Israeli Security Agency Defends Use of Threatening Messages

Muslim worshippers gather before the morning prayer on the first day of Eid al-Fitr, which marks the end of the holy fasting month of Ramadan, outside the Dome of the Rock at the Al-Aqsa mosque complex in the Old City of Jerusalem on April 21, 2023. (AFP)
Muslim worshippers gather before the morning prayer on the first day of Eid al-Fitr, which marks the end of the holy fasting month of Ramadan, outside the Dome of the Rock at the Al-Aqsa mosque complex in the Old City of Jerusalem on April 21, 2023. (AFP)
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Israeli Security Agency Defends Use of Threatening Messages

Muslim worshippers gather before the morning prayer on the first day of Eid al-Fitr, which marks the end of the holy fasting month of Ramadan, outside the Dome of the Rock at the Al-Aqsa mosque complex in the Old City of Jerusalem on April 21, 2023. (AFP)
Muslim worshippers gather before the morning prayer on the first day of Eid al-Fitr, which marks the end of the holy fasting month of Ramadan, outside the Dome of the Rock at the Al-Aqsa mosque complex in the Old City of Jerusalem on April 21, 2023. (AFP)

Israel’s Shin Bet internal security agency is defending its use of a sophisticated surveillance tool that was used to send threatening text messages to Palestinian protesters during unrest at Jerusalem’s most sensitive holy site two years ago.

A leading civil rights group has asked Israel’s Supreme Court to halt the practice, saying the threatening messages exceeded the authorities of the Shin Bet. It has also noted that the messages were sent erroneously to people uninvolved in the unrest.

In a May 4 submission, the Shin Bet asked the court to dismiss the case. It said the tracking technology was a legitimate tool within the scope of its authority.

It described the misfired messages as an isolated error, said it had identified “several specific flaws in the manner of sending the messages” and updated its guidelines to prevent similar mistakes in the future.

It described the tool as “proportionate, balanced and most reasonable.”

The messages were sent to hundreds of Palestinians in May 2021 at the height of one of the city’s most turbulent periods in recent years. At the time, Palestinian protesters were clashing with Israeli police at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in violence that helped fuel an 11-day war between Israel and the Hamas militant group in the Gaza Strip.

Using mobile-phone tracking technology, the Shin Bet sent a text message to people it believed were involved in the clashes and told them “we will hold you accountable” for acts of violence.

The recipients included both Palestinian residents of east Jerusalem, who hold Israeli residency rights, as well as Palestinian citizens of Israel. While some recipients had participated in the clashes, others, including people who lived, worked or prayed in the area, received the message erroneously and said they were surprised or scared. Jewish Israelis in the area are not known to have received the message.

The Association for Civil Rights in Israel has warned that such mass messages could have a “chilling effect” on Israel’s Palestinian minority and says the Shin Bet should properly investigate anyone suspected of breaking the law.

Two of the group’s attorneys, Gil Gan-Mor and Gadeer Nicola, issued a joint statement accusing the Shin Bet of using “intrusive surveillance tools” to intimidate citizens and convey that they are under surveillance.

“Sending a threatening text message to a citizen is not an option in a democratic country,” they said.



Elusive Assassination Target, ‘Shadow Unit’ Founder: Who Is Mohammed al-Sinwar?

An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)
An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)
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Elusive Assassination Target, ‘Shadow Unit’ Founder: Who Is Mohammed al-Sinwar?

An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)
An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)

Doubts persist over whether senior Hamas military commander Mohammed al-Sinwar has been killed or survived an alleged Israeli strike, as Israeli officials intensify efforts to confirm his assassination while Hamas remains tight-lipped.

Multiple sources within the group have refused to confirm or deny al-Sinwar’s fate, fueling speculation surrounding the elusive commander, who has a decades-long track record of evading Israeli assassination attempts.

Al-Sinwar, the younger brother of slain Hamas leader Yehya al-Sinwar, has remained a top Israeli target throughout the Gaza war.

Yet, for more than 18 months of fighting, Israel has not officially confirmed a direct strike on him — a fact that reinforces his reputation as a master of disguise and a “high-value, hard-to-detect” target.

Despite a 13-year age gap — Yehya was born in 1962 and Mohammed in 1975 — the two shared not only blood ties but a deep-rooted partnership within Hamas, rising through the ranks together to lead the group’s military and political strategies.

The timing of Israel’s apparent attempt to target al-Sinwar — roughly 24 hours after the release of Israeli-American soldier Edan Alexander — has raised questions about whether the move was a calculated signal or the result of an intelligence breakthrough.

Sources within Hamas and other Gaza-based militant factions declined to confirm or deny whether the operation to recover Alexander was linked to locating al-Sinwar’s suspected hideout.

Tuesday’s intense airstrike, followed by a continued bombardment of the area on Wednesday that created a fire belt to prevent any rescue attempts, suggests Israel believed it was striking a high-value target.

Israel’s use of fire belts in a recent air assault on southern Gaza has drawn comparisons to previous assassination attempts targeting senior figures in Hezbollah and Hamas, including Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah and top Hamas military commanders Marwan Issa, Ahmed al-Ghandour, Bassem Issa and Jamal al-Zebda during the 2021 Gaza war.

On Tuesday night, Israeli warplanes dropped dozens of bombs and missiles on the emergency yard and rear compound of the European Gaza Hospital east of Khan Younis, as well as surrounding areas — with strikes extending up to 500 meters in some directions and about 300 meters in others, according to field sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat.

Israeli public broadcaster Kan reported that the attack involved bunker-busting bombs aimed at destroying a suspected underground tunnel network in the area. The strikes targeted multiple tunnel entrances to ensure that anyone hiding inside would be killed, even if not directly hit.

Sources from Gaza-based factions told Asharq Al-Awsat that the location did in fact contain a tunnel system previously damaged in the 2014 war. Hamas’ military wing, Al-Qassam Brigades, reportedly managed to restore the tunnels, which had only suffered minor damage in earlier attacks during the current conflict.

As his role within Hamas expanded, al-Sinwar became a frequent target of Israeli assassination attempts spanning more than two decades.

One of the closest calls came during the 2021 conflict, when he was lightly wounded in a tunnel strike alongside Rafaa Salama, the former commander of Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade.

Both men survived the attack with minor injuries.

Salama was later killed in an Israeli strike in July, along with Mohammed Deif, Hamas’ elusive military chief, in the coastal al-Mawasi area.

Al-Sinwar has survived at least seven Israeli assassination attempts over the past two decades, according to Hamas sources — a track record that has helped cement his image as one of the group’s most elusive and high-value operatives.

One early attempt came during the Second Intifada, which erupted in September 2000. In 2003, an explosive device was planted in the wall of his home, but he escaped unscathed.

In 2006, an Israeli strike targeted a vehicle believed to be carrying al-Sinwar. He was not inside at the time, and the operation failed — one of several similar attempts over the years.

In 2008, Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that al-Sinwar outwitted Israeli intelligence by manipulating radio communications.

He allegedly used pre-recorded transmissions to give the impression he was speaking live over a two-way radio, prompting Israeli forces to bomb the signal’s location. The attack missed its target — al-Sinwar was never there.

In another reported incident in 2019, local media claimed that al-Sinwar, Salama and other Hamas commanders were the targets of an Israeli commando operation involving a plot to poison and abduct them from a beach in Khan Younis. The Al-Qassam Brigades swiftly denied the report, calling it baseless.

Al-Sinwar is credited with founding the group’s secretive “Shadow Unit,” tasked with guarding high-value captives, including Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, according to Hamas sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat.

The unit was established with approval from Mohammed Deif, the elusive commander of Hamas’ armed wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades. Al-Sinwar personally oversaw the formation of its initial core, selecting trusted field operatives from his home city of Khan Younis in southern Gaza.

Al-Sinwar’s central role in the 2006 abduction and concealment of Shalit near the Rafah border prompted the creation of the unit. Sources say it was formed roughly three months after the kidnapping, following several Israeli airstrikes on suspected Shalit hideouts.

The unit’s existence remained classified until 2016 — five years after Shalit’s release in a prisoner swap — when al-Qassam released previously unseen footage of the soldier during his captivity.

According to the same sources, both Deif and al-Sinwar ordered the establishment of the unit, with many of its founding members hailing from the Khan Younis refugee camp.

They included senior field commanders such as Abdul Rahman al-Mubasher, Khaled Abu Bakra, and Mohammed Dawoud — all of whom were later killed in Israeli operations in 2013 and 2021.

Other key figures linked to the unit included Sami al-Humaidah from Rafah, killed in 2008, and Abdullah Labad, a top explosives engineer from Gaza’s al-Shati camp, who was assassinated in 2011 along with his brother Ismail, a senior field operative involved in weapons production and smuggling.

Al-Sinwar continued to expand and develop the Shadow Unit for years, discreetly recruiting new members and enhancing its capabilities. Its full mission only became clearer following the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on southern Israel.

Within Hamas, al-Sinwar has long been seen as the de facto operational commander of the al-Qassam Brigades, sources told Asharq Al-Awsat.

While Deif remained the official general commander, al-Sinwar is believed to have overseen many of the group’s military and administrative portfolios, shaping battlefield tactics and command structures behind the scenes.