzeh in Hama province, which killed more than ten civilians.

The group’s founding statement framed the assault as part of a campaign of “sectarian revenge” targeting Alawites and Shiites, whom it referred to using derogatory sectarian terms. The communiqué also described the group as “decentralized” and reliant on autonomous cells with no identifiable leadership or headquarters.

Although Syria’s Interior Ministry declined to provide details on the group, officials confirmed they are closely monitoring its activity – a sign that authorities consider the threat credible, despite the group's lack of formal structure.

Who are Saraya Ansar al-Sunna?

Sources in northern Syria told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has claimed responsibility for a series of assassinations in rural Hama and Homs, targeting Alawite civilians.

The group framed the killings as “retribution” against alleged Assad loyalists, or “shabiha”, whom they accuse the state of failing to prosecute. The sources said growing frustration over the lack of transitional justice has fueled accusations that the state is delivering “selective justice,” a phrase increasingly used to mock what some see as a stalled reconciliation process.

Despite fiery rhetoric and threats, the shadowy group has yet to establish a tangible presence on the ground.

So far, its activities remain confined to anonymous, closed Telegram channels, where it disseminates sharply worded statements steeped in religious condemnation and anti-government sentiment.

According to sources familiar with extremist activity in central Syria, the group relies entirely on text-based messaging and has shown no visual evidence of leadership or organized operations.

Two names have emerged frequently in connection with the group: “Abu Aisha al-Shami” and “Abu al-Fath al-Shami” - likely pseudonyms. Both are believed to be former members of Hurras al-Din, an offshoot of al-Qaeda. Intelligence suggests they have since reemerged in small clandestine cells operating quietly in parts of rural Homs and Hama.

In one statement posted on a Telegram channel, Abu al-Fath al-Shami - introduced as the group's “religious authority” - launched a scathing attack on President Ahmad al-Sharaa, accusing him of apostasy and betrayal.

His message, couched in harsh ideological language, cast the new Syrian government not merely as a political adversary but as a theological enemy - a marked escalation in tone.

Still, the group has so far refrained from direct armed confrontation with the Syrian state. Instead, it appears to be focused on retaliatory attacks against what it calls the “social incubators” of the former regime - a reference to Alawite civilian communities historically aligned with Bashar al-Assad.

This approach, emphasizing ideological hostility over direct conflict, reflects a broader, long-standing rift within the extremist landscape in Syria.

It mirrors the old divide between al-Qaeda’s traditionalist wing and the more localized, pragmatic faction led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under al-Sharaa. Though this internal split had faded from prominence, al-Sharaa’s high-profile meeting with Trump in Riyadh appears to have reignited it, sparking renewed debate among radical ideologues.

Prominent extremist figures have stepped up criticism of al-Sharaa, accusing him of betraying ideological principles in pursuit of political gains, particularly following his unprecedented outreach to the US and Israel.

Among the loudest voices was Khaled Abu Qatada al-Ansari, a former senior figure in Hurras al-Din, who denounced the Syrian state as “treasonous” and accused it of deviating from the “true path.”

His comments were echoed by Samer al-Ali, also known as Abu Ubaida, a former religious authority in Jabhat al-Nusra, who charged al-Sharaa with abandoning the core tenets of the original project for political pragmatism.

Outside Syria, criticism followed a similar pattern. Abu Abdullah al-Shami, a well-known ideologue based in Iraq, described al-Sharaa’s foreign policy pivot as a “fundamental betrayal of doctrine.”

Meanwhile, a stark split emerged among veteran thinkers: cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi reaffirmed his staunch opposition to al-Sharaa, framing his overtures to Washington and Israel as a departure from religious “constants.”

In contrast, Abu Qatada struck a more nuanced tone, suggesting that such shifts might be necessary in the post-Assad era to safeguard the revolution’s gains.

The debate underscores a widening rift between two ideological camps - one branding al-Sharaa an apostate, the other viewing his actions as a pragmatic response to evolving realities and branding him as the “man of the moment.”

No Organized Opposition Within the State

Despite the heated rhetoric, former military commander Adham Abdulrahman told Asharq Al-Awsat that there is no significant extremist bloc within Syria’s government or its security institutions challenging al-Sharaa’s policies.

“This is the policy of a state, not just one man - even if al-Sharaa is the architect,” he said.

“While there is still public and religious discomfort around peace with Israel, it's no longer as emotionally charged as it once was. Over time, these sentiments may coalesce into various forms of opposition, but they won’t be exclusively religious – they could be nationalist or political as well.”

He added that even radical factions, especially foreign fighters who once resisted integration, are now gradually shifting their focus.

“Most of them are moving toward reintegration, prioritizing daily life and stability. They may not fully endorse the new government, but they’re adapting - I’ve seen this happen in multiple cases,” Abdulrahman said.

Extremist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda are attempting to exploit discontent within Syria’s shifting political landscape, but analysts say al-Sharaa’s government – forged through years of conflict – is proving far from vulnerable.

“ISIS is actively seeking to regroup and recruit from disillusioned or marginalized segments, relying on its familiar slogans,” said former military commander Adham Abdulrahman.

“But this new government, born from an authentic organizational experience and equipped with deep security and military know-how, is not an easy target.”

Diverging Currents in HTS

According to Ahmad Sultan, a researcher specializing in Islamist movements, internal divisions are emerging within the HTS, the backbone of the new Syrian state.

“Some factions within HTS still cling to hardline ideology and remain visibly frustrated with al-Sharaa’s policy shifts,” Sultan told Asharq Al-Awsat. “They lack a coherent vision for governance beyond regime collapse and still regard any contact with perceived enemies as tantamount to apostasy.”

By contrast, other elements within HTS advocate a more pragmatic approach. “They view political openness as a tactical necessity for this phase,” Sultan said. “al-Sharaa’s administration is walking a fine line between these factions to preserve cohesion amid Syria’s complex reality.”

Sultan emphasized that the pro-al-Sharaa bloc remains dominant. “The opposition within HTS doesn’t represent the majority. The leading current supports Sharaa and wields greater power,” he said.

“The administration has made it clear that it won’t align with anti-engagement elements, though it may seek to pacify them to avoid destabilization - especially as al-Sharaa’s international legitimacy hinges on curbing extremism.”

Fears of Splits, Push for Consolidation

The researcher warned that any significant rift within HTS - the central pillar of the state - could destabilize the entire administration and potentially spark internal conflict.

“Al-Sharaa’s government is preparing to tackle critical files: the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast, the presence of foreign fighters, border control, and consolidating central authority,” Sultan explained. “To do that, it must neutralize ultra-hardline elements within.”

He added that al-Sharaa is relying on practical methods to prevent extremist drift inside his administration, including religious education and theological persuasion aimed at preserving unity.

“Some clerics close to al-Sharaa command real influence among hardline circles,” Sultan said. “If tensions escalate, these figures could play a key role in diffusing conflict through religious argumentation and appeals to collective responsibility.”

Al-Sharaa is prepared to take tough measures - including arrests and even eliminations - against hardline elements within the state who reject moderation and persist in incitement.

“Containment through religious dialogue is the preferred option,” said Sultan.

“But when that fails, the alternative may be surgical removal of factions that prove resistant to integration.”

Sultan warned that the government will not tolerate extremist mindsets if they shift toward agitation and destabilization. “If a radical current chooses confrontation, al-Sharaa will not hesitate to resort to decisive tools, including imprisonment or targeted action,” he said.

Strained Popular Base

Despite the state’s assertive posture, some observers caution that the strategy carries risks, particularly if it alienates the broader revolutionary base that once fueled Syria’s rebellion.

“The Syrian landscape remains fluid and unpredictable,” said Mohamed Ibrahim, also known as Abu Yahya al-Shami, a former military commander within an Islamist faction. “If the government wants long-term stability, it cannot afford to lose the core support of former revolutionaries.”

Al-Shami, who remains closely connected to Islamic movements, drew a clear line between constructive dissent and extremist rhetoric.

“Takfir- branding others as apostates - is the weapon of extremists and ISIS sympathizers. It’s unacceptable to many of us within the Islamist current,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He stressed that criticism of al-Sharaa’s government should be expressed through informed, balanced discourse.

“There is no such thing as ‘legitimate chaos.’ Sharia is the standard by which actions are judged. Disagreements must be addressed scientifically and socially, not through disorder.”

Al-Shami also warned that hardline rhetoric by extremist groups risks influencing disillusioned youth and fueling radicalization in Syria’s fragile post-war landscape.

“There is concern that some enthusiastic or overly zealous youth may be swayed by extremist narratives,” al-Shami told Asharq Al-Awsat, adding that “those with experience and awareness are working to contain these tendencies, which only aggravate problems rather than solve them.”

He also cautioned that ISIS remains a looming threat, capable of exploiting simmering discontent in Salafi circles and drawing in defectors from factions opposed to Syria’s new leadership under al-Sharaa.

“ISIS thrives in environments where ignorance and extremism take root,” he said.

“The group could recruit from those who once fought under revolutionary banners, only to find themselves later disillusioned with a political reality that doesn’t match the slogans they lived by,” explained al-Shami.

As al-Sharaa’s administration pushes ahead with normalization and international outreach, including controversial overtures to former foes, observers say the ability to manage backlash from former allies and militant hardliners will be key to preserving security and cohesion.



Gaza Patients Face Death Again as Rafah Crossing Stays Closed

Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
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Gaza Patients Face Death Again as Rafah Crossing Stays Closed

Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)

Patients and wounded in Gaza are facing increasingly harsh conditions after Israeli authorities again closed the Rafah land crossing, which had been partially reopened for a short period under a ceasefire agreement following a prolonged shutdown that prevented tens of thousands from leaving for medical treatment.

The crossing’s reopening at the beginning of February had raised hopes among patients and the wounded that they would be able to travel abroad for treatment. However, Israeli restrictions on the number of people permitted to leave further complicated the situation.

Those hopes faded when the crossing was closed again following the start of the war with Iran on the 28th of last month.

Twelve-year-old Asmaa al-Shawish, who suffers from a rare disease known as Sanfilippo syndrome, has for years faced the threat of death as her health has recently deteriorated sharply, her mother told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Her mother said the girl had obtained a medical referral to receive treatment abroad in 2023, shortly before the war began, but did not manage to travel in time. She remained inside Gaza, and her condition has continued to worsen day by day.

She said her daughter is losing the ability to drink water and suffers from brain atrophy as well as enlargement of the liver and spleen. The child also experiences constant seizures and requires daily treatment in hospitals in an effort to keep her alive as long as possible. Her condition, she added, is deteriorating rapidly.

“When the Rafah crossing opened, we felt a little hope that we might be able to travel again,” she said. “But the large number of patients and wounded waiting like us delayed our departure until the occupation closed it again, leaving us to face our fate on our own.”

“Every time I see my daughter in this condition, I grieve over her harsh circumstances,” she added. “I see her taking her last breaths, and she could die at any moment.”

20,000 Patients

According to the Gaza Health Ministry, more than 20,000 patients and wounded people urgently need treatment abroad. Deaths are already being recorded among those waiting for the crossing to reopen regularly, as it operated before the war, so they can travel and save their lives.

The ministry said hospitals in the enclave lack the medical capabilities needed to save these patients amid the difficult conditions imposed by the Israeli blockade. It added that some medicines have completely run out, while others are close to being depleted.

According to the government media office, the total number of travelers and returnees during the period when the Rafah land crossing was partially open reached 1,148 out of the 3,400 expected to travel in both directions. This represents about 33% compliance with the agreement that was supposed to be implemented after the ceasefire.

Government sources from Hamas told Asharq Al-Awsat that there are “no promises to reopen the Rafah land crossing, even partially.”

Hazem Qassem, a spokesman for Hamas, said the continued closure of the Rafah crossing “under flimsy security pretexts and false claims” represents a “blatant and dangerous violation” of the ceasefire agreement and a retreat from commitments made to mediators, particularly Egypt.

He said the move is part of efforts to “tighten the blockade” imposed on the enclave, preventing tens of thousands of wounded people from traveling to receive what he described as their natural right to medical treatment.

Continued Killings

On the ground, Israel has continued its escalation, killing more Palestinians and striking multiple targets across the enclave.

The Israeli military said on Tuesday it had killed six Palestinians, three of whom it said had crossed the “yellow line” north of the enclave, and three armed Hamas members in tunnels in Rafah.

The number of Palestinian deaths since the ceasefire has risen to more than 656, including at least 20 killed since the start of the war with Iran. The cumulative toll since Oct. 7, 2023, has reached 72,134 deaths.

This coincided with Israeli airstrikes, artillery shelling and gunfire in several areas on both sides of the yellow line in the enclave. For the second consecutive day, bulldozers were seen demolishing what remained of homes east of Khan Younis, about 20 meters from Salah al-Din Road.

A warplane also struck a house whose residents had evacuated following an Israeli order in northern Khan Younis. Another strike hit a mobile phone charging point and an internet service station in an empty area next to tents housing displaced people southwest of Gaza City.


Trump’s Tough Test: Is Military Success Enough to End the War?

US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
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Trump’s Tough Test: Is Military Success Enough to End the War?

US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)

On the eleventh day of the war, the conflict with Iran looks closer to a military decision than a political settlement. By most circulating estimates, the US and Israel have dealt heavy blows to Iran’s missile infrastructure, air defenses and military command structure, sharply reducing Tehran’s ability to strike its neighbors as it did in the opening days.

But the key question remains unanswered: is military success enough to end the war?

Here, the ambiguity of US President Donald Trump comes into view. He says the war “will end soon” and suggests he could talk to Iran. Yet he also insists Washington “has won in many ways, but not enough,” warning of tougher strikes if Tehran continues threatening shipping and energy flows.

The contradiction is not just rhetorical. It reveals a real dilemma: a battlefield achievement that still lacks the political formula to turn it into a stable endgame.

Iran, meanwhile, does not appear to be winning militarily. The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as a new supreme leader, widely read as a defiant signal, was followed by statements from senior officials pledging to continue the fight and rejecting negotiations.

The regime’s response to the strikes has not been compromise but tighter alignment with the Revolutionary Guards.

Tehran’s calculation is straightforward: political survival matters more than battlefield losses. If it prevents its adversaries from forcing total surrender, endurance itself can be seen as a form of victory.

Oil: Iran’s Most Powerful Card

As Iran loses conventional military tools, oil remains its most potent weapon. The Strait of Hormuz is not merely a shipping lane; it is a critical chokepoint for global energy markets. Any disruption there reverberates instantly through prices, shipping costs, insurance premiums and political nerves in Washington and Western capitals.

That is why markets have quickly become part of the war.

Iran knows it cannot match the United States and Israel in airpower or technology. What it can do is raise the economic and political price of the conflict, for both its adversaries and the world.

As oil prices climb, pressure builds inside the United States and Europe to end the war quickly. Not because Iran has prevailed militarily, but because it has turned energy into a strategic lever.

This is what makes the decision to stop the bombing so sensitive. If Washington halts the war simply because oil prices spike or political pressures grow, Tehran will draw a clear lesson: threatening energy flows ensures survival.

That would be more consequential than any short-term battlefield gain. It would mean Iran, even after losing much of its arsenal, still holds a deterrent capable of helping it rebuild its position later.

If, however, the US and Israel continue the pressure until Iran loses the ability to threaten shipping and disrupt energy markets, the regime would be stripped of its last major lever. Only then would halting the strikes resemble ending a war rather than freezing it.

The “Day After” Question

The central criticism aimed at Trump in Washington and abroad is simple: he lacks a coherent plan for the day after.

Who governs Iran? Who prevents chaos? Who signs ceasefire arrangements and nuclear restrictions? And who ensures the country does not slide into instability like that in Iraq or Syria?

The question is legitimate, but it may not match Trump’s own logic.

The US president does not appear interested in rebuilding Iran or managing a political transition there, as Washington attempted in earlier post-September 11 interventions. His approach seems simpler and harsher: destroy the regime’s ability to threaten US and regional interests.

What happens to power in Tehran afterward may not be a direct American responsibility.

In that sense, Washington does not seem intent on toppling the regime and then inheriting the burden of governing the country. The objective appears to be weakening it enough that it can no longer pose the same threat.

If the regime collapses internally, that would be an added bonus. If it survives but with far fewer capabilities, that too can be framed as a win.

This approach is less about nation-building and more about strategic punishment followed by withdrawal.

But such a method carries risks. There is no strong evidence that the regime is close to collapse despite visible fractures in its leadership. Nor is there an organized alternative ready to take its place.

Pushing Iran toward internal fragmentation or civil conflict could open the door to far wider instability, displacement and regional violence.

For that reason, the absence of a detailed day-after plan may not mean the administration lacks a goal. It may simply mean it has deliberately lowered its political ambitions.

The promise is not a new, stable and democratic Iran—only a weaker one.

Such a gamble will succeed only if Iran accepts the new reality, or proves unable to resist it. So far, Tehran shows little sign of doing so.

Three Possible Endings

The first scenario is a conditional ceasefire after the core strikes are completed. Operations would continue for days or weeks until Washington and Tel Aviv conclude that Iran’s missile, nuclear and military structures have been damaged enough. Indirect channels would then open to impose a ceasefire formula on US-Israeli terms.

This is the most rational outcome. It would allow Trump to claim victory without becoming trapped in a regime-change operation or the occupation of a large, complex country.

The second scenario is a longer war than Washington wants. That would happen if Mojtaba Khamenei rejects any settlement that looks like surrender and continues betting on exhausting markets and raising costs for the Gulf and the wider world.

Iran might not win militarily. But it could pursue a political objective: pushing the US to stop before turning its battlefield gains into a full strategic victory.

The third, and perhaps most likely, scenario is a victory without resolution.

The US and Israel would destroy a significant share of Iran’s capabilities and curb its ability to threaten shipping and its neighbors. Yet the regime survives – more hard-line and more tightly bound to the Revolutionary Guard, convinced that survival requires rebuilding deterrence later.

In that case, the conflict is not solved at its roots. It is merely postponed. What changes is the balance of power, not the conflict itself.

Will Trump Stop the Bombing Now?

The most realistic answer: not yet, but not indefinitely either.

Stopping now under pressure from oil markets and financial panic would allow Tehran to claim it succeeded in setting limits on Washington. Continuing indefinitely without a political horizon could turn military success into an open-ended drain.

Trump is therefore operating in the gray zone between those outcomes: seeking enough strikes to claim a decisive military victory while avoiding the burdens of the “day after” that previous US administrations accepted.

The risk is that this middle path produces only an incomplete victory.

Iran would be weaker but not politically defeated. The war would fade, but its deeper causes would remain.

The coming days will determine not only when the war ends, but also what its ending means: a settlement imposing new realities on Iran, or merely a pause from which the regime emerges wounded yet convinced that oil leverage saved it.

That is the real test facing Trump, not in the number of targets destroyed, but in the kind of ending he ultimately delivers.


Iran Bets on Long War to Wear Down Trump’s US, Say Experts

Smoke rises after an air strike in central Tehran, Iran, 10 March 2026. (EPA)
Smoke rises after an air strike in central Tehran, Iran, 10 March 2026. (EPA)
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Iran Bets on Long War to Wear Down Trump’s US, Say Experts

Smoke rises after an air strike in central Tehran, Iran, 10 March 2026. (EPA)
Smoke rises after an air strike in central Tehran, Iran, 10 March 2026. (EPA)

Outgunned by the United States, Iran's rulers have been lashing out on multiple fronts -- but experts say what looks like a chaotic reaction is actually a time-tested strategy to outlast a stronger enemy in a fight to survive.

To some, Iran's response since US and Israeli strikes killed supreme leader Ali Khamenei on the war's first day look like those of a decapitated and directionless power.

Why is Iran targeting Gulf countries, Türkiye and Azerbaijan with air strikes? Why not seek those countries' support, or at least keep them neutral?

But various analysts see a well-honed strategy of asymmetric warfare in Iran's retaliatory offensive: resist the onslaught, and make the enemy pay a price so heavy they have to give up.

"Iran's strategy is to create pressure on Washington, DC by angering the Gulf and by creating upward trends in the price of oil, gas and other commodities," said Burcu Ozcelik, a Middle East security expert at Britain's Royal United Services Institute.

Although Iran's leadership was badly shaken by the strikes that killed Khamenei -- now replaced by his son Mojtaba as supreme leader -- and other top figures, the system is holding so far.

And Tehran is digging in for an all-or-nothing fight, against a United States that has less at stake.

- 'Exit ramp' -

Tehran has little chance of defeating the US military.

But it can hope to outlast the current campaign, which is limited to air strikes. US President Donald Trump will meanwhile have to think hard about the potential political costs before sending in ground troops.

"Tehran is trying to raise the cost of escalation until Washington starts looking for an exit ramp," said Ali Vaez, an Iran expert at the International Crisis Group.

It is a page straight out of the textbook on asymmetric warfare.

In a classic 1975 paper, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars", the late professor Andrew Mack unpacked the reasons for outcomes such as the US defeat in Vietnam.

He underlined how weaker powers can exploit the gradual diminishing of a stronger adversary's political capacity to wage war.

Since the Iranians "don't have unlimited supplies of missiles and drones, we see them trying to use their firepower carefully, to make the conflict last long enough that Trump eventually says, 'That's enough'", said Agnes Levallois, head of the Middle East-focused think tank iReMMo.

"The longer the conflict lasts, the more Tehran believes the strategic balance -- psychologically and politically -- begins to shift" in its favor, said Danny Citrinowicz, of Israel's Institute for National Security Studies.

And the Iranian toolkit goes deeper.

"Tehran, cognizant of its inability to win a conventional war against the US, relies on irregular tactics to drag out the war, primarily through economic coercion and cost asymmetry," said a briefing by the US research center Soufan.

That includes sowing chaos in the Middle East, bombing neighboring countries and sending global oil and gas prices skywards by effectively shutting the crucial Strait of Hormuz.

- War of attrition -

If Trump comes under enough pressure from Gulf allies and energy inflation, he may have to fold.

"Market impacts, Hormuz disruptions and oil prices are all variables that will weigh heavily on Washington's thinking," said analyst Emily Stromquist of US advisory firm Teneo.

The strategy relies on the assumption that Gulf countries will have more pull on Trump than key US ally Israel, which is gunning for regime change in Iran.

If the Islamic Republic survives, it may pay a heavy price.

"The regime in Iran will have to make some deep concessions" in any end-game, said Ozcelik.

The Gulf states "will want to have some influence" in any ceasefire agreement, and Iran's relations with the rest of the region will be badly damaged, she said.

But none of that likely matters to Tehran, said Citrinowicz.

"From Iran's perspective, the goal of this war is to maximize its gains and 'imprint' in the minds of its adversaries the costs of fighting Iran in the future," he said.