Russia: Military Relations with Iran will Not be Subject to Pressure

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during the signing ceremony of an agreement to build a railway last May (Reuters)
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during the signing ceremony of an agreement to build a railway last May (Reuters)
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Russia: Military Relations with Iran will Not be Subject to Pressure

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during the signing ceremony of an agreement to build a railway last May (Reuters)
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during the signing ceremony of an agreement to build a railway last May (Reuters)

Russia's military cooperation with Iran will not succumb to geopolitical pressure, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said, following a report that Washington has asked Teheran to stop selling drones to Moscow.

"There are no changes, and cooperation with Iran will continue," Ryabkov said, according to a report on Saturday from Russian state news agency RIA.

The official was responding to a question about Russia’s ability to obtain guarantees from Iran regarding the military-technical cooperation in light of reports of a US proposal to Tehran to reduce military cooperation with Russia.

“We are independent states and do not succumb to the dictates of the United States and its satellites."

Earlier this month, the European Union's commissioner for security and foreign affairs, Josep Borrell, expressed to Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian his "concern about military cooperation" between Tehran and Moscow.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin warned that the increase in Iranian-Russian military cooperation has negative consequences for Ukraine and the Middle East region.

The White House threatened to impose sanctions on those facilitating military cooperation between the two countries.

Moscow has repeatedly denied reports that Russian forces used Iranian drones in Ukraine, stressing that these accusations are baseless, according to the Novosti agency.

The Financial Times reported earlier in August that the US is pushing Iran to stop selling armed drones to Russia as part of discussions on a broader “unwritten understanding” between Washington and Tehran to de-escalate tensions and contain a long-simmering nuclear crisis.

According to an Iranian official and another person briefed on the talks, the US wants Iran to stop supplying drones to Russia, which Moscow is using in the war in Ukraine, and spare parts for the unmanned aircraft.

Iran admitted sending drones to Russia, but it had previously said, “they were sent before” the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, a White House official said last June that Iran transported several hundreds of drones to Russia since August 2022.

Meanwhile, Major General Yahya Safavi, the military advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, confirmed that Iran's new strategy is to connect the maritime and ground geostrategic domains.

Safavi said in a speech during the fifth meeting of a council making policies for a national conference on maritime threats and opportunities that it would be impossible to define the position of Iran in the “geometry of the new world order” without a strong presence in high seas and oceans.

“We need to connect the maritime and ground geostrategic domains. This is a new strategy as Iran’s geographical location gives us such a capacity,” the general was quoted by Tasnim news agency.

He added that a requisite for Iran to become a maritime power is its presence in the Antarctic for research and scientific activities.

The official noted that Iran must promote the strategy of a sea-oriented economy and boost its maritime power with the presence of its trade and military fleet in the oceans and seas and by using the network of South-North and East-to-West corridors in cooperation with the Russian Federation and China.

Furthermore, the Iranian Army concluded large-scale electronic warfare maneuvers in central territories under the codename "The Shield of the Guardians of Jurisprudence.”

The exercise aimed to assess the effectiveness of electronic warfare units, including locally built and manufactured radars, drones, micro aerial vehicles (MAVs), and other military equipment.

Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, Deputy Chief of Iran's Army for Coordination, pointed out that the drill included various types of homegrown electronic warfare systems, radars, drones, cyber and aerospace systems, manned and unmanned fighter jets, micro aerial vehicles, fixed, mobile, ground- and air-based electronic warfare systems.

Sayyari revealed that more than 95 percent of the war game plans have been carried out successfully, reiterating the country's full preparedness for defense.

He asserted that Iran would never attack or take aggressive action against any country.

Sayyari highlighted that the combat scenarios and electronic warfare operations implemented in these joint and specialized maneuvers show the extent of the Iranian army's progress in electronic warfare.

Tasnim Agency reported that the electronic defense systems in the general area of the maneuvers successfully carried out civil and electronic defense operations against large and small enemy drones.

The news agency added that "the exercise encompassed tasks such as identifying radio and data communications, executing group annihilation operations using micro aerial vehicles, electronic radar protection, and disrupting and deceiving ground-based radar systems with a range of tactical and jamming systems."

It further noted that "the exercise featured aerial tracking operations by Air Force fighter jets and disruption and deception operations aimed at cruise missile navigation, utilizing both airborne and ground-based platforms."

During the maneuver, electronic warfare support activities were carried out by manned and unmanned aerial vehicles (Ababil 3, 4, 5, and Kaman 12) and electronic defensive systems.



Iran's Regional Strategy on the Line after Nasrallah’s Killing

 Workers install a huge portrait of slain Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on a building at Enqelab-e-Eslami (Islamic Revolution) Sq. in Tehran, Iran, Sunday, Sept. 29, 2024. (AP)
Workers install a huge portrait of slain Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on a building at Enqelab-e-Eslami (Islamic Revolution) Sq. in Tehran, Iran, Sunday, Sept. 29, 2024. (AP)
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Iran's Regional Strategy on the Line after Nasrallah’s Killing

 Workers install a huge portrait of slain Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on a building at Enqelab-e-Eslami (Islamic Revolution) Sq. in Tehran, Iran, Sunday, Sept. 29, 2024. (AP)
Workers install a huge portrait of slain Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on a building at Enqelab-e-Eslami (Islamic Revolution) Sq. in Tehran, Iran, Sunday, Sept. 29, 2024. (AP)

Questions have been raised about Iran’s strategy in the region as Israel intensified its attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon after it killed the party’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, one of Tehan’s most important allies in its Axis of Resistance.

Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli raid on Beirut’s southern suburbs on Friday. An Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) deputy commander, Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan, was also killed in the attack.

Nasrallah’s death was another major blow to Iran’s regional strategy. Its biggest blow was in January 2020 when the US killed IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani near Baghdad airport. Soleimani was the mastermind of Iran’s foreign operations.

The country had never really recovered from his death, in terms of regional or internal strategy, even though it tried to paint a different picture under the term of late President Ebrahim Raisi and especially after the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation by Hamas in Gaza.

Raisi’s Iran tried to demonstrate that it had a cohesive regional policy, whether in terms of supporting the activities of the Axis of Resistance or improving relations with neighbors.

Masoud Pezeshkian was elected president after Raisi’s death in a helicopter crash in May. He seemed to adopt a different approach than his predecessor by demonstrating an openness to working with the West. This approach was confirmed when he formed his foreign policy team which included members of the delegation that succeeded in striking the 2015 nuclear deal with the West that led to the suspension of sanctions on Iran.

Going forward, Pezeshkian will have to face major challenges if he wants to lift more sanctions off his country or ease tensions with European powers, especially if Donald Trump were to be elected president of the United States in November.

Trump may restore his maximum pressure on Tehran if it refuses his conditions to reach a new nuclear deal that would include changes to its behavior in the region and limit its ballistic missile and drone program.

At any rate, Iran’s nuclear file will be at the top of priorities in any talks between it and the West, regardless of who wins the American elections on November 5.

Other challenges in the past year included the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July hours after he attended Pezeshkian’s swearing in ceremony.

The assassination cast a shadow on the new president’s term amid fears that the IRGC would carry out a strike in retaliation to the killing. Ultimately, the Guard did not carry out any major response, leaving Tehran’s supporters somewhat disappointed.

Pezeshkian said in New York last week that the retaliation would have impacted negotiations to reach a ceasefire in Gaza and that Iran had come under pressure to show restraint. He was criticized inside Iran for saying that Tehran wanted to ease the regional tensions, including with Israel.

The Iranian government fears that any new confrontation between Iran and Israel would fuel Trump’s chances of winning the election, which is something Tehran wants to avoid. Trump had approved Soleimani’s killing and pulled the US out of the nuclear deal, imposing new sanctions against Tehran in the process.

With Nasrallah’s assassination last week, what will the IRGC do to avenge the killing of one of Iran’s top allies? Iranian government officials warned Pezeshkian against falling into Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s “trap” to drag his country to war.

The IRGC boasts major economic, political and cultural influence in Iran and it is relying on its proxy war in the region without having to embroil Iran in a direct confrontation with its foes.

So, the most likely is option is that Iran will mobilize its proxies on several fronts to retaliate against Israel for the latest blow it has been dealt.

The second option is the IRGC launching hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones against Israel just to save face.

The decision to avenge Nasrallah and Nilforoushan’s killing will be taken at the highest levels, said vice president for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif, a reference to the Supreme National Security Council, whose decisions are approved by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Failure to retaliate against the killings will cast doubt among the IRGC’s supporters about its ability to act in times of crises.

The third option could see the IRGC carry out a wide rocket attack against Israeli facilities and infrastructure. This is unlikely with the US elections around the corner and because such an attack could lead to an American attack on Iran, possibly on its nuclear facilities. Moreover, the Iranian people are strongly opposed to the idea of Iran being dragged to a destructive war.

The fourth option would see Iran getting involved in a limited confrontation with Israel in an attempt to justify why it needs strategic deterrence weapons, such as ballistic missiles. Such a move would effectively allow Iran to alter its nuclear program and lead it to produce nuclear weapons.