Arabs in Israel: A Dangerous Security Secret, Especially During Elections

Benjamin Netanyahu with his wife and Israeli President Isaac Herzog (AFP)
Benjamin Netanyahu with his wife and Israeli President Isaac Herzog (AFP)
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Arabs in Israel: A Dangerous Security Secret, Especially During Elections

Benjamin Netanyahu with his wife and Israeli President Isaac Herzog (AFP)
Benjamin Netanyahu with his wife and Israeli President Isaac Herzog (AFP)

“We on the right and center-right represent about 65% of the electorate, so we will remain able to form governments in the future. I know I will lose support and may even alarm many of my good friends. But I believe we must tie our fate to that of the Arabs in Israel.”

Natan Eshel, known as Benjamin Netanyahu’s closest adviser, published those words on June 16, 2019.

His opinion piece appeared that day in two newspapers at opposite ends of Israel’s political spectrum: Haaretz, which the right sees as radically left-wing, and Makor Rishon, the newspaper of the pro-settlement right, which the left regards as a platform for the fascist right.

Anyone who knows the inner workings of Israeli politics understands that the article expressed Netanyahu’s own views. The governing right was addressing the entire Israeli public, from the far right to the far left, through the liberal center.

Its message: the right had the courage to change official policy toward Arab citizens, marked throughout Israel’s history by racial discrimination and the suppression of freedoms.

The article sent shock waves through Israel. The country was in a historic constitutional crisis, going through five elections in two and a half years. “The Arabs are not the problem, but the solution,” Eshel wrote in the same article.

What happened over seven years to make Netanyahu abandon that path and embrace its opposite, hostility and hatred?

And why is Israel’s Central Elections Committee, supposedly a model of integrity, now voting overwhelmingly to disqualify all Arab candidate lists, seeking to deny Arab citizens their basic right to run for the Knesset?

A closer look reveals that most Israeli parties are mired in racism. They treat the Arab minority with arrogance and condescension, just as Aryans in Europe treated Jews: excluding them, trampling on their rights and doing everything they can to diminish their standing.

The question remains: What drove Netanyahu to seek fair treatment for Arabs, then retreat so far that he now sees them as an “eighth front” in Israel’s wars, alongside Iran, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iraq’s Hezbollah, Hamas in Gaza, the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Houthis in Yemen?

Mansour Abbas. AFP

The turn begins

Some trace the shift to 2016, when Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit decided to file indictments in three serious corruption cases.

These analysts see Netanyahu’s outreach to Arab citizens as a normal democratic step: an attempt to redress decades of racial discrimination and show that the right, in particular, could put them on a path toward equality.

He had approved Plan 922, allocating $5 billion to narrow some of the disparities caused by discrimination. The plan was developed with the Joint List, led by lawmaker Ayman Odeh, and the National Committee of Heads of Arab Local Authorities, led by Mazen Ghnaim.

But Netanyahu’s aides had a different calculation. They were building an alliance of right-wing parties to shield him against the judiciary, which was trying him on three corruption indictments.

The right was fragmented. Its far-right parties distrusted Netanyahu’s governments, which always included one or more centrist parties. He offered them a deal: a permanent alliance, in good times and bad, that would hold under any circumstances and support him in court.

When far-right leaders began throwing their weight around and imposing conditions, he turned to another tactic: an alliance with one of the Arab lists.

All the Arab parties had by then united under the Joint List. Netanyahu knew that bringing one into his coalition could break that unity. He would achieve three goals at once: divide his opponents, as he routinely did; secure a governing majority; and win respect in the West for ending the exclusion of Arabs and discrimination against them.

But the hard-line far right insisted he must not ally with Arabs. The opportunity collapsed.

His center-right rivals, Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, seized it instead. In 2021, they formed a coalition with the United Arab List, led by lawmaker Mansour Abbas. That alliance gave them the numbers to form a government.

The government lasted a year and a half; too little time to fundamentally change Israeli policy. But it gave Arab parties political legitimacy and secured several gains for Arab citizens, foremost among them Plan 555, providing an estimated $10 billion in funding.

It began with Rabin

Abbas’ alliance with the Bennett-Lapid government was not the first to include Arabs.

In 1993, Shas, the party of ultra-Orthodox Jews of Middle Eastern origin, left Yitzhak Rabin’s government, reducing it to a minority. Rabin turned to the Arabs.

They were represented by two parties: the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, led by lawmaker Tawfiq Zayyad, with three seats, and the Arab Democratic Party, led by lawmaker Abdulwahab Darawshe, with two. Together, they formed the “blocking bloc,” preventing the right from toppling the government.

Rabin showed a sincere commitment to the alliance. He accepted two conditions: begin a process to achieve full equality for Israel’s Arab citizens and recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The alliance delivered on both fronts. The Oslo Accords were one of its fruits. But, as is well known, the Israeli right assassinated Rabin. Netanyahu then took power for his first term, from 1996 to 1999.

The process was derailed. Arabs were again excluded and pushed toward the political margins. Their parties resumed their struggle from the back benches of the Knesset opposition, in street demonstrations and through international pressure from United Nations bodies, the European Union and other institutions.

Netanyahu once again turned them into a bogeyman to frighten Jews.

Incitement long before Oct. 7

The impression that Netanyahu is exploiting the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, 2023, to fuel hatred of Arabs in Israel misses the longer history. Incitement against them began long before the attack. Netanyahu himself played a decisive role.

An Israel Democracy Institute poll showed how successful that incitement had been.

Conducted a week before his June 2019 call to bring Arabs into the coalition, it found that 81% of Jewish respondents opposed Arab parties’ participation. Just 13% supported it.

The Hamas attack, however, became a defining benchmark for Israeli policy and a fixation for an entire society. At its core lies hatred of Palestinians — all Palestinians, including Gaza’s children — and support for killing them alongside their mothers, daughters and elderly people. Even Palestinian citizens of Israel were cast as enemies.

Why? Did they join the Hamas attack? Did they approve of it?

Every Israeli politician and military official knows that Arab citizens stand in direct opposition to Hamas and wholly opposed its attack. Many were themselves killed or wounded.

Arabs opposed the attack

Arabs in the Negev were among the first hit by Hamas rockets during the attack. Six were killed.

The attackers also killed a Palestinian woman wearing a headscarf who tried to stop them from killing civilians. She told them their actions violated Islamic values. They shot her.

They also shot an Arab paramedic from Iksal, near Nazareth, who worked for Magen David Adom, as he treated a wounded Jew.

Even the Islamic Movement led by lawmaker Mansour Abbas condemned the Oct. 7 attack as “a massacre and an inhuman, unjustified act that does not reflect the values of the Palestinian people.” Almost every Arab politician in Israel did much the same.

To say that “after Oct. 7, no government may be formed that relies on Arab parties” is therefore a slur built on lies and ingratitude. Behind it lies blind racism.

The threat this policy poses to Israel’s future has ignited a struggle among Jews themselves over how to respond.

The majority, including liberal centrist forces led by Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, embrace this racist position without shame or hesitation.

Despite their positive experience of an alliance with Mansour Abbas, they bowed to Netanyahu’s campaign, disavowed that alliance and pledged to reject any government dependent on an Arab party.

Eisenkot tried to soften his opposition. At a meeting with voters in Jerusalem last Friday, he said: “Since this morning, my team has been dealing with the promise supposedly made to them that Mansour Abbas would be in the government. Anyone who knows me knows that I do not make promises.”

His answer still left him an opening. Every partner, he said, must accept three basic principles: that Israel is a Jewish, democratic and liberal state; the values of the Declaration of Independence; and the obligation to perform military or national service.

Last Tuesday, he told Radio 103FM he had added a fourth condition: anyone joining his government must support eliminating Hamas.

A liberal and left-wing current rejects this racist approach. It argues that the Jewish people, who once suffered racial discrimination in its most abhorrent forms, now practice it openly, explicitly and as official policy.

“Bringing Arab parties and Arab society into any future governing coalition is a strategic necessity to save Israel and defeat the right, which is destroying Israel,” said Yair Golan, leader of the Democrats party.

Yet Golan joined the racist right-wing parties in backing the disqualification of Sami Abu Shehadeh, leader of Balad.

Yair Lapid. AFP

A cautious Arab campaign

Arab parties are fighting cautiously, seeking to give the right no ammunition against them on any front.

The right has made the fight against these parties a central campaign goal, particularly as it watches its opponents fall into its trap. It is pursuing a legal battle to disqualify every Arab party and bar them from elections, arguing that they support terrorism and do not recognize Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

Arab party leaders grasped what the election battle meant for their community’s future. They chose the safest paths to greater political weight.

First, they sought to prevent any Arab votes from being wasted.

Three parties formed an alliance: the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, led by Professor Yousef Jabareen; the Arab Movement for Change, led by lawmaker Ahmad Tibi; and the National Democratic Assembly, led by Sami Abu Shehadeh. They also signed a surplus-vote agreement with the United Arab List, led by lawmaker Mansour Abbas.

Second, the two Arab lists signed a code of honor pledging a fair and clean election campaign. Their leaders agreed to cooperate in the Knesset afterward to secure the strongest possible parliamentary leadership positions.

Third, Abbas added a Jewish lawmaker, former police major general Yoav Segalovitz, to his list, giving him second place.

Segalovitz has an extensive record of fighting organized crime, now the gravest scourge facing Arabs in Israel. His presence on an Arab list undercuts those who would deem it illegitimate.

Abu Shehadeh’s disqualification

Fourth, they widened the battle with the right, involving international actors from the United Nations, the European Union and some groups in the United States to prevent the racist campaign against them.

The Elections Committee disqualified Sami Abu Shehadeh over an article he wrote on Oct. 8, 2023, the day after the Hamas attack on Israel.

The article glorified the attack as a successful act of resistance and an outcome to be expected under the physical principle that “for every action, there is a reaction.”

Abu Shehadeh repudiated its substance. Speaking before the committee on Wednesday, he said he had written it before learning of the atrocities committed during the Hamas attack.

Writing the article was a mistake, he said. If he wrote it today, he would write it differently.

He stressed that he rejected violence against any party, whether a state or individuals, and that his political record was full of support for a just peace. The proposal to disqualify him was therefore unfair.

The retraction did not save him. A decision was also made to disqualify even Abbas’ list, which had expressed willingness to join the government.

The Supreme Court adopted the same position. It told him it would disqualify him if he continued with the court proceedings, but advised him to withdraw and cancel his candidacy himself.

He did so. His action joined the earlier measures seen as part of a measured effort to pull the rug out from under the right.

First the parties, then citizenship

Arabs now see their struggle as fundamental and existential. Those seeking to disqualify their parties are, in practice, paving the way to stripping them of their status as citizens.

They see clearly how brutal views such as those of Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich influence a range of Jewish actors: from armed militias threatening their existence to the terrorist professor at Bar-Ilan University who devised a plan for a Jewish terrorist organization to kill hundreds of Arabs and force them from their homeland.



Al-Mirghani: A Statesman of Peace

Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.
Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.
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Al-Mirghani: A Statesman of Peace

Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.
Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.

November 16 was no ordinary date in Sudan’s collective memory. It was the day Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani was laid to rest in Khartoum North. It was also the anniversary of the Sudanese Peace Initiative he signed 38 years earlier with Dr. John Garang in Addis Ababa, an accord known as the Mirghani-Garang Agreement.

It was as though history had chosen the day of his farewell to remind Sudan of the defining conviction he carried throughout his life: that the country could not be saved through war, but through dialogue.

This is not to place al-Mirghani, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, beyond criticism or to dismiss the disputes and disagreements that marked his political career. But fairness demands recognition of his unwavering commitment, at decisive moments, to peace, consensus and national unity. That is why he deserves to be called a man of peace.

On November 16, 1988, al-Mirghani and Garang made political history with a remarkably brief document: barely a page long and fewer than 400 words. But its significance was immense.

The agreement called for a ceasefire, the suspension of the provisions on hudud punishments and related articles of the September 1983 laws pending a national constitutional conference, the lifting of the state of emergency, cancellation of military agreements affecting national sovereignty, and formation of a national committee to prepare for the constitutional conference.

Its central premise was fundamental: the war was not an isolated southern problem, but a manifestation of a broader Sudanese crisis that could be resolved only through dialogue on equal terms among all political and social forces.

The agreement faced open opposition from the National Islamic Front before the Constituent Assembly approved it on April 3, 1989. Then came the June 30 coup, cutting short the process before it could be completed.

It would be wrong to attribute the coup solely to the Mirghani-Garang Agreement, just as it would be impossible to assert that peace was guaranteed had democracy been allowed to run its course. But it is entirely reasonable to say that Sudan lost a genuine opportunity for peace, one that would not be forgotten.

Instead of the swift peace envisioned in a single-page document, the war continued for roughly another 16 years after the coup. It claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, forced millions from their homes and into exile, and saw the proliferation of armed groups and militias.

Ultimately, Sudan needed years of negotiations and volumes of protocols and agreements to reach the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. That accord, in turn, opened the way to self-determination, the 2011 referendum and the secession of South Sudan.

This contrast is what makes the Mirghani-Garang initiative a living document to this day. One page had outlined a broad political vision for a united country. Years later, Sudan required seemingly endless documents to reach an outcome in which it lost a cherished part of its territory and people.

Jaafar Hassan, a leading figure in the Unionist Alliance and spokesman for the Sumoud coalition, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the late al-Mirghani was “one of Sudan’s pillars and one of the few men of sound judgment.”

Hassan said al-Mirghani had pursued peace early on, drawing on his position as head of the Democratic Unionist Party and leader of the Khatmiyya Sufi order.

Al-Mirghani had put his considerable popularity among his followers at the service of peace, recognizing early the dangers of allowing the war in South Sudan to continue. He was behind the landmark agreement between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement led by John Garang.

“Had it not been for the National Islamic Front’s coup in 1989, Sudan would still be united today,” Hassan said.

He stressed that al-Mirghani’s commitment to peace and national unity was not a fleeting political position, but of principles on which he refused to compromise.

Milestones in the pursuit of peace

The 1988 initiative was not the only landmark in al-Mirghani’s record. At least six major milestones can be identified in his pursuit of peace.

The first was his agreement with Garang. The second was his leadership of the National Democratic Alliance after the coup, bringing together political parties, trade unions and armed movements of differing orientations under one umbrella.

The third was the 1995 Asmara Conference on Fundamental Issues, which placed war, democracy, identity and the relationship between religion and the state at the heart of the national dialogue.

The fourth came at the alliance’s second conference in Massawa in 2000, when it affirmed that Sudan’s problems could be resolved only through “serious and sustained dialogue among all Sudanese political forces” in a democratic environment.

The fifth milestone came through negotiations in Jeddah and Cairo, culminating in the 2005 Cairo Agreement between the government and the National Democratic Alliance under al-Mirghani’s leadership. The agreement opened the door to ending a prolonged political confrontation and allowing opposition forces to return to political life.

In Darfur, al-Mirghani sought to narrow differences between the government and armed movements that had not signed peace agreements. He encouraged those movements to unify their positions so they could join negotiations from a stronger position.

In 2022, he again proposed an initiative for comprehensive national dialogue and returned to Khartoum after a long absence, making another attempt to bring Sudanese factions together before the country descended into its current war.

Not everyone agreed with all his political choices. But at the time of his passing, there was broad agreement that his name had been closely associated with national unity and dialogue.

Political analyst Mohamed Latif told Asharq Al-Awsat that al-Mirghani’s political record might be a subject of disagreement for some, “but it is difficult to dispute that he was one of the leaders of Sudan’s two largest religious communities.”

“He succeeded in preserving the cohesion of the Khatmiyya order inside and outside Sudan, as well as its peaceful religious mission, far removed from violence and extremism,” he added.

The Mirghani-Garang Agreement was among the most significant moments not only in al-Mirghani’s life but also in Sudan’s modern history, he went on to say.

The agreement came after more than five years of fierce war between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the Sudanese army, despite repeated attempts to bring the fighting to an end.

Latif said Sudanese collective memory preserves two contrasting images from that period: the enormous crowds that welcomed al-Mirghani upon his return to Khartoum after signing the agreement in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, and the subsequent attempt to assassinate him at his home in the Khartoum 2 neighborhood.

The two episodes seemed to offer early signs of the struggle between the desire for peace and the path of violence that would later come to define Sudan.

The most meaningful tribute to al-Mirghani lies not in words of mourning alone, but in drawing lessons from his life and Sudan’s recent history.

Whenever the door to dialogue has been closed, the doors to war have opened wider. Whenever the illusion of a military solution has prevailed, the Sudanese people have paid the price in bloodshed, displacement and division.

Sudan once squandered the opportunity presented by a brief agreement that might have opened a different path. It must not squander today’s opportunity to end this devastating war.

Peace is not weakness. Negotiation is not betrayal. Ending the war is not merely one political option among many, but a national and moral duty to save what remains of Sudan.


West Bank’s Displaced Palestinians Hold Little Hope for Post-Netanyahu Era

A general view shows extensive demolitions in a neighborhood of Tulkarem refugee camp, near the city of Tulkarem in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, on November 11, 2026. (AFP)
A general view shows extensive demolitions in a neighborhood of Tulkarem refugee camp, near the city of Tulkarem in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, on November 11, 2026. (AFP)
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West Bank’s Displaced Palestinians Hold Little Hope for Post-Netanyahu Era

A general view shows extensive demolitions in a neighborhood of Tulkarem refugee camp, near the city of Tulkarem in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, on November 11, 2026. (AFP)
A general view shows extensive demolitions in a neighborhood of Tulkarem refugee camp, near the city of Tulkarem in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, on November 11, 2026. (AFP)

After Israeli forces pushed him and thousands of others out of the West Bank refugee camp of Tulkarem last year, Adel Darsieh held onto his hope of returning home, but it is fading fast.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed no return for the displaced people from the camp near the northern city of Jenin.

He is now fighting for his political life after his party lost seats in Israel's general election last month and former general Gadi Eisenkot was tasked with trying to form a new government.

But even the prospect of an end to Netanyahu's rule is not enough to lift Darsieh's hopes.

"Whether it's this government or a new one, what does it change?" said the 64-year-old. "They're two sides of the same coin."

The Israeli military carried out a major operation in the north of the occupied Palestinian territory in early 2025, during a temporary ceasefire in Hamas-ruled Gaza, having vowed to root out extremists.

Shortly before the election, Netanyahu announced that no one removed from Tulkarem would be allowed back.

For Palestinian families, it is a second form of displacement. The Tulkarem camp was set up in 1950 for refugees who fled or were forced out during the creation of the state of Israel two years earlier. The West Bank has been occupied by Israel since 1967.

"Successive generations have lived through displacement without being able to return to their homes. If our grandparents and parents couldn't return, how can we believe that our return will be possible?" Darsieh said.

According to UN figures, the Israeli operation launched last year displaced 12,100 people from the Tulkarem camp.

- 'Empty stomachs' -

With the Israeli military keeping up periodic operations around the region, Darsieh is living near the camp in a modest, makeshift home with a sheet metal roof. His wife uses a wheelchair.

He went to receive trays of mansaf, a dish of rice, meat and fermented yoghurt, prepared by Fazaa Kitchen, a solidarity group that serves food to the displaced.

Working from the building of the Wadi al-Hawarith charity, volunteers in orange jackets fill, seal and package portions of food in an assembly line.

The group prepares and distributes some 1,200 meals to 400 families.

"If we weren't cooking, families would be going to bed with empty stomachs," said the organization's head, Hussein al-Sheikh Ali, 60, who himself is displaced.

He described Israel's actions in the West Bank since the Gaza war -- a conflict launched in response to the unprecedented attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7, 2023 -- as "collective punishment".

Netanyahu's now-caretaker government, which includes far-right figures, rapidly expanded Israeli settlements in the West Bank which are considered illegal under international law.

"Some Palestinians hope that a new Israeli government might emerge with a less extremist, more moderate tone," Ali said.

"Yet the fear remains that the same policies towards the Palestinians will persist, even if the political figures themselves change."

Faisal Salama, who heads Tulkarem camp's popular committee, which represents residents, called Netanyahu's decision to stop residents returning illegal.

But he held out guarded hope for an end to military operations. He pointed to how Israel, soon after the election, ended an operation in Hebron that displaced 3,000 Palestinians, which was launched after gunmen shot dead two Israeli soldiers.

- 'Scale of suffering' -

Even if residents could return, much of the camp has been destroyed. Houses have been razed, buildings emptied and businesses burnt down.

Eisenkot, who commanded forces in the West Bank during the second Intifada, a Palestinian uprising from 2000 to 2005, has sought to appeal to a broad spectrum including liberals but has only taken some distance from Netanyahu on security.

Eisenkot backs the existence of the major settlements but has also spoken out forcefully against extremist settlers who have attacked Palestinians with virtual impunity.

Beth Oppenheim, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said a consensus has emerged among Jewish Israelis on key policies on the West Bank, including opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state.

Still, she said that Eisenkot as prime minister could be more flexible on allowing a return to Tulkarem.

"I think that given the political atmosphere in Israel today, this will be done through a security pretext," she said.

"They would make the case that this is necessary to stabilize the situation in the West Bank and that having people displaced could create the conditions for unrest," she said.

For Asia Assaf, 44, a Fazaa Kitchen volunteer whose home was destroyed in March 2025, political debates are far away from her daily concerns.

"One cannot truly grasp the scale of suffering until one has experienced it firsthand," she said.


Spy Scandal and Midterm Defeat Heat Up Trump’s Asia Visit

US President Donald Trump waves as he attends a midterm campaign rally at Salina Regional Airport in Salina, Kansas, US, November 1, 2026. (Reuters)
US President Donald Trump waves as he attends a midterm campaign rally at Salina Regional Airport in Salina, Kansas, US, November 1, 2026. (Reuters)
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Spy Scandal and Midterm Defeat Heat Up Trump’s Asia Visit

US President Donald Trump waves as he attends a midterm campaign rally at Salina Regional Airport in Salina, Kansas, US, November 1, 2026. (Reuters)
US President Donald Trump waves as he attends a midterm campaign rally at Salina Regional Airport in Salina, Kansas, US, November 1, 2026. (Reuters)

US President Donald Trump heads to Asia this week, reeling from a midterm election drubbing and Chinese spy allegations that have raised the stakes for his latest face-to-face with Beijing's powerful leader, Xi Jinping.

Trump will first visit Manila for meetings with Southeast Asian and other regional leaders on Tuesday before jetting to Shenzhen for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, where he will meet the Chinese president and hold three-way discussions with Xi and Russia's Vladimir Putin.

With a fragile trade-war truce between the US and China extended to early next year, and more Trump-Xi talks due in December at the G20 in Miami, some analysts had initially billed the Shenzhen meeting as a low-stakes summit.

But a backlash against Trump's Republican Party in this month's midterms and criticism that his administration failed to act on intelligence that Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, who has close ties to Trump, had an affair with a suspected Chinese spy, have muddied those expectations.

"With less reason to worry about market reactions or electoral fallout, (Trump) may be more willing to consider disruptive measures," said Ruby Osman, a senior policy adviser on China at the Tony Blair Institute, a London-based think tank.

Washington has already signaled such willingness ahead of the meeting, urging China to live up to its commitments ‌made under the truce ‌agreed between Trump and Xi a year ago.

Chinese analysts say they are particularly concerned that the Nvidia saga, including ‌allegations that ⁠restricted semiconductors were ⁠diverted to Chinese customers, will now harden US attitudes towards China.

US House Speaker Mike Johnson said last week there was growing consensus in Congress on further limiting Chinese access to advanced chips after the scandal, and Democrats are expected to press hard on the issue when they take over the House and Senate majorities in January.

China has said the United States has fabricated the spy narrative to justify a technological blockade.

Zhu Feng, director of the Institute of International Studies at Nanjing University, said the spat could also speed up "the decoupling of AI" between the world's two superpowers even as they try to cooperate on mitigating the technology's risks.

Trump is not expected to directly raise the spy allegations with Xi, one senior US administration said on condition of anonymity, adding that the Nvidia situation "should not really have any bearing on the trip".

TRUMP'S LEGACY

Rather than picking fresh fights with China, Trump may want to ⁠focus on legacy-building endeavors such as denuclearization agreements with Beijing and Moscow, or securing another meeting with North Korea's secretive ‌leader, Kim Jong Un.

Trump sees the unprecedented summit with Xi and Putin as possibly providing movement towards ‌an agreement on nuclear arms control. But that is a non-starter for China, which has far fewer warheads than the others, Chinese analysts said.

Trump may also seek to enlist Putin ‌and Xi's support in setting up a future meeting with Kim, who has close ties to the Chinese and Russian leaders.

The president will be focused on "building his ‌legacy," said Victor Cha at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a US think tank. A big part of that is his North Korea diplomacy, which he has devoted a lot of time to over his two terms, Cha added.

The proposed three-way meeting has drawn comparisons, particularly in Russia, with the 1945 Yalta Conference between the US, Britain and the Soviet Union that formalized spheres of influence, set the stage for the post-World War Two order and became shorthand for great-power deals imposed on smaller countries.

Such a framing is particularly worrisome for Ukraine, engaged in a ‌four-year war with Russia. Trump is not expected to raise Ukraine at the meeting, the senior US official said.

'A LOT TO LOSE'

Xi could also seek to take advantage of Trump's political weakness after his election humbling, analysts ⁠say.

Top of Beijing's wish list is ensuring ⁠that the US president doesn't approve a $14 billion arms package to Taiwan, which China claims as its own. Trump has said he is holding the arms back as a "negotiating chip" with China.

But with China's export engine humming, simply buying time may be enough for Beijing, said Jonathan Czin, a foreign policy analyst at the Brookings Institution, a US-based think tank.

"Xi just needs Trump to remain reluctant to revert toward a more competitive posture toward China for as long as possible. China will take whatever time it can get to fortify itself for the next round in the contest," said Czin, who formerly worked at the Central Intelligence Agency and as director for China at the US National Security Council.

Beijing will be acutely aware that whoever succeeds Trump when his term ends in two years time, may be less accommodating, said Czin and Osman.

Trump's Democratic predecessor, Joe Biden, repeatedly angered China with comments over human rights issues and a pledge that the US would defend Taiwan if Beijing attacked. Many of Trump's potential Republican successors, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, are also seen as more hawkish on China.

Both leaders will also be wary of reigniting a trade row that threatened to tank the global economy and financial markets last year, said Kurt Tong, a former senior State Department official now with the Asia Group think tank.

Despite the frustration the US has voiced on Chinese implementation of the terms of the truce, Tong expects it will be further extended beyond its January 10 expiration.

"The two sides are quite incentivized to maintain this fragile stability ... despite also having some disagreements," added senior China analyst Chim Lee at the Economist Intelligence Unit.

"They both have quite a lot to lose."