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US Senators Urge Biden to Impose Magnitsky Sanctions on Sudan's Hemedti

Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader General Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo (Reuters)
Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader General Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo (Reuters)
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US Senators Urge Biden to Impose Magnitsky Sanctions on Sudan's Hemedti

Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader General Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo (Reuters)
Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader General Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo (Reuters)

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has written an open letter to US President Joe Biden, calling on him to swiftly determine whether or not he intends to impose sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act with respect to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its leader, General Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo, both accused of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.

The letter was written by Michael McCaul, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Benjamin Cardin, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jim Risch, ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Gregory Meeks, ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

“We jointly request a determination pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act of whether Sudan's RSF and its Commander have engaged in activity described in subsection of that Act, such as gross violations of internationally recognized human rights committed against human rights defenders and persons seeking to expose illegal activity by government officials,” the Senators said in the letter.

War Crimes

The bi-partisan letter, which follows the one-year anniversary of the war in Sudan between the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), mentioned that on December 6, 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the RSF had committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing since the outbreak of fighting in Sudan on April 15, 2023.

The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act authorizes sanctions against foreign persons who commit gross violations of internationally recognized human rights against individuals seeking: to expose illegal activity carried out by government officials; or to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote internationally recognized human rights and freedoms.

“The actions of the RSF and Hemedti, including those described above, more than meet that threshold,” the Senators affirmed.

RSF’s Financial Networks

The Senators then urged Biden to examine the RSF’s financial networks and sources of revenue, such as gold smuggling, and relationships with Russia and Wagner Group, and to assess whether they are also deserving of sanction under the Magnitsky Act for acts of significant corruption by government officials in Sudan.

The letter mentioned that on September 6, 2023, the US Department of Treasury sanctioned Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo, Hemedti's brother, as a leader of the RSF. It had also imposed visa restrictions on RSF General Abdul Rahman Juma.

It also stated that gunmen in RSF uniforms abducted and killed human rights activist and lawyer Ahmed Mohammed Abdullah and his colleague Adam Omer in Nyala, South Sudan, while Khamis Abdullah Abakar, the governor of West Darfur, was assassinated while he was in the custody of the RSF, just hours after he had criticized the RSF in a television interview, describing its actions as “genocide.”

In the letter, the Senators also said human rights lawyers, defenders, and democracy activists in El Geneina, West Darfur, faced targeted threats and killings by the RSF and allied militia, including Mohammed Ahmed Kudia, a member of the Darfur Network of Monitors, Khamis Arabab, a member of the Darfur Bar Association, Khidir Sulieman Abdelmageed, the head of the human rights organization Afkar, Abd Elrazeg Adam Mohammed, a member of the Darfur Network of Monitors, Tareg Hassan Yagoub Elmalik, a founding member of the Darfur Bar Association and El Sadeg Mohammed Ahmed Haroun, a member of the Darfur Bar Association who had filed cases against the RSF for its attacks on the Krinding IDP camp in 2021 and 2022.

Also, there have been numerous reported incidents of the RSF targeting journalists, the letter said, adding that the RSF arbitrarily detained dozens of civilians, including political activists.

Aid

On Friday, Senator Cardin delivered a speech on the Senate floor marking one year since the onset of civil war in Sudan, and called on the US and its international partners to ramp up humanitarian assistance for war-affected Sudanese and for impacted populations in surrounding countries.

Cardin also urged the House of Representatives to pass the national security supplemental without delay to bring needed aid to its partners around the world.

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Arab World

Areas Controlled by Armed Gangs in Gaza Become Safe Havens for Criminals and Killers

Palestinians inspect a destroyed tent and traces of blood on the ground following an Israeli strike that killed three people in Gaza City's Al-Remal neighbourhood on November 1, 2026. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)
Palestinians inspect a destroyed tent and traces of blood on the ground following an Israeli strike that killed three people in Gaza City's Al-Remal neighbourhood on November 1, 2026. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)
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Areas Controlled by Armed Gangs in Gaza Become Safe Havens for Criminals and Killers

Palestinians inspect a destroyed tent and traces of blood on the ground following an Israeli strike that killed three people in Gaza City's Al-Remal neighbourhood on November 1, 2026. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)
Palestinians inspect a destroyed tent and traces of blood on the ground following an Israeli strike that killed three people in Gaza City's Al-Remal neighbourhood on November 1, 2026. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)

About a week ago, gunmen killed two police officers affiliated with the Hamas government and wounded several others during an operation in Deir al-Balah, central Gaza, to arrest a wanted suspect. The attackers subsequently fled in what was not the first incident of its kind.

Field sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that, within hours of the incident, it became clear that the gunmen had headed toward areas where armed gangs operate east of Deir al-Balah.

According to the sources, areas controlled by armed gangs in the Gaza Strip, primarily located in territories under Israeli military control that account for approximately 70% of the enclave, have become safe havens for criminals, particularly those responsible for killing security personnel.

The sources confirmed that all those who fled to areas where armed gangs operate had committed crimes of a purely criminal nature.

Repeated Incidents

One source said that over the past year and a half, similar incidents had been documented involving gunmen who committed murders, wounded individuals, carried out robberies or engaged in drug trafficking before fleeing to areas controlled by armed gangs.

These gangs exploit such incidents to recruit fugitives into their ranks, taking advantage of their personal circumstances, socioeconomic conditions and the fact that they are wanted by police and judicial authorities.

In the October 26 incident, police officers were attempting to ambush a wanted suspect when he opened fire on them. Other gunmen joined the shooting, killing two officers and wounding several others.

Multiple sources confirmed this account, including the Hamas-run Interior Ministry, which said it was pursuing the suspects and continuing its efforts to maintain security and stability in the Gaza Strip and prevent the spread of lawlessness.

However, some of those involved returned the day after the killings, barricaded themselves inside a house and gathered armed relatives around them.

The sources reported mediation attempts aimed at resolving the dispute and persuading the wanted suspects to surrender to Hamas government security forces, but no agreement has been reached so far.

The families of the two slain officers have demanded swift retribution and insisted that neither those directly involved nor their supporters be allowed to escape punishment.

In a joint statement, the families said that carrying out retribution was the only guarantee of "upholding justice and calming tensions."

Their demands came amid fears of renewed violence that could result in deaths on both sides, particularly after some of those involved in the killings returned to Hamas-controlled areas.

Security Concerns

Armed gangs have become a persistent security concern for Hamas security agencies and other Palestinian factions, which continue to pursue their members, particularly in light of the gangs' involvement in serious security incidents, including assassinations of security officials and abductions of faction activists.

The situation comes as Hamas police and security agencies face severe difficulties investigating and pursuing criminal and security-related offenses across the Gaza Strip because of repeated Israeli attacks against their personnel.

In the latest such incident, several police officers were killed on Sunday while deployed in areas south of Al-Mawasi in Khan Younis, when an Israeli drone struck them as they carried out their duties.

Five officers were killed, including Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Al-Jamal and Major Bassam Miqdad. Six others, including civilians, sustained injuries of varying severity.

Gaza's Interior Ministry described the attacks as "systematic," saying they had killed 75 police officers and personnel since the ceasefire took effect in October 2025.

In a statement, the ministry appealed to the international community to "take urgent action and pressure the occupation to stop its crimes against the police force, which performs civilian duties under the law to preserve citizens' security and safety."

Repeated Attacks

Separately, three Palestinians, including a man and his child, were killed in an airstrike on a crowded street filled with displaced people in the Al-Rimal neighborhood of western Gaza City.

The man's wife and their other child sustained serious injuries.

The strike occurred during a period of heavy movement by residents, displaced people and schoolchildren, leaving several others wounded, some critically.

A Hamas source told Asharq Al-Awsat that Jamal Abu Isaid, a commander in the Al-Qassam Brigades, the movement's military wing, was among those killed in the strike.

Only minutes separated the first airstrike, which targeted police officers in Khan Younis, from the second, which struck a group of civilians in Gaza City.

Around midday Sunday, several Palestinians were also wounded, including a woman in critical condition, when Israeli military vehicles opened fire toward the Halawa displacement camp in Jabalia al-Balad, northern Gaza.

Another Palestinian was reported to have died from critical injuries sustained several days earlier in the village of Al-Masdar in central Gaza.

The latest deaths brought the number of Palestinians killed since the ceasefire came into effect to more than 1,585, with over 5,700 others wounded.

During October, Israeli airstrikes across the Gaza Strip killed more than 143 Palestinians, including 22 children, according to figures from the enclave's Health Ministry.

 

Arab World

Yemeni Army Holds Positions Around Taiz, Advances in Al-Jawf

Yemeni government fighters ride on the back of a truck during battles at the Jabal Han front west of the city of Taiz on October 21, 2026. (Photo by AFP) /
Yemeni government fighters ride on the back of a truck during battles at the Jabal Han front west of the city of Taiz on October 21, 2026. (Photo by AFP) /
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Yemeni Army Holds Positions Around Taiz, Advances in Al-Jawf

Yemeni government fighters ride on the back of a truck during battles at the Jabal Han front west of the city of Taiz on October 21, 2026. (Photo by AFP) /
Yemeni government fighters ride on the back of a truck during battles at the Jabal Han front west of the city of Taiz on October 21, 2026. (Photo by AFP) /

Yemeni government forces have held their positions on the front lines around the besieged city of Taiz, repelling a fierce Houthi attack on the Al-Aqrud front southeast of the city with support from the Popular Resistance. Meanwhile, government forces recaptured military positions and strategic high ground east of Al-Hazm, the capital of Al-Jawf Governorate, in a battlefield development aimed at advancing toward the city.

While government forces maintained their defenses in Taiz and made gains in Al-Jawf, the Houthis expanded their military operations toward Al-Maqatirah district in northern Lahj Governorate. Despite airstrikes and significant losses, the group seized the historic Al-Maqatirah Castle and advanced into key areas and high ground, including the Al-Nafaq area and positions overlooking the Hayjat Al-Abd mountain pass, following fierce clashes with government troops.

According to local sources, government forces, supported by the Giants Brigades and Nation's Shield Forces, still control large parts of the district. They have repelled attacks and destroyed columns of Houthi reinforcements at the foot of the mountain pass and in the Wadi Souq Al-Rubou area.

Government troops continue to launch counterattacks to recapture positions seized by the Houthis, while deploying additional reinforcements and tribal fighters to confront the group's advance.

Clashes south and southeast of Taiz are concentrated on the Al-Aqrud and Kahlan fronts, as well as in Al-Dhabab west of the city.

Government forces, backed by the Popular Resistance, repelled a fierce Houthi assault on the Al-Aqrud front amid continuing clashes and airstrikes targeting Houthi concentrations in these areas.

On Sunday, airstrikes extended to areas in Dhamar and Hodeidah governorates, including Bajil district. Houthi positions in Hayjat Al-Abd and along the Al-Sahi road southwest of Taiz were also targeted as part of the air operations accompanying the ground battles.

Meanwhile, the Houthi offensive remained concentrated on Al-Maqatirah district in northern Lahj, where the group seized the historic Al-Maqatirah Castle and advanced into Al-Nafaq and several elevated positions overlooking the Hayjat Al-Abd mountain pass.

Strategic Importance of Al-Maqatirah

These developments carry significant military implications because of the location of the Al-Maqatirah mountains and castle, which overlook the Hayjat Al-Abd and Al-Karbah roads, two vital routes connecting Taiz with southern Yemen.

Control of the castle allows forces to monitor movements around these corridors and threaten traffic passing through them, raising concerns about further military restrictions on roads leading to Taiz and deepening the isolation of a city already suffering under a Houthi siege.

The strategic importance of these heights extends beyond securing local roads. Controlling them opens the way for an advance toward Tur Al-Bahah district and provides an elevated vantage point overlooking Al-Anad military base in Lahj Governorate.

Because of its mountainous location, Al-Maqatirah also serves as strategic depth for routes connecting to the western coast and the Bab Al-Mandab Strait.

Control of its high ground would help secure lines of advance, reduce the risk of flanking maneuvers, and influence troop movements and supply routes across the area extending toward Ras Al-Arah, south of the Bab Al-Mandab Strait.

Battlefield Gains in Al-Jawf

In a parallel development, Yemen's armed forces, represented by the First Emergency Division, announced the recapture of military positions and strategic high ground east of Al-Hazm following fierce battles that forced Houthi fighters to flee their positions around the Duhaidha Mountains.

The forces said they seized weapons and ammunition depots abandoned by the Houthis and destroyed military vehicles and armored combat vehicles.

They added that dozens of Houthi fighters were killed or wounded in the clashes, while others were captured.

On the administrative and military front, Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council issued two presidential decrees on Sunday appointing Major General Hussein Al-Ajji Ali Al-Awadhi as governor of Al-Bayda Governorate and Major General Ameen Ali Al-Akimi as governor of Al-Jawf Governorate. Al-Akimi was also appointed commander of the Al-Jawf Military Axis.

Arab World

What Does the End of MINURSO Mean for the Future of Western Sahara?

A United Nations Security Council meeting titled "Maintenance of international peace and security" at UN headquarters in New York City, US, October 29, 2026. REUTERS/Jeenah Moon
A United Nations Security Council meeting titled "Maintenance of international peace and security" at UN headquarters in New York City, US, October 29, 2026. REUTERS/Jeenah Moon
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What Does the End of MINURSO Mean for the Future of Western Sahara?

A United Nations Security Council meeting titled "Maintenance of international peace and security" at UN headquarters in New York City, US, October 29, 2026. REUTERS/Jeenah Moon
A United Nations Security Council meeting titled "Maintenance of international peace and security" at UN headquarters in New York City, US, October 29, 2026. REUTERS/Jeenah Moon

Russia has plunged the Western Sahara dispute into an unprecedented geopolitical impasse after vetoing an amended US-drafted resolution at the United Nations Security Council that sought to fundamentally reshape the longstanding regional conflict.

Although the US draft secured the support of 11 council members, Russia's unexpected veto blocked its adoption.

Washington responded swiftly, using its own veto to block a rival Russian draft resolution that proposed a conventional technical extension of the UN mission's mandate without altering its underlying structure.

The diplomatic confrontation between the two powers prompted Morocco's King Mohammed VI to announce, in an urgent statement issued by the Royal Cabinet, the closure of the chapter on the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) after 35 years of operations.

The king also called for the issue to be removed entirely and permanently from the Security Council's agenda, describing the existing framework as outdated and ineffective on the ground.

Competing legal frameworks and the legacy of Resolution 2797

At the heart of the dispute between Washington and Moscow are competing legal and institutional frameworks that each side has sought to establish, a confrontation that began taking shape with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2797 on Oct. 31, 2025.

That resolution marked a significant shift by endorsing Morocco's autonomy proposal as the basis for negotiations.

The latest US draft sought to build on Resolution 2797 by establishing expanded autonomy as the exclusive and definitive framework for resolving the dispute, removing references to a referendum from the UN framework and reducing the mission's military component ahead of its eventual administrative dissolution.

Russia, by contrast, sought to halt that process, which Washington had pursued under the framework established by Resolution 2797.

Moscow's permanent representative to the United Nations objected to what he described as an attempt to override existing balances, while Russia introduced an alternative resolution proposing to extend MINURSO's mandate until Oct. 31, 2027.

The Russian proposal would have retained the mission's name and traditional responsibilities, leaving room for broader interpretations of the political process that could accommodate all parties, including Algeria and the Polisario Front.

What does the shift mean for the parties and their allies?

The change in the international approach to Western Sahara is reshaping the calculations of regional and international powers involved in the dispute.

For Morocco's international allies, the Security Council deadlock presents a new reality.

Major European capitals, including Paris and Madrid, now face pressure to translate their political support for Morocco's autonomy initiative into direct bilateral and economic partnerships with Rabat, rather than relying primarily on diplomatic negotiations and votes at the United Nations.

Moroccan diplomacy has increasingly favored that approach as an alternative to the UN-led framework.

Meanwhile, countries supporting the traditional UN approach, including African governments aligned with Algeria, face a different set of challenges.

Although Russia's veto succeeded in blocking the US attempt to rewrite the legal framework governing the dispute, it also shifted greater responsibility for maintaining stability to regional actors.

Regional alliances may therefore have to reconsider their strategies in dealing with a Morocco seeking to exercise full sovereignty over the territory without UN monitoring, and a Polisario Front searching for alternative diplomatic channels to compensate for the loss of the Security Council framework.

What next for regional stability after the institutional vacuum?

The region is entering a new phase in the management of the Western Sahara dispute following the expiration of MINURSO's mandate without renewal.

The absence of a renewed mandate threatens to end the mission's longstanding role as an international third-party observer monitoring the lines of contact and ceasefire arrangements.

Without that UN framework, the parties could face fewer institutional and diplomatic constraints, leaving developments on the ground increasingly dependent on their respective positions on sovereignty and territorial control.

Morocco views the mission's absence as an opportunity to end what it considers a temporary arrangement and proceed with the administration and development of the territory it claims as its own, without the restrictions associated with UN monitoring and reporting.

The Algeria-backed Polisario Front, meanwhile, faces the prospect of losing a central UN platform through which it has pursued its demand for a referendum on self-determination.

The institutional shift could move the dispute away from the Security Council's negotiating chambers and toward developments on the ground and direct bilateral diplomacy.

The future of stability and sovereignty in North Africa would then depend increasingly on the measures taken by the parties themselves and the regional and international alliances supporting them.