Sources: Ghalibaf’s Baghdad Visit Fell Short of All Objectives

Iraqi Parliament Speaker Haibat al-Halbousi with Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf at the entrance to parliament (parliament website)
Iraqi Parliament Speaker Haibat al-Halbousi with Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf at the entrance to parliament (parliament website)
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Sources: Ghalibaf’s Baghdad Visit Fell Short of All Objectives

Iraqi Parliament Speaker Haibat al-Halbousi with Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf at the entrance to parliament (parliament website)
Iraqi Parliament Speaker Haibat al-Halbousi with Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf at the entrance to parliament (parliament website)

Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on Thursday backed Iraq’s push to bring weapons under state control amid a Sept. 30 deadline.

Ghalibaf also reaffirmed Tehran’s commitment to security agreements between the two countries.

He arrived in Baghdad on Wednesday with a high-level Iranian delegation for an official visit due to end on Thursday with a trip to Najaf after meetings with Iraqi political and religious leaders, particularly the main factions in the Coordination Framework.

His visit comes as the issue of armed factions moves to the center of Iraq’s political agenda ahead of the deadline set by the country’s main political forces for bringing weapons under state control.

The State Administration Coalition, which includes leading Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish political forces, said after an Aug. 5 meeting that weapons must be confined to state institutions.

It described groups operating outside official structures in ways that threaten national security as “illegitimate.”

Visit falls short of its aims

Informed Iraqi sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Ghalibaf’s visit “did not achieve all its objectives,” particularly an effort to “soften Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s position” on enforcing the state monopoly on weapons once the deadline expires at the end of September.

While in Baghdad, Ghalibaf met several Shiite leaders and attended a Coordination Framework meeting on Wednesday evening, which was also attended by al-Zaidi.

The talks come as political forces search for a way out of one of the government’s most sensitive disputes, while armed factions, according to the same sources, have begun putting forward new conditions over how their weapons should be handled.

Al-Zaidi, according to prevailing political assessments, remains committed to the deadline for handing weapons over to the state, despite pressure from political forces and armed factions seeking to revise either the deadline or the terms of implementation.

An informed Iraqi politician said Coordination Framework leaders were no longer as well placed to mediate between al-Zaidi and factions rejecting the weapons plan, citing divisions within the alliance and the growing overlap with other political and judicial disputes.

The source also linked that weakness to the role of Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zidan, amid the possibility that anti-corruption measures could widen to include other leaders and figures within the Coordination Framework.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets with Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in Baghdad, Iraq, August 19, 2026. Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office/Handout via REUTERS

Al-Zaidi digs in

Political assessments suggest al-Zaidi has told lawmakers and officials in private meetings that he does not intend to retreat from the Sept. 30 deadline.

One scenario under discussion is al-Zaidi’s resignation, an option the sources say some forces implicated in corruption cases may favor in hopes of reshuffling the political landscape.

But al-Zaidi could instead take his case directly to the public, a move that could weaken his political opponents, particularly if he wins the backing of Moqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Sadrist movement, one of the most prominent Shiite blocs.

Other sources familiar with discussions inside the Coordination Framework said some parties were seeking to tie the countdown to the Sept. 30 weapons deadline to the anti-corruption campaign, which has no fixed timetable.

Such a move, they said, could open the door to political bargaining between the two issues.

The Iraqi politician who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat said one scenario would see al-Zaidi score gains in the anti-corruption campaign against political, administrative, and government figures, regardless of their level of responsibility, potentially strengthening his standing with the public.

In return, political forces could push to extend the weapons deadline, either by freezing the process, concealing weapons, or moving them outside Iraq.

The proposal has so far failed to persuade al-Zaidi, the source said, citing what he described as international commitments the prime minister made during his visit to the United States.

Dispute over control of key issues

Behind the scenes, some Coordination Framework parties believe al-Zaidi may have gone too far in his handling of the weapons and corruption files.

From their perspective, allowing one side to control both issues would be difficult because of their political overlap and because rival forces do not want a single actor, even the prime minister, to manage them alone.

Those holding that view argue that al-Zaidi reached the premiership with the backing of the main Shiite forces and therefore cannot, in their view, override or challenge them on issues directly tied to their political and security interests.

In that context, comments by Faleh al-Fayyad, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces, carried particular significance.

“The choice of Ali al-Zaidi as prime minister was born in this room,” al-Fayyad said in a television interview, referring to the room where the interview was being conducted.

The PMF is an institution linked to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, a position held by al-Zaidi.

Legal route emerges

Legislation specifically aimed at bringing weapons under state control has emerged as one possible route for the government to navigate the political and security complications surrounding the Sept. 30 deadline.

Saif al-Saadi, an expert on political and legislative affairs, told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sept. 30 was “not merely a deadline set by the government.”

Rather, he said, it represented “a referendum on the legitimacy of reclaiming the Iraqi state and its institutions from the encroachment of the parallel state.”

He said the deadline would also test al-Zaidi’s decisions: whether they prove strong and enforceable, or strong in wording but weak in implementation.

Saadi said al-Zaidi’s government maintains, in principle, that the decision to bring weapons under state control “is not discussed in the capitals of other countries.”

But he said armed factions have what he described as ideological ties that cross borders and are ideologically linked to Iran’s supreme leader.

Saadi said al-Zaidi’s government was moving toward sending legislation to parliament specifically aimed at restricting weapons to the state, describing the move as highly pragmatic.

Such legislation, he said, would allow the prime minister to move beyond the Sept. 30 deadline, ease external pressure represented by Iranian influence and reduce domestic pressure from political actors with armed wings before “throwing the ball into parliament’s court.”

Asked whether an armed confrontation could erupt after Sept. 30, Saadi ruled out that scenario, saying he did not believe fighting would break out after the deadline because al-Zaidi had warned of the risk of internal collapse.

Saadi also ruled out applying Anti-Terrorism Law No. 13 of 2005 to anyone who manufactures, uses, or possesses drones without official authorization on the grounds that such acts constitute terrorist crimes subject to the law’s severe penalties.

He said al-Zaidi’s government had, in his view, failed its first test in the case of Abbas al-Yaqubi, a leader in Harakat al-Nujaba who was arrested and released without investigation on Wednesday.

Instead, Saadi said Iraq was more likely to face the risk of financial collapse as a result of US sanctions, while adding that he could not rule out “strikes on selected targets inside Iraq.”



Syria and Türkiye Move to Forge Strategic Partnership

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan meets US Ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy to Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack, a day after Turkish-Syrian talks in Ankara (Turkish Foreign Ministry)
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan meets US Ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy to Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack, a day after Turkish-Syrian talks in Ankara (Turkish Foreign Ministry)
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Syria and Türkiye Move to Forge Strategic Partnership

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan meets US Ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy to Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack, a day after Turkish-Syrian talks in Ankara (Turkish Foreign Ministry)
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan meets US Ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy to Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack, a day after Turkish-Syrian talks in Ankara (Turkish Foreign Ministry)

Syria and Türkiye are moving to forge a strategic partnership, deepening political and security coordination while expanding economic ties.

The two countries’ foreign and defense ministers held talks in Ankara on Tuesday on counterterrorism, defense cooperation and regional developments. They also reviewed final preparations for launching a joint high-level committee to oversee bilateral relations.

Strategic Coordination

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan outlined plans to strengthen cooperation against terrorism and organized crime based on shared interests.

Fidan and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, joined by Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler and his Syrian counterpart Murhaf Abu Qasra, also examined the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into Syrian state institutions.

Fidan reaffirmed Türkiye’s support for the process under the principle of “one state, one army,” arguing that it would strengthen Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

He emphasized the need to end terrorism in Türkiye, Syria and Iraq, put an end to the denial of identities and allow everyone to participate in political life in an atmosphere of peace and stability.

Ankara remains committed to working closely with Damascus to ensure the process succeeds while extending bilateral cooperation into new areas, he added.

Türkiye is pursuing a process aimed at dissolving and disarming the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), including organizations Ankara considers affiliated with it, particularly the SDF, and withdrawing PKK elements from areas of northern Iraq.

The initiative, which Ankara calls “Terror-Free Türkiye,” also envisions what it describes as a “terror-free region.”

Talks with Barrack

On Wednesday, Fidan met US Ambassador to Türkiye and President Donald Trump’s envoy to Syria and Iraq, Tom Barrack, at the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

Diplomatic sources indicated that the meeting covered SDF integration and developments in Syria, Iraq and the wider region.

Al-Shaibani had met Barrack in Ankara on Tuesday. According to the Syrian Foreign Ministry, both officials underscored the importance of coordination and consultation to strengthen regional security and stability.

At a press conference following Tuesday’s talks, Fidan expressed confidence in Syria’s future, citing the determination of its people and the country’s growing contribution to regional stability, development and counterterrorism.

He detailed plans for cooperation between the two countries’ defense and security institutions to counter threats facing Syria, including attempts to divide the country and terrorist activity.

Türkiye was also working to help restructure the Syrian army and strengthen its security institutions, he noted.

Fidan cautioned that threats from terrorist organizations, particularly ISIS, and continued security unrest could disrupt trade and regional connectivity.

Expanding Economic Cooperation

Fidan highlighted the deepening bilateral relationship, pointing to numerous healthcare and education projects completed in Syria and an agreement to establish a joint Turkish-Syrian university in Damascus.

He also reiterated Ankara’s position that regional countries should take responsibility for addressing challenges in their own strategic and geographic surroundings rather than relying on outside powers.

Fidan accused Israel of seeking to destabilize Syria and urged an end to Israeli attacks on Syrian territory and compliance with the 1974 Disengagement Agreement.

For his part, al-Shaibani described Syria as a cornerstone of Middle East stability and Türkiye as an indispensable partner in maintaining it.

He put bilateral trade at nearly $3.7 billion in 2025, an increase of more than 40%.

Efforts were underway to ease Syrian product entry into the Turkish market, establish a legal framework to protect them, accelerate the rehabilitation of border crossings and prepare for the Qamishli crossing to begin operating soon, he explained.

Al-Shaibani announced an agreement to accelerate a railway project linking Türkiye to the Gulf through Syria and Jordan.

The electricity interconnection between Aleppo and the Turkish city of Cicek had also been rehabilitated, with work underway to increase its capacity.

Turning to strategic cooperation, al-Shaibani outlined discussions on expanding training and capacity-building, improving coordination against terrorism and organized crime, and creating conditions for the voluntary and sustainable return of Syrian refugees.

He stressed that these efforts were based on the principle of Syrian sovereignty over the country’s entire territory.


Is Eastern Libya Moving Toward Full Autonomy?

Osama Hammad attends a conference on combating terrorism and curbing irregular migration in Benghazi on November 3 (Government of Stability media office)
Osama Hammad attends a conference on combating terrorism and curbing irregular migration in Benghazi on November 3 (Government of Stability media office)
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Is Eastern Libya Moving Toward Full Autonomy?

Osama Hammad attends a conference on combating terrorism and curbing irregular migration in Benghazi on November 3 (Government of Stability media office)
Osama Hammad attends a conference on combating terrorism and curbing irregular migration in Benghazi on November 3 (Government of Stability media office)

The prospect of autonomy in eastern Libya has returned to the political forefront after the government appointed by the House of Representatives threatened to assert financial and administrative independence.

The move has revived questions about whether such an arrangement is feasible and what it could mean for the unity of state institutions and the management of resources and powers in a country divided for years.

The debate has widened among Libyan politicians, tribal leaders and activists since Benghazi-based Prime Minister Osama Hammad raised the possibility on Monday of allowing his government to independently manage resources and public facilities within the territory under its authority.

Hammad’s warning came in response to the Government of National Unity, headed by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, preventing a House of Representatives session from taking place in the western city of Zintan.

The incident renewed disputes over the powers of Libya’s rival institutions and the geographic and administrative limits of their authority.

Supporters of autonomy argue that it would protect the interests of eastern and southern Libya and allow the regions to manage their resources without being held back by the dysfunction of central institutions.

Critics, however, warn that such a move could entrench the country’s divisions in the absence of national consensus and constitutional guarantees governing the distribution of power and wealth.

The Federal System

Political analyst Abdullah al-Dibani believes Hammad’s government has the legal and executive means to pursue financial and administrative independence, or autonomy, as a way to protect citizens’ interests and ensure continued development.

Al-Dibani told Asharq Al-Awsat that the move draws its legitimacy from the government’s appointment by the elected House of Representatives, as well as the security stability, reconstruction projects and infrastructure development achieved in eastern and southern Libya.

He described the proposed move as a response to political deadlock and the disruption of legislative activity, aimed at preventing political disputes from holding the country’s resources and citizens’ livelihoods hostage.

Independent management of resources, he argued, could help ensure a fairer distribution of wealth and the continued provision of public services.

The debate echoes longstanding calls by Libyan politicians for a federal or quasi-federal system that would grant the country’s three historic regions - Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan - greater powers to manage their own affairs.

Yet the proposal appears to lack consensus even among those who regard federalism as a possible solution to Libya’s current crisis.

Abu Bakr al-Qatrani, a leading figure in Libya’s federalist movement, argues that federalism already exists in practice because of the division between rival governments in the east and west, but that it has neither been enshrined in the constitution nor established democratically.

Libya abolished its federal system in 1963 under Constitutional Amendment Law No. 1 of that year, which established a unitary state.

In a Facebook post, al-Qatrani warned that adopting federalism would not address the roots of the crisis as long as disputes persisted over ministries and sovereign institutions, which he described as the real focus of the struggle among Libyan factions.

Complexities and Obstacles

Questions about Libya’s political future intensified after a video circulated showing young Libyans at a heritage festival organized by the Libyan Heritage and Wildlife Authority in Benghazi on Tuesday.

During a traditional dance, participants chanted slogans calling for Saddam Haftar, deputy commander-in-chief of the eastern-based Libyan National Army, to be installed as president of Libya.

They also displayed a banner featuring his photograph in civilian clothing alongside the word “President.”

Others, however, consider autonomy unlikely at present.

Among them is Dr. Aref Teer, a professor of political science at the Libyan Academy for Postgraduate Studies, who argues that threatening to assert financial and administrative independence does not necessarily mean it can be implemented at this stage.

He cited political, economic and social complexities, as well as the need for constitutional and institutional arrangements that could take decades to establish.

“Libyan public opinion does not appear receptive to the idea of dividing the country or undermining its unity,” he said, pointing to the historical symbolism of King Idris al-Senussi, whose legacy is associated with Libya’s declaration of independence and the unification of its regions in 1951.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Teer stressed that the interconnected nature of Libya’s sovereign financial and economic institutions, together with the overlap of resources and revenues among regions, posed obstacles to establishing an independent financial administration.

These factors also raised questions about the place of Fezzan and southern Libya in any future arrangements, he added.

On the international front, Teer considered it unlikely that neighboring countries or the broader international community, including the United States, Britain, Russia and China, would accept such a move at present.

He did not, however, rule out a change in circumstances over the longer term if divisions persisted and efforts to reach a comprehensive political settlement continued to falter, potentially prompting rival parties to explore alternative administrative arrangements.

Between these competing positions, Mohamed al-Mubasher, chairman of the Libyan Council of Elders for Reconciliation, advocates an approach centered on citizens’ rights and the fair distribution of wealth.

“Libya’s problem is not a problem of maps,” he said, arguing that people across the country’s cities and regions share similar needs, including salaries, medicine, education and employment opportunities.

Al-Mubasher acknowledged that demands for federalism had legitimate motivations, particularly feelings of marginalization and the accumulation of unfulfilled promises.

But he questioned the value of changing the structure of the state without fair institutions and effective mechanisms for oversight and accountability, warning that corruption and favoritism could simply be transferred to the regions.

Instead, he proposed empowering municipalities by granting them meaningful authority and independent budgets, alongside transparent rules for distributing revenues.

He pointed to the interconnected nature of Libya’s economy, banking system, currency, oil wealth and social ties across regions as foundations for preserving the country’s unity.


Who Will Succeed al-Mirghani? Eldest Son Has First Claim to Religious Leadership as Party Succession Remains Contested

Abdullah al-Mirghani with Prime Minister Kamil Idris during a condolence gathering in Khartoum (Sudan News Agency/SUNA)
Abdullah al-Mirghani with Prime Minister Kamil Idris during a condolence gathering in Khartoum (Sudan News Agency/SUNA)
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Who Will Succeed al-Mirghani? Eldest Son Has First Claim to Religious Leadership as Party Succession Remains Contested

Abdullah al-Mirghani with Prime Minister Kamil Idris during a condolence gathering in Khartoum (Sudan News Agency/SUNA)
Abdullah al-Mirghani with Prime Minister Kamil Idris during a condolence gathering in Khartoum (Sudan News Agency/SUNA)

The death of Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, who for decades led both Sudan’s Khatmiyya Sufi order and the Democratic Unionist Party, has opened the question of succession on two fronts.

Within the religious order, several senior representatives insist that his eldest son, Ali, has the first claim to its leadership. But the party presidency remains contested, with three of al-Mirghani’s sons competing for influence amid differences over the war and political alliances inside and outside Sudan.

Al-Mirghani succeeded his father, Ali al-Mirghani, as spiritual leader of the Khatmiyya order following his death in 1968, in a transition that proceeded smoothly and without major public dispute.

In 1982, following the death of party leader Sharif Hussein al-Hindi, he assumed the presidency of the Democratic Unionist Party, combining religious and political leadership until his death in Cairo on November 13.

A source told Asharq Al-Awsat that three of al-Mirghani’s sons — Abdullah al-Mahjoub, Mohamed al-Hassan and Jaafar al-Sadiq — were competing for leadership of the party and the religious order.

They draw support from different factions and groups inside Sudan and abroad, as well as from ties to regional actors that the source said were backing some of them.

According to the source, Abdullah al-Mahjoub enjoys the support of a regional state and Sovereignty Council Chairman Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Mohamed al-Hassan, meanwhile, is backed by another regional state and political forces opposed to the war, including parties that signed the Framework Agreement.

Jaafar al-Sadiq relies on forces within the Democratic Bloc alliance, which he chairs, despite having differed with some of the alliance’s positions in the past.

Eldest Son Has Priority

The source said Mohamed al-Hassan’s endorsement of his elder brother Ali as head of the Khatmiyya order had introduced a fourth name into the religious succession arrangements. Ali had remained outside the political disputes among his brothers.

Under longstanding traditions within the al-Mirghani family, the eldest son has priority in inheriting the sajjada, or spiritual leadership of the Khatmiyya order, unless he declines the position.

The party presidency, however, is governed by organizational and constitutional procedures whose interpretation has become a source of disagreement among party leaders.

The source said a group of senior representatives of the order was insisting that its leadership pass to Ali al-Mirghani as the late leader’s eldest son.

Following his father’s death, Mohamed al-Hassan publicly endorsed his elder brother’s succession as head of the Khatmiyya order.

He also signed a statement identifying himself as “President of the Democratic Unionist Party (Original),” having served as deputy party president during his father’s lifetime.

A source in the party’s organizational secretariat said Ali’s claim to the religious leadership rested on traditions dating back to the order’s founder, and that Mohamed al-Hassan’s endorsement amounted to recognition of that entitlement.

Under those traditions, family members, senior representatives of the order and its followers pledge allegiance to the eldest son, the source added.

Who Will Lead the Party?

Regarding the party presidency, the organizational secretariat source, in remarks carried by a Sudanese newspaper, said Mohamed al-Hassan was authorized to manage party affairs until its general congress convenes.

The source cited a decision issued by his father in 2013 dissolving the party’s organizational bodies and establishing an interim steering committee, chaired by Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani with Mohamed al-Hassan as his deputy, to prepare for the general congress.

Following the party president’s death, responsibility for continuing to manage party affairs and completing the establishment of its institutions and organizational structures falls to his deputy on the steering committee, the source explained.

In remarks made before al-Mirghani’s death and reported by Sudan Tribune, the party’s deputy organizational secretary, Osama Hassouna, said Mohamed al-Hassan derived his constitutional and organizational legitimacy from decisions issued by his father following the Reference Conference.

In contrast, Mohamed Syed Ahmed, an adviser to the party president known as “al-Jakoumi,” said the party presidency was not hereditary.

He argued that choosing al-Mirghani’s successor was a matter for consultation and the relevant party institutions.

Jaafar al-Sadiq al-Mirghani, deputy party president and chairman of the Democratic Bloc alliance, renewed his pledge to uphold his father’s approach and mission and preserve the family’s religious and national legacy in a farewell address.

He did not address arrangements for either the political or religious succession. Some analysts, however, interpreted his emphasis on preserving the family’s legacy as an indication of his position on the succession.

Unionist leader Moataz al-Fahl told Asharq Al-Awsat that the succession question had not yet been settled, as party and religious leaders and the late leader’s sons remained occupied with mourning ceremonies.

He said Jaafar al-Sadiq, Abdullah al-Mahjoub and Ahmed al-Mirghani had traveled to Sudan to attend the funeral and had not discussed succession arrangements.

“Sayyid Mohamed Osman was too important a figure for his succession to be settled so quickly,” he said.

Disputes Predate His Death

Organizational disputes between Mohamed al-Hassan and Jaafar al-Sadiq date back several years before their father’s death.

They became public in 2022, when the brothers adopted differing positions on party management and political alliances.

In November that year, al-Mirghani issued a video directive instructing Jaafar al-Sadiq to continue his duties as deputy party president and address what he described as organizational “breaches of discipline.”

Mohamed al-Hassan’s faction, however, maintained that the 2013 decisions establishing the steering committee remained the basis of its organizational legitimacy.

The disputes resurfaced in June 2025, when decisions issued in the party president’s name called for restructuring the executive bureau and appointing Ahmed Saad Omar as its head, replacing Jaafar al-Sadiq.

The decisions drew objections from some Unionist leaders, while others maintained that they were legitimate.

An Opportunity to Reunite the Unionists

Political analyst Mohamed Latif said separating the religious leadership of the Khatmiyya order from the political leadership of the party could open the way to reunifying Unionist factions.

Some factions had distanced themselves from the original party because of its association with religious authority.

Latif told Asharq Al-Awsat that Mohamed al-Hassan’s endorsement of his elder brother Ali as head of the Khatmiyya order, alongside his own declaration that he was assuming the party presidency, marked a shift in the historic relationship between the two leadership roles. Their father had held both positions for decades.

Latif argued that the development could give the Unionist movement an opportunity to restore its unity and political role in Sudan.

He also noted that the call for an end to the war, which featured prominently in Mohamed al-Hassan’s statement, could pave the way for closer ties with civilian forces supporting a democratic transition.

The source who described the rivalry among al-Mirghani’s sons, however, warned that an escalation of their disputes could cost the family its historic influence within the party and lead to its leadership passing outside the al-Mirghani family.
The source pointed out that the presidency of the Democratic Unionist Party had been separate from leadership of the Khatmiyya order before Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani combined the two positions.

Political figures from outside the family had previously led the party, notably Ismail al-Azhari and Sharif Hussein al-Hindi.

As succession arrangements unfold, the Unionist movement faces organizational divisions and disagreements over the war and political alliances.

The party’s various factions have yet to reach a consensus on a leadership arrangement following al-Mirghani’s death.