Drop in UN Aid Increases Food Insecurity in Yemen

Saudi aid to Yemen through the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center. (KSrelief website)
Saudi aid to Yemen through the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center. (KSrelief website)
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Drop in UN Aid Increases Food Insecurity in Yemen

Saudi aid to Yemen through the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center. (KSrelief website)
Saudi aid to Yemen through the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center. (KSrelief website)

The United Nations warned again of the repercussions of increased food insecurity in Yemen’s liberated areas, as economic experts expressed their concern about new risks after Russia suspended the Black Sea grain deal.

Most of Yemen's governorates are witnessing a significant rise in the prices of food commodities and a deterioration in the local currency.

Mohammed Shamsan, a resident of the al-Maqatirah district in Lahj, passes daily by the UN aid distribution center, hoping to receive a food basket to help him provide essential items for his family.

Shamsan, currently looking for a job, lost the aid provided by international bodies the last time food rations were distributed because he traveled for work to a different area, and his wife, who was sick, could not receive it.

He fears his name has been dropped from the lists of aid beneficiaries.

The World Food Program (WFP) indicated that June food prices in Aden and the liberated governorates increased 26 percent on average.

The Program stated that fuel prices recorded a significant increase in addition to the deterioration of the local currency in the liberated areas.

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) expected the food security situation will likely deteriorate until early September, just before harvests, in line with seasonality, expected increases in food prices, limited access to income/reduced purchasing power, impacts of recent floods, reduced humanitarian food assistance, and continued conflict in front-line districts.

The FAO report stated that the lingering impact of the war in Ukraine would likely aggravate the food insecurity situation further because of expected severe wheat flour shortages and skyrocketing bread prices in response to reduced import flows following Russia's withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

- Decline in aid

The WFP announced at the beginning of this month that it would reduce food aid in Yemen by 35 percent, warning that six million people are in the emergency phase of food insecurity.

A few days earlier, the Program announced its humanitarian operations are getting a significant boost with a $2.68 million contribution from the Australian government to support some of the most affected families.

The residents of the liberated governorates are experiencing a new wave of high prices of various basic commodities due to the financial crisis that affected the local markets.

The Yemeni government indicated that basic commodities are available in the country, but residents of several governorates expressed their inability to provide daily and basic needs.

Adviser to Yemen's Ministry of Local Administration, Jamal Balfakih, confirmed that the situation in Yemen is worsening due to the ongoing war and lack of funding.

Balfakih explained to Asharq Al-Awsat that the drop in funding depends on several factors, such as the rise in global need considering recent wars and developments and lack of transparency.

He indicated that the 35 percent reduction and an increase in the operating budget of the organizations, climate change, and high gas prices in Europe would be reflected in a painful economic regression on Yemenis who were supposed to receive aid during the past two years for development in the country.

Balfakih, also the general coordinator of the Higher Relief Committee, confirmed that the government had previously warned of a food crisis, and aid was supposed to be directed during the past two years to agriculture and fish to help alleviate the suffering of Yemenis.

He noted that this will be reflected in increasing societal suffering, especially considering the deteriorating economic situation, and will have painful repercussions on Yemenis.

- Reliance on the Alliance and expatriates

Balfakih said the authorities relied on the Saudi-led coalition to support legitimacy to help Yemen in such crises.

He appealed to Yemeni businessmen and merchants to contribute through their charitable institutions to support the poorest Yemenis and alleviate their suffering in such tragic situations.

Economic researcher Abdul Wahed al-Obali downplayed the impact of reducing the funding of the WFP and other international organizations.

He explained that this is not the first time spending has been cut due to low financing, noting that the basis of benefiting from this aid is minimal for the Yemenis.

Obali indicated that the salaries of the WFP employees would be affected by the funding drop, noting that the Yemenis are the ones who suffer from the increasing rise in the prices of commodities and basic materials.

He explained that Russia's withdrawal from the Black Sea grain agreement would aggravate the crisis and cause a rise in wheat prices, borne by the Yemenis and their expatriate families abroad.

The expert stressed that the expatriates are the real and only supporters of the national economy due to their remittances, which reduce the humanitarian crisis for many Yemenis.

Saudi Arabia is at the forefront of the countries that host Yemeni expatriates, as their number reaches approximately 1.3 million.



A 5-Step Approach to 'Dismantling Iraqi Militias'

PM Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces Faleh Al-Fayyad, and PMF's chief of staff Abu Fadak (government media)
PM Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces Faleh Al-Fayyad, and PMF's chief of staff Abu Fadak (government media)
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A 5-Step Approach to 'Dismantling Iraqi Militias'

PM Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces Faleh Al-Fayyad, and PMF's chief of staff Abu Fadak (government media)
PM Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces Faleh Al-Fayyad, and PMF's chief of staff Abu Fadak (government media)

Despite continuous American demands for the Iraqi authorities to curb and dismantle factions, observers noted that the meetings of the leaders of the Coordination Framework have not been tackling this issue.

This could threaten the loss of American support for the new government, while experts propose a 5-step approach to resolve the matter.

The American insistence on dismantling armed factions has become recently highly clear through a series of punitive measures, beginning with a $10 million reward for information leading to the leader of Kataib Hezbollah, Abu Hussein Al-Hamidawi, then placing seven factions on sanctions and terrorism lists, and finally a similar reward for information about Abu Alaa Al-Wala'i, leader of Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada.

Contrary to the discourse that escalated about three months ago regarding the necessity of disarming factions and restructuring the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the Coordination Framework forces remain silent, despite the factions' actual involvement in the war with Iran and their missile attacks inside Iraqi territory and abroad on some Arab Gulf states.

War undermined efforts

A leading source from the Coordination Framework states that the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran "undermined what could be called efforts to integrate the factions."

The source confirms to Asharq Al-Awsat that "the Coordination Framework had indeed begun preliminary discussions on mechanisms for addressing the issue, but the war ... provided the appropriate pretext for the factions to refuse to disarm, considering that the war represents an existential threat to them."

The source points out that "the leaders of the Coordination Framework recognize the seriousness and magnitude of the risks posed by American demands, but they are forced to ignore them due to pressure from the factions and the Iranian actor," indicating that "some forces and figures that possess armed factions have a genuine desire to integrate their elements into the army and restructure the PMF, but they appear incapable of taking any action due to the regional developments and the stalled efforts to form a government."

Dismantling the Funding System

Writer and political researcher Dr. Basil Hussein believes that dismantling the factions is linked to what he calls the "funding system."

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Coordination Framework forces are “a fragile coalition where disparate interests intersect.”

He points out that "armed factions are not merely an executive arm in the hands of political parties; rather, they are often the backbone upon which these parties are built economically, politically, and socially."

He further states that "any serious attempt to dismantle the factions will inevitably mean dismantling the entire funding system, which amounts to political suicide for anyone who undertakes it. Therefore, such efforts will always remain incomplete and selective, avoiding any harm to the core structure upon which the militias' influence rests."

In addition to these reasons, Hussein believes that "dismantling the factions is not a purely Iraqi decision; rather, it relates to the Iranian vision that has long viewed these factions as a cornerstone of Tehran's forward defense strategy.”

He adds that "when American pressure on the factions intensifies and their room for maneuver narrows, they will reluctantly bend rather than willingly, resorting to a superficial solution that masks their facade without touching their essence. They may change their name while retaining their structure, and formally dissolve into state institutions while maintaining their networks, weapons, and loyalties outside any actual oversight."

Mourners attend the funeral of fighters with Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces who were killed in an airstrike, in Baghdad, Iraq, April 8, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani

5 Steps to a Solution

For his part, Firas Elias, Professor of Political Science at the University of Mosul and a specialist in Iranian studies, proposes an approach that includes five steps that would help dismantle the factions.

He believes that the future of armed factions in Iraq will directly depend on the future of the war between Tehran and Washington, as they "will be directly affected by the outcome of this war."

Elias tells Asharq Al-Awsat that "discussing practical ways to deal with armed factions requires developing a new approach for the post-war phase. The practical method is not (immediate dismantling), but rather a gradual re-engineering of power through the state."

Elias anticipates that if the Framework forces succeed in forming a government, and under American pressure, they may move along five paths: "First: separating the PMF as an official body from the factions as political-military arms, establishing that the PMF, which receives salaries from the state, is exclusively subject to the Commander-in-Chief, while any formation that retains independent decision-making or external affiliation is treated as an entity outside the state."

The second move involves "controlling money before weapons. The most effective approach is to audit salaries, contracts, crossings, companies, economic offices, and transfers. When informal resources are cut off, the factions become less capable of maneuvering."

In the third path, Elias expects "restructuring leadership by changing sensitive positions within the PMF Commission, transferring some brigades to distant sectors away from the borders, integrating selected units into the army or Federal Police, and retiring undisciplined leaders or assigning them to symbolic positions."

The Iraqi expert adds a fourth path related to "dismantling from within, not through confrontation. The government may differentiate between three types: factions amenable to integration, factions requiring political containment, and completely resistant factions. The approach to dealing with them would be piecemeal: incentives for the disciplined, isolation for the resistant, and legal pressure on those involved."

He concludes with the fifth path, which concerns "transforming American pressure into internal political leverage. The Framework might tell the factions: either adhere to state discipline, or face sanctions, financial isolation, and security measures that affect everyone. Here, American pressure becomes a tool in the hands of the government, not merely an external threat."

Despite these five paths, Elias believes that "the 'Framework will not dismantle the factions in one stroke, because they are part of its political structure. However, it may work to gradually strip them of their military and financial independence, while retaining the PMF designation in a disciplined, institutional manner."


Four Killed in Israeli Strikes on Southern Lebanon

Israeli tanks drive in Lebanon, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border, in northern Israel, April 25, 2026. (Reuters)
Israeli tanks drive in Lebanon, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border, in northern Israel, April 25, 2026. (Reuters)
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Four Killed in Israeli Strikes on Southern Lebanon

Israeli tanks drive in Lebanon, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border, in northern Israel, April 25, 2026. (Reuters)
Israeli tanks drive in Lebanon, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border, in northern Israel, April 25, 2026. (Reuters)

Four people were killed on Saturday in Israeli strikes on southern Lebanon, Lebanon's state news agency reported, while the Israeli military said Hezbollah had fired rockets at Israel, the latest challenges to a tenuous, recently extended ceasefire.

The ceasefire agreed between Israel and Lebanon has led to a significant reduction in hostilities, ‌but Israel ‌and Iran-backed Hezbollah ‌have ⁠continued to clash ⁠in southern Lebanon, where Israel has kept soldiers in the self-declared buffer zone.

The Israeli military said on Saturday that it had struck loaded rocket launchers belonging to Hezbollah in three locations in southern Lebanon overnight ⁠and targeted several Hezbollah fighters in ‌separate strikes.

It was ‌unclear whether the deaths reported by the ‌state news agency were linked to those ‌Israeli strikes.

The Israeli military restated its warning for Lebanese residents not to approach the Litani River area in southern Lebanon while it battles ‌Hezbollah.

It said it had intercepted a "suspicious aerial target" within the area its ⁠forces ⁠are presently occupying, and that two rockets were fired by Hezbollah into northern Israel, one of which was intercepted. There were no reports of casualties.

A Hezbollah lawmaker said on Friday that a US-mediated ceasefire in the war with Israel was meaningless, a day after it was extended for three weeks. The truce had been due to expire on Sunday.


Syria to Begin Trying Assad-Era Figures on Sunday, Says Justice Official

Residents gather in a street after Friday prayers to celebrate the arrest of Amjad Yousef, a key suspect in the 2013 Tadamon massacre, in Tadamon, Syria, April 24, 2026. (Reuters)
Residents gather in a street after Friday prayers to celebrate the arrest of Amjad Yousef, a key suspect in the 2013 Tadamon massacre, in Tadamon, Syria, April 24, 2026. (Reuters)
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Syria to Begin Trying Assad-Era Figures on Sunday, Says Justice Official

Residents gather in a street after Friday prayers to celebrate the arrest of Amjad Yousef, a key suspect in the 2013 Tadamon massacre, in Tadamon, Syria, April 24, 2026. (Reuters)
Residents gather in a street after Friday prayers to celebrate the arrest of Amjad Yousef, a key suspect in the 2013 Tadamon massacre, in Tadamon, Syria, April 24, 2026. (Reuters)

Trials of prominent figures from the rule of ousted Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad are set to begin this weekend, a justice ministry official told AFP on Saturday, starting with a former security official.

"The first trial sessions for symbolic former Syrian regime figures will begin on Sunday" with Atif Najib, who was arrested in January of last year, the official told AFP on condition of anonymity.

Najib is the former head of political security in south Syria's Daraa province, the cradle of the country's 2011 uprising, and is accused of orchestrating a crackdown there. He is also a cousin of the ousted leader.

The ministry official said trials would follow for Wassim al-Assad -- another of the former president's cousins -- and Amjad Youssef, the main suspect in a 2013 massacre who was arrested this week, as well as "pilots who took part in bombing Syrian cities and towns".

Syria's civil war began with a brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protests and spiraled into a 13-year conflict that killed more than half a million people.

Assad's forces pounded opposition-held areas, including with airstrikes and crude barrel bomb attacks, while tens of thousands of people disappeared, some into the country's brutal prison system.

Since seizing power in December 2024, Syria's new authorities have repeatedly announced the arrests of former officials, vowing to provide justice and accountability for Assad-era atrocities.

Assad fled to Russia with only a handful of confidants, abandoning senior officials and security officers, some of whom reportedly went abroad or took refuge in the coastal heartland of Assad's Alawite minority.

Syrian Justice Minister Mazhar al-Wais said Friday on X that the Damascus criminal court was ready "for the moment that victims have long waited for: the start of public trials", calling them "part of the transitional justice process".

Rights groups, activists and the international community have repeatedly emphasized the importance of transitional justice in the war-ravaged country.

The protest movement against Assad began in Daraa on March 15, 2011, after 15 students were arrested for allegedly writing anti-government slogans on the city's walls.

Residents said the students were tortured, leading to a protest to demand their release that ended in bloodshed.

Najib, blamed for the crackdown, was dismissed soon after. He was on a US Treasury sanctions list alongside other Syrian officials.

Wassim al-Assad was arrested last June. The US Treasury sanctioned him in 2023, saying he had led a paramilitary unit and was "a key figure in the regional drug trafficking network".