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ICC Issues Arrest Warrant Against Mali’s ‘Desert Fox’

Iyad Ag Ghaly in northern Mali in 2012 (AFP)
Iyad Ag Ghaly in northern Mali in 2012 (AFP)
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ICC Issues Arrest Warrant Against Mali’s ‘Desert Fox’

Iyad Ag Ghaly in northern Mali in 2012 (AFP)
Iyad Ag Ghaly in northern Mali in 2012 (AFP)

The International Criminal Court (ICC) said it issued an arrest warrant for the leader of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Iyad Ag Ghaly, one of the Sahel’s top terrorist militant leaders and the most important leader of el-Qaeda in West Africa.
The arrest warrant against him was issued in 2017 under seal but made public only on Friday.
This means that the Court had first issued it when Ag Ghaly was named as JNIM's overall emir shortly following the organization’s formation in March 2017.
Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin is the largest alliance of terrorist movements in the Sahel region. It includes Ansar Eddine, the Sahara Emirate, an al-Qaeda affiliated group, the Macina Liberation Front and Al-Mourabitoun organization.
In a statement issued on Friday, the ICC said that the “Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court, at the request of the Prosecutor, made public an arrest warrant against Iyad Ag Ghaly.”
It added that the arrest warrant was initially issued under seal on 18 July 2017 and that Ghaly is not detained by the ICC.
The warrant was not made public when it was issued in 2017 because of the “potential risks to witnesses and victims.”
War Crimes
The Court said there are reasonable grounds to believe that Ag Ghaly would be the undisputed leader of Ansar Eddine, which had control of Timbuktu, Mali, between January 2012 and January 2013 when war crimes and crimes against humanity were allegedly committed in the Malian historic city.
The Court accuses Ag Ghaly of being responsible for the murder of soldiers placed hors de combat in Aguelhoc on 24 January 2012. It referred to the battle led by Ag Ghaly in January 2012 in the city of Aguelhok between Ansar Eddine and the Malian army, in which the latter suffered heavy casualties.
He is also accused of imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty; rape, sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence.
The ICC noted that Ag Ghaly is suspected of having committed these crimes jointly with others and/or through others; ordering, soliciting or inducing their commission or aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in the commission of these crimes; or in any other way contributing to the commission or these crimes; and/or as a military commander.
The Chamber ordered the Registrar of the Court to prepare a request for cooperation in the arrest and surrender of the suspect, and to address it to the competent authorities of any relevant State and any other relevant authority.
Mali’s Desert Fox
The ICC memo comes years after the disappearance of Ag Ghaly in the Sahel region of Africa.
Unofficial reports say the man is hiding in a rugged mountainous area on the border between Mali and Algeria, where his Tuareg ethnicity is deeply embedded.
The court's indictment focuses on the period when Iyad Ag Ghaly led the Ansar Eddine group, which he founded in 2011, and after he allied with el-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and took control of large parts of northern Mali in 2012.
But Ag Ghaly’s plan collapsed after the French Special Forces had touched down in Malian territory to prevent the collapse of the state of Mali, and to hunt down the man.
The Forces dealt a heavy blow to his group in 2013 and forced it to retreat towards the Ifoghas' Mountains in the far northeast of Mali.
In the 1980s, Ag Ghaly’s journey landed him in Libya where he received military training and joined the ranks of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s Green Brigade which was composed mainly of Tuareg tribesmen.
Having excelled in training, he earned a place in the Libyan mission and was sent to fight against Tchad and also to South Lebanon to fight alongside Palestinians.
Ag Ghaly returned to northern Mali in the early 1990s to form a rebel militia which opposed the Malian central government based in Bamako.
In 2007, the man had a Salafist lifestyle. During this period, he established relations with militant extremist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and played a major mediating role to ultimately win the release of western hostages and earned huge sums of money.
Most Wanted Man
The International Criminal Court (ICC) published the arrest warrant on Friday against Iyad Ag Ghaly, however, the court does not have the capacity to apprehend suspects and relies on member states to carry out arrests.
For the past 10 years, the French had unsuccessfully tried to arrest the 76-year-old man in Mali.
Reports claim that Ag Ghaly was wounded in one of the French attempts to liquidate him.
Nicknamed “Desert Fox,” he is described as intelligent and highly experienced on desert trails.
Ag Ghaly was able to hide for years because of the support he enjoys from locals.
Since 2020, Ag Ghaly is fighting a war on two fronts: The man continues his attacks against the state and the Army in Mali where he expanded his circle of influence in the north and center. Also, he is fighting a bloody war against ISIS, the terrorist group that is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people in Mali.

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Arab World

Iraqi Judiciary Applies ‘Terrorism Provisions’ to Drones

People watch as smoke billows from an oil warehouse in the Kani Qirzhala area on the outskirts of Erbil, the capital of Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region, following a suspected drone strike, on April 1, 2026. (Photo by AFP)
People watch as smoke billows from an oil warehouse in the Kani Qirzhala area on the outskirts of Erbil, the capital of Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region, following a suspected drone strike, on April 1, 2026. (Photo by AFP)
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Iraqi Judiciary Applies ‘Terrorism Provisions’ to Drones

People watch as smoke billows from an oil warehouse in the Kani Qirzhala area on the outskirts of Erbil, the capital of Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region, following a suspected drone strike, on April 1, 2026. (Photo by AFP)
People watch as smoke billows from an oil warehouse in the Kani Qirzhala area on the outskirts of Erbil, the capital of Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region, following a suspected drone strike, on April 1, 2026. (Photo by AFP)

Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council has instructed the country’s courts to apply the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Law to anyone who manufactures, uses, or possesses drones for unlawful purposes, while a security official said the directive is aimed specifically at curbing the activities of armed factions.

In a brief statement on Wednesday, the Council said it had directed the competent courts to enforce Anti-Terrorism Law No. 13 of 2005 against “anyone who manufactures, uses, or possesses drones employed for purposes contrary to the law.”

The law is Iraq’s principal legal framework for prosecuting terrorist crimes that threaten national unity and public safety, carrying penalties of up to the death sentence for perpetrators, instigators, planners, and financiers.

The directive comes amid months of government efforts to bring all weapons under state control and dismantle armed groups operating outside official security institutions.

An Interior Ministry security official told Asharq Al-Awsat that the judicial directive is “exclusively linked to armed factions” and is intended to increase pressure on them. He said the measure places drone-related offenses under terrorism statutes even though Iraqi law permits the use of officially licensed drones, indicating that it is directed at attacks carried out - or potentially to be carried out - by armed factions.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, the official described drones as one of Iraq’s most serious security challenges because they are easy to transport and operate, while the country lacks effective counter-drone capabilities, a weakness exposed during recent attacks.

Since the outbreak of the US-Israeli war against Iran on February 28, armed factions have carried out hundreds of attacks, many involving drones, against civilian and military targets.

Kurdish sources say cities in the Kurdistan Region alone have come under more than 800 attacks by Iran-aligned factions, ostensibly because of the presence of US forces and Iranian Kurdish opposition groups.

The factions have also launched dozens of drone attacks against vital assets in several Gulf states and Jordan, prompting those countries to issue a joint statement on March 25 condemning the attacks and urging Baghdad to take immediate action to halt operations by Iran-backed armed groups.

Iraq has long permitted drones for civilian, commercial, and official security purposes, provided operators obtain prior approval from the Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority and the relevant security agencies.

In early February, the authority introduced new regulations governing licensing, operating requirements, legal obligations, and approved uses, including media production, filmmaking, advertising, tourism, protection of oil and energy pipelines and public utilities, agriculture, environmental monitoring, border security, and official Interior Ministry thermal-drone operations against smugglers.

Drone manufacturing is also “common in Iraq,” according to Ahmed al-Janabi, a software and telecommunications engineer, though primarily for civilian and service-related uses. He said drone components are widely available on Iraqi markets and enter the country through multiple routes, including smuggling networks from Iran via Sulaymaniyah.

Specialized import offices also supply drones, often disguising component shipments. While authorities routinely confiscate unauthorized drones and impose relatively light prison sentences on violators, al-Janabi said the key change is that such offenses are now prosecuted under the Anti-Terrorism Law.

Arab World

Beirut Transfers 128 Syrian Convicts Home

Lebanese army soldiers secure the area at the entrance of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah village, southern Lebanon, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese army soldiers secure the area at the entrance of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah village, southern Lebanon, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
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Beirut Transfers 128 Syrian Convicts Home

Lebanese army soldiers secure the area at the entrance of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah village, southern Lebanon, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese army soldiers secure the area at the entrance of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah village, southern Lebanon, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH

Lebanon has transferred 128 Syrian convicts to their home country, a Lebanese security source told AFP on Wednesday, the second batch of handovers under an agreement the two sides signed earlier this year.

Overcrowded Lebanese prisons host around 2,000 Syrian nationals held on various charges.

Many are still awaiting trial, while hundreds have been brought before military courts on charges of "terrorism" or related offences, including attacks on Lebanese forces.

Others are in custody for alleged membership in militant or armed groups that were opposed to now-ousted Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, who was supported by Lebanon's Hezbollah during the Syrian civil war.

The security source, who requested anonymity, said that Beirut "handed over the second batch of Syrian convicts in Lebanon to Damascus, numbering 128 convicts" on Wednesday.

The transfer follows the handover of more than 130 Syrian detainees in March, under an agreement signed between the two countries the previous month, which will cover almost 300 convicts who have served 10 years or more in Lebanese prisons.

Under the agreement, they will be required to complete the remainder of their sentences in Syria.

At least 260 convicts have now been sent to Syria's Adra prison out of 356 in Lebanon's Roumieh, the source added.

The issue of the detainees had been a sticking point in Beirut-Damascus relations following Assad's overthrow in December 2024.

It was discussed by Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam during his visit to Damascus in May, where he met Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Over the past year, both sides have repeatedly expressed their determination to open a new chapter in their relations.

Arab World

Syrian Troop Killings Expose Repeated Attacks, Security Lapses

Syrian army personnel on a military vehicle in Deir Hafer, rural Aleppo, in January 2026. (Reuters)
Syrian army personnel on a military vehicle in Deir Hafer, rural Aleppo, in January 2026. (Reuters)
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Syrian Troop Killings Expose Repeated Attacks, Security Lapses

Syrian army personnel on a military vehicle in Deir Hafer, rural Aleppo, in January 2026. (Reuters)
Syrian army personnel on a military vehicle in Deir Hafer, rural Aleppo, in January 2026. (Reuters)

The recent killing of two Syrian army members near Manbij, east of Aleppo, was not an isolated attack. It was part of a recurring pattern of strikes on government forces, exposing serious administrative and security gaps that groups opposed to Syria’s new administration are using to target its personnel.

Syria’s Ministry of Defense media and communications department said on June 20 that two soldiers from the 76th Division were killed after unknown gunmen attacked them near Manbij.

The soldiers were riding a motorcycle on a road near the city when they came under direct fire.

Since the fall of the Assad regime, Asharq Al-Awsat has tracked many similar attacks on Syrian security and army personnel. Most have occurred as members were heading to or leaving their posts, often on motorcycles or via irregular transport.

Many see the pattern as evidence of weak protection measures and poor organization of personnel rotations.

Rural Aleppo has witnessed several assassinations this year. Among the most prominent were the killing of two Syrian army members in March and another member of the Interior Ministry in April near the town of al-Rai.

Similar incidents have also been reported across most Syrian provinces, including Daraa, Latakia, rural Hama and Homs.

Embarrassing the Syrian state

Demands have grown for personnel to avoid moving alone, wearing military uniforms or using motorcycles in remote areas where the risk is high and support is hard to reach.

Major Khaled al-Abdullah, director of the Syrian interior minister’s office, said the defense and interior ministries had repeatedly issued circulars banning personnel from wearing official uniforms outside working hours and requiring them to follow safety measures suited to Syria’s current conditions.

He said the immediate aim of attacks by groups opposed to the new administration, including Islamic State and remnants of the ousted regime, was to “try to embarrass the Syrian state.”

Abdullah stressed that authorities were working hard to impose security, eliminate armed groups and organizations, and had made significant progress on what he called a difficult path.

But in remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, he also pointed to “continued internal and external challenges that the Syrian state is working to overcome and whose danger it seeks to end.”

Manbij, the most dangerous route

Abu Mohammed al-Hussein, who oversees a cluster of checkpoints in eastern rural Aleppo, said the movement of personnel had become a problem. He said he had repeatedly asked for buses to transport rotating shift members, especially in rural areas far from the city center.

Hussein said one member of his checkpoint group survived an assassination attempt on the Manbij-al-Bab road in eastern rural Aleppo at the end of March. The incident pushed him to issue special orders regulating how his personnel move.

“A civilian car offered to take one of my men to Aleppo city,” he said. “After they had driven several miles, they claimed there was an emergency and said they had to return. As soon as he got out, the driver’s companion fired several shots at him with a pistol. Two hit his magazine pouch and one pierced his foot. He survived by a miracle.”

He said shift rotations are “decided centrally by sector commanders” and are often carried out at night because service areas are far from where personnel live. He said a ban on carrying weapons and moving through residential areas had also made personnel easier targets.

“With repeated assassination attempts, I issued a decision banning nighttime shift rotations, prohibiting movement in civilian cars or on motorcycles, which have also become easy targets, and limiting transport to road security vehicles,” he added.

Hussein said they were still waiting for approval of a request to allocate a bus to transport security and military checkpoint personnel deployed along the Aleppo-Manbij road.

He described it as “one of the most dangerous land routes,” linking Aleppo to outlying areas and Raqqa province, and passing through an area that remained for years under the control of the ousted regime and the Syrian Democratic Forces.

Ban on keeping weapons

Haider al-Mohammed, a special tasks member, disagreed. He said “transport buses are, in practice, the easy target” and are often attacked, meaning the problem of securing personnel goes beyond transport.

He said decisions that stripped personnel of the means to protect their safety and identity were the direct reason behind the rise in assassinations, alongside the exceptional conditions in the country and the process of “clearing out groups that believe they can create chaos and fear.”

He said among the most important of these decisions were “the ban on wearing face coverings, the ban on keeping registered weapons, and the strict instruction not to carry personal weapons, along with leniency over wearing official uniforms.”

As a result, he said, personnel are exposed, easy targets for these groups, and left without weapons to defend themselves.

On this point, Major Khaled al-Abdullah said Syria’s security and military institutions were working to “implement solutions to facilitate and reduce regular movement in a way that helps end the threat and strengthen the safety of their personnel.”

He said the pattern of attacks “confirms their randomness.” The failure to select specific targets or have prior knowledge of the personnel being targeted, he said, was “an attempt to create chaos and confuse the Syrian state.”