The possibility of the war in Europe expanding is no longer being discussed as a distant scenario or a theoretical assumption. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the continent has entered a new security phase in which military confrontation overlaps with cyberattacks, sabotage, airspace violations, disinformation campaigns, and pressure on infrastructure. What is concerning is that Europe is increasingly talking about preparing for a possible war with Russia toward the end of the decade, even as NATO continues to emphasize that there are no indications of an imminent attack.
Europe's current situation therefore carries two parallel messages. The first is that the risk of a broader confrontation has become more serious than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The second is that a full-scale war is not, at present, a scenario expected to break out tomorrow or the day after. Current concerns are primarily linked to the accumulation of "hybrid warfare" incidents and the possibility that Moscow could use limited or covert operations to test the alliance's readiness to respond.
Evidence of this is mounting. In recent months, there have been airspace-related incidents, including the interception and downing by NATO fighter jets of a Russian drone over Lithuania, as well as other incidents involving a Russian military aircraft, a Russian vessel, and a Danish military helicopter. In Germany, an attempted drone attack at Leipzig Airport was linked to a person suspected of having ties to Russia. At the same time, European governments have been warning of an increase in acts of sabotage, cyberattacks, and attacks targeting infrastructure.
Field Preparations
The issue is no longer limited to political warnings. Germany is preparing for the possibility of receiving large numbers of casualties in its hospitals, while Lithuania has updated its civilian evacuation plans, and military exercises have intensified across the Baltic region and the Nordic countries. German and Swedish forces have conducted joint exercises near the strategically important island of Gotland, while NATO forces have held other exercises near Russia's Kaliningrad exclave, located between Poland and Lithuania and about 360 kilometers from Russia's main territory.
But the most contentious question concerns not only what is happening now, but also the date for a war that is increasingly being discussed, both privately and publicly, in Europe: 2029 to 2030.
Why the End of the Decade?
The official European and NATO explanation is not that war will break out by 2030. Rather, assessments refer to a period in which Russia could have rebuilt its military capabilities following the war in Ukraine and re-equipped its forces sufficiently to threaten NATO's eastern flank. General Carsten Breuer, Germany's Inspector General of the Bundeswehr and the country's highest-ranking military officer, explains that referring to a specific date is not a prophecy, but a timeframe for assessing the Russian military's potential ability to recover its strength. According to assessments attributed to NATO, Moscow could, by the end of the decade, have accumulated the resources and capabilities needed to launch a potential attack.
This is where Europe's political dilemma emerges. The more frequently warnings are issued about a possible war in 2029 or 2030, the more the dates themselves become part of public consciousness. More importantly, European officials are calling for increased defense spending, governments are rebuilding their military capabilities, and NATO is intensifying its exercises, while the idea of preparing for a future war is becoming a permanent policy.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has articulated this logic by saying that Europe is "safe now," but may not be so in three to five years, using this timeframe to argue for increased defense spending. At the same time, European officials have spoken about the need to prepare to respond to "Russian aggression," rather than about a European decision to go to war with Russia.
Between Prevention and Response
Against this backdrop, one of the most interesting aspects of the situation becomes clearer: Is Europe working to prevent war, or has it begun treating war as a possible outcome for which it must prepare?
The distinction is not merely semantic. Military preparedness can serve as a deterrent, with the aim of convincing an adversary that the cost of an attack would be high. At the same time, however, the intensity of the rhetoric surrounding war can make a scenario that seemed unlikely only a few years ago part of the daily political debate.
In this context, some European voices have also begun calling for a return to dialogue with Moscow. Finnish President Alexander Stubb said it was time for the European Union to begin opening channels of communication with Russia, while European Council President António Costa spoke of Europe's readiness for possible negotiations concerning Ukraine. The European Union is discussing designating a point of contact for such talks.
This tension between military preparedness and the need for dialogue reflects Europe's underlying dilemma. On one hand, public pressure is growing to end the war and reduce the amount of money being spent on weapons. On the other hand, European governments believe that ending the war on certain terms could allow Russia to rapidly rebuild its military strength, while Europe itself is still in a transitional phase of rebuilding its armed forces.
Ukraine finds itself at the center of this equation. Continued European military support means a continued flow of weapons to Kyiv, but it also means the war continues. Military support thus becomes both a means of assisting Ukraine and a means of maintaining military pressure on Russia while Europe waits to restore its own defense capabilities.
A Psychological Campaign?
None of these calculations means that a war between Russia and NATO has become inevitable. On the contrary, NATO sources have confirmed that there is currently no imminent threat of an attack. The alliance's official assessment has not changed, nor have the allies received a formal briefing on new intelligence indicating an imminent attack.
It was notable that Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys said political statements could be part of a coordinated campaign to warn Moscow against testing NATO's collective-defense provision under Article 5.
At the same time, the figures illustrate why there is concern. Between January and August 2026, 100 officially recorded hybrid warfare incidents were documented in Europe, compared with 60 during the same period the previous year, according to Ukraine's Sahajdachny Security Center. A NATO source said the actual number could exceed 200 incidents if cyberattacks were excluded, adding that NATO institutions face thousands of cyberattacks each month.
Perhaps the clearest indication of the scale of European concern came on September 18, when French President Emmanuel Macron brought together party leaders and candidates for the upcoming presidential election at the Élysée Palace for a confidential security meeting. Participants received a briefing from senior intelligence officials on the evolving threat. Macron said the nature of the Russian threat in Europe was changing and that sabotage, which had previously targeted primarily government or military facilities, could shift toward targets capable of causing civilian casualties.
Europe therefore appears caught between two wars: an ongoing war in Ukraine and a potential war for which preparations are being made toward the end of the decade. Between them lies a broad space of deterrence, sabotage, cyberwarfare, military exercises, and warnings.
Talk of 2029 or 2030 may simply be a planning framework for rebuilding Europe's military capabilities, or it may form part of a deterrence strategy specifically intended to prevent Moscow from considering a test of NATO. But the risk lies in allowing preparation for war to become a permanent state, and in allowing the scenario of war itself to become more familiar than the prospect of peace.
Ultimately, the current evidence does not indicate that Europe is inevitably heading toward war with Russia. It does, however, indicate something more complex: Europe has begun acting on the assumption that it must be prepared for such a war, while at the same time continuing to search for a path that could prevent it. The latter is a responsibility shared by both sides.
