China Signals ‘New Normal’ with Coast Guard Patrols off Taiwan’s East

A handout photo from Taiwan Coast Guard taken and released on July 8, 2026 shows a Taiwan Coast Guard patrol vessel (R) sailing near a China Coast Guard ship in waters south of Kinmen, in Kinmen, Taiwan. (Handout / Taiwan Coast Guard / AFP)
A handout photo from Taiwan Coast Guard taken and released on July 8, 2026 shows a Taiwan Coast Guard patrol vessel (R) sailing near a China Coast Guard ship in waters south of Kinmen, in Kinmen, Taiwan. (Handout / Taiwan Coast Guard / AFP)
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China Signals ‘New Normal’ with Coast Guard Patrols off Taiwan’s East

A handout photo from Taiwan Coast Guard taken and released on July 8, 2026 shows a Taiwan Coast Guard patrol vessel (R) sailing near a China Coast Guard ship in waters south of Kinmen, in Kinmen, Taiwan. (Handout / Taiwan Coast Guard / AFP)
A handout photo from Taiwan Coast Guard taken and released on July 8, 2026 shows a Taiwan Coast Guard patrol vessel (R) sailing near a China Coast Guard ship in waters south of Kinmen, in Kinmen, Taiwan. (Handout / Taiwan Coast Guard / AFP)

China has signaled its intent to maintain a new coast guard patrol east of Taiwan, analysts say, as Beijing dials up pressure on the self-ruled island that it claims is part of its territory.

Tensions over Western Pacific waters off Taiwan spiked after the Chinese coast guard and other ships launched their first "law enforcement operation" in that area in June.

During the operation, the China Coast Guard for the first time radioed cargo ships passing Taiwan for information about their crew and destination.

Chinese state media said the operation was in response to talks between Japan and the Philippines to draw a boundary in those waters.

But Taipei branded it "expansionism in disguise" and several Western governments expressed concern over the "novel" activity.

China Coast Guard vessels patrolling the waters since then have been replaced by a second group that will "continue law enforcement patrols", China Coast Guard spokesperson Jiang Lue said Saturday.

"China is essentially announcing a new normal," Ray Powell, director of SeaLight, which monitors China's maritime activities, told AFP.

China deploys fighter jets and navy ships around Taiwan on an almost daily basis, and Chinese coast guard ships regularly enter waters near Taiwan's outer islands, including those off China.

Until June, however, China Coast Guard's presence in waters east of Taiwan had been limited to "blockade-style military exercises", William Yang, a senior analyst for the International Crisis Group, told AFP.

The patrols were "beyond just political signaling", said Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

"Beijing appears to be claiming vast law enforcement rights across its claimed exclusive economic zone that go far beyond what is allowed by international law," Poling told AFP.

Su Tzu-yun, a military expert at the Taipei-based Institute for National Defense and Security Research, said China's patrols were establishing "new operational norms".

"By conducting radio verification procedures for passing commercial vessels, China is effectively rehearsing the mechanisms required for a future blockade or quarantine," he said.

- 'Sashimi strategy' -

For years, China has been steadily expanding its military and coast guard activities in waters around Taiwan and the region.

Taiwan's National Security Bureau director-general Tsai Ming-yen said Monday that four Chinese formations including warships were operating in the Western Pacific, noting an "upward trend" in mobilization during China's peak maritime exercise season.

"We've tracked a record high of over 110 #PLAN & #CCG vessels" along the First Island Chain, National Security Council chief Joseph Wu said on X on Saturday.

Taiwan has responded to China's new coast guard patrol by deploying two of its own coast guard vessels to monitor the two Chinese ships.

The Chinese patrol has been generally operating between 74-124 nautical miles (137-230 kilometers) from Taiwan's shores, which Taiwanese officials say is within the island's exclusive economic zone.

During last month's operation, Taiwan heard for the first time China Coast Guard contacting three passing cargo ships for information about their crew numbers and port of destination.

One of the cargo ships -- a Singapore-flagged container ship -- complied with China's demands, a senior coast guard official has told AFP.

Taiwan's Ocean Affairs Deputy Minister Sung Chen-en said Wednesday that China had attempted to "establish a model where the shipping community feels the need to report to them", but failed.

Sung said China must be stopped "at the early stage" to ensure that it "never succeeds".

"We will make sure that (the patrols are) not permanent because they are not supposed to be here," Sung told AFP.

Chinese coast guard ships regularly patrol around the disputed Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyu in Chinese, which are administered by Tokyo but also claimed by Beijing, and the contested South China Sea, which China claims almost in its entirety.

"They seem to want people to understand that this is what they're doing here," Powell said of the patrols off Taiwan, describing them as "a step up the quarantine ladder".

"It's a very unsubtle signal that they intend to stay there for the long term."

Su said it fits into China's "methodical" approach to expanding patrols around the region as part of a "sashimi strategy".

China is "making extremely thin, almost imperceptible slices that individually appear insignificant but collectively produce substantial changes to the strategic status quo," he said.



The World: End of Unipolarity or Dawn of a More Turbulent Global Order?

Multiple poles and shifting centers of power (Reuters illustration)
Multiple poles and shifting centers of power (Reuters illustration)
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The World: End of Unipolarity or Dawn of a More Turbulent Global Order?

Multiple poles and shifting centers of power (Reuters illustration)
Multiple poles and shifting centers of power (Reuters illustration)

The world today no longer resembles the one that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The international order, characterized for three decades by US supremacy and Washington's ability to influence political, economic and security decisions, is undergoing profound transformations that are reshaping the global balance of power.

At the forefront of these changes are China's rise, Russia's re-emergence as an influential strategic power, India's growing international presence, and the economic and political weight of the European Union and other regional powers.

But has the world truly entered an era of multipolarity, or is it still in a transitional phase marked by US dominance, Chinese competition and conflicting international ambitions? And will the distribution of power among more countries produce a more balanced global order, or lead to greater rivalry and instability?

From Unipolarity to Multiple Centers of Power

A multipolar world is generally understood as an international system in which three or more major powers possess the military, economic and diplomatic capabilities to influence global affairs.

It differs from a unipolar system dominated by a single state and from the bipolar order that defined the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Following the end of the Cold War, Washington enjoyed broad military, technological and economic superiority, supported by a network of alliances and financial and trade institutions that helped shape the global economy.

China, however, gradually emerged as a major economic and technological power and expanded its military capabilities, while Russia sought to restore its strategic standing, drawing on its nuclear arsenal, geographical position and natural resources.

Multipolarity does not necessarily mean that rising powers form cohesive alliances. Differences in political systems, economic interests and historical experiences remain significant. Their main point of convergence may simply be a shared desire to limit US unipolar dominance and redistribute international influence.

China-Russia relations are an obvious example. Their ties have developed into a strategic and economic partnership encompassing energy, trade, and military and diplomatic cooperation. Yet describing the relationship as a fully integrated alliance may be an exaggeration, given that both countries maintain their own interests and strategic calculations.

China occupies a central position thanks to its industrial and commercial strength, technological advances, overseas investments and Belt and Road Initiative.

It is not merely competing economically with the United States but is also seeking to expand its influence within international institutions and develop alternative or parallel financial and trade arrangements.

Russia, meanwhile, derives much of its power from its military and nuclear capabilities, its position on the UN Security Council and its role in energy markets.

The war in Ukraine has placed Moscow at the center of geopolitical confrontation with the West, but it also faces economic and technological constraints and mounting military costs.

India presents a different model, seeking to expand its influence without aligning itself entirely with any single political or military bloc.

Its foreign policy is based on the principle of "strategic autonomy," allowing it to participate in BRICS alongside China and Russia while simultaneously strengthening cooperation with the United States, Japan and Australia through the Quad.

 

This combination of pictures created on November 15, 2026 shows (L/R) Russia's President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on October 30, 2026, US President Donald Trump in Dubuque, Iowa on November 1, 2026, and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on November 6, 2026.(Photo by various sources / AFP)

Europe and Middle Powers

The transformation of the international order is not limited to major powers. The European Union possesses considerable economic and regulatory influence, with its single market, trade policies and legal standards allowing it to shape the behavior of governments and businesses beyond its borders.

However, the absence of unified military capabilities and full strategic autonomy, together with several member states' reliance on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and differences in their foreign policies, limits the EU's ability to act as a fully integrated political and military pole.

At the same time, middle powers such as Brazil, Türkiye and Indonesia are becoming increasingly important.

Their resources, geographical positions and diplomatic relationships give them leverage in international negotiations, while competition among major powers for their cooperation provides greater room to diversify their economic and security partnerships.

International Institutions Face a Test

One of the most significant consequences of the shift toward multiple centers of power is the growing debate over the legitimacy and effectiveness of international institutions.

The United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization and other bodies were established under balances of power that differ considerably from those prevailing today.

The UN Security Council illustrates this contradiction. Its five permanent members, the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom, retain veto power despite profound changes in the global economic and political landscape.

This has intensified calls to reform the council and expand representation for countries and regions whose current influence is not reflected in its permanent membership.

The rise of BRICS and the establishment of the New Development Bank also reflect emerging economies' desire for financial and institutional mechanisms that give them a greater role in shaping international policy.

These developments do not necessarily signal the displacement of existing institutions. Rather, they indicate a declining willingness to accept the Western-dominated order as the only framework for global governance.

Multipolarity: Balance or New Conflicts?

Scholars disagree over whether a multipolar international system is more stable than a unipolar or bipolar one.

Some argue that the presence of multiple major powers reduces the likelihood of domination, since any state seeking to expand its influence may encounter counterbalancing alliances. Such a system also gives countries more options for diplomatic maneuvering.

Others warn that multiple centers of power increase the risk of miscalculation because alliances become more complex, interests overlap and reactions during crises become harder to predict.

Europe before World War I provides an example of these dangers. Interlocking alliances, colonial rivalries and an arms race helped turn the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in 1914 into the spark that ignited a world war.

Yet multipolarity does not inevitably lead to war. The understandings reached among European powers after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 demonstrated that a relative balance of power could be maintained.

Nuclear weapons add another crucial dimension to this equation.

Nuclear deterrence makes direct confrontation between major powers less likely, but it does not prevent conventional wars, proxy conflicts or economic and technological pressure.

What Kind of World Lies Ahead?

The most important question may not be whether the world has become multipolar, but what kind of multipolarity is taking shape.

The United States continues to enjoy military superiority, a global presence and an extensive network of alliances, while China represents the most serious challenger to its influence.

Russia, India, the European Union and other regional powers also affect the global balance of power to varying degrees, although their capabilities and roles are far from equal.

As the world awaits the full implications of the trilateral summit between China, the United States and Russia in Shenzhen, the international system appears to be in a transitional phase whose defining features have yet to emerge.

US unipolar dominance is no longer as firmly established as it once was, but multipolarity has not yet evolved into a stable system governed by clear rules and institutions capable of managing competition.

The central challenge lies not in the number of major powers, but in the nature of the relationships that develop among them.

If the emergence of multiple centers of power is accompanied by reforms to international institutions, stronger cooperation and respect for international law, it could lead to a more representative and balanced global order.

But if it develops into an unrestricted struggle for influence, weapons and resources, the world could enter a prolonged period of instability, potentially culminating in a major war.


Iran Considers Uranium a Red Line, Trump Says: ‘They Don't Want to Make a Deal That's Acceptable to Me’

Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi speaks to media representatives in Islamabad on November 16, 2026. (Photo by AFP)
Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi speaks to media representatives in Islamabad on November 16, 2026. (Photo by AFP)
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Iran Considers Uranium a Red Line, Trump Says: ‘They Don't Want to Make a Deal That's Acceptable to Me’

Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi speaks to media representatives in Islamabad on November 16, 2026. (Photo by AFP)
Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi speaks to media representatives in Islamabad on November 16, 2026. (Photo by AFP)

Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Tehran still hoped diplomacy could end its war with the United States, while US President Donald Trump said Iran wanted a deal but one that was not acceptable to him.

Araghchi told the state-owned Iran newspaper that messages continued to be exchanged between Iran and Washington through mediators, and that Tehran was seeking "an agreement that would ensure there was no further war".

He also said Iran wanted guarantees that Washington was serious about negotiations before proceeding further, adding that Iran had discussed with mediators the ⁠form and nature ⁠of confidence-building measures.

The remarks came as diplomatic efforts continued to try to end a conflict that has destabilized the Middle East, disrupted shipping, driven up global energy prices and drawn in countries across the region.

The foreign minister said Iran's red lines included keeping its highly enriched uranium in the country, though ⁠he said a "fair solution" was still possible.

Authorities have previously mentioned "feasible formulas" to resolve the dispute between Tehran and Washington over the matter, including diluting the highly enriched uranium stockpile under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The IAEA estimates that Iran had 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60% when Israel and the US attacked Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025. How much of that has survived is unclear.

"I believe a fair solution can be reached on the issue of nuclear ⁠material, one ⁠that is based on our national interests while also meeting the country’s needs," Araghchi said.

Trump, in a press conference on Friday, said: "They want to make a deal, but they don't want to make a deal that's acceptable to me."

The United States and Israel attacked Iran on February 28, prompting Tehran to strike Israel and Gulf states hosting US military bases.

Qatari and Iranian officials met on Tuesday in talks aimed at "bridging perspectives and narrowing the gap between proposals presented on the ground," a spokesperson for Qatar's foreign ministry said.


Two Tankers Attacked in Strait of Hormuz

In this handout photo provided by the Lewis Pugh Foundation, taken from a boat accompanying endurance swimmer Lewis Pugh, smoke rises from a burning liquefied petroleum gas tanker in the Strait of Hormuz off the Musandam Peninsula, Oman, Tuesday, Nov. 17, 2026. (Lewis Pugh Foundation via AP)
In this handout photo provided by the Lewis Pugh Foundation, taken from a boat accompanying endurance swimmer Lewis Pugh, smoke rises from a burning liquefied petroleum gas tanker in the Strait of Hormuz off the Musandam Peninsula, Oman, Tuesday, Nov. 17, 2026. (Lewis Pugh Foundation via AP)
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Two Tankers Attacked in Strait of Hormuz

In this handout photo provided by the Lewis Pugh Foundation, taken from a boat accompanying endurance swimmer Lewis Pugh, smoke rises from a burning liquefied petroleum gas tanker in the Strait of Hormuz off the Musandam Peninsula, Oman, Tuesday, Nov. 17, 2026. (Lewis Pugh Foundation via AP)
In this handout photo provided by the Lewis Pugh Foundation, taken from a boat accompanying endurance swimmer Lewis Pugh, smoke rises from a burning liquefied petroleum gas tanker in the Strait of Hormuz off the Musandam Peninsula, Oman, Tuesday, Nov. 17, 2026. (Lewis Pugh Foundation via AP)

A tanker sailing outbound through the Strait of Hormuz was hit on its stern by an unidentified projectile about 11 nautical miles north of Oman's Khasab, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) said on Saturday.

UKMTO later reported another incident involving ⁠a tanker hit in ⁠its engine room by an unidentified projectile 17 nautical miles east of Khasab.

No ⁠casualties were reported in either incident, while the environmental impact remained unknown, UKMTO said.

The incidents followed a similar attack on a tanker near Khasab on Friday that caused a fire on board, according to the British maritime security agency.

Khasab lies on Oman's Musandam Peninsula at the ⁠entrance ⁠to the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic waterway that carried nearly one-fifth of global crude oil supplies before the US-Israeli conflict with Iran.

Shipping through the strait has been disrupted since Iran moved to close the waterway following the eruption of the conflict on February 28.