Syria’s al-Sharaa Under Trump’s Spotlight, Admiring ‘Strong’ Leaders

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
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Syria’s al-Sharaa Under Trump’s Spotlight, Admiring ‘Strong’ Leaders

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)

A hundred days after Ahmed al-Sharaa was sworn in as Syria’s president, US officials are still proceeding with caution regarding his administration. There are concerns about the potential for chaos, which could create fertile ground for extremist groups and allow Iran to maintain its foothold in the country.

Additionally, there are growing anxieties over Türkiye’s expanding influence across Syria and its implications for Israel.

These points were highlighted in discussions with Robert Wood, a former US ambassador who held various positions at the State Department and served at the US Mission to the United Nations; Robert Ford, former US ambassador to Syria; Henri Barkey, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and former government official; and Ayman Abdel Nour, a Syrian-American political analyst and journalist.

While caution is urged in evaluating al-Sharaa’s leadership, it remains unclear whether his actions will translate into meaningful governance.

According to Wood, the current situation in Syria can be described as highly complex, especially considering recent violence, and experts are watching closely to see how al-Sharaa navigates these challenges. While his hosting of a national unity conference has drawn some positive attention, concerns remain about the broader implications of his leadership.

Ford shares a similar perspective, acknowledging that Shara's actions often align with what one would expect from a head of state. Notably, his agreement with Mazloum Abdi, leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is seen as a potential step toward greater internal stability, provided it is properly implemented.

However, Barkey emphasizes that Abdi controls a much larger force than other groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which likely made it necessary for al-Sharaa to strike a deal with him. If Abdi forms alliances with other minority groups, such as the Druze, he could become a key figure of opposition to al-Sharaa’s rule. Additionally, al-Sharaa faces the challenge of reducing his reliance on Turkish support, while also proving his ability to act independently on the international stage.

US diplomats, however, remained cautious about al-Sharaa's leadership, with some expressing skepticism about his ability to lead effectively. While he appears to be acting presidentially, concerns persist regarding his control over extremist factions within his government, as well as recent security violations in Latakia and Tartus. Experts note that despite his ascent to power, Sharaa has yet to unite the country, with some pointing to the collapse of the regime’s military as a key factor in his rise.

A significant point of criticism from Barkey is al-Sharaa’s appointment of former jihadists as governors in key areas, including Latakia and Tartus, as well as his reliance on family members and loyalists within his government.

While some US officials argue that Sharaa’s government may not be directly involved in recent incidents, uncertainty remains about who in his administration might be complicit.

For his part, Abdel Nour highlights a shift in public perception of al-Sharaa since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024.

Initially, Syrians—including Alawites—were relieved by Assad's ousting, but nearly 100 days into Sharaa's presidency, tensions have risen due to discrepancies between al-Sharaa’s rhetoric and the reality on the ground, particularly in relation to key figures like Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani and mid-level officials.

Key Questions Raised on Accountability and Rule of Law

Ford echoed concerns about al-Sharaa’s ability to address critical issues, including accountability and the rule of law, especially following the unrest in Latakia and Tartus.

Despite al-Sharaa’s formation of a committee to investigate the incidents, Ford questions whether those responsible for violations will be held publicly accountable, stressing that such actions are crucial for maintaining trust within security forces and the broader public.

Wood acknowledged the significance of al-Sharaa’s national unity conference yet remains deeply concerned about the potential agreements Sharaa may strike with the SDF. While he sees positive signs, he underscores the importance of thorough investigations into recent killings, as the identities of those responsible remain unclear.

US Perspectives on al-Sharaa’s Leadership

Abdel Nour describes two prevalent perspectives in Washington regarding al-Sharaa’s leadership. One, held by military and security figures with experience in Iraq, doubts that the new Syrian leadership will bring significant change, regardless of its outward appearance. The other viewpoint suggests giving al-Sharaa several months to adjust to the new reality.

Fears Over ISIS Prisoners and Regional Stability

A significant concern raised by Wood is the potential release of approximately 9,500 ISIS fighters currently held in over 20 prisons across Syria, should Sharaa reach a deal with the SDF. These fighters could pose a serious security threat not only to Syria but to Iraq and the broader region.

Ford added that al-Sharaa’s past, particularly his involvement with jihadist factions like Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, raises questions about his true political motivations. Ford wonders whether al-Sharaa used these groups for political leverage.

Iran’s Influence and Regional Dynamics

Both Wood and Ford emphasize the importance of monitoring Iran’s role in Syria. Ford warns that further instability could provide Iran with opportunities to rebuild its influence in certain Syrian communities, which he believes would not align with US national security interests.

Wood stresses that neighboring countries, including Israel and Türkiye, have a strong interest in a unified Syria to avoid further regional instability.

Professor Barkey cautions that while Iran's influence in Syria has not been eliminated, Tehran will likely continue to pursue ways to reassert its presence.

Türkiye-Israel Tensions and the Future of Syria

Concerns over a potential Turkish-Israeli confrontation in Syria are growing. Ford points out that Türkiye, a key player with growing ties to al-Sharaa’s government, could play a significant role in Syria’s future. He worries that a direct conflict between Turkish and Israeli forces, potentially involving airstrikes or proxy engagements, could escalate tensions in the region.

However, Barkey believes that such a scenario is unlikely to escalate into direct military confrontation. Instead, he suggests that the Turkish-Israeli rivalry will remain largely political, with both countries focusing on strategic interests in the region, particularly in Syria’s south where Israel is concerned about the resurgence of Hezbollah or other new actors.

In discussions surrounding Syria’s new constitution, Ford sees little value in UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and the Constitutional Committee led by UN Special Envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen. Similarly, Barkey shares Ford’s skepticism, noting that he sees limited potential for the UN to bring about meaningful change unless Arab countries step in with support.

Barkey also echoes the view held by many that US President Donald Trump was unpredictable in his decision-making. He added that Trump had a deep admiration, though not fascination, for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, viewing him as one of the “strongmen” capable of shaping the future of their countries as they see fit.

Looking ahead, Barkey remains uncertain about Syria’s future, acknowledging that the situation is highly unpredictable. He suggests that if Syria were to experience another war or a severe collapse of law and order, it is highly probable that ISIS could resurge.

The US government, Barkey speculates, is likely deeply concerned that without American forces acting as a buffer or deterrent, the stability of the region could be further jeopardized in the event of a breakdown in Syria.



Official Contacts Aim to Keep Lebanon out of War on Iran as Israel Raises Readiness on Northern Front 

This photograph shows a memorial for slain Lebanese Hezbollah longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah at the entrance of the southern village of Qannarit on February 16, 2026. (AFP)
This photograph shows a memorial for slain Lebanese Hezbollah longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah at the entrance of the southern village of Qannarit on February 16, 2026. (AFP)
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Official Contacts Aim to Keep Lebanon out of War on Iran as Israel Raises Readiness on Northern Front 

This photograph shows a memorial for slain Lebanese Hezbollah longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah at the entrance of the southern village of Qannarit on February 16, 2026. (AFP)
This photograph shows a memorial for slain Lebanese Hezbollah longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah at the entrance of the southern village of Qannarit on February 16, 2026. (AFP)

Israel has raised the alert level of its military along the border with Lebanon, raising questions that Lebanon’s south may again be involved in a regional confrontation should the US attack Iran.

Given the heightened tensions between the US and Iran, questions have been asked over whether Hezbollah will become involved in a new war. Its Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem had recently announced that the party will not remain on the side if Iran is attacked.

On the ground, Israel blew up houses in southern Lebanon border towns and carried out air strikes in the south. Israeli military spokesman Avichay Adraee said the raids targeted “Hezbollah infrastructure,” including arms caches and rocket launchers.

Their presence in the south is a violation of current agreements, he added.

Amid the high regional tensions, Israel’s Maariv quoted a military source as saying that the army has come up with plans, including a preemptive strike against Hezbollah, which would drag the south and the whole of Lebanon into a new war.

Ministerial sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the presidency has been carrying out internal and foreign contacts since Thursday morning to keep Lebanon out of any escalation.

Hezbollah had launched a “support front” war against Israel a day after Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack. In 2024, the war spiraled into an all-out conflict, with Israel decimating the Hezbollah leadership and severely weakening the party.

Israel believes that Hezbollah has been rebuilding its capabilities since the ceasefire that was struck in November 2024.

Kassim Kassir, a political analyst who is close to Hezbollah, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “No one knows what Hezbollah will do because the situation is tied the extent of the attack, should it happen.”

He noted that Qassem was ambiguous when he said the party will decide what to do when the time is right, but at any rate, he stressed that the party will not remain on the sidelines or abandon Iran.

“No one knows what Hezbollah’s abilities are, so everything is possible,” Kassir said.

Riad Kahwaji, a security and defense affairs expert, said he does not rule out the possibility that Hezbollah would join the war should the US attack Iran.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, he stressed that Iran is now the United States’ main target, when previously it used to confront its proxies.

It has now taken the fight directly to the heart of the problem, which is the Iranian regime, he remarked.

The extent of the military mobilization in the region and the frequent American statements about regime change all indicate that a major military operation may be imminent, he added.

Israel’s military also favors preemptive operations, so it is watching Hezbollah, which remains Iran’s most powerful regional proxy despite the blows it received in 2024 war, Kahwaji said.

Hezbollah still possesses a rocket arsenal that can threaten Israel, he remarked.

Israel’s high level of alert on the border with Lebanon could be in readiness for any development. Should Tel Aviv receive word from Washington that it intends to attack Iran, then it could launch operations against Hezbollah as part of preemptive strikes aimed at preventing the party from launching attacks against it, Kahwaji said.

“As long as Hezbollah possesses heavy weapons, such as rockets, and drones, that it has not handed over to the army, then Lebanon will continue to be vulnerable to attacks in the next confrontation. It will be exposed to Israeli strikes as long as this issue remains unresolved,” he added.


Israel Keen to Attack Iran’s Regional Proxies before they Can Join the War

Two Israeli soldiers launch a drone. (Israeli Army)
Two Israeli soldiers launch a drone. (Israeli Army)
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Israel Keen to Attack Iran’s Regional Proxies before they Can Join the War

Two Israeli soldiers launch a drone. (Israeli Army)
Two Israeli soldiers launch a drone. (Israeli Army)

The Israeli army is preparing to carry out “massive and unprecedented” strikes against groups backed by Iran, including the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and armed factions in Iraq, should they join a potential war in the region, revealed Israeli military sources.

Iran is applying great pressure on these groups to take part in any upcoming conflict because the regime in Tehran concluded that their staying on the sidelines during the 12-day June war in 2025 was a strategic error, the sources said according to Israeli estimates.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had on Thursday warned Iran that his country is making its own preparations for possible Iranian missile strikes in response to any US action.

“We are prepared for any scenario,” he said, adding that if Iran attacks Israel, “they will experience a response they cannot even imagine.”

A military source said the Houthis pose a “direct threat not just to Israel, but to the whole world.” He accused the Houthis of impeding international trade in the Red Sea.

Even though the Houthis are not firing at all ships, they are still a threat to everyone, added the source. The militants are producing weapons and possess advanced technology, he warned, comparing them to a “dangerous ticking timebomb that must be swiftly neutralized.”

Israeli and foreign experts revealed that Iran is providing large financial support to its allied armed groups in the region in order for them to join a war should US President Donald Trump act on his threat to strike Iran.

In 2025, Iran allotted a billion dollars to these groups so that they can carry out rocket attacks against Israel.

It remains to be seen if these groups will respond to Iran’s pressure. Israeli estimates believe that the Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq are unlikely to join a war, while Hezbollah and the Houthis are more prepared to do so.

Israel has turned to mediators to warn these parties that any attack against it will be met with a “massive and unprecedented response.”

In Lebanon, the sources said that the military operations Israel is carrying out against Hezbollah and other armed groups are aimed at undermining the party’s efforts to bolster its combat abilities.

They acknowledged, however, that the Israeli military establishment senses that Hezbollah is rebuilding its capabilities at a faster pace than Israel’s operations at reining it in.

The Houthis, meanwhile, have a relatively greater margin of independence, but they are always ready to take part in any regional war to shift attention away from the situation inside Yemen, said Israeli estimates.

The Houthis are receiving Iranian funds to boost their military capabilities and produce more weapons. They also continue to smuggle weapons to Hamas in Gaza. Israel also accuses them of extorting several countries, whereby they pledge not to attack their ships in exchange for money.

The Houthis are ultimately fully supportive of Iran’s goals despite the blows they have been dealt by Israel. The Houthis are suffering from a drop in combat abilities. The pace of their training of fighters has also dropped, while their airports have been damaged in Israeli attacks and the Houthis are facing difficulties in rebuilding them.

Despite the losses, the Houthis are still a threat. They possess heavy long-range missiles and drones and still have the ability to shut Israel’s southern Eilat port.


Iraqi Confusion Over Allegations of US Warning of Sanctions

The Coordination Framework faces a dilemma after nominating Nouri al-Maliki for Prime Minister (INA)
The Coordination Framework faces a dilemma after nominating Nouri al-Maliki for Prime Minister (INA)
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Iraqi Confusion Over Allegations of US Warning of Sanctions

The Coordination Framework faces a dilemma after nominating Nouri al-Maliki for Prime Minister (INA)
The Coordination Framework faces a dilemma after nominating Nouri al-Maliki for Prime Minister (INA)

Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein said that the authorities have received an oral message from Washington, “clearing and explicitly” hinting at possible sanctions if former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki was named to head the new government.

The Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement on Thursday that Hussein, who also serves as Deputy Prime Minister, had discussed in a televised interview the nature of cooperation and joint work with the US, particularly with regard to the formation of the upcoming government, without addressing the threat of sanctions, which led to “confusion in media coverage.”

The ministry stated that the US message included two main points. The first referred to the possibility of imposing sanctions on “certain individuals and institutions” if the largest bloc in parliament held onto its current nominee for the PM’s post, while the second addressed the standards for joint cooperation, mainly the nature of the upcoming government.

The ministry’s clarifications come amid increasing US warnings against selecting al-Maliki to head the government. The US State Department affirmed that Washington’s position is “firm and resolute,” and that his selection would force Washington to reassess its relationship with Iraq.

The Coordination Framework, which includes ruling Shiite parties, is divided over al-Maliki’s nomination, and attempts are being made to persuade him to withdraw his candidacy to preserve the unity of the alliance.

The Sunni Sovereignty Alliance, led by Khamis al-Khanjar, expects al-Maliki to take the initiative to withdraw his nomination to spare the country economic sanctions.

Fahd al-Rashed, a senior figure in the Sunni alliance, told Shafaq News that al-Maliki is expected to step aside given “his concern for the country’s interests.”

“We have no objection to al-Maliki personally,” al-Rashed added, “but we fear the repercussions of US reservations over the candidate, including threats of economic sanctions.”