Major defeats are often born of major miscalculations. The 1967 war between Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel; Sharon’s invasion of Beirut and the expulsion of Fatah (PLO) in 1982; Saddam Hussein’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990 despite the massive military buildup against him.
The pattern repeated in 2003, Sadam was urged to step down but he believed Iraq would prove far more difficult than Kuwait. Nor should we forget the chain of consequences following October 7, 2023 attacks. Hezbollah assumed Israel would not fight on two fronts, an assumption that ended with its destruction and the elimination of senior Iranian military leaders.
These were not surprise wars. All were preceded by intense tensions, repeated warnings, and visible military mobilizations.
Tehran is now reacting, cautiously, to unfolding developments. It has held two rounds of bilateral negotiations with the US. What has emerged publicly suggests that Iranian flexibility exists but it is limited.That is a positive sign, yet it will not be enough to restrain the military armada poised for confrontation.
Iran seems to be adopting the same approach it used in negotiations with former President Obama’s team: buying time and offering few carrots. Those talks stretched over four years, two years of secret bilateral negotiations beginning in 2012, followed by two more years involving the European Union, Russia, and China. Gulf states and Israel were excluded, deepening their suspicions. The agreement’s signatories celebrated the deal, but it proved short-lived. By the end of Obama’s presidency, it unraveled because it was incomplete.
Today, the region is witnessing a substantial display of American military mighty power intended to strengthen negotiating leverage.
So far, however, it has not achieved its full objective. The negotiations have been confined largely to the nuclear file, while regional and international actors had hoped Iran would also address its ballistic missile capabilities and destabilizing militias.
Iran’s leadership would be mistaken to assume that enticing Washington with a nuclear agreement and promises of investment will shield it from military action. Israel, in particular, regards Iran’s ballistic missile program as an existential threat not merely the nuclear issue and will seize any opportunity to eliminate it. Even if a nuclear agreement is reached with Washington, it would likely leave the door open for future confrontations under different justifications.
Since October 7, Israel has resolved that it will not tolerate the presence of a force that threatens its security.
In the last conflict, Israel succeeded in sidelining Iran’s regional proxies, Hezbollah foremost among them, early on. Tehran had long considered Hezbollah its strategic deterrent, arming it sufficiently to threaten Israeli cities. Yet at the decisive moment, Iran found itself exposed. Hezbollah’s senior leadership was eliminated, and thousands of pagers carried by high-ranking operatives were detonated in swift operations. For the first time, Iran’s airspace was left vulnerable after the destruction of its air defense systems.
The balance of military power remains unfavorable to Iran. A nuclear agreement alone is unlikely to suffice—even for the US. administration, which indicated this week that the current offer falls short, raising once again the specter of escalation and war.
As noted at the outset, a deceptive sense of security—and the self-conviction that confrontation is impossible—often drives leaderships toward catastrophic errors.
In 2003, the American military buildup against Iraq was immense. Yet Saddam Hussein’s speeches were filled with assertions such as “America will not dare” and “any war will become a quagmire.” He wagered that the anticipated cost of war would deter Washington from invading and toppling his regime. The outcome was swift: American forces entered Umm Qasr, advanced on Baghdad, and the regime collapsed with barely a conventional war.
This time, President Trump is unlikely to deploy large invading forces. Destruction would be carried out remotely—and that could suffice to dismantle Iran’s military infrastructure. It might have been wiser for Tehran to negotiate over these assets in exchange for broader gains and to avert war altogether.
We understand the difficulty of making rational decisions in such circumstances. Regimes often struggle with repositioning and making concessions, fearing that any retreat could trigger cascading consequences. That fear is not entirely unfounded. All options may be bad—but war remains the worst of them.
