Former commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, Mohammad Ali Jafari, said his country’s defense strategy is firmly centered on “disproportionate warfare” against its “main enemies.”
In a televised interview aired Saturday night, Jafari described last June’s 12-day confrontation with Israel as “a real exchange of fire” but “not a full-scale war,” warning that Tehran’s response in any future conflict “will not be delayed.”
He also laid part of the blame for what he called the “weakening of the resistance front” in Syria on Bashar al-Assad, the ousted Syrian president. “Assad’s decline in willpower was so deep that even Qassem Soleimani could not reverse it,” Jafari said.
Jafari argued that Iran “dealt a significant blow to Israel” and stressed that “the Iranian people did not feel defeated” during that period.
He explained that the confrontation was described as a war because “some of the essential elements of war were present, such as the exchange of fire and the expansion of operations.” But he emphasized that “this was not a full-scale war. There were no ground battles.. but there was a real clash.”
He added: “Israel knows very well that Iran, with its size, population, and capabilities, will not enter an all-out war. US support is the decisive factor behind Israel’s military power.” Jafari said that Western assessments of Iran at the time reflected “ignorance and a poor understanding of the Iranian people’s capabilities, often naive and sometimes laughable.”
On the prospect of another conflict, Jafari said escalation toward a wider war “is unpredictable and depends on the enemy’s calculations.” He added: “If the enemy acts rationally, it will not choose the path of attack because the political, economic, and military costs would be extremely high and the outcome uncertain.” He also pointed to political considerations inside Israel, including the leadership’s need to maintain power, as factors that frequently shape its strategic decisions.
Jafari warned that Iran’s military experience in managing crises, combined with “a cohesive home front,” would ensure that any hostile act “would be met with a proportionate response.” He noted that the gap between the outbreak of any future war with Israel and Iran’s counterattack would be “shorter than in the past,” citing accumulated defensive experience.
“Hezbollah Took a Blow but Did Not Fall”
Jafari also addressed Hezbollah’s role in the conflict. “Although Hezbollah suffered heavy losses, including the deaths of some of its senior commanders, it remains resilient. Perhaps 30 percent of its capabilities were targeted, but 70 percent are still intact,” he said.
“Hezbollah was taken by surprise but held its ground, preventing Israel from advancing. In the end, negotiations were held to end the war,” he added. Jafari referred to the debate over Hezbollah’s disarmament: “We’re hearing talk of walking back that plan, which clearly shows the strength and endurance of the resistance.”
Tehran and Moscow
Turning to Iran–Russia relations, Jafari highlighted the difference between the two countries’ capabilities in sensitive military domains. He said Russia has shown interest in Iranian technologies, particularly drones and precision missile guidance.
Missiles and Drones at the Core of Strategy
The former Iranian commander revealed that since 2000, under direct instructions from Iran’s Supreme Leader, the IRGC has focused its efforts on two main priorities: developing missile capabilities and advancing drone technology. He explained that this focus followed more than a year of high-level discussions aimed at defining the division of responsibilities between Iran’s regular army and the Revolutionary Guard.
“We knew as early as the 1990s that a confrontation with Israel was a realistic possibility,” he said. “That is why these capabilities became central to our defense strategy.”
According to Jafari, Iran’s investments in missile precision and drone technology are designed to give the country an asymmetric edge, allowing it to respond quickly and effectively to any threat, without the need to engage in a conventional war. He argued that the IRGC’s experience over the past two decades has made its deterrence “more flexible, faster, and more reliable than ever before.”
