Since protests erupted in Iran, political elites in Iraq have quietly debated whether the “Islamic Revolution” in Tehran might be nearing a rapid collapse. Yet the more cautious question circulating in Baghdad is different: what if the Iranian system survives, but weakened and stripped of its tools, for years to come?
This question now resonates within the corridors of the Coordination Framework, the coalition most closely tied to regional power dynamics. It appears to be repositioning itself amid shifting centers of influence, but not before paying a price.
Figures from Shiite parties and armed factions, as well as researchers interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat, say anxiety over Iran’s trajectory is palpable in Baghdad, though rarely expressed openly for ideological reasons and because of what they describe as a chronic inability to produce independent national policies.
Pressure on Shiite forces has been building for months. Washington is pushing to dismantle militias and sever their operational and economic ties with Iran. Tehran is weighed down by sanctions and protests whose sparks have reached even the bazaars. Meanwhile, the Coordination Framework is attempting to engineer a governing formula capable of surviving these pressures.
It is widely believed that the heavy presence of armed factions’ representatives in parliament - holding more than about 80 seats - is part of a broader strategy to adapt to US pressure, whether Iran’s system collapses or remains weak for years.
Accordingly, Shiite political actors appear compelled to move from the era of militias toward the state, though only after establishing a strong central power within state institutions, in order to avoid confrontation with Washington and prepare for the possibility of Iran’s declining influence.
Over time, it has become clear that avoiding confrontation with the United States requires not only reducing Iranian influence but also constructing local power under the umbrella of a national political settlement.
A situation resembling Saddam Hussein
Since 2003, Shiite parties have rarely debated Iran’s future publicly. There is a prevailing belief that discussing the fate of a system led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is ideologically taboo for those who profess absolute loyalty to him, according to a senior leader in the Coordination Framework.
Many also dismiss the possibility of Iran’s collapse altogether. But Hisham Dawood, a researcher at the French National Center, argues that the impact of maximum sanctions on Iranian society cannot be ignored. He said sanctions do not overthrow regimes as much as they reshape societies, shifting them from a culture of living to one of survival.
In private gatherings, Iraqi politicians have begun drawing an analogy that alarms Shiite groups. They note that Tehran’s system is approaching a condition similar to that of Saddam Hussein’s regime after the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent economic embargo, a crushed social base and a leadership gradually stripped of its traditional tools.
Aqeel Abbas, a researcher on US affairs, does not believe Iran’s system will collapse but is convinced that its behavior will change. On that basis, Shiite forces may seek to adapt in order to weather the storm.
This trajectory, however, does not appear sufficient in Washington’s eyes. The United States is not searching for treasure but for the key. US presidential envoy Mark Savaya wrote that militias are merely a symptom of a deeper disease in Iraq. For months, he has been shaping among Shiite circles in Baghdad a narrative of sustained pressure within a broader American strategy.
Groups such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq have shown striking flexibility compared with their past. The faction that once fought the Americans now stands as one of the main pillars of government and parliament and is reportedly planning to dominate both in the next legislative cycle, according to associates of its leader, Qais al-Khazali.
During his election campaign months ago, al-Khazali welcomed US investments. Yet Washington continues to press for the removal of his representative in parliament from the post of deputy speaker, according to information leaked from meetings held by Acting Chargé d’Affaires Joshua Harris with Coordination Framework officials.
A Western diplomat who served in a mission between Baghdad and Damascus during the fight against ISIS explains US behavior toward Shiite factions: after months of “power diplomacy” in exchange for avoiding military targeting, the Americans are not seeking a truce but a decisive blow followed by a deal on their terms. Savaya’s role, he says, is likely to clarify and enforce those conditions.
More than weapons
Spokespersons for armed factions declined to comment on questions about their plans for dealing with US pressure. But a senior figure in an armed faction, speaking anonymously, said they had reached a stage of “confrontation without masks — no intermediaries, no maneuvering.”
Aqeel Abbas believes Shiite forces may attempt to transform existing militias into local forces under new names, limited to protecting the system inside Iraq without regional roles or provoking the United States and Israel.
Theoretically, such a shift could satisfy Washington. But the faction leader warned that the confrontation goes beyond weapons: the Americans, he said, want the core of influence and resistance. “We tried to confine the crisis to weapons, but now they are pressing on our existence, our economy, and our ideological ties. What room for maneuver remains except defending our dignity?”
He added that such questions are being raised in Baghdad faster than they are answered in Tehran.
Iran “that cannot be defeated”
Hisham Dawood divides Shiite reactions in Baghdad into three groups.
The first consists of pro-Iran forces with direct ideological ties to Tehran, which do not view the Iraqi state as the ultimate framework of political belonging but rather as a field of action within a transnational project. These forces, Dawood argues, are prepared to bear high costs - even if they affect the Iraqi state - so long as they serve what they consider a religious obligation toward Tehran.
Indeed, many factions place near-absolute confidence in Iran. A faction leader who was active in Syria before the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime said some battles are managed according to logic that transcends local calculations, and that the final decision is not always in the hands of those who pay the price on the ground. He argued that without Iran, the Islamic Revolution would have no meaning.
The second group comprises forces that have governed Iraq since 2003 and occupy a more complex position. They are not overtly pro-Iran ideologically or organizationally, but they remain deeply influenced by Tehran for historical and sectarian reasons, and out of fear that Iranian influence could reshape internal Shiite alignments.
These forces seek to present themselves as holders of national legitimacy, yet in decisive moments they still defer to Tehran. Many observers believe this dynamic was reflected in what was described as Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s “concession” to Nouri al-Maliki over the premiership - an attempt, according to a senior Shiite leader, to restore Maliki’s centrality through a new-old alliance.
Pro-Iran groups mobilized demonstrations in central and southern cities, carrying images of Khamenei and Iranian flags. But the Coordination Framework issued only one statement urging diplomatic solutions and warning of economic challenges and falling oil prices. This has revealed a leadership caught between traditional power calculations and growing risks.
The third group consists of a popular majority with weak political representation, which views the continuation of the Iranian model in Iraq as a source of political stagnation, economic crisis, social paralysis, and international isolation.
The Sadrist movement may represent part of this majority. Dawood argues that it is politically reduced to an image of Iranian extension, a simplification that imposes a heavy symbolic and political cost.
Most Iraqi Shiite forces - except some ideological actors - appear ready to strike deals with Washington, provided their interests within the Iraqi state are guaranteed, in a manner resembling the model the United States is testing in Syria.
Meanwhile, attempts to create a strong institutional umbrella to fill the vacuum have emerged through the prominent role of the Supreme Judicial Council. On the eve of the legislative elections, Judge Faiq Zaidan urged adherence to constitutional timelines for forming Iraq’s leadership. Weeks later, he began publicly naming factions that must limit weapons. Iraqi elites now speak of an alternative governing umbrella that could fill the vacuum with the force of law.
An emergency exit
A Western diplomat believes this is the first time in years that Shiite groups may be forced to reconsider options that appear unrealistic, not only for Washington but even for Tehran. He pointed to the fate of the Syrian Democratic Forces as a warning for those who bet on open and absolute hostility.
While these developments paint a suffocating picture for Shiite factions, they also open an emergency exit from the old game toward new alliances.
A former government adviser described such an exit as a search for new alliances during a period in which Iran remains an ideological umbrella but without claws. He argued that pressures on armed factions leave no luxury of choice: Shiite forces must first build sustainable local partnerships and then balance relations with emerging centers of power in the region and the Arab world.
Yet this emergency exit may not accommodate all Shiite players within what Dawood describes as a fragmented state. The central question remains open: will the United States seek to preserve pluralism among Shiite political and factional actors, or will it prefer to support a centralized authority with an authoritarian grip, as some actors in Baghdad now advocate?
