Arman to Asharq Al-Awsat: Burhan Represents the Army, Not Sudan

Leading member of Sudan’s Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) Yasir Arman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Leading member of Sudan’s Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) Yasir Arman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Arman to Asharq Al-Awsat: Burhan Represents the Army, Not Sudan

Leading member of Sudan’s Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) Yasir Arman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Leading member of Sudan’s Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) Yasir Arman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Leading member of Sudan’s Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) Yasir Arman warned that the war between the army and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) will go one for a long time, remarking that neither party has managed to achieve a decisive victory after six months of fighting.

In an interview to Asharq Al-Awsat, he also warned that the conflict was still restricted to these two parties but could grow to become a civil war between various segments of society.

This demands the formation of a broad civilian front of national powers that can stop the conflict from growing, suggested Arman, who is also head of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), a main faction of the FFC.

On army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, he noted that he was incapable of uniting the military behind a peace agenda, so he sought a conflict – which the Islamists are behind – to destroy the December 2019 revolution.

He explained that the army resorted to war after it had failed in its coup against the revolt in October 2021.

Moreover, Arman said: “This war is an opportunity for the isolated National Congress and Islamists to return to power.”

He added that they were keen on making the RSF their junior partner, so they won’t be opposed to reaching an agreement with them according to certain conditions.

‘War of wars’

Arman said the current war is different than the ones that erupted in Sudan after its independence. This is a “war of wars,” he remarked, explaining that it is a culmination of the failure of the national project that took shape when Omar al-Bashir, backed by Islamists, seized power in 1989.

They usurped the state, politicized the armed forces and couldn’t maintain one state institution, he lamented.

The army, for its part, resorted to forming smaller armies that could eliminate armed resistance groups so that it could maintain its grip on power, he went on to say.

The current war has destroyed the old version of the Sudanese state and has deeply harmed civilians and state infrastructure. The war will go on for decades, he said, adding that the state is on the verge of collapse.

Moreover, Arman denied claims that the FFC was the political wing of the RSF.

These are claims made by the Islamists who want to destroy the political and civilian society movement, he continued. They believed that the current war could be decided in their favor within three days, but they failed.

Burhan doesn’t represent Sudan

Commenting on Burhan’s speech before the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly last week, Arman said Burhan represents the armed forces, not Sudan, since he carried out a military coup against the civilian democratic rule.

During his foreign trip, Burhan didn’t offer any practical solutions or proposals to end the conflict, he remarked. All he did was discuss the possibility of prolonging the “reckless” war.

Meanwhile, RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, has offered a clear vision of how to end the war and has made clear commitments to the people.

Arman added that Burhan and Hemedti have announced that they were ready to end the war and commit to the Jeddah platform. “We demand that they sign a long-term ceasefire agreement, open safe passages for the delivery of humanitarian aid and cease violations,” he added.

They must also join hands with civilians who want to achieve change and address the roots of the crisis, he said. They must build a professional army that is far removed from the current armed forces.

Remnants of ousted regime

Arman noted, however, that the remnants of the ousted Bashir regime are the ones who are really controlling this war.

They are behind the mobilization of civilians to take part in the fighting and even attacking Burhan himself, he charged.

They had warned him against heading to Jeddah to sign a ceasefire deal and have instead encouraged him to continue the war, Arman said.

He described the Jeddah mediation, led by Saudi Arabia and the United States, as “the most important attempt to end the war, but it stumbled at the lack of political will to really end it.”

The platform needs to incorporate the initiatives of the African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). New forces should join the efforts, such as the European Union, Troika and Arab and African nations, to create a new drive for peace, he went on to say.

“The greatest obstacle, however, are the delusions of the Islamists who believe that they will be victorious in this war,” Arman told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“They want to prolong the war to replicate the scenario in Syria in Sudan,” he warned. They ultimately want the international community to recognize them.

Political will

An opportunity is at hand to stop the war and seek a new national project where Sudan is the winner, not any party against the other, he stressed.

“No progress can be made without the parties displaying a political will to end the war,” he stated.

Moreover, initiatives need pressure from regional and international powers so that they can be implemented.

“Yes, the current efforts include important countries, but without coordination and collective work, they won’t be able to influence the parties” on the ground, he noted, underlining the importance of pressure from the EU and UN in making an impact.

Other obstacles include a clash in regional and international interests and failure to effectively bring in civilians to the peace process.

Arman said all initiatives should be combined at one platform – Jeddah – to create a cohesive vision and for the civilians to be an active player in the process.

The international community must also take real resolutions against everyone prolonging the conflict, he urged.

The real pressure must also come from the Sudanese people themselves, he added. The political movement that was forced to flee Khartoum needs time to regroup and refocus its agenda.

No one in Sudan wants foreign intervention to end the war, he said.



At Least 5 Dead in Fresh Israeli Strikes on South Lebanon Despite Ceasefire

19 June 2026, Lebanon, Sojoud: Smoke billows frorm an Israeli air strike on alleged Hezbollah positions in the southern Lebanese village of Sojoud. Photo: Marwan Naamani/ZUMA Press Wire/dpa
19 June 2026, Lebanon, Sojoud: Smoke billows frorm an Israeli air strike on alleged Hezbollah positions in the southern Lebanese village of Sojoud. Photo: Marwan Naamani/ZUMA Press Wire/dpa
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At Least 5 Dead in Fresh Israeli Strikes on South Lebanon Despite Ceasefire

19 June 2026, Lebanon, Sojoud: Smoke billows frorm an Israeli air strike on alleged Hezbollah positions in the southern Lebanese village of Sojoud. Photo: Marwan Naamani/ZUMA Press Wire/dpa
19 June 2026, Lebanon, Sojoud: Smoke billows frorm an Israeli air strike on alleged Hezbollah positions in the southern Lebanese village of Sojoud. Photo: Marwan Naamani/ZUMA Press Wire/dpa

At least five people were killed in Israeli air strikes and drone attacks in southern Lebanon on Saturday, Lebanese state media reported, just hours after a ceasefire between Israel ⁠and Hezbollah took effect.

State news agency NNA said Israeli warplanes and drones carried out a series of strikes across ⁠the Nabatieh area overnight and into Saturday morning, destroying residential buildings and homes, while Israeli artillery shelled Nabatieh and its outskirts before dawn.

Three people were killed in strikes on the town of Arab Salim, while one person was killed in Deir Zahrani, and another after "an enemy drone launched a strike on a motorbike" at the entrance of the town of Dweir, NNA said.

Israel and Hezbollah agreed to the ceasefire on Friday following an escalation in hostilities ⁠in ⁠Lebanon, according to a US official.

A senior Israeli official and two Hezbollah sources confirmed the agreement to Reuters. The US official said the truce was to begin at 4 p.m. (1300 GMT) on Friday.


Lebanese, Int’l Contacts Contain South Lebanon Security Deterioration

A giant portrait of Lebanese President Joseph Aoun hangs at the northern entrance to Sidon, as cars carrying displaced people from southern Lebanon head toward Beirut. (EPA)
A giant portrait of Lebanese President Joseph Aoun hangs at the northern entrance to Sidon, as cars carrying displaced people from southern Lebanon head toward Beirut. (EPA)
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Lebanese, Int’l Contacts Contain South Lebanon Security Deterioration

A giant portrait of Lebanese President Joseph Aoun hangs at the northern entrance to Sidon, as cars carrying displaced people from southern Lebanon head toward Beirut. (EPA)
A giant portrait of Lebanese President Joseph Aoun hangs at the northern entrance to Sidon, as cars carrying displaced people from southern Lebanon head toward Beirut. (EPA)

Lebanese and regional contacts contained a sharp deterioration in Lebanon’s security situation after a major military escalation between Israel and Hezbollah, and threats by Tel Aviv to escalate further.

Lebanese sources said Israel was seeking to undermine the ceasefire agreement, pressure Lebanese negotiators ahead of a fifth round of talks with Lebanon in Washington, and secure gains on the ground.

Reuters quoted a US official as saying Israel and Hezbollah had agreed to a ceasefire starting at 4 p.m. local time, after a major escalation that killed 47 Lebanese, including children and civilians, and four Israeli soldiers in clashes with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The Israeli air force carried out more than 150 strikes in southern and eastern Lebanon.

“Hezbollah and Israel agreed to a ceasefire,” the US official said, adding that US and Qatari negotiators reached the agreement with help from Iran.

“We understand that after the exchange of fire earlier today, Israel and Hezbollah are now in a ceasefire,” the official said.

Israel and Hezbollah both said they were ready to respect the ceasefire and respond to violations.

Lebanese and international contacts

The security deterioration triggered a flurry of regional, international and local contacts.

Official sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Lebanese President Joseph Aoun “began a series of international contacts in the morning with influential countries to lower the escalation, prevent further deterioration and ensure commitment to the ceasefire.”

The contacts focused mainly on the United States and Qatar.

Aoun also condemned “the continuing Israeli escalation.”

“What we are witnessing today in the south and the Bekaa, with the expansion of Israeli attacks and further killing and destruction, is a dangerous and condemnable escalation, especially as it has affected dozens of innocent people, including women and children,” Aoun said.

He said the escalation “effectively targets all ongoing efforts to consolidate the ceasefire and end the war, especially after the latest developments between the US and Iran.”

“But this will not prevent work to achieve a comprehensive ceasefire as quickly as possible. This is what I instructed the Lebanese negotiating delegation to pursue in the next round in Washington,” he said.

“There can be no leniency on this issue because a comprehensive ceasefire is the entry point for discussing other issues, most importantly the Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of the army and the return of prisoners.”

On the international level, Hezbollah parliamentary bloc member MP Hassan Fadlallah said Iran had informed the group that negotiations with the United States could not continue without the implementation of a comprehensive ceasefire.

Fadlallah urged the Lebanese government to reject any direct negotiations with Israel while Israeli attacks on Lebanon continue. He said Washington was responsible for ensuring Israel stops its attacks and implements the terms of the agreement.

Geographic expansion and pressure on Lebanon

The sudden deterioration appeared to signal an Israeli attempt to bypass the agreement that took effect last Monday.

Sources in the Shi’ite duo told Asharq Al-Awsat that Israel was “pressuring to strike the agreement directly and target it.” They said Tel Aviv was also trying to pressure the Lebanese negotiator before the fifth round of direct negotiations with Israel opens in Washington next Tuesday. The talks are due to run for three days.

The sources said Israel was trying to “seize additional cards with which to pressure Lebanon.”

They cited “an Israeli desire for geographic expansion after its failure to achieve a major expansion during 110 days of war.” The area where Israel made significant advances in the first weeks of the war, they said, was the same area Hezbollah evacuated and where it committed to restricting weapons to the Lebanese state.

But attempts to expand beyond that area “met fierce resistance that slowed the push,” the sources said.

The source said a fourth reason was “an internal crisis linked to the rising far-right mood in Israel,” adding that “military failure is driving it to target civilians in Lebanon.”

Ceasefire before any arrangements

Lebanese observers say Israel’s failure to abide by the ceasefire agreement is not driven only by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s sense of being “sidelined” after the agreement was signed.

They say Israel is also trying to reach an agreement with the Lebanese state in exchange for withdrawal from occupied territory, and to begin disarming Hezbollah in exchange for halting the escalation.

Hezbollah rejects this. The group is relying on US-Iranian understandings and continues to criticize the Lebanese state’s negotiating track.

Still, Lebanese authorities are proceeding with the sessions scheduled to begin Tuesday.

Lebanese ministerial sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the instructions to the negotiating delegation are clear: demand a full and comprehensive ceasefire before discussing any other arrangements.

The sources said Beirut “is holding to its demands.”

Singling out Lebanon

Hezbollah, however, rejects the direct negotiating track.

Sources following Hezbollah’s escalation against the track said the group “believes there is an overlap of interests between Tel Aviv and the state within the framework of the track on which the state is relying to achieve withdrawal and a ceasefire.”

The sources said Hezbollah believes the direct negotiating track rests on the view that Israel is uncomfortable with US performance in the agreement with Iran, while Lebanon is uncomfortable with Iran’s performance.

They said Hezbollah had “sensed that Lebanon was being singled out” through the US statement issued after the first negotiating session. This, they said, was reinforced in the declaration of intent paper in the fourth round, which appeared to show bias toward Israel in the negotiations.

Hezbollah MP Hussein Hajj Hassan said: “The authorities agreed to a joint statement with the Americans and Israelis containing language to the effect that Hezbollah is a common enemy of Israel, America and Lebanon. This was stated by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, while the Lebanese delegation did not utter a word. No Lebanese official in power objected to this language. Therefore, what is required from them is a position clarifying whether they agree with this language or not.”

He called on Lebanese officials “to bridge the gap they created with the resistance and its public, and to bridge the gap they created with the Islamic Republic of Iran, for Lebanon’s interest and not for Iran’s interest.”


US, Domestic Pressures Seen Behind Baghdad Dismissals

 Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets US envoy Tom Barrack in Baghdad, June 16, 2026. Iraqi government media/Handout
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets US envoy Tom Barrack in Baghdad, June 16, 2026. Iraqi government media/Handout
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US, Domestic Pressures Seen Behind Baghdad Dismissals

 Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets US envoy Tom Barrack in Baghdad, June 16, 2026. Iraqi government media/Handout
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets US envoy Tom Barrack in Baghdad, June 16, 2026. Iraqi government media/Handout

A shake-up by Iraqi Prime Minister al-Zaidi in security and economic posts has raised questions over the messages he is trying to send: is he seeking to redraw the balance of power inside the state, or responding to external demands tied to his expected visit to the United States next month?

The moves came as talks to complete the cabinet lineup were still under way, giving them added political weight. Iraqi prime ministers have often avoided sweeping decisions in sovereign institutions before fully securing their governments, wary of clashing with the political forces that have anchored the system since 2003.

The changes touched some of the state’s most sensitive institutions, including the National Security Service and the central bank.

Supporters say the move shows a push to bring in new faces and project the prime minister’s ability to act independently. Critics say some of the decisions amount to recycling familiar figures within the ruling system.

Coordination Framework reaction

What drew more attention than the reshuffle itself was the response from the main political forces, especially the Coordination Framework, which backed al-Zaidi’s rise to office.

So far, there has been no strong public objection, although the decisions affected figures long tied to centers of influence inside the state.

Yassin al-Bakri, a political science professor at Al-Nahrain University, said the steps carried several messages at once. He described them as an early show of force, a test of political reactions and an attempt to present al-Zaidi as a figure able to move from business into the management of Iraq’s complex political balances.

Al-Bakri told Asharq Al-Awsat that the prime minister had stepped into an area several predecessors had avoided by moving to reorder influential posts before completing his cabinet.

That could give him wider room to negotiate over the remaining ministries, especially the Interior Ministry, which remains contested by several political parties.

Between home and abroad

The timing of the decisions carries added weight as al-Zaidi’s expected visit to the United States approaches, along with an anticipated meeting with US President Donald Trump next month.

Observers believe the changes may be meant to reassure Washington that the new government is ready to take steps on institutional reform and strengthening state authority, especially after meetings al-Zaidi held with US officials in recent weeks.

Basil Hussein, head of the “Kloatha” center for studies, said the timing of the changes, alongside a meeting with US envoy Tom Barrack, makes it difficult to dismiss the possibility that they are linked to understandings with Washington.

But Hussein said a broader reading also suggests that al-Zaidi is trying to reshape what he called the “hard core” of the security and financial agencies, ensuring their loyalty to the prime minister’s office rather than to the political forces that brought them in.

Under this reading, the reassignment of some figures affected by the reshuffle suggests the prime minister is trying to gradually loosen existing networks of influence without directly confronting powerful forces inside the Coordination Framework. But this view is weakened by the fact that some dismissed figures were replaced by others from the same party-linked circles or their allies.

Analysts are divided over whether al-Zaidi’s decisions mark the start of a confrontation with the political class or merely a calculated maneuver within existing understandings.

On one hand, his background as a businessman and his previous ties with influential actors give him deep knowledge of the system’s power centers and weak points. That could give him more room to maneuver than some of his predecessors had.

On the other hand, the limits of that room remain tied to several factors: the outcome of his expected visit to Washington, the level of external support he may secure and the willingness of Iraqi political forces to adapt to his efforts to redistribute influence inside state institutions.

Some decisions also looked, to observers, more like political settlements than a rupture. Influential figures were moved to other posts rather than pushed out entirely, suggesting the continued need to preserve the balances that govern Iraq’s political system.

In the end, al-Zaidi’s changes look like an early test of the limits of executive power in Iraq. They carry reformist elements and messages of strength, but they have not yet amounted to a break with the forces that brought him to power.