Tunisia’s Kais Saied Wins Landslide Reelection

 Tunisian president and candidate for re-election Kais Saied joins his supporters after the announcement of the provisional results for the presidential elections, in the capital Tunis, Tunisia, Sunday, Oct. 6, 2024. (AP)
Tunisian president and candidate for re-election Kais Saied joins his supporters after the announcement of the provisional results for the presidential elections, in the capital Tunis, Tunisia, Sunday, Oct. 6, 2024. (AP)
TT

Tunisia’s Kais Saied Wins Landslide Reelection

 Tunisian president and candidate for re-election Kais Saied joins his supporters after the announcement of the provisional results for the presidential elections, in the capital Tunis, Tunisia, Sunday, Oct. 6, 2024. (AP)
Tunisian president and candidate for re-election Kais Saied joins his supporters after the announcement of the provisional results for the presidential elections, in the capital Tunis, Tunisia, Sunday, Oct. 6, 2024. (AP)

President Kais Saied won a landslide victory in Tunisia's election Monday, keeping his grip on power after a first term in which opponents were imprisoned and the country's institutions overhauled to give him more authority.

The North African country's Independent High Authority for Elections said Saied received 90.7% of the vote.

“We’re going to cleanse the country of all the corrupt and schemers,” the 66-year-old president said in a speech at campaign headquarters. He pledged to defend Tunisia against threats foreign and domestic.

The closest challenger, businessman Ayachi Zammel, won 7.4% of the vote after sitting in prison for the majority of the campaign while facing multiple sentences for election-related crimes.

Saied's win was marred by low voter turnout. Election officials reported 28.8% of voters participated on Oct. 6 — a significantly smaller showing than in the first round of the country's two other post-Arab Spring elections and an indication of apathy plaguing the country's 9.7 million eligible voters.

Saied’s most prominent challengers — imprisoned since last year — were prevented from running, and lesser-known candidates were jailed or kept off the ballot. Opposition parties boycotted the contest, calling it a sham.

Saied won his first term in 2019 promising to combat corruption. In 2021 he declared a state of emergency, suspended parliament and rewrote the constitution to consolidate the power of the presidency — a series of actions his critics likened to a coup.

Tunisians in a referendum approved the president's proposed constitution a year later, although voter turnout plummeted.



Lebanese Ex-FM Mitri to Asharq Al-Awsat: No Alternative to Resolution 1701, Even if It Needs Rewording

Lebanese Former Foreign Minister Tarek Mitri.
Lebanese Former Foreign Minister Tarek Mitri.
TT

Lebanese Ex-FM Mitri to Asharq Al-Awsat: No Alternative to Resolution 1701, Even if It Needs Rewording

Lebanese Former Foreign Minister Tarek Mitri.
Lebanese Former Foreign Minister Tarek Mitri.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 forms the cornerstone for any diplomatic solution to the Israeli war on Lebanon, despite the loopholes caused by repeated violations since its adoption in August 2006.

Although rapid developments and Israel’s policy of destruction across Lebanese territories have made it difficult to be “built upon”, Lebanese former Foreign Minister Tarek Mitri stated that it is impossible to agree on an alternative resolution due to the sharp divisions within the Security Council and the veto power wielded by the United States and Russia.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Mitri emphasized that there is “no alternative to this resolution, although it requires a new preamble and rewording.”

Ambiguous clauses in the resolution have led to its repeated violations by both Israel and Hezbollah, as each interprets the provisions according to its own interests.

Mitri, who was one of the architects of the resolution when he served as acting foreign minister in former Prime Minister Fuad Siniora’s government, pointed out that all Security Council resolutions contain some ambiguities, and a careful reading of 1701 shows that while its tone is strong, its wording leaves room for interpretation.

“The main problem with resolution 1701, which led to its varied interpretations, is that it calls for a cessation of hostilities rather than a ceasefire. There was also ambiguity, especially in paragraph (8), which discusses security arrangements in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line, making it free of armed personnel,” he said.

He also noted that the resolution was issued under Chapter VI, but the greatest confusion arose when it came to the role of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeepers, as they were given the authority to take all necessary measures to prevent any military presence or unauthorized armed activities, as if it were issued under the UN’s Chapter VII article.

“Unfortunately, these forces did not fulfill their role, and instead of being a monitoring and intervention force, they themselves have become monitored,” he continued referring to their being tracked and confronted by Hezbollah supporters.

The developments of the July 2006 war led to the adoption of this resolution under fire and the massacres committed by Israel. Mitri did not hide the fact that resolution 1701 was not thoroughly studied, and all parties were primarily focused on agreeing to halt hostilities.

He noted that the resolution “would not have been issued if the Lebanese government, under the leadership of Fuad Siniora, had not decided to send 15,000 soldiers to the South. However, for various reasons, Lebanon was unable to fulfill this promise, first due to a lack of resources and the army being preoccupied with numerous tasks, including maintaining internal security.”

Although the resolution has been subject to continuous violations, which the Security Council has frequently evaluated and warned against, it has remained a framework that regulates the security situation along the Blue Line, which separates Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories.

The former minister pointed out that between the adoption of the resolution and the cessation of hostilities in 2006, and Oct. 7, 2023, “Hezbollah did not initiate any conflicts, its weapons were not visible, and its military activities were absent. Hezbollah considered itself compliant with resolution 1701 as required, while Israel violated Lebanese airspace thousands of times, even refusing to provide Lebanon with landmine maps, which led to the deaths of dozens of Lebanese civilians.”

On whether this resolution is still viable, Mitri noted that the true intentions of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government are unclear.

“The Americans are warning Netanyahu against a ground invasion, but he claims he only wants limited operations to target Hezbollah, which is uncertain,” he remarked.

He also highlighted contradictory signals, such as when the Americans and French presented their proposal for a ceasefire, Israel resorted to a rapid escalation in Lebanon.

Mitri expressed concerns based on previous Israeli experiences, saying: “In 2006, Israel claimed its operations in Lebanon aimed to strike Hezbollah, but they destroyed Lebanon, and today they are applying the same scenario, even though they have avoided targeting Beirut’s international airport and refrained from destroying bridges.”

He emphasized Lebanon’s role in opening a diplomatic window, stating that the country has no choice but to implement resolution 1701 and be prepared to send the army to the South.

“Israel knows the Lebanese government is weak, and if it obtains a commitment from Lebanon to implement the resolution, it will demand even more,” he stated.

Although many believe that resolution 1701 is no longer the valid international course to end the current war in Lebanon, Mitri ruled out the possibility of the Security Council issuing an alternative resolution.

He argued that the Security Council may renew the call for its implementation with some rewording and a new preamble.

He also explained that the international institution is paralyzed, with the US and Russian vetoes preventing any alternative decision.

“If Israel makes military advances, it will close the door to a diplomatic solution. However, if Hezbollah manages to withstand Israeli intervention, it could open the door for political solutions,” the former minister concluded.