Who Are Hezbollah's Remaining Allies in Lebanon?

Hezbollah supporter weeps during a ceremony to mark the second anniversary of the death of party leader Hassan Nasrallah . Nasrallah was killed in a massive Israeli air strike on September 27, 2024. Photo: Marwan Naamani/dpa
Hezbollah supporter weeps during a ceremony to mark the second anniversary of the death of party leader Hassan Nasrallah . Nasrallah was killed in a massive Israeli air strike on September 27, 2024. Photo: Marwan Naamani/dpa
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Who Are Hezbollah's Remaining Allies in Lebanon?

Hezbollah supporter weeps during a ceremony to mark the second anniversary of the death of party leader Hassan Nasrallah . Nasrallah was killed in a massive Israeli air strike on September 27, 2024. Photo: Marwan Naamani/dpa
Hezbollah supporter weeps during a ceremony to mark the second anniversary of the death of party leader Hassan Nasrallah . Nasrallah was killed in a massive Israeli air strike on September 27, 2024. Photo: Marwan Naamani/dpa

The second anniversary of the assassinations of former Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine exposed a grim reality facing Hezbollah inside Lebanon. It showed that the group has lost its network of domestic allies, as evidenced by the absence, for the first time in two decades, of figures who had been allied with the group before the 2024 war.

Two years after the assassinations, observers closely following the group's situation say Hezbollah is facing not only the challenge of rebuilding its capabilities and reorganizing its ranks, but also the erosion of the network of alliances it built over many years. A number of political forces appear to have reconsidered the value of maintaining ties with the group amid shifts in the balance of power domestically and regionally.

Among its most prominent former allies, the only one to attend the commemoration of Nasrallah was Suleiman Frangieh, head of the Marada Movement, who had been the group's candidate for the presidency before President Joseph Aoun was elected, along with leaders representing the Amal Movement, its partner in the Shiite duo.

Political Cover Unravels

Hezbollah succeeded in building a broad network of political alliances spanning most of Lebanon's sects and denominations after signing the 2006 memorandum of understanding with the Free Patriotic Movement. According to its opponents, this enabled the group to secure "political cover" for retaining its weapons and expanding its influence, eventually entrenching a parallel reality alongside state institutions.

But this network began to gradually unravel after the "Gaza Support" war, alongside the major military setback suffered by Hezbollah and the resulting change in its position within Lebanon's political equation. One of the most prominent signs of this unraveling was the distancing of key allies, foremost among them the Free Patriotic Movement on the Christian political scene, along with the declining presence of its allies among Sunni and Druze forces.

The distancing of Hezbollah's allies is not linked solely to the shift in the balance of power after the war, but also to the political and financial risks that have come to accompany close ties with Hezbollah. This comes amid US sanctions that have already targeted individuals and entities linked to the group or accused of supporting it, as well as threats to expand the sanctions to include other allies and political figures. This has prompted some of the group's allies to reassess their calculations, fearing that their relationship with Hezbollah could turn from a source of political influence into a source of costs and sanctions.

Transactional Alliances

Dr. Hilal Khashan, a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut, said the "cross-sectarian network" the group sought to build after entering politics was essentially "marginal." He noted that "the group long benefited from its military strength to build broad political influence and from presenting itself as a force capable of establishing a balance with Israel."

According to Khashan, the group spent years "entrenching a narrative based on taking the battle to the Galilee and portraying the existence of a military balance with Israel," a narrative that "a large part of the Shiite community believed." But the military strength Hezbollah had amassed, which was considered one of its main sources of influence in the region, "suffered an unprecedented blow during the war, which inevitably affected its political position."

Khashan told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah had, throughout the past period, "provided political cover for parties and forces in exchange for obtaining cover for its policies and weapons, making many of the alliances closer to transactional alliances and exchanges of interests than to firmly established political or ideological partnerships."

Khashan believes that "the collapse of the balance of power that allowed the group to manage these relationships will make rebuilding its previous network of alliances extremely difficult, particularly as political forces that once saw benefits and political protection in an alliance with it now face a different reality." He expects the Amal Movement, through new figures, to assume leadership of the Shiite community in the coming phase.

Alienation Likely to Increase

Political writer and editor-in-chief of the Janoubia website Ali Al-Amin, for his part, said Hezbollah, which had been "a center of attraction for allies and political patronage for many years, is no longer so today, three years after the start of the Support War. It currently lacks allies and is facing an internal and external siege, a reality that can be readily observed." Al-Amin added: "This was clearly evident at the commemoration of the assassinations of its two former secretaries-general, as most of those who had once competed to sit in the front row were absent."

Al-Amin told Asharq Al-Awsat that "this alienation is likely to increase," noting that "the issue of weapons is another matter related to Hezbollah's role and position, which does not appear to have understood what befell it, the Shiites, and Lebanon as a result of a major catastrophe. It remains committed to its role as an Iranian tool subject to the calculations set by the Supreme Leader from inside Iran."

Al-Amin concluded: "In light of the current political and security circumstances, and with the group continuing to use rhetoric that is at odds with reality and its new facts, it will find no resonance beyond its supporters. Its visits to some political forces have not produced anything that could be described as a restoration of its alliances or friendships. In practical terms, it is trying to climb out of the hole it fell into by falling into more holes, which will deepen its predicament and expose its inability to redefine its existence on the foundations of the state."

He added: "In view of all this, it cannot be expected that the group will repair its fractured alliances. Rather, they will continue to collapse and disappear."



Western Warnings about Muslim Brotherhood Bolster Egypt’s Crackdown on Group

The Muslim Brotherhood’s headquarters after being set ablaze in Cairo in the summer of 2013. (Getty Images)
The Muslim Brotherhood’s headquarters after being set ablaze in Cairo in the summer of 2013. (Getty Images)
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Western Warnings about Muslim Brotherhood Bolster Egypt’s Crackdown on Group

The Muslim Brotherhood’s headquarters after being set ablaze in Cairo in the summer of 2013. (Getty Images)
The Muslim Brotherhood’s headquarters after being set ablaze in Cairo in the summer of 2013. (Getty Images)

US President Donald Trump’s warnings about the Muslim Brotherhood could strengthen Egypt’s efforts to restrict the group’s activities at home and abroad, researchers told Asharq Al-Awsat, following a series of Egyptian and Western measures targeting its networks.

Speaking to Salem News Channel on Thursday, Trump said the Brotherhood posed risks extending to the United States and Europe. Asked whether it or communists were more dangerous, he described both as major threats but suggested the Brotherhood currently posed the greater danger.

Mounir Adib, a researcher specializing in extremist movements and international terrorism, said Trump’s remarks reflected growing Western awareness of transnational networks.

Their significance lay in their timing, as Washington increasingly moved beyond warnings toward legal and financial measures against specific Brotherhood branches, he added.

Adib said the shift reinforced Egypt’s longstanding position that the organization uses institutions and affiliated entities to advance its political objectives.

Hesham al-Naggar, a researcher specializing in jihadist groups, described Trump’s comments as recognition of Egypt’s approach since 2013, although he considered Western measures insufficient.

He said Cairo’s initial efforts to dismantle the Brotherhood domestically and pursue its overseas networks encountered Western resistance, partly because of earlier expectations surrounding political Islam.

Attitudes have since shifted, including among some left-wing intellectuals, he noted.

On November 24, 2025, Trump signed an executive order directing the State and Treasury departments to consider terrorist designations for Brotherhood branches in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon.

In January, Washington designated the Egyptian and Jordanian branches as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, while the Lebanese branch was also designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

The Sudanese Brotherhood received terrorist designations in March.

In May, the Trump administration outlined a counterterrorism strategy focusing on the Brotherhood as what it described as an ideological source of modern jihadist terrorism.

Argentina also designated the Egyptian, Jordanian and Lebanese branches earlier this year, while the European Parliament approved an October 8 resolution calling for a common EU strategy against Brotherhood networks.

Adib said these developments strengthened Cairo’s case for targeting financing channels and overseas operations, but stressed that international cooperation should rely on intelligence, evidence and legal procedures rather than political labels alone.

Al-Naggar said even limited Western measures would reinforce Egypt’s efforts.

Trump’s remarks followed Egypt’s decision to place the Brotherhood permanently on its terrorism list under a final court ruling published in the Official Gazette on Monday, after years of temporary designations.

Several Brotherhood leaders, including Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie, remain imprisoned in cases involving violence, terrorism and murder.

The following day, a Cairo criminal court issued a first-instance ruling placing 35 entities and 36 individuals based in Europe on Egypt’s terrorism lists for five years.

Adib said the next phase could bring closer US-European cooperation in intelligence sharing, monitoring financial flows and reviewing organizations linked to prohibited activities.

Al-Naggar called for a broader international response, including stronger security and intelligence cooperation, arguing that the issue extended beyond the Arab region to global security and stability.


PMF-Led Government Committee Enters Iraq’s Jurf al-Sakhar

Members of the committee in Jurf al-Sakhar on Friday in this photo released by platforms close to the PMF.
Members of the committee in Jurf al-Sakhar on Friday in this photo released by platforms close to the PMF.
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PMF-Led Government Committee Enters Iraq’s Jurf al-Sakhar

Members of the committee in Jurf al-Sakhar on Friday in this photo released by platforms close to the PMF.
Members of the committee in Jurf al-Sakhar on Friday in this photo released by platforms close to the PMF.

An Iraqi security committee began investigating suspected fuel smuggling in Jurf al-Sakhar, north of the Babil province, on Friday, amid mounting tensions between the government and Kataib Hezbollah over the area and efforts to bring weapons under state control.

Troops deployed around the area to secure the committee’s entry, but political mediation reportedly halted their advance amid disagreements over how the investigation would proceed.

Footage showed a large military deployment before committee members met commanders believed to be from the pro-Iran Kataib Hezbollah. Sabereen News, an outlet close to armed factions, broadcast a Kataib Hezbollah commander addressing Interior Ministry officers.

Security Media Cell chief Saad Maan denied that political groups or armed factions were represented on the committee, saying it had begun fieldwork early Friday.

A security source told Shafaq News that the committee conducted an initial inspection after agreeing with faction representatives on investigative procedures and field visits.

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi formed the committee Thursday, placing it under the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Its members represent the prime minister’s office, intelligence and anti-corruption bodies, the Oil Ministry, security agencies, forensic authorities and the Energy Police.

The November 12 order was signed by Lt. Gen. Abdul Amir al-Shammari, director of the commander-in-chief’s office.

The decision followed a three-hour meeting between al-Zaidi, Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri, PMF chairman Falih al-Fayyadh and chief of staff Abdul Aziz al-Muhammadawi, known as Abu Fadak.

According to Shafaq News, al-Zaidi demanded enforcement of Iraqi law against offenders, while al-Amiri and al-Fayyadh proposed giving the parties concerned time to reorganize and resume dialogue over weapons.

The proposal included continuing negotiations through a four-member committee seeking to resolve disputes and preserve stability.

A government adviser told Asharq Al-Awsat that Baghdad’s changing approach reflected the armed groups’ growing political influence.

“The state is not merely confronting forces that possess weapons; these forces have also become capable of influencing political decision-making,” the adviser said.

The government prioritizes restoring sovereignty without confronting society or its communities, he stressed.

Disputes over Kataib Hezbollah had already disrupted a planned Monday meeting between al-Zaidi and Coordination Framework leaders, while negotiations over bringing weapons under state control had produced no progress.

Separately, Babil Governor Ali Turki, affiliated with Asaib Ahl al-Haq, resigned after publicly denying oil smuggling in Jurf al-Sakhar.

Informed sources said his remarks were made without the federal government’s knowledge or coordination with Asaib’s leadership, prompting movement chief Qais al-Khazali to order his resignation.

Jurf al-Sakhar has been a major armed-faction stronghold since 2014. It is believed to contain military camps, prisons, weapons depots and rocket and drone manufacturing facilities.

Many also believe the area serves as an operations center for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, an allegation denied by faction representatives and parties in Iraq’s governing coalition.


Lebanese Army Seizes Weapons Cache in Beirut’s Southern Suburbs, Raising Questions about Their Origins

The seized weapons in this photo released by the Lebanese Army.
The seized weapons in this photo released by the Lebanese Army.
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Lebanese Army Seizes Weapons Cache in Beirut’s Southern Suburbs, Raising Questions about Their Origins

The seized weapons in this photo released by the Lebanese Army.
The seized weapons in this photo released by the Lebanese Army.

The Lebanese Army seized a large cache of weapons and ammunition during a raid on a warehouse in Musharrafieh, in Beirut’s southern suburbs.

Although the warehouse does not appear to belong to Hezbollah, the operation drew attention because it took place in the group’s stronghold, reviving debate over the state’s efforts to impose monopoly on arms.

The army said the raid followed “surveillance and monitoring of activities linked to weapons transportation and trafficking.” The seized weapons and ammunition were handed over, and an investigation into a detained suspect was launched under judicial supervision.

The army arrested a Lebanese citizen identified by the initials “A.A.” Its statement did not identify the warehouse’s owner or indicate any organizational affiliation.

According to information obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat, the owner belongs to a family from the Chiyah area and went into hiding immediately after the raid.

Retired Brig. Gen. Fadi Daoud told Asharq Al-Awsat that the raid was a preemptive security operation based on surveillance rather than a reaction to an immediate incident.

He noted that the army’s statement referred to weapons trafficking and transportation without attributing the warehouse to any particular organization.

“We therefore cannot hold any specific party responsible before the investigation is completed,” he said.

Daoud also warned that storing ammunition in the densely populated southern suburbs posed a direct threat to residents.

“This raid carries a dual message: domestically, that weapons fall exclusively under state authority, and internationally, that the army is serious and capable,” he said.

He described the raid as part of a broader process that began with the government’s decision to establish a state monopoly on arms, stressing the importance of awaiting the investigation’s findings and applying the same standards across all regions.

“The army has once again demonstrated its capabilities and will continue this approach consistently and transparently,” he added.

Possible sources

Military affairs observer Mustafa al-Asaad examined photographs of the seized weapons and suggested that the collection was more consistent with the activities of an experienced arms dealer than with preparations for direct military confrontation.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, he considered it unlikely that the weapons formed part of military shipments sent from Iran to Lebanon.

“The variety of the weapons on display and their different origins indicate that the dealer does not rely on a single source but has an extensive network of contacts allowing him to obtain various types of firearms,” he said.

Al-Asaad noted that some of the pistols visible in the photographs are legally imported into Lebanon through established channels, while others appeared to have been smuggled or stolen from Iraq.

He pointed in particular to several Glock pistols, especially beige-colored models, resembling firearms used by Iraqi military and security agencies, including the police, army and special forces.

They may have reached Lebanon through a smuggling route from Iraq via Syria, although he cautioned that their origins could not be established without examining their serial numbers and identifying marks.

Al-Asaad also drew attention to a gold-plated Kalashnikov rifle, suggesting that some of the dealer’s customers might be collectors seeking distinctive firearms rather than weapons for combat.

He said the variety and quantity of weapons indicated considerable experience and connections within Lebanon’s arms trade, which has operated through established networks for decades.

Grenades and night-vision equipment

Al-Asaad also identified hand grenades and materials that could be used to manufacture explosives, although the quantities visible did not suggest an unusually large stockpile.

The collection included scopes and night-vision equipment used for military purposes but also available on the arms market.

He pointed to small automatic firearms resembling pistols, including models from the Skorpion family, which have historically been used in assassinations, including during the 1980s.

However, he stressed that their presence did not indicate preparations for assassinations, as such weapons could also appeal to collectors.

Al-Asaad compared the cache with arms seized by the Lebanese Army during previous raids in the Bekaa Valley, including rocket launchers and anti-armor weapons more clearly associated with direct military use.

He said that the latest photographs did not show any particularly unusual weapons that would be difficult to obtain on the Lebanese market.